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Preface 
 
 
 
At the threshold of this book a few remarks concerning its origin and 
nature might be helpful to clarify its intention and thus prevent mis-
understandings in this respect. 
In 2006 Jörn Rüsen, the president at that time of the Kulturwissen-
schaftliches Institut (KWI) in Essen, launched an interdisciplinary project 
under the title “Humanism in an era of globalisation – an intercultural dia-
logue on culture, humanity and values”.1 This project was never intended to 
provide a defence for a number of pre-established theses concerning hu-
manism; in fact, it explicitly re-examined the viability of traditional West-
ern and other humanisms and involved itself in the quest to overcome their 
defects. For this purpose, the project included a thorough revision of the 
entire dossier on the historical debates concerning humanism as support for 
an inter-cultural reflection on the orientation of people’s action – wherever 
they may be interacting in this globalising world. Consequently an exami-
nation of the long history of the criticism of humanism formed an integral 
part of the project.2  
It is within this framework that I was requested to contribute a mono-
graph to the project in order to clarify Levinas’ position on humanism. I 
acquit myself of this task in Part 2 of the book. The aim of this reading of 
Levinas is, in accordance with the spirit of the project, neither to demon-
strate Levinas’ fidelity to a particular idea of humanism, nor to provide an 
apology for Levinas’ philosophy, but to propose a balanced interpretation 
of what Levinas understands by the “humanism of the other (human)”. 
The title chosen for my book testifies to the very favourable impression 
                                           
1 At the time of the finalisation of this book the project description was accessible in 
http://www.kwi-humanismus.de/en/k3.Humanismusprojekt.htm. 
2 See also the Foreword to Shaping a human world – Civilizations, Axial Times, 
Modernities, Humanisms, ed. by Oliver Kozlarek, Jörn Rüsen and Ernst Wolff. 
Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011. 
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that the global dimension of the KWI project has made on me; its forma-
tive influence on the entire content will be evident. 
As readers of Levinas know, the central tenets of his humanism of the 
other are similar to those found elsewhere in his philosophy. For this reason, a 
number of remarks are warranted about the manner in which this reading of 
the humanism of the other will be submitted to criticism and embedded in the 
larger design of the present book. Given the critical position that I defended in 
De l’éthique à la justice3 with respect to both Levinas’ philosophy of the sig-
nification of alterity and his idea of political justice that is rooted in it, no obvi-
ous way forward in reading Levinas presented itself to me. Levinas is a great 
philosopher – one cannot easily dismiss his work, nor can one simply step into 
it with a few corrections. Consequently, the present study serves the purpose 
of looking for a way of engaging with Levinas after the criticism of his phi-
losophy formulated in my above-mentioned book. The reader will therefore 
find in these pages an attempt, an essay, or an exploration in thinking “after 
Levinas”, rather than an introduction to his work.4 Such an undertaking re-
quires a lot of preparatory exegetical work. Since parts of the relevant work in 
this regard can be found in De l’éthique à la justice, I shall, where necessary, 
refer to, summarise or reformulate the argument, as required in each case. As 
response to my earlier book, the present book presents the next step in my re-
flection on Levinas and on those matters which concerned him.  
This is then the meaning of the “after Levinas” in the subtitle of the 
book. I have purposely chosen the word “after” for its ambiguity. When it 
is said that somebody is after money, it means that that person pursues 
money, just like when somebody runs after someone else. In this sense I 
follow Levinas, since, despite my criticism, there are a number of key as-
pects of his philosophy that I do consider worthy of following (an exposition 
of these aspects will be given in Chapter 6, §3). But because of the seri-
ousness of my earlier criticism of Levinas, something essential to his work 
has to be left behind and in this other sense that which is undertaken in this 
book is reflection after Levinas. The title of the book represents both of 
these two meanings: on the one hand, this study is Levinasian in the central 
position it accords to the notion of responsibility; on the other hand, the 
span, the means, the conditions and the beneficiary of this responsibility – 
all indicated by the phrase “globalised world” – represent my concern to 
pursue thought on responsibility in a different way to that of Levinas.  
                                           
3 De l’éthique à la justice. Langage et politique dans la philosophie de Lévinas 
(Phaenomenologica 183). Dortrecht: Springer, 2007; henceforth De l’éthique à la 
justice. 
4 This does not exclude the fact that I have tried to present especially the Part on 
humanism in such a manner as to give access to Levinas’ thought for the non 
initiated. 
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The adjective “political” in the title indicates that I delimit my reflection, 
as far as is practical, to the question of the political implications of Levinas’ 
philosophy and assign a relatively minor position to the issue of signification 
and the debate about ontology and ethicity. However, I definitely do not 
intend to indicate by “political responsibility” an exploration on the duties 
of political office bearers, which was the earliest sense in which the word 
responsibility was used. “Political”, as used in the title, doesn’t refer to the 
particular social sphere of politics, but rather, in accordance with Levinas’ 
own use of the term, is used to designate the dimension of action with and to-
ward the plurality of others. Political responsibility refers here to responsi-
bility as it is integrated into the political, and thus has consequences for is-
sues like power, strategy, and institutions in politics, but also elsewhere. In 
fact, Chapter 1 is devoted to advocating that for Levinas already the adjective 
“political” is always attributed “pleonastically”, as it were, to responsibility, 
and to placing this conviction in the centre of my interpretational strategy for 
this book. If I then retain the pleonastic doubling of “responsibility” by “po-
litical” in the title, it is exactly to insist on this perspective that I adopt on Levi-
nas’ work and that will remain the direction in which I shall attempt to think 
“after Levinas”. The book is intended for specialists of Levinas and phe-
nomenology, however scholars of the ethics of responsibility, of post-colonial 
studies and of the issues engaged with in the humanism/anti-humanism de-
bate, as well as readers of political thought in Weber, Apel and Ricoeur, will 
hopefully find the book useful too. 
A number of people who have discussed this project with me while the 
manuscript was in preparation deserve special mention: Olivier Abel, Jeffrey 
Barash, Rodolphe Calin, Michel Deguy, Maria Dimitrova, Alfred Hirsh and 
Jörn Rüsen. While thanking them cordially for their input, I need to excul-
pate them in the same breath from any complicity in the creation of the 
insufficiencies that the reader will probably find in the text. 
I would like to thank three institutions and three persons for their practi-
cal support in creating and providing favourable circumstances in which to 
prepare this manuscript: the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut in Essen, 
where Jörn Rüsen hosted me as visiting fellow in the autumn of 2009, the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, where Olivier Abel 
received me as visiting researcher in the spring of 2010 and the University 
of Pretoria, to which I am affiliated and in particular my former head of 
department, Deon Rossouw. 
My thanks are also extended to Izan Zybrands, Fritz Wolff, Pam Apps, as 
well as to Angelika Wulff, Martin Hanke and Birgit Klöpfer who have been 
helpful in different ways in the prepartation and publication of the book. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Doing justice to responsibility: 
The primordial political nature  
of Levinas’ philosophy 
 
 
 
1 ORIENTATION:  
LEVINAS AS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER 
Emmanuel Levinas today enjoys wide recognition as one of the most 
original and important thinkers of the Western philosophical tradition on 
the ethical. Through the changes in his manner of thought over the six 
decades during which he wrote, developed his central concern, namely 
to argue that, and show how, we are not duped by ethics, rather, it is the 
ethical that sets the tone for our entire human existence. The best-known 
analysis that evokes the core of Levinas’ work, and that could be consid-
ered his philosophical signature, is the idea of the face of the other, by 
which the self is affected in a sui generis manner, namely ethically. 
By far the largest part of his philosophical work is devoted to the 
question of the self and the other, to the vis-à-vis, to the for-the-other. 
That being the case, when one writes about Levinas, one has to write 
about this, and the present book is no exception in this regard. However, 
as justified and as common as this perspective on Levinas’ work might 
be, it is of crucial importance to see how Levinas relativises the place of 
the face-to-face, of the intimate ethical relation to the single other, by the 
relation to the third, i.e. to the plurality of others. In other words, one has 
to see that the reflections on the ethical find their place within reflection 
on the political.  
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The political importance and even the intrinsic political nature of 
Levinas’ thought have not always been recognised. That this is the case 
is to a certain extent Levinas’ own doing and to some degree due to 
good reasons. Is his point not after all that it is hopeless to start contem-
plating the political if the essence of the ethical has not been deter-
mined? And since it is already an enormously ambitious project to de-
termine the meaning of the ethical, most of Levinas’ attention by far is 
devoted to it. The dominance of the analyses of the relation between self 
and the single other should not mislead us though:  
“[t]here are always at least three people. […] As soon as there are three people, 
the ethical relation to the other becomes political”,1  
says Levinas, and this will be the recurrent theme throughout this book. 
The tension between the ethical and the political in Levinas’ philosophy 
is betrayed by the contradiction between the two adverbs “always” (tou-
jours) and “as soon as” (dès que) in this citation: the political introduces 
something new to a relation that exists before it … but there is no before, 
since the plurality of others was always there and thus the relation to the 
other had always been political.2 And this is exactly where the concern of 
the current book is situated. My entire reading of, and dialogue with, 
Levinas is guided by the conviction of the crucial place of the political in 
his thought. 
Having stated the general orientation of this study, the place of the 
political in Levinas’ thought has to be traced more clearly in order to 
justify the political perspective with reference to Levinas’ argument and 
with respect to his work on the ethical.3 
                                           
1 “Ethics of the infinite”, in Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers. The 
phenomenological heritage. Richard Kearney. Manchester: Manchester Universi-
ty Press, 1984, pp. 49–69 / “Il y a toujours au moins trois personnes. […] Dès 
qu’il y a trois personnes, la relation éthique à l’autre devient politique” in “De la 
phénoménologie à l’éthique”, in Esprit 234, 1997, pp. 121–140, citation, p. 129 
(my emphasis, translation modified). 
2 See De l’éthique à la justice 338–344. This idea will be developed below, as well 
as in Chapter 6 (§ 2) and Chapter 7. 
3 In the entire book, the emphasis of the exploration of Levinas’ political thought 
will be on his later work. This is justified to a certain extent by the fact that the lar-
ger part of the themes explored in this book is situated in Levinas’ later works (of 
these themes the exegesis of the humanism of Humanism of the other in Chapter 5 
takes a central place). Furthermore, the central issue of the third is simply not well 
developed in Levinas’ earlier work. Finally, the exploratory nature of the argu-
ment that I present in this book serves as further justification for this strategy. This 
choice for the later philosophy is not principled and therefore, in subsequent 
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2 “THERE ARE ALWAYS AT LEAST THREE…”:  
URGENCY AND PRIMACY  
OF THE POLITICAL RELATION4  
One of the most articulate expressions of the intention and ambition that 
Levinas had for his philosophy is to be found in the essay Ethics as first 
philosophy and this intention again clearly situates his work with respect 
to the tradition of Western philosophy:  
“In this essay we wish to ask whether thought understood as knowledge, since the 
ontology of first philosophy, exhausts the possibilities of the meaning of thought 
and whether, beyond knowledge and its hold on being, there doesn’t emerge a 
more urgent wisdom [une sagesse plus urgente].”5 
In opposing these two possibilities the aim is not to replace the tradition of 
philosophy (or ontology) with the more urgent wisdom that Levinas pro-
poses, but to relativise the former by reference to the latter. If the Western 
tradition of philosophy is not to be abandoned, what then, in Levinas’ mind, 
motivates the quest for a new philosophy, and even a different kind of first 
philosophy? What is it that makes Levinas’ first philosophy a “more urgent 
wisdom”? The particularity of Levinas’ notion of a first philosophy, and the 
justification for his claim to its urgency, resides in what it identifies as the 
first question of philosophy. This first question is not  
“‘[w]hy being rather than nothing?’, but how being can be justified [or justify itself]?”6 
As is well known, this question, according to Levinas, is not one of mere 
curiosity or even of methodological rigour, it is a question of one’s own 
life7 and of its justification:  
                                           
elaborations of the current study, Levinas’ earlier philosophy will have to be ac-
corded its rightful place. 
4  What follows here (§2) is the first part of the essay announced in De l’éthique à 
la justice 372 as forthcoming under the title “The ambiguous meaning of politics 
in Levinas.” The second half is to be found in §§ 2.1 and 2.2 of Chapter 6. 
5 LR 78 / EPP 77, translation modified. 
6 LR 86 / EPP 109, translation modified. 
7 This is also what Husserl, in a text on responsibility and first philosophy, claims 
for his own version of first philosophy: “we realize that such a philosophy could 
be no theoretical hobby of humanity, that a philosophical life should rather be un-
derstood as a life out of absolute self-responsibility: the personal single subject, as 
subject of personal life, wants in its entire life, in all of its praxis to make up its 
mind genuinely freely, that is that it can at any time justify the right of its decision 
for itself.”, “Meditation über die Idee eines individuellen und Gemeinschaftsle-
bens in absoluter Selbstverantwortung”, in Edmund Husserl, Erste Philosophie 
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“One has to respond to one’s right to be, not by referring to some abstraction and 
anonymous law, or judicial entity, but in fear for the others […] as if I had to answer 
for the other’s death even before I had to be.”8  
More explicitly then, the death or the vulnerability of the other in gen-
eral, imposes the question that sets first philosophy in motion. 
It is for this reason that the phenomenon of tyranny represents a major 
point of orientation in Levinas’ work. Tyranny is not only indicative of the 
extremes of violence to which people may be subjected, it is also the con-
dition in which people are most at risk of being incapacitated to respond for 
their own being by answering for the fragile being, mortality and death of 
others. As such, tyranny could be considered the culmination of everything 
against which Levinas developed his thought and one could perhaps say, as 
he said of Plato, that his philosophy is “as it were obsessed by the threat of 
tyranny”.9 This political obsession drives first philosophy. It is because of the 
threat of tyranny and a myriad of other forms of violence that “may well 
have to be challenged according to the criterion of our ethical responsibility 
to the other” that “ethical philosophy should remain first philosophy”, as 
Levinas explains in a remark that will retain our attention later.10 
Thinking radically, Levinas’ opposition to tyranny does not limit itself 
to an opposition to historical instances of political oppression, dictatorship, 
totalitarianism and genocide – of which, alas, it is not difficult to list exam-
ples. Rather, “politics left to itself bears a tyranny in itself”,11 that is to say, 
“the element of violence in the State, in the hierarchy, appears even when 
the hierarchy functions perfectly”12 or again, the finality of justice behind 
the institution of the State is “soon unrecognized in the deviations imposed 
by the practicalities of the state”.13 It follows naturally from this conviction 
                                           
(1923/1924), Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion, Husserl 
Gesammelte Werke Band VIII. Rudolf Boehm (ed.). Haag: Martinus Nijhof, 
1959, pp. 193–202 (citation, p. 197). 
 That Levinas’ notion of first philosophy shares much more with the Husserlian 
notion thereof than with the Aristotelian first philosophy has at least been indicated 
in Jean Greisch’s and Jacques Rolland’s “Présentation” to the volume Emmanuel 
Lévinas. L’éthique comme philosophie première. Paris: Cerf, 1993, pp. 7–10, of 
which they were the editors, and later by Jacques Rolland in “L’humain dans 
l’homme. Quelques notes”, in Esprit 234, 1997, pp. 111–120, in particular p. 115. 
8 LR 82, 83 / EPP 93, 98, translation modified. 
9 CPP 16 / LC 36. 
10 “De la phénoménologie à l’éthique”, op. cit. p. 137 (my translation) / “Ethics of 
the infinite”, op. cit. p. 66. See Chapter 6, § 2.2. 
11 T&I 300 / TI 334–335. 
12 BPW 23 / LC 97. 
13 OS 123 / HS 167. 
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that Levinas’ philosophy should be characterised by a profound interest in 
politics, at the very least in politics as problem. In fact, it would not be 
exaggerated to claim that behind the description of the essential nature of 
politics in these citations also lies an implicit reference to that which urged 
their author to reflect on it: he who writes that “politics left to itself, carries 
in itself a tyranny”, does not want to leave politics to its own devices, does 
not want politics to function perfectly according to its own inherent logic, 
and cannot accept that justice is traded for mere practical expediency. Ethics 
as first philosophy can only be called “urgent”, if this driving intention of 
it is borne in mind. 
But what does it mean not to leave politics to its own devices by 
writing philosophy? In order to answer this question one needs to inspect 
Levinas’ strategy for speaking about the political. This will be done in 
two parts: arguing, first, that on the most profound level politics is con-
stituted by the non-ontological meaning, that is, by ethics; and second, 
that ethics necessarily passes into politics, or in fact, that ethics has al-
ways already passed into politics.  
2.1 The constitution of political meaning 
In order not to leave politics to itself, Levinas tackles this problem at the 
most basic level known to him, namely that of meaning. Two completely 
different sources are identified: phenomenology or ontology and ethics.14  
Firstly, as Levinas summarises the most important lesson he learned 
from Sein und Zeit, the whole human being is ontology:15 with my whole 
existence I am a logos about Being, because I am the ontological difference. 
Levinas calls this logos the Said in his later philosophy and describes it as a 
conatus in suo esse perseverandi, the exertion to persevere in one’s own 
being (Spinoza). If this is all there is to being human and to meaning then, 
according to Levinas right from “Some reflections on the philosophy of 
                                           
14 “I would maintain, against Heidegger, that philosophy can be ethical as well as 
ontological, can be at once Greek and non-Greek in its inspiration. These two 
sources of inspiration coexist as two different tendencies in modern philosophy 
and it is my own personal task to identify this dual origin of meaning – der Ur-
sprung des Sinnhaften – in the interhuman relationship.” “Ethics of the infinite”, 
op. cit. p. 57 / “De la phénoménologie à l’éthique”, op. cit. p. 129. Similarly GDT 
126f / DMT 143f, formulated closely to OB xlii / AE X. 
15 “The whole human being is ontology.” (ENT 2, translation modified) / “Tout 
l’homme est ontologie.” (EN 13). In Levinas’ adoption of the notion of “first phi-
losophy” one should probably see a continuation of the polemics with Heidegger 
as summarised by the question of the famous article “Is ontology fundamental?”.  
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Hitlerism” (1934),16 there is no escaping the fire of war burning always in 
Being itself:17 the being that is characterised by the fact that he/she belongs 
to Being (what Heidegger calls mineness, Jemeinigkeit) would be a warrior. 
This is the first, the ontological, source of meaning. 
But, secondly, Levinas learned a perspective on reality from Husserl in 
which one’s natural attitude is suspended in order to gain an understanding 
of the originary phenomena that constitute meaning behind the subject’s 
back and that could be thematised only later in reflection.18 In Levinas’ later 
philosophy, reduction leads (re-ducere) the Said back to its constituting Say-
ing, which is the second source of meaning, namely the ethical. Just as in the 
study of the pragmatics of language, but here with a completely different 
import, the Saying belongs to the Said: the Saying is the Saying of a Said, 
but the significance of the Saying exceeds that of what is Said – by being 
directed at someone, by being a Said for someone. One could rephrase this 
idea in more ontological terms: the being that I am has a significance that 
exceeds that which can be attributed to its always understanding Being, al-
ways being ontology, always being Said – and this by being for the other.  
Emblematic of these two sources of meaning – of the ethical differ-
ence between the Saying and the Said with which the Saying associated – 
is the phenomenon of ageing:19 the more I persevere in my existence, the 
more I lose my life; the conatus cannot be dissociated from a passivity of 
which I am not in any sense the agent. Levinas analyses this passivity as 
the proximity of the other. In proximity, my exposition to the other is a 
giving of myself to the other, to the point of substituting myself for the 
other. I am being made a sign for the other.20 This sign is the testimony, 
that I give to the other, of being absolutely under the influence of the other, 
in the sense of having the totality of my being directed to the other.21 The 
sign that I am as given to the other, the Saying of the Said that I am, is a 
kind of meaning that is not ontological, and Levinas wagers that it can thus 
only be an ethical meaning, namely my election or assignation to be re-
                                           
16 IH 23–33. 
17 T&I 21 / TI 5. 
18 DEHH 131, OB 20 / AE 38–39. Cf. also OB 53 / AE 91: “The movement back to 
the Saying is the phenomenological Reduction, in which the indescribable is de-
scribed.” (translation modified).  
19 Cf. OB 59–94 / AE 86–94. The discussion of ageing will be resumed and ex-
panded in Chapter 5, § 3. 
20 Cf. OB 49 / AE 83, GDT 198–199 / DMT 231–232 and the exposition of the 
theme in De l’éthique à la justice 257–259. 
21 GCM 74 / DVI 121–122. 
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sponsible for the other.22 The passivity of losing or ceding my life for the 
other is so decisive that I can only react to it, or respond to it, and this in 
the ethical sense, namely to take responsibility for it.  
It is of the greatest importance to underline the most salient characteris-
tics of this responsibility as presented by Levinas. (1) My life is the “ethical 
difference” (cf. ageing), the difference between the Saying and the Said and 
this difference marks an absolute asymmetry between myself and the other. 
This asymmetry consists of owing the other my devotion, or rather responsi-
bility, without there being any contract that establishes this obligation; this 
obligation precedes all contracts, agreements or legal status between people. 
(2) This responsibility is an infinite imperative – the more I answer the other, 
the more I obey the originary imperative, the more I still have to do so. I owe 
the other everything. (3) This imperative has no content. The injunction 
“thou shalt not kill” by which Levinas often designates this imperative, is to 
be interpreted as just a formal absolute imperative not to infringe on the mor-
tality of the other,23 not to act in such a way as to reduce the other to mere 
being, but to give yourself for the other. The Saying remains unsayable or 
unspeakable (indicible).24 (4) This responsibility is the principle of hetero-
nomy. I am the assigned or elected one or the hostage of the others’ impera-
tive. (5) In the face of this imperative nobody can answer for the other in my 
place. Responsibility radically singularises the subject. 
All of this comes to the fore under reduction. Most of Levinas’ philo-
sophical effort goes into pointing out and reflecting on the Saying, arguing 
that we are not duped by it. However, there is never a question of a Saying 
which is not a Saying of a Said. The subject might be passively constituted 
by its exposition to the other, but he/she lives in an ontological world. The 
Saying has meaning only as Saying of a Said. 
2.2 Politics: the indispensable translation  
of the Saying to the Said 
There is continuity between the unspeakable Saying and the Said of 
which it is the Saying. But the Saying goes beyond the Said and the Said 
                                           
22 OB 47 / AE 80: “saying is to respond to another” (in italics in the text). 
23 The face is sometimes defined by the non-phenomenalisable mortality of the other: 
“This discovery of his/her death [the death of the other – EW], or this hearing of 
his/her appeal, I call the face of the other”, in Racismes. L’autre et son visage. 
Grands entretiens réalisés par Emmanuel Hirsch. Paris: Cerf, 1988, citation p. 94. 
24 OB 7 / AE 19. 
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never exhausts the Saying.25 The clearest way to express Levinas’ per-
spective on the relation between the Saying and the Said is by referring 
to the pair translation/treason:  
“The correlation of the Saying and the Said, in other words the subordination of 
the Saying to the Said, to the linguistic system and to ontology is the price asked 
for its manifestation. In language as Said, everything is translated in front of us – 
albeit at the price of a treason. Language as servant and thus indispensable.”26  
Thus, there is no automatic, unproblematic transition between the two 
sources of meaning identified by Levinas. The translation of the Saying 
into a Said is always imperfect. Yet, it is this indiscreet translation of the 
unspeakable ethical imperative of Saying into the sayable, audible and 
ontological language of the Said that serves to let the ethical meaning of 
the Saying appear in the ontological world. That is why the translation is 
indispensable even if its service comes at the price of a partial treason. 
The paradigmatic situation in which Levinas identifies and describes the 
Saying or the proximity of the other, is one in which the other is alone in 
front of me. The vast majority of his texts on this issue follow the pattern of a 
subject face-to-face with one other. But this is an abstraction: life is life with 
many, also for Levinas. And it is this fact that necessitates and complicates 
the translation of the Saying into the Said. If there were just two people, I 
and the other, my responsibility would have entailed the direct, immediate 
and complete giving of myself to the other. But there are always at least 
three: I, the other and another other of the first two of us.27 I find myself in 
the proximity of a plurality of others, each of which constitutes me as subject 
beyond my ontological existence, each of which elects me to infinite respon-
sibility. What is the relation between this plurality of expositions that consti-
tute me, in the face of which I answer every time: “Here I am”? According 
to Levinas, this relation is one of contradiction:  
“The third introduces a contradiction in the Saying whose signification before the 
other until then went in one direction. This is, in itself, the limit of responsibility, 
birth of the question: What do I have to do in justice?”28  
                                           
25 OB 57 / AE 96. 
26 “La corrélation du dire et du dit, c’est-à-dire la subordination du dire au dit, au sys-
tème linguistique et à l’ontologie est le prix que demande la manifestation. Dans le 
langage comme dit, tout se traduit devant nous – fût-ce au prix d’une trahison. 
Langage ancillaire et ainsi indispensable.” (AE 17–18, my translation / OB 6). 
27 OB 157 / AE 245. 
28 OB 157 (translation modified); “Le tiers introduit une contradiction dans le Dire 
dont la signification devant l’autre allait, jusqu’alors, dans un sens unique. C’est, 
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The plurality of appeals made to me, troubles the apparent unambiguity 
of the ethical imperative and creates the question in me: who comes before 
whom and how? Ethics now demands justice. 
The moment this question arises, consciousness is born, but always born 
as bad consciousness, as bad conscience (mauvaise conscience). The first 
“break with passivity”,29 the first moment of conatus, the commencement of 
the Said, of the ontological difference, the Da of Dasein, is that question 
concerning the thirds: who comes before whom? This is the question of 
justice and in the mindset of Levinas the birth of politics. Hence the decisive 
remark by Levinas (cited above):  
“There are always at least three people. […] As soon as there are three people, 
the ethical relation to the other becomes political and enters into the totalizing 
discourse of ontology.”30  
This conclusion summarises the vital point that the Levinasian subject, 
always faced with the plurality of ethical others, is constituted as a politi-
cal subject, as a subject whose being consists of having to translate (at the 
risk of treason) ethics in the world of ontology, that is the world of politi-
cal co-existence. In other words, there is no aspect of the existence of the 
Levinasian subject that is not always confronted by the question about and 
the obligation to realise justice, because the subject is always already taken 
up in the concern for the plurality of others, that is, the political concern. 
Therefore, the implication of Levinas’ philosophy of the plurality of others 
is that all responsibility has to be borne politically; “political responsibility” 
is a pleonasm. All the readings of Levinas that see in him a non-political 
philosopher miss this central point.31 
                                           
de soi, limite de la responsabilité naissance de la question: Qu’ai-je à faire avec 
justice?” (AE 245, my emphasis). 
29 OB 62 / AE 101. 
30 “Ethics of the infinite”, op.cit. pp. 49–50 / “De la phénoménologie à l’éthique”, 
op. cit. p. 129. 
31 Although Didier Frank (L’un-pour-l’autre. Levinas et la signification. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2008) exposes difficulties in the “transition” 
from ethics to justice in a way different from what I have done in De l’éthique à la 
justice (Chapter 8, § 4) or from what I am doing here, we do concur that “if the 
third looks always in the face and the eyes of others, then substitution – supposing 
that the presence of the third doesn’t make substitution inaccessible, or even com-
pletely impossible and this is exactly the entire problem – is always from the out-
set measured or weighed [mesurée]” (p. 229), where “measured” means the same 
as “entered into the calculation of justice”, i.e., the practice of politics (cf. De 
l’éthique à la justice 346–349). From this Frank derives the necessary “anteriority 
of justice” in relation to ethics (p. 240). It might be that the conclusion of an “an-
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Levinas is notoriously skimpy on what this political condition of the 
subject consists of and, as already indicated, it is the objective of the cur-
rent study to make a contribution to this issue. However, it is appropriate 
to render the most important indications given by Levinas of the changes 
that take place when the Saying is translated into the Said in the company 
of the third. (1) There is (at least, according to Levinas) a correction of the 
asymmetry between me and the other(s); the other is looked at or even de-
faced (dé-visagé),32 that means, consideration of the other is henceforth 
integrated in the ontological world. (2) Why is this asymmetry corrected? 
It happens on the basis of the mutual contradiction between the thirds. The 
State is the condition in which my infinite responsibility for the others is lim-
ited. (3) This means that instead of being immediately infinitely responsible 
for this or that particular other, I have to think, weigh, compare and measure. 
The others become brothers, citizens and I also may become an other, I may 
become important, because the actualisation of justice depends on my capac-
ity to actualise it. Thus the State is the institutionalised rendering of people’s 
answer to the question of justice: who comes before whom? (4) But no insti-
tutionalisation of any idea of justice could ever be complete. I am called to 
act as a prophet in order to call the State to greater justice, to respond to the 
other beyond the call of law. (5) This extreme justice asks of me to unsay the 
Said: firstly, the Said in the form of a currently institutionalised system of 
justice, but secondly, also the Said that I am myself, that is, to continue to 
give my life for the other up to the point of saying à-Dieu to the ontological 
world – to the point of becoming saintly – but this, always only in so far as 
this call for saintliness is limited by the initial question of justice: which of 
the others should come before the other others? 
What then is the political scenario to which these considerations will 
lead, or rather, how does Levinas interpret the political implications of his 
philosophy of meaning and of the constitution of the subject? According to 
him, my efforts of answering the initial question of justice will lead to pro-
phetic and even saintly acts. These are acts by which the ethico-political 
subject will attempt to achieve as well as possible an answer to the plurality 
of infinite appeals made to him/her, that is, he/she will do whatever is pos-
sible to actualise justice. This is the political model of Jerusalem. But that 
same subject will have to question the efficiency and durability of these 
                                           
teriority” over-states the case; it would probably be more prudent to consider eth-
ics and justice to be “contemporaneous”. This does not, however, exclude the 
claim for the primacy of the political that I make in the present Chapter. 
32 OB 158 / AE 246. 
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efforts of justice and therefore, in the face of all the thirds, there is an 
equality that arises between the subject and the others. Out of this relation, 
institutions and the law grow too, all of which would then ideally attempt 
to safeguard a particular idea of what justice entails. This is the political 
model of Athens.33 And since every institutionalisation of justice is imper-
fect, Levinas believes in the “liberal State”, that is, a State that is always 
capable of improving legislation and justice.34 This perspective on politics 
could be summarised as follows:  
“Usually the State is preferable to anarchy – but not always. In certain cases, in 
fascism or totalitarianism for instance, the political order of the State may well 
have to be challenged according to the criterion of our ethical responsibility to the 
other. That is why ethical philosophy should remain first philosophy.”35 
In other words, the State as an institutionalised endeavour of realizing 
justice will always have to be called upon to improve justice; the indis-
cretion and partial betrayal committed to the plurality of Sayings in an 
attempt to translate them as truly as possible, should be unsaid (dédit) by 
the prophetic or saintly intervention (by Jerusalem) in order to create an 
even more just Athens. By developing this theory of justice (Said) that 
depends on the Saying (therefore, ethics as first philosophy), Levinas 
would have contributed to his initial task, namely not leaving politics to 
itself, not letting politics unfold itself by its own logic, and not abandon-
ing the ethical finality of the State to oblivion. 
Up to this point, this reading of Levinas’ later political thought 
should be considered as uncontroversial. Levinas’ philosophy is one of 
demanding ethics, one of remaining responsible for the other even up to 
the point of unsaying the Said that you are yourself, that is, up to the 
point of giving yourself in saintliness to the other. In the pages that follow, 
I shall further explore, explain and criticise these points. The nature of 
the ethical intervention in politics will also have to be reconsidered in 
view of answering the difficult question: is the kind of politics that Levi-
                                           
33 BPW 24 / LC 99–100. 
34 “Socialité et argent”, in Emmanuel Lévinas. Cahier de l’Herne. Catherine Chalier 
and Miguel Abensour (eds.). Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1991, pp. 106–112, refe-
rence p. 111. 
35 “L’Etat est d’habitude préférable à l’anarchie – mais pas toujours. Dans certains 
cas, dans le fascisme ou le totalitarisme, par exemple, l’ordre politique de l’Etat 
peut devoir être défié d’après le critère de notre responsabilité éthique à l’autre. 
C’est pourquoi la philosophie éthique doit rester la philosophie première.” “De la 
phénoménologie à l’éthique”, op. cit. 137 (my translation) / “Ethics of the infini-
te”, op. cit. p. 66. 
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nas had in mind as actualisation of his ethics the only Levinasian politics 
conceivable? (see especially Chapters 6 and 7). 
3 CLARIFICATIONS ON THE TITLE 
This preliminary presentation of Levinas as a political philosopher should 
suffice to justify the line of research of this book. Those interpreters of his 
work that are convinced that his sole concern was with a philosophical 
presentation of the ethical and that it would therefore be impermissible or 
at least besides the point to interrogate his work on the practical, political 
implications thereof, will probably be frustrated by my line of exploration 
and discussion of the work of Levinas. To such scholars it should of course 
be conceded that by far the biggest part of Levinas’ work is devoted to find-
ing a credible and intelligent discourse on the ethical, that Levinas didn’t 
spend much time on the practical implications of his work and besides that 
he didn’t consider the elaboration on the practical implications of his thought 
to impact significantly on the discourse on the ethical. However, it should be 
borne in mind that the person who wrote Levinas’ books – Emmanuel Levi-
nas himself – was, by doing so, already responding not to the appeal of an 
other, but to the appeals of the plurality of others and thus, by so doing, was 
looking for the realisation of justice – that is, if we follow his own philoso-
phy. One has to measure what it means when he claims that the Saying is not 
only the meaning of being, but “the very signifyingness of signification [la 
signifiance même de la signification]”,36 in other words, the significance of 
Being. How could signifiance (significance and meaning) be significant, if it 
is nothing more than a meaning (that remains unspeakable, indicible) and if 
nothing can be said of this significance? What is significance, if one can 
have no discussion about this weight? Also what does it mean – as in the 
citation above – if Levinas calls ontology ancillary or servant and thus indis-
pensable (ancillaire et ainsi indispensable)37 to ethics, if one should simply 
dispense with the question of how it is ancillary and indispensable? That is 
why restricting Levinas to contemplation on the ethical alone, is condemning 
him to a performative contradiction and rendering the urgency with which he 
regards first philosophy unintelligible. 
                                           
36 OB 5 / AE 17. 
37 OB 6 / AE 18. 
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This brings me to the justification of the title of this Chapter – doing 
justice to responsibility.38 Levinas is a philosopher of ethics of the greatest 
importance. But the centre of gravity of all of his thought seems to be po-
litical: there is no relation to the other that is not politically mediated, since 
all relations to the other involve relations to the plurality of others. For this 
reason, if Levinas is a philosopher of ethics, of responsibility, he is so by 
being a philosopher of justice: the only thing that one could responsibly do 
out of responsibility for the others in the plural, is to relativise the respon-
sibility for each one of them, by the call for justice. This is the first sense 
in which justice should be done to responsibility: it means that recognition 
should be given to the fact that the relations of responsibility to the others 
are plural and that this fact calls for a reflection appropriate to this plural-
ity, which means considering responsibilities from their import of justice. 
Responsible responsibility is justice. But the quest for justice towards 
which responsibilities naturally lead, transforms them, it does something to 
those responsibilities, but only thus could they remain responsible. Only 
by submitting responsibility to this transformation can it remain true to 
itself; only thus could justice be done to responsibility – which is the second 
sense of the title. Responsibility without justice is irresponsible. 
When the theme and approach to Levinas in this book is indicated in 
the title as that of “political responsibility”, the relationship between these 
two terms should consequently be understood as explained here: it is only 
by taking the political dimension of responsibility seriously that justice can 
be done to responsibility. Even though a lot of my effort will be devoted to 
analysing and responding to the limits and weaknesses of Levinas’ own 
contribution to this question, it can certainly not be claimed that the question 
concerning the relationship between the ethical and the political in respon-
sibility is foreign to Levinas. Since it is, then, the explicit aim of the pre-
sent study to approach Levinas from this tail-end of his philosophy, much 
less will be said about language, alterity, face-to-face, proximity and other 
more central notions of Levinas’ philosophy. Instead, the question con-
cerning the political will be pursued with the objective of seeing how to go 
beyond Levinas – as per the purposely ambiguous subtitle of the book – 
how to reflect on political responsibility “after Levinas”. 
                                           
38 I came across this very appropriate phrase in the title of a book review by William 
S. Hamrick, “Doing justice to responsibility”, in Human Studies 26/3, 2003, 
pp. 401–407; the specific content given to the phrase is derived from my interpre-
tation of Levinas’ ethico-political project, rather than from that review. 
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This objective will be pursued while constantly keeping in mind the 
second part of the title of the book: “for a globalised world”. This is cer-
tainly the most unexpected part of the title of this book and of its content. 
It will be the objective of Chapters 2 and 3 to shed light on this dimension 
of responsibility. However, a few remarks by way of introduction are in 
order. Whereas it is quite obvious that Levinas was not a theoretician of 
globalisation or international relations, one has to concede that such 
questions are not completely absent from his work. Consider for instance 
the significance of political catastrophes for Levinas, of which most had 
an international or global dimension:  
“The 1914 War, the Russian Revolution refuting itself in Stalinism, fascism, Hitler-
ism, the 1939–45 War, atomic bombings, genocide and uninterrupted war. […] 
A liberal politics and administration that suppresses neither exploitation nor war; a 
socialism that gets entangled in bureaucracy.”39 
It is noteworthy that Levinas placed on the same level those instances of 
catastrophe that took place very far from his lived experience and those of 
which he was personally a victim, at least as far as they merit reflection on 
the ethical. If it is further taken into account that these catastrophes practi-
cally always have an international dimension, then one could reasonably 
claim that, for Levinas, what happens on an international level concerns 
individual ethical subjects, at least in the sense that it poses or enforces the 
question concerning the ethical.40 If we then ask “what is it in our day and 
time that could be considered worthy of serious reflection concerning the 
ethical?”, would it not be such international or global historical phenomena 
as the genocide in Rwanda or the global network of exploitative labour 
relations or again the inhumanity of some humanitarian aid after the earth-
quake in Haiti? If the global extent of the events that enforce the question 
concerning the political is to be affirmed, should it not at least be regarded 
as a legitimate question to see if the response to the world – the responsi-
bility taken for the world – has to take on the same scale? 
The notion of responsibility for a globalised world is not entirely 
foreign to Levinas’ way of thinking. But even if it were, would that pre-
vent us from enquiring into Levinas’ thought as fitting contribution to an 
issue that wasn’t his? The reference to a “globalised world” in the title of 
the book thus stands for the deliberate attempt to appropriate Levinas, or to 
                                           
39 DF 281 / DL 390–391, similarly PN 3 / NP 9, A&T 132 / AT 139, ENT 97 / EN 
107. 
40 These international and global implications of Levinasian thought on responsibil-
ity will be developed in more detail in Chapter 3, especially § 3. 
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put his philosophy to the test, for a context that was not at the centre of his 
preoccupations. This approach seems to me justifiable in itself, but also 
called for by the change in context from that of Levinas to that of the pre-
sent author. Whereas I don’t dispute the right of people outside of Europe 
or the West to read and comment on works of European authors and to do 
so in the terms of the authors they comment on (e.g., I respect the right of 
anybody outside of France to become a Levinas scholar in the narrow 
sense of the word), it seems equally acceptable for us, writing from different 
contexts to those of the author commented on, to engage seriously with 
these authors, but with a different agenda.  
If this book is intended as reflection on political responsibility for a 
globalised world, then the ambition is not to develop an ethics for global-
isation and international politics. Rather the last half of the title of the book 
refers to the extent and context of relevance of responsible action. Further-
more, the insistence on a globalised world also serves to underscore the 
importance of reflection on the contemporary state of the means by which 
responsible action is undertaken. This means that the question of responsi-
bility will be considered as it takes profile in an era of globalisation, with 
the means available to people living in such a world and for a world in 
which the geopolitical dimension of action is its ultimate horizon. “For” 
refers to the context of relevance and to the beneficiary. But these themes 
will be addressed in detail in the Chapters that follow. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PART 1 
Ethics after the colonies:  
The global scope of Levinas’ political thought 
 
 
 
The title chosen for the first Part of the book may seem like a misnomer: 
Levinas the post-colonial and international political theorist! I do recognise 
that the terms chosen for the current exploration give a greater indication 
of the aim of the present study than of the texts of Levinas that will be 
commented on in pursuing that aim. Yet, the point of departure and central 
concern is a study of what Levinas wrote. The aim is not to make some-
thing of Levinas that he wasn’t but to exploit what is allowed for and even 
suggested by his work. In order to justify this title and to anchor, as it 
were, this Part, I propose the following passage from the book to which I 
shall devote a careful study in Chapter 5 and which the title shows should 
be situated very near to the core concern of my study: Humanisme de 
l’autre homme, Humanism of the other or of the other human being. This 
guiding citation gives us a keyhole view, not only of this particular book 
of Levinas, but also of the largest part of his philosophy: 
“The most recent, most audacious and most influential ethnography, maintains the 
plurality of cultures on the same level. The political work of decolonisation is in this 
way linked to an ontology – thought on Being, thought that is interpreted from mul-
tiple and multivocal cultural signification. And this multiple-interpretability of the 
meaning of Being, this essential disorientation – is, perhaps, the modern expression 
of atheism.”1  
                                           
1 “L’ethnographie la plus récente, la plus audacieuse et la plus influente, maintient 
sur le même plan les cultures multiples. L’œuvre politique de la décolonisation se 
trouve ainsi rattachée à une ontologie – à une pensée de l’être, interprétée à partir 
de la signification culturelle, multiple et multivoque. Et cette multivocité du sens 
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Whereas the questions concerning ontology and the multiple meanings of 
Being will be examined in detail in Chapter 5, three interrelated terms 
from this passage deserve detailed examination at this stage in order to 
appreciate the suggestion that Levinas makes: ethnography, decolonisation, 
atheism. What is the most recent ethnography and what did it, according to 
Levinas, bring about that is significant? What does the apparent category 
of personal or private conviction, namely atheism, have to do with politics? 
What does Levinas exactly claim concerning decolonisation as a symptom 
of a regrettable situation of (ontological) disorientation? In Chapter 2 the 
coordination of these three terms will be examined; Chapter 3 is devoted 
to a further exploration of colonisation and decolonisation in Levinas, with 
a view on the global range of responsible action. 
                                           
de l’être, cette essentielle désorientation – est, peut-être, l’expression moderne de 
l’athéisme.” (HO 20 / HH 33–34, my translation). 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Ethnography, atheism, decolonisation1 
 
 
 
It hardly needs to be recalled that when ethnography is evoked, we speak 
immediately about much more than merely one of the human sciences, 
since the practice of this discipline is one of the privileged windows on the 
unfolding of the relationship between Europe and its others.2 Since Levi-
nas concurs with this opinion, albeit in a self-styled Heideggerian way, 
rather than in the often strongly Foucauldian inspired way seen especially 
in post-colonial studies, we need to examine his statement further. 
Levinas’ point in the guiding citation is to refer to a state of consensus in 
(at least “the most audacious”) ethnography, namely that it maintains the 
                                           
1 This Chapter is a considerably extended version of §§ 2 and 3 of my article “The 
State and politics in a post-colonial, global order. Reconstruction and criticism of a 
Levinasian perspective”, in SA Publiekreg / SA Public Law 24/2, 2009, pp. 352–
369. Part of the introduction to this Part has also been drawn from it; likewise the 
discussion of Levinas’ Dostoyevsky citation (used in Chapter 5, §2.3) was used as 
§1 of that article. 
2 To cite but one perspective on the historical situation in which ethnography tended 
to be organically linked with colonialism: “These anthropological productions, of-
ten commissioned after military invasion of an African territory or after a rebellion 
against occupying European powers, were intended to provide the European ad-
ministrations and missionary-cultural workers with information about the ‘primi-
tive’ both to guarantee efficient administration and to provide knowledge of the 
‘African mentality’, so that, while demonizing and repressing African practices, 
the ‘superior’ European values and attitudes could be effectively inculcated into 
the African conscience. From the transformations in the African economies and 
politics to religion and the educational institutions, the goal was to maximize 
European profit, secure the total domination and subjection of the colonial terri-
tory to the metropole, and reproduce Europe and European values not only in the 
material lives, but also in the cultural and spiritual lives and expressions of the Af-
ricans.” Emmanuel Eze, “Introduction: Philosophy and the (post)colonial”, in 
Postcolonial African philosophy. A critical reader. Emmanuel Eze (ed.). Oxford 
and Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell, 1997, pp. 1–21, citation p. 10. 
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equal value of different cultures. Who the ethnographers of this ethnography 
could be, and what Levinas really got from them, is of no slight importance. 
In fact, an exploration of two ethnographers to whom Levinas could possibly 
refer is of crucial importance to understanding some of the most intense con-
cerns of his work. In other words, my aim is not a mere philological hy-
pothesis on the name(s) to be filled into the general box of “ethnography” in 
the guiding citation; rather, by considering two likely candidates that Levinas 
could have had in mind, one could learn a lot about his philosophical project, 
but starting this time not from the face of the other, but from the relationships 
between people from different cultural settings. The two ethnographers that I 
shall consider in turn are Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and Claude Lévi-Strauss. In 
each case, I shall ask what could have been the decisive ideas that struck 
Levinas in the work of these authors.  
1 LUCIEN LÉVY-BRUHL, OR THE USE OF 
ETHNOGRAPHY FOR ONTOLOGY AND POLITICS 
Although I do not think that Levinas had Lévy-Bruhl in mind when he wrote 
the cited passage, there are three reasons why it would be useful for us to 
consider him in this regard. First, he is by far the ethnographer to whom 
Levinas refers most and he is the only ethnographer to whom Levinas has 
dedicated an entire study.3 Second, the link that is made in the citation be-
tween ethnography and atheism recalls Levinas’ reading of Lévy-Bruhl 
since, as will be pointed out, the question of atheism is often referred to 
when Levinas writes about Lévy-Bruhl. Third, one sees illustrated very 
clearly from Levinas’ first appropriation of the work of the ethnographer, 
that ethnography and ontology are used to interpret each other mutually. 
What did Levinas retain from Lévy-Bruhl? 
1.1 “To be is to participate” 
From his earliest references to Lévy-Bruhl, it is the notion of “participation” 
that draws Levinas’ attention. Being is incommunicable for a human being, in 
other words, human beings are characterised by an ontological solitude. Lévy-
Bruhl’s presentation of participation in so-called “primitive” cultures seems, 
however, to suggest an alternative possibility of existence, namely transitive4 – 
                                           
3 “Lévy-Bruhl and contemporary philosophy” (ENT 39–51 / EN 49–63). 
4 TO 43 / TA 22. 
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an existence in which a human being is not merely directed at the other, but is 
the other. This is for Levinas more important than what Lévy-Bruhl has to con-
tribute on the apparent pre-logicial or mystical character of the “primitive men-
tality” (mentalité primitive).5 If such a transitive form of existence is possible, 
this would entail an existence by which one is fused, through participation, into 
a general, ecstatic, ontological monism.6 Ontological solitude and participa-
tion would be two divergent historically conditioned forms of existence.  
By the time Levinas wrote down this discovery (1946/47), calling 
“existing” (exister) a transitive verb, is long since philosophically inno-
cent. In an essay on Heidegger in 1932 (that is, before Levinas began to 
distance himself from Heidegger), it is explained that 
“[o]ne could perhaps say that Heidegger’s entire philosophy consists in consider-
ing the verb ‘to exist’ as a transitive verb”7  
and accordingly the existentials (Existentialien) of Dasein could be con-
sidered as adverbs of this transitive verb.8 This fact should be pointed 
out so that we can from the outset pay attention to the Heideggerian and 
ontological overtones that Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of participation has in 
Levinas’ reading thereof. When we examine participation, we reflect on 
the modes of being of the human being or rather, of Dasein. 
This first qualification of participation as an existence in a fused onto-
logical monism with other people can be developed by considering the sub-
sequent description of participation as “impersonal vigilance” (vigilance im-
personnelle).9 Participating in Being as the “primitives” do, according to 
Lévy-Bruhl, is like when one suffers insomnia: I remain awake despite being 
exhausted: this vigilance, the failure to fall asleep, is not an action of the sub-
ject, rather, it remains awake in the subject (ça veille).10 Similarly, participa-
tion is the mode of existence in which one has no private existence (or no 
“ontological solitude” as in Time and the other), but existence “returns to an 
undifferentiated background”.11 This “fond indistinct” is what Levinas calls 
the il y a, the “there is”. The il y a is pure Being or existence, or in the 
grammatical metaphors that Levinas uses, it is in-finite “to be”, it is anony-
                                           
5 TO 42 / TA 22. 
6 TO 43 / TA 22. 
7 DEHH 80. Levinas’ use of “exister” instead of “être” is not an existentialist mis-
reading of Heidegger, but is chosen to avoid the strangeness that the translated 
Heideggerian terminology had. Cf. ENT 48 / EN 59. 
8 GDT 58 / DMT 68. 
9 E&E 60 / EE 98. 
10 E&E 66 / EE 111. 
11 E&E 61 / EE 99. 
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mous or impersonal, since no being has taken hold of it, there is no being 
that has “conjugated” it yet, as it were.  
The impersonal vigilance of participation that characterises, according 
to Lévy-Bruhl, the “primitive mentality” is haunted by or subject to a hor-
ror before the sacred, since the sacred is exactly this impersonal Being 
(être) without beings, this capricious impersonal flux of events (il y a) in 
which people defencelessly participate:  
“The impersonality of the sacred in primitive religions […] describes a world 
where nothing prepares for the apparition of a God. Rather than to God, the notion 
of the there is [il y a] leads us to the absence of God, to the absence of every being. 
Primitive people are absolutely before Revelation, before the light.”12  
In this sense the effective mood of horror provoked in the “primitives” by the 
sacred, testifies to the possibility of an existence in which one is absolutely 
fused with or diluted into the flux of being to the point of Being depersonal-
ised,13 that is to say, in which one participates in pure being to such an extent 
that there is no exit from this identity with Being. Any intervention from out-
side or interruption of this flux of Being is precluded. In this sense participa-
tion is an atheistic existence. We shall see in Chapter 5 (§1) that this is for 
the younger Levinas typical of human existence in general: human existence 
is fatally diluted into Being and in need of an escape; but it is also a form of 
existence that can be celebrated in disdain for this need of an escape or inter-
ruption – with disastrous political consequences (see also §1 of Chapter 5). 
Ten years after Time and the other and Existence and existents, Levinas 
comes back to Lévy-Bruhl in two texts that are again very instructive. In his 
essay “Lévy-Bruhl and contemporary philosophy” (1957), Levinas’ perspec-
tive on the ethnographer’s work is taken from a shift in the latter’s own con-
viction concerning the relationship between “primitive” culture and modern 
culture. Following the development of Lévy-Bruhl’s thought in the Car-
nets,14 Levinas argues that the ethnographer gradually abandoned his famous 
distinction between pre-logical, “primitive” thought and modern scientifi-
cally formed thinking for a vision of the unity, in other words for the univer-
sal similarity, of the human spirit.15 But what becomes then of the studies of 
the “primitive mentality”? They serve to uncover structures of the human 
                                           
12 E&E 61 / EE 99, translation modified. 
13 E&E 61 / 100. 
14 Published as Les carnets de Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (with a preface by Maurice Leen-
hardt). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. 
15 ENT 40 / EN 50. 
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mind in general.16 This is then Levinas’ objective with his essay on Lévy-
Bruhl: to point out how Lévy-Bruhl’s ethnography teaches us something that 
is universally valid about human existence, to show where some of the 
fundamental concepts of human existence come from17 and how these pre-
pare or enforce developments in contemporary philosophy. The essential 
point of similarity is to be found in the insistence, by both Lévy-Bruhl and 
contemporary philosophy, on the originary, non-representational mode of 
existence of human beings, which Lévy-Bruhl refers to as “participation”.  
What does this pre-representational participation entail? “To be is to 
participate [Être, c’est participer]”, cites Levinas from the Carnets, and 
comments:  
“The participation that comes into play in the affective category of the supernatu-
ral in no way leads from an imprecise physical phenomenon toward metaphysical 
being, but from the given thing toward a power that no longer has the solid 
framework of being, toward the diffuse presence of an occult influence.”18  
In other words, “participation” describes the primordial mode of existence 
in which the human being is situated not yet among things, but in a flux of 
powers. This would be the primordial access to the world: not as an indi-
vidual separated from the things, but as a participator in an atmosphere or 
a climate, in which that which will later on become substance is still “de-
substantialised”19 and to the power of which one is exposed.20 In this, 
Lévy-Bruhl is very close to “contemporary philosophy” – meaning, first 
and foremost Heidegger’s – for whom, according to the rendering of Levi-
nas, existence replaces the subject21 in the sense that as (a) being (étant) 
existence is first and originally a present participle of Being (être): first 
                                           
16 Such is also the more recent conviction expressed by the historian of anthropol-
ogy, Frédéric Keck, when opening his essay “Causalité mentale et perception de 
l’invisible. Le concept de participation chez Lucien Lévy-Bruhl” (in Revue phi-
losophique 3/2005, pp. 303–322) by stating categorically: “The oeuvre of Lucien 
Lévy-Bruhl can be reread today, no longer in the framework of an analysis of the 
thought of ‘primitive societies’, since all contemporary anthropology has decon-
structed the belief in the existence of such societies, but with a view to questioning 
the nature of the mind [la nature du mental].” (p. 303). This essay places the work 
of Lévy-Bruhl, and in particular the notions of mentality and participation, within 
the historical development of epistemology in anthropology and provides a more 
detached (and superbly historically informed) perspective on Lévy-Bruhl’s posi-
tion, than the engaged perspective of Levinas of which I trace the contours here. 
17 ENT 41 / EN 51. 
18 ENT 45–46 / EN 56. 
19 ENT 47 / EN 57. 
20 ENT 48 / EN 57. 
21 ENT 48f / EN 59. 
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verbal, with adverbial traits, before being substantive with qualities. In this 
ontological description,  
“the I, thus delivered up to Being, it is thrown out of its abode into an eternal exile, 
losing its mastery over itself, overwhelmed by its own being. Henceforth, it is a prey to 
events that have already determined it. […] being-in-the-world is the exemplary fait 
accompli. Being that is about to be is already Being that has traversed you through and 
through. […] the I that is in their grasp decides, is engaged, takes hold of itself.”22  
Such would be, then, the conclusion of an existential, ontological (in the 
Heideggerian sense) rendering of the central findings of Lévy-Bruhl’s 
ethnography. 
The importance of pre-representational participation as the essential 
mode of being of human beings allows for the use and understanding of the 
word mentality. Now, the word does not serve to distinguish the cognitive 
events of “primitive” peoples over against the rationality of “the healthy 
adult white male [l’homme blanc, adulte et bien portant]”.23 Rather, a de-
scription of the “primitives” helps us to see something that is at work in all 
human beings. This something is the “mentality” behind, and thus the pre-
representational situatedness, of the representational mind. It is the mentality 
behind the mens (mind).  
“The notion of mentality consists in affirming that the human mind does not de-
pend solely on an exterior situation – climate, race, institution, or even contracted 
mental habits that would pervert the natural illumination. Mentality is in itself 
dependence; it emerges from an ambivalent possibility of turning toward conceptual 
relations or of remaining in relationships of participation. Prior to representation 
it is strikingly engaged in Being; it orients itself in Being.”24  
That the subject is pre-representationally or pre-reflectively engaged is exactly 
what is ascribed by Heidegger to human existence: human existence, or more 
correctly Dasein, is engaged in existence in the sense that its own being is lived 
as a transitive verb, that means (as Levinas would paraphrase) that by conju-
gating the verb “to be”, human existence is inseparably linked or attached to 
Being.25 Furthermore, this transitiveness by which Dasein is its own being, is 
engaged in that its own being is to it as a task: Dasein has to be.26 Master of its 
                                           
22 ENT 47 / EN 58, translation modified. 
23 ENT 39 / EN 49. 
24 ENT 50 / EN 61, translation modified. 
25 ENT 50 / EN 62 
26 See Martin Heidegger, Being and time. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(transl.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, [1962] 1988, pp. 173, 321, 346 / Sein und Zeit. 
Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag [1927] 1993, pp. 134, 276, 300. 
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existence by conjugating Being, Dasein is at the same time played by Being, as 
in the citation above:  
“As for the I, thus delivered up to Being, it is thrown out of its abode into an eternal 
exile, losing its mastery over itself, overwhelmed by its own being. Henceforth, it 
is a prey to events that have already determined it.”27  
That this phenomenological and ontological appropriation of Lévy-Bruhl’s 
notion of participation also has consequences for the co-existence of people is 
underlined by Levinas at the end of his essay. He suspects that the idea that 
separate individuals merge into one social entity (the “social body [corps so-
cial]”)28 could explain and even partially justify “the modern feeling of exis-
tence”.29 Levinas speculates on the possibility that the era in which he wrote 
this essay is one of philosophy in which the first intuition concerning being is 
derived from such a fusional experience of society.30 Not only could it be pos-
sible that contemporary experience of social existence is justified by such a 
fusional feeling of society, but it is possible that work such as that of Lévy-
Bruhl has contributed to flatter or encourage “a nostalgia for outdated and ret-
rograde forms”.31 Instead of merely enlarging our understanding of reason by 
extending it to the modes of thinking of people that would otherwise or for-
merly be suspected of lacking in rationality – as Levinas appraises the positive 
contribution of Lévy-Bruhl – the new appreciation for the mode of thinking of 
the “primitive mentality”, justified as it may be in the face of the shortcomings 
and catastrophes provoked by technical reasoning, risks entailing “a reversion 
to primitive mentality pure and simple”.32 This situation of a return to the 
primitive mentality – of which the essence seems to be for Levinas the fu-
sional or participational experience of social existence – as well as the failure 
of technical rationality, is described by Levinas as a crisis. But if we enquire as 
to what constitutes this crisis, we obtain only the last question of the essay:  
“But is monotheistic civilization incapable of responding to this crisis by an ori-
entation liberated from the horrors of myths, the confusion of thought they pro-
duce, and the acts of cruelty they perpetuate in social customs?”33  
                                           
27  ENT 47 / EN 58. 
28 ENT 51 / EN 62. 
29 ENT 51 / EN 62. Here, Levinas uses the word “modern” for “contemporary” or 
“fairly recent”. 
30 ENT 51 / EN 62–63. 
31 ENT 51 / EN 63. 
32 ENT 51 / EN 63. 
33 ENT 51 / EN 63. 
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This socio-cultural diagnosis with which the essay on “Lévy-Bruhl and con-
temporary philosophy” concludes, draws up two opposing visions of what 
contemporary “European” culture or civilisation is supposed to be: one is 
dominated by its monotheistic roots, the other by the horror of myths and par-
ticipation; the latter would be characterised by a nostalgia that leads to cruelty, 
the former is questioned about its capability to resist or subvert the latter.34 
1.2 Heidegger, nostalgia, cruelty and the eclipse  
of monotheism 
The terms of this diagnosis – nostalgia, cruelty, and the eclipse of monotheism 
– would remain vague, if it was not for the fact that one finds them in the other 
text of 1957 in which Levinas refers to Lévy-Bruhl.35 In a thematic overview 
of the two dominant truth strategies of Western philosophy,36 Levinas ex-
plains that most often philosophers have opted against truth as an encounter 
with the transcendent other, that maintains the philosopher in a heteronomous 
relation to the other and leads ultimately to a metaphysics enquiring about the 
divine, and for an approach by which the other has to be incorporated into the 
self/same (même) – knowledge consists in the autonomous action of the self 
that identifies the diversity of the others in itself.37 Affirming strongly the 
freedom and autonomy of the knowing subject (the same/self) seemed the 
best manner to overcome the disturbing fusion and confusion of opinion as is 
described for the mythical stage of sociality by Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of par-
                                           
34 Levinas may well have been influenced by Franz Rosenzweig in this opposition, 
considering what Rosenzweig calls the “world historical opposition (Welthistori-
scher Gegensatz) of mythology and revelation” – see “Atheistische Theologie” in 
Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften 3, Zweistromland. Kleinere 
Schriften zu Glauben und Denken. Reinhold and Annemarie Mayer (eds.). 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, pp. 687–697, especially p. 693. In this essay, 
Rosenzweig objects to the mythological interpretation of both Christianity and Ju-
daism as a reduction of the faith content of these religions to what is explicable in 
purely human terms. It is probably not irrelevant to recall that the essay on Lévy-
Bruhl was published only two years before Levinas’ important paper on 
Rosenzweig: “‘Between two worlds’. The way of Franz Rosenzweig” (1959) (DF 
181–201 / DL 252–281). 
35 Apart from Rosenzweig’s thoughts alluded to above as an external aid to illumi-
nate Levinas’ thought here, another form of clarification, in particular the link be-
tween monotheism and the benefits of its secularisation of society, can be ob-
tained from the 1956 essay “For a Hebraic humanism”, which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4, §1. 
36 CPP 47–48 / DEHH 165–166. 
37 CPP 48 / DEHH 166. 
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ticipation.38 Whatever one might think of this all too hasty typology of truth 
strategies and the all too cryptic reference to Lévy-Bruhl, Levinas seems to 
consider this opposition of a philosophical strategy of the affirmation of the 
freedom of the self over and against the tyranny of the other a positive devel-
opment, in as far as it overcomes the blind and harmful influence of the others 
over the self under a regime of tyranny or of the mythical stage of human exis-
tence. However, in the rest of the same essay, the full élan of his critical en-
ergy is directed at the “narcissism” inherent in the “primacy of the 
self/same”,39 especially since, in its most eminent form – that of the philoso-
phy of Heidegger – it reverts to all that is violent in the primitive participa-
tion:40 it conquers, dominates and possesses41 whatever it encounters, it is 
fundamentally atheistic, since it cannot tolerate the thought of ideas coming 
into its domain that it had not placed there by reason itself,42 it draws its 
strength from capturing the particular individuality by means of neutral, gen-
eral notions, and implicitly it considers itself naturally justified in confronta-
tion with the other.43 Rarely in Levinas’ entire oeuvre is his judgement formu-
lated as severely as in this text, when he explains his conviction that this stra-
tegic supremacy of the self over the other is fully maintained in the philosophy 
of Heidegger.44 It is in his judgement that one sees not only a criticism of an-
other philosopher, but a development of a social strategy for which the name 
of Heidegger is often in Levinas a synecdoche. 
In Heidegger one encounters Dasein as possessed by freedom rather 
than Dasein disposing of freedom. In this way the freedom is not ques-
tioned,45 since  
“[b]eing is inseparable from the comprehension of Being; Being already invokes sub-
jectivity. But Being is not a being. It is a Neuter [as in the critique of the strategy of the 
same – EW] which orders thought and beings, but which hardens the will instead of 
                                           
38 CPP 48 / DEHH 166. 
39 CPP 49 / DEHH 167. 
40 In fact, the reference of Levinas to Lévy-Bruhl is not clear and my interpretation 
of it, apart from being guided by my previous reading of Levinas’ longer essay on 
the ethnographer, is based on what Levinas says of Heidegger: “Heidegger does 
not only sum up a whole evolution of Western philosophy. He exalts it by 
showing in the most pathetic way its anti-religious essence become a religion in 
reverse” (CPP 53 / DEHH 171). It seems to be implied here that Western phi-
losophy entails an escape from and eventual reverting to something similar to the 
“primitive mentality”. 
41 CPP 48 / DEHH 167. 
42 CPP 49 / DEHH 167. 
43 CPP 49–51 / DEHH 167–169. 
44 CPP 51ff / DEHH 169ff. 
45 CPP 51, 52 / DEHH 169, 170. 
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making it ashamed. The consciousness of his finitude does not come to man from the 
idea of infinity [this is the form of the excluded other – EW] that is, its not revealed as 
an imperfection, does not refer to the Good, does not know itself wicked.”46  
By so doing, Heidegger’s philosophy  
“continues to exalt the will to power, whose legitimacy the other alone can unset-
tle, troubling good conscience”,47  
he “maintains a regime of power more inhuman”48 than that of the technical 
power issued from Greek thought. This “regime of power”, speculates Levi-
nas, finds its historical expression in Nazism, that could well be based on  
“peasant enrootedness and a feudal adoration of subjugated men for the masters 
and lords who command them”.49 
Whereas the Nietzschean colouring of this criticism of a nostalgia for a 
life of plenty in the motherland50 is clear, it should be pointed out that 
the “enrootedness” (in the citation above51) is the Heideggerian equivalent 
of Lévy-Bruhl’s participation. Once this has been noticed, it becomes 
easier to see what Levinas has in mind when he calls this “peasant en-
rootedness” “a pagan existing”52 and explains that  
“[a]nonymous, neuter, [Being] directs [building and cultivating], ethically indifferent, 
as a heroic freedom, foreign to all guilt with regard to the other”.53  
One finds in these words a parallel exclusion to that found earlier in the 
“primitive mentality”:  
“The impersonality of the sacred in primitive religions […] describes a world where 
nothing prepares for the apparition of a God. Rather than to God, the notion of the 
there is [il y a] leads us to the absence of God, to the absence of every being. Primitive 
people are absolutely before Revelation, before the light.”54  
Desubstantialisation, whether it is in the “primitives” or in Heidegger, leads 
to people being overpowered by an impersonal, anonymous power that ex-
cludes them from being affected by anything that would transcend it. 
                                           
46 CPP 52 / DEHH 170. 
47 CPP 52 / DEHH 170. 
48 CPP 52 / DEHH 170.  
49 CPP 52 / DEHH 170. 
50 Later in the same text, Levinas describes the inverse attitude, namely the desire for 
the other in the following terms: “It does not refer to a lost fatherland or plenitude; 
it is not homesickness, not nostalgia” (CPP 57 / DEHH 175). 
51 And again CPP 53 / DEHH 171. 
52 And see CPP 52f / DEHH 171: “atheism and paganism”. 
53 CPP 53 / DEHH 170. 
54 E&E 61 / EE 99, cited above. 
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But again, the point is not to criticise the political engagement of one 
individual. The “peasant enrootedness”, this  
“earth-maternity determines the whole Western civilization of property, exploita-
tion, political tyranny, and war.”55  
And Heidegger is not only the summary and summit of Western philosophy, 
but in the manner that he is presented by Levinas, represents the “outcome of 
a long tradition of pride, heroism, domination, and cruelty”.56 Thus, the 
terms of the social criticism at the end of Levinas’ essay on Lévy-Bruhl57 – 
nostalgia, cruelty, and the eclipse of monotheism – have all found their his-
torical referents. They have also been elaborated on by the traits of a specific 
form of contemporary “participation” that is not only responsible for an un-
fortunate period of German history, but characteristic of the entirety of 
Western civilisation: possession, exploitation, tyranny in politics, and war. 
1.3 Ethnography, ontology and socio-political criticism 
This is incidentally also the high point of Levinas’ use of Lévy-Bruhl; 
since the remaining references58 to the ethnographer entail no significant 
interpretation of his work, one could say that Levinas’ use of Lévy-
Bruhl comes to an end in 1957. We therefore have to take stock of what 
has been gained by this overview of Levinas’ use of Lévy-Bruhl’s work. 
It should be clear that Lévy-Bruhl could not be the author of the ethnog-
raphy to which Levinas refers in our guiding citation (page 33, above): not 
only was Lévy-Bruhl not considered contemporary any more in 1964, he 
could not be considered as an ethnographer that “maintains the plurality of 
cultures on the same level” (in most of his work). Also, where there are indi-
cations of a levelling of Lévy-Bruhl’s regard for different cultures (according 
to Levinas’ reading of the ethnographer’s Carnets) the question of cultural 
plurality is of no importance to Levinas, rather it is the matter of participation 
and what it implies that is the focus of his attention. It should also be re-
marked that in the commentaries that Levinas wrote on Lévy-Bruhl, the 
question of decolonisation, and indeed of colonisation, is absent. However 
through the exploration of Levinas’ readings of Lévy-Bruhl a number of 
valuable insights have been gained. 
                                           
55 CPP 53 / DEHH 171.  
56 CPP 52 / DEHH 170. 
57 ENT 51 / EN 63. 
58 T&I 234, 276 / TI 260, 309, A&T 129 / AT 136. 
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(1) Levinas’ take on Lévy-Bruhl means that his texts on the ethnographer 
read like an introduction to (especially Heideggerian) phenomenology.59 
In these texts one finds a good number of the basic elements of Heideg-
ger’s Daseinsanalyse. These basic elements are the following: At the cen-
tre of all philosophical questions is the difference between Being as the 
verb “to be” and being as beings that are. Understanding of the verb “to 
be” happens only in that being (Dasein) that is the place where the differ-
entiation between “to be” and the beings take place. This understanding of 
“to be” is a matter of pre-predicative or pre-representational existence, 
rather than a series of episodes of conscious cognition. Existing means for 
Dasein to understand “to be” or Being. In fact, existing is a continuous 
understanding or interpreting event. Hence the importance of analyses of 
the different modes by which Dasein factically exists.60 All of these ele-
ments of Heidegger’s philosophy have been taken over and appropriated 
by Levinas. This should be stated emphatically because, for all his criti-
cism of Heidegger, Levinas is a profoundly Heideggerian philosopher 
and it is only after this has been recognised, that his criticism of Heideg-
ger, as well as his modifying appropriation of parts of Heidegger’s phi-
losophy, can be appreciated. But what does this contribute to our under-
standing of the guiding citation in the introduction to this Part? 
(2) The implicit claim of our guiding citation (page 33) is that ethnography is 
ontologically significant and instructive. Through the overview of Levi-
nas’ readings of Lévy-Bruhl we have seen how Levinas as a scholar in 
phenomenology knows how to identify noteworthy aspects of the ethno-
graphical descriptions for considerations, not merely about the “primiti-
ves”, but about people in general. This is not an obviously correct proce-
dure, since the analyses of Dasein do not constitute an anthropology. I 
would even claim that one of the purposes of Levinas’ phenomenological 
hermeneutics of ethnography is to use the ethnography in order to provide 
a more anthropologising reading of phenomenology, and in particular of 
Heideggerian ontology. Thus, the characteristics of the life of “primiti-
                                           
59 This is also the justification for pointing out, from the beginning, the Heideggerian 
resonances of Levinas’ reading of Lévy-Bruhl. However, the relation between 
Levinas’ reading of Lévy-Bruhl and phenomenology is much more complex than 
could be given account of here, since at the time that Levinas was developing this 
reading, Lévy-Bruhl had already received a favourable reception by Husserl and 
Sartre; Merleau-Ponty would do so round about the same time as Levinas (cf. 
Frédéric Keck, “Causalité mentale et perception de l’invisible”, op. cit. p. 320f). 
Comparing Levinas to such other phenomenological readers of Lévy-Bruhl would 
reveal more of the intricacy of this matter. 
60 Cf. De l’éthique à la justice 5–7. 
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ves”, interpreted with the aid of Heidegger, helps us to return to Heideg-
ger in order to find the anthropological import of his claims about Da-
sein’s ontological existence. This doesn’t mean that the ontology of Hei-
degger is simply collapsed, but that it is accompanied by a parallel dis-
course, by a path that is indicated from Dasein, through anthropology, to 
political or social criticism. This is the strategy by which Levinas deve-
lops a discourse that always has political overtones when it is explicitly 
ontological, and has an ontological tenor, when it is explicitly political. 
This is how he could assert that in the ethnographic claim to the equality 
of cultures, the connection between a political event (decolonisation) and 
an ontology (one of plurality) becomes visible. 
(3) The climax of this coupling of the ontological with the political is situated 
in the political implications of an ontology that would reduce the other to 
the same, that fuses or constrains the other to participate in the flow of the 
same. Although we have seen how Levinas exposes this violence of onto-
logy,61 especially in connection with his reading of Lévy-Bruhl in 1957, it 
should be noted here already that this has been a part of his work from ve-
ry early on. In De l’évasion (On escape – 1935) for instance, Levinas pro-
poses his own project explicitly in terms of a renewal of the question of 
“Being as ‘to be’ [l’être en tant qu’être]”,62 i.e., in the terms of Heidegge-
rian ontology, and inquires if Being or “to be”, understood in this manner, 
is not perhaps “the sign of a certain civilisation that is installed in the fait 
accompli of Being63 and incapable to get out of it”64 and he warns (or al-
ready diagnoses?) that  
“every civilization that accepts Being, the tragic despair that it entails and the 
crimes that it justifies, deserves the name of barbaric.”65  
                                           
61 I shall not enter here into the legitimate question as to the validity of Levinas’ 
criticism of Heidegger. My concern is only with Levinas’ interpretation and the 
implications thereof. 
62 EV 99. 
63 Above, we found the idea of being as “fait accompli” too, namely where Levinas 
referred to “being-in-the-world is the exemplary fait accompli.” (ENT 47 / EN 58). 
64 EV 99. 
65 EV 127. But here too, the reference to the question of paganism/atheism and mono-
theism is not impossible to indicate. In a (confessional and philosophical) text from 
the same year Levinas writes: “Paganism is neither the negation of spirit, nor igno-
rance of a unique God. The mission of Judaism would be only very modest if it 
brought monotheism to all the peoples on earth. It would be to instruct those that 
know. Paganism is a radical inability to exit the world. It does not consist of negat-
ing spirits and gods, but of situating them in the world.” (cited after Roland in EV 
153–154). Monotheism is thus opposed to a form of incapacity to be affected by 
something from outside of this world and that carries in religious terminology the 
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 In Chapter 5 (§1), the early formulation of the coupling of ontological 
and political violence will be examined in more detail. 
(4) When the matter of the violence of Western civilisation is placed on 
the agenda, and especially in connection with the work of Lévy-
Bruhl, the issue of decolonisation is spontaneously evoked. In fact, 
in contemporary African philosophy, Lévy-Bruhl is often named as 
the colonial ideologue par excellence.66 The categorical formulation 
of Kebede is telling in this regard:  
“No need to go into fussy research to lay hands the method used to invent the 
‘white man’. All the ingredients are found in the thinker who is universally be-
lieved to have codified the colonial discourse, namely Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.”67  
 Now, it is clear that the political fate of the “primitives” as well as that of 
their colonised and decolonised descendants is not the matter of concern 
for Levinas as a reader of Lévy-Bruhl. What he appreciates most is the 
ethnographer’s ideas in which the distinction between Western rationality 
and the “primitive mentality” has already withered away and the notion of 
the pre-logical has been abandoned to make place for an equivalence of 
two manners of thinking in minds that are in essence the same68 – Levi-
nas’ ethnographer is neither one of a hierarchy of differences (as the ear-
lier Lévy-Bruhl would be), nor of an indifference to differences (as the 
ethnography in our guiding citation). Rather, Levinas relates cultural dif-
ferences in a phenomenological manner by arguing that what is constitu-
tive of the “primitive mentality” is equally constitutive of the mentality of 
(at least some of) his contemporaries. It is the participatory aspect of the 
constitution of human beings’ mentality that is criticised by Levinas, not 
the alleged inferiority of either of the two as such. What will be decisive in 
his work are the arguments that allow for the denunciation of violence in 
both of these “mentalities”. And let it immediately be added that, the in-
stance of authority for the judging of cultural expressions is not a factor of 
                                           
name of paganism. But this corresponds not only with what Levinas saw in Lévy-
Bruhl’s notion of participation, but also to his philosophical project in On escape of 
finding an escape or “excendance” from Being and the violence that it implies. 
66 I say “contemporary”, since the négritude philosophers, influential around the 
time of decolonisation, made a positive appropriation of some of Lévy-Bruhl’s 
analyses (cf. for instance Abiola Irele on Senghor in “African philosophy, Franco-
phone”, in E. Craig (ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
67 Messay Kebede, Africa’s quest for a philosophy of decolonization. Amsterdam 
and New York: Editions Radopi, 2004, p. 1. 
68 ENT 40, 49 / EN 50, 61. 
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rationality (nor of irrationality) and is itself worthy of being called “pre-
logical”69 in what is to Levinas an eminently positive sense. It is in the 
name of the ethicity that Levinas will support by means of his philosophy 
that he is capable of denouncing the crimes, the possession, the violence 
and the cruelty that he considers prevalent in Western civilization. And it 
is on the basis of this ethical judgement, and not on the basis of the superi-
ority of Western culture, that Levinas would also criticise whatever he 
deemed worthy of criticism in other cultures.70 There is no reason why the 
violence in colonialism would not be included in Levinas’ criticism of 
Western civilisation’s crimes, possession, violence, and cruelty and there-
fore this subject will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3. 
(5) In all of this, the religious terms “atheism”, “paganism” and “mo-
notheism” play a considerable role. For the moment I only state that the 
intention with which Levinas uses them in his philosophical texts is not 
simply (or perhaps, not at all) to introduce confessional categories into 
his philosophical discourse. If one wants to understand Levinas’ stance 
on the matter of ethics, ontology, plurality and politics, it is of utmost 
importance to see that these terms are capable of carrying meanings 
other than confessional ones. This seems to me the appropriate interpre-
tational approach to Levinas, independent of the question of whether one 
accepts what Levinas says by using these terms, or not. 
(6) The thought strategy that links ethnography, ontology and atheism, ac-
companied by a social criticism and the question of its solution had thus 
been present in Levinas’ work for a long time when the words of the 
guiding citation were formulated. Far more than a mere philological cu-
riosity, this fact helps us to understand how a number of different strands 
of thought in his early work fit together, and to understand the indissolu-
ble link between what is written on the level of ontology and its implica-
tions for a socio-political criticism. Two further advantages are to be de-
rived from this. First, it will give us a frame of reference with which to 
explore the meagre references of Levinas to Lévi-Strauss. This in turn 
will help us to see the shift in Levinas’ diagnosis of the essential socio-
political problem from his earlier work to his later work and subsequent-
ly it will allow us to discern what is at stake in Levinas’ concern with 
matters of cultural and political plurality and unity. Second, such a view 
                                           
69 HO 53f / HH 86. 
70 That he didn’t hold strictly to this principle and succumbed in some places to either 
an idea of cultural superiority or moral superiority, will be recalled in Chapter 6 
(§1). 
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on the changes of Levinas’ political concerns will make it possible to gi-
ve a more correct philosophical interpretation of the question of atheism 
and monotheism, alluded to above. 
We therefore have to move on to the consideration of our second ethnog-
rapher, Claude Lévi-Strauss.  
2 CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS,  
DECOLONISATION AND INDIFFERENCE 
Considering Lévi-Strauss as the ethnographer that Levinas could have had in 
mind in the guiding citation (page 33) might at first sight seem somewhat 
doubtful. In Levinas’ entire work, Lévi-Strauss is referred to by name only 
twice.71 In fact, one of these two references seems to exclude Lévi-Strauss 
from any serious place in Levinas’ thought, since the latter confesses in a 
context where he speaks explicitly about Lévi-Strauss: “even today, I don’t 
understand structuralism”72 and “probably I haven’t read [Lévi-Strauss or 
structuralism – EW] as one should”73 and of Lévi-Strauss he admits that “I 
don’t at all see where is the point of his view”.74 However, in what follows, 
the correspondence with our citation is easily detectable: the “vision” of 
Lévi-Strauss “corresponds, certainly, from a moral point of view, to what is 
called decolonisation and the end of dominant Europe […]”.75 Nothing more 
of value is said in this passage, but the connection between Lévi-Strauss and 
decolonisation is decisive. 
The other of the two explicit references to Lévi-Strauss in Levinas’ work 
is at the end of his 1959 essay on Rosenzweig. This is an important place for 
two reasons. First, this is the essay with which Levinas has practically single-
handedly opened French studies of the author that he considered to be “the 
                                           
71 I limit myself here only to the issues evoked by the guiding citation and these ex-
plicit references to Lévi-Strauss. The question concerning the relation between 
Levinas’ idea of humanism and that of Lévi-Strauss – both of which could be said 
to aspire to a post-colonial and post-subjectivist notion of humanism, albeit in 
quite different ways – will not be dealt with here.  
72 EL 161. 
73 EL 162. 
74 EL 161. 
75 EL 161. I do not take it too seriously when Levinas says that Lévi-Strauss is “Cer-
tainly the most distinguished mind of the century” (EL 161), since on the very 
next page Ricoeur is called “the best [of the distinguished minds] of our era.” (EL 
162). Besides, it is hard to see on what basis one could sing such praise to an 
author that one avows one doesn’t understand.  
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only modern philosopher of Judaism that would be worthy of this name”76 
and of whom he would later recognise that in Totality and infinity,77 his in-
fluence is too prevalent to be cited.78 Second, it indicates that Levinas had 
made a significant appropriation of the work of Lévi-Strauss, at the very 
latest around the time when his interest in Lévy-Bruhl waned.79 I cite this 
passage at length, since it says a lot about Levinas’ own manner of thinking 
and it will immediately fill in the image of our guiding citation (of page 33). 
“There is yet another way in which history could put in question the existence of the 
Jewish people […] there is an interpretation according to which [this existence] 
goes nowhere: all civilizations would be equal. Modern atheism is not the negation 
of God. It is the absolute indifferentism of Tristes Tropiques [of Lévi-Strauss]. I 
think that this is the most atheist book that has been written in our day, the abso-
lutely disoriented and most disorientating book […]. Rosenzweig […] allows us, in 
the very name of philosophy, to resist the supposed necessities of history.”80 
These cryptic remarks of Levinas on Lévi-Strauss resonate with the guid-
ing citation by (1) the issue of a non-hierarchical relationship between dif-
ferent cultures or civilisations, (2) the disorientation that it entails, (3) the 
atheism that it expresses and (4) the politics of decolonisation with which 
it fits. On the basis of this accord, it could be allowed to interpret “history” 
in the citation about Tristes tropiques, with “Being” in the guiding citation 
– an equivalence that is commonly used by Levinas since his earliest texts. 
Hence, the suspicion about Lévi-Strauss as the ethnographer of disorienta-
tion is affirmed. The fact that the guiding paragraph could accommodate 
other ethnographers too could be considered of no consequence, since in 
what is said about Lévi-Strauss Levinas’ essential point is clarified.81  
                                           
76 “Recension. Léon Chestov: ‘Kierkegaard’”, in Emmanuel Levinas, L’intrigue de 
l’infini. Marie-Anne Lescouret (ed.). Paris: Flammarion, 1994, pp. 87–90, citation 
p. 87. 
77 T&I 28 / TI 14. 
78 Cf. De l’éthique à la justice 14–22 on Levinas’ reading of Rosenzweig. 
79 I say “at the latest” since it cannot be excluded that it is to someone like Lévi-
Strauss that Levinas refers at the end of his essay on Lévy-Bruhl, when he speaks 
of the “renewal of mythology, the elevation of myth to the rank of superior 
thought by secular thinkers” (ENT 51 / EN 63). Also, the claim I make here cov-
ers only what can be supported by textual references. 
80 DF 201 / DL 279–280, translation modified. 
81 Bernasconi’s demonstration that Levinas is constantly in dialogue with Merleau-
Ponty on the issues of culture, decolonisation and a phenomenology of meaning, 
and their interrelation, in the first chapter of HO should be considered perfectly 
plausible (see Robert Bernasconi, “One-way traffic: the ontology of decoloniza-
tion and its ethics”, in Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty. Galen A. Johnson 
and Michael B. Smith (eds.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990, 
pp. 67–80). My point is not to exclude such a role of Merleau-Ponty in this chap-
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But the importance of identifying the culprit exceeds the joy of playing 
philological sleuth. It enables us to identify what Levinas considers the 
ontological and political implications of Lévi-Strauss’ ethnography to be. 
(1) There would be, in Levinas’ mind, ontological implications in maintain-
ing the equivalence of the value of different cultures, as Lévi-Strauss 
does. If Levinas were to make a reading of Lévi-Strauss, in the same 
manner as he did of Lévy-Bruhl, he would have indicated what the 
“ontology – thought on being, thought that is interpreted from multiple 
and multivocal signification” entails (see the guiding citation, page 33, 
above). In fact, (and this is perhaps because Levinas was not sure of his 
reading of Lévi-Strauss) he did so, but only obliquely – we find this 
analysis, without reference to Lévi-Strauss in the first chapter of Human-
ism of the other, from which our guiding citation comes. 
(2) We can elucidate the political consequences of the implied ontology by 
considering the two ways in which Levinas (in the citation from the es-
say on Rosenzweig, page 51, above) believes the Jewish people – and 
with them all ethical agents – to be threatened. (1) The first consists of 
being simply drawn along by history and history being its own exclusive 
judge. History (or Being) is for Levinas a totalising and identity-creating 
force that allows for no true judgement about the manner in which parti-
cularities disappear in the universal history (here one recognises again 
Levinas’ criticism of Heidegger’s notion of being). This is the problem 
of participation again, this time formulated as a historical concept rather 
than an ethnographic one. In this perspective, what Levinas said of the 
individual in a Heideggerian perspective, holds also for other peoples: “it 
is a prey to events that have already determined it.”82 (2) The implicit 
ontology of Lévi-Strauss’ ethnographic convictions poses a somewhat 
different problem to ethical agency: it doesn’t destroy the agency by in-
tegrating it into a whole, into the flow of an identity-creating force, but 
by collapsing all judgement or valuation between agents, in other words, 
by indifference. Levinas refers to this indifference as a disorientation (in 
the guiding citation of page 33) – “disorientation” being synonymous he-
re with “atheistic” and, especially when the time at which Levinas wrote 
it is taken into account (1964), it is not surprising to see that the political 
                                           
ter of HO – in fact, Levinas explicitly orients his discussion of meaning on Mer-
leau-Ponty – but to expose and exploit what is present in Levinas’ relation to the 
ethnographer. 
82 ENT 47 / EN 58. 
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manifestation of this dis-orientation is seen in the dis-occidentalisation of 
the world, i.e., in the process of decolonisation.83 Strangely enough, 
when, in the finishing paragraphs of the essay, Rosenzweig is presented 
as the solution for the problem posed by Lévi-Strauss, the parameters of 
the problem change in such a manner that it again becomes a question of 
undermining the necessity of history and the issue of indifferent plurality 
seems to slip away.84 It is as if Levinas here finds a problem for which, 
at this stage, he has no solution, and can find none, not even in Rosen-
zweig. I shall comment on this shift below, for time being let it then be 
noted that there are two distinguishable threats to the continued existence 
of the Jewish people.  
(3) Thus far, in my commentary on the essay from Difficult freedom, I have 
referred, without problem, to the Jewish people. This is of course impo-
sed by reference to a text that was initially prepared for a Jewish audien-
ce (namely the Colloque d’Intellectuels Juifs de Langue Française). Ho-
wever, Levinas leaves ample room for the appropriation of his argument 
by and for non-Jews, or to put it differently, the essence of what he says 
applies to all people and not only to Jews. This becomes clear when one 
takes seriously that Levinas presents Rosenzweig’s intellectual opposi-
tion to the necessity of history as allowed for in the name of philosophy, 
which in this case should be taken to stand for universal validity (as op-
posed to validity only for those that adhere to the authority of the same 
religion).85 One finds more explicit support for such a claim, if one ac-
cepts Levinas’ conviction that 
“[t]o wish to be a Jew today is therefore, before believing in Moses and the 
prophets, to have the right to think that the significance of a work is truer in terms 
of the will that wished it into being than the totality into which it is inserted”.86  
                                           
83 “The world created by this saraband of countless equivalent cultures, each one 
justifying itself in its own context, is certainly dis-Occidentalized; however, it is 
also disoriented [dés-occidentalisé, mais aussi un monde désorienté].” (HO 37 / 
HH 60). 
 It should be noted here that the double analysis of the most important figures of 
political catastrophes, as I have reconstructed them here with the help of Levinas’ 
reading of Lévy-Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss, is also to be found elsewhere in his work. 
The essay “On the deficiency without care, in a new sense” [De la déficience sans 
souci au sens nouveau]” (GCM 43–51 / DVI 77–89, my translation) is an excel-
lent example thereof. 
84 DF 201 / DL 280. 
85 That the universal validity of Rosenzweig’s practice of philosophy could be ques-
tioned is not excluded here. The point, however, is to see if Levinas speaks in 
principle only about Jews or if his ideas apply in principle also to other people. 
86 DF 200 / DL 279. 
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 In other words, what is essential in Judaism is not in the first instance the 
fidelity to the faith tradition but the conviction that one could – also 
independently from the Jewish confession – act in a manner as to in-
fringe on the identitary and totalising power of history of Being, for it is 
only in this way that judgement and evaluation of action is possible.87  
(4) It should at least be noted that, as far as the political tenor of Levi-
nas’ reading of Lévi-Strauss is concerned, (and apart from the que-
stion of the continued existence of the Jewish people that I have just 
reinterpreted as the continued existence of ethical agency) that in the 
1959 passage there was no reference to decolonisation, whereas in 
1964 (the guiding citation) it takes an important position as the political 
manifestation of ontological indifference and of atheism. Given the 
terseness of the references to Lévi-Strauss this could of course be mere 
coincidence. Let it at least be suggested that since the passage on Lé-
vi-Strauss and the guiding citation are so similar in tenor and con-
tent, and since in both cases the reference to Lévi-Strauss is placed in 
a strategically important position88 for the indication of the problem, 
that it might perhaps be considered possible that this change in wor-
ding reflects Levinas’ appropriation of the events of decolonisation 
that have unfolded in the meantime.89 What decolonisation meant for 
Levinas’ thought on politics will be examined below. 
(5) We have seen, in the conclusions drawn from Levinas’ use of Lévy-
Bruhl, that the use of terms like “atheism” or “monotheism” in this 
kind of context does not have much to do with personal convictions 
in matters of religion. Similarly, in reflecting on the implications of 
Lévi-Strauss’s ethnography, Levinas is concerned with an implicit 
ontology to which the ethnographic text testifies, and its political 
implications. The term “atheism”, in the guiding citation and in the 
short remarks about Tristes tropiques, thus refers to a stance of indiffe-
                                           
87 The issue of the coordination between philosophy and reflection that is embedded 
in a Jewish community, as Levinas understands it, will be explored further – 
namely in Chapter 4 (§4) and Chapter 5 (§4). 
88 In the case of the guiding citation, its importance for Humanism of the other will 
be shown in Chapter 5. 
89 To recall just the major markers of French decolonisation: Laos, Cambodia, Viet-
nam, as well as Tunisia and Morocco became independent before or in 1956 and 
the big number of Sub-Saharan African colonies and Madagascar in 1960. The 
Algerian war came to an end and Algeria gained independence in 1962 when 
Levinas was probably already working on the essay from which the guiding cita-
tion comes (Humanism of the other, chapter 1). Djibouti and the Comoros had to 
wait until the second half of the 1970s for their independence. 
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rence with regard to the Being-disclosing capacity of distinct cultural 
phenomena. An “atheistic” ethnography (or for that matter any other 
form of “atheistic” discourse on the same subject) is one that is in fa-
vour of a non-hierarchical relation between different cultures and 
even engaged in promoting an attitude by which any such hierarchi-
sation is rejected as a political act – of this, decolonisation would be 
a supreme example in the time Levinas wrote – and it is in this atti-
tude and its corresponding political practice that Levinas sees an in-
capacity to distinguish, to judge, to differentiate in a normative man-
ner, or in other words, he sees in such an attitude an indifference 
that, if pursued consistently, would entail political disorientation. In 
short, here again atheism doesn’t refer in the first place to a personal 
conviction concerning the non-reality of a transcendent person; as it 
referred in the discussion of Lévy-Bruhl to the impenetrability of a 
fused, identity-creating flux of history, here it refers to the practice 
(the “political work” from the guiding citation) issued from a deep 
acceptance of an irresolvable indifference – hence Levinas’ term 
“indifferentism” – to which he will also refer as the “crisis of mo-
notheism” in Humanism of the other. Whereas one could perhaps still 
consider the use of the word “atheism” in the citation from the essay 
on Rosenzweig on Tristes tropiques as made from and for a religious 
context, its repetition in the guiding citation from Humanism of the 
other is undeniably philosophical. 
Having presented the detailed exegesis of Levinas’ remarks on Lévy-
Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss, it is now necessary to draw a few conclusions 
from the two sets of remarks, considered together. 
3 CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF LEVINAS’ 
PHILOSOPHY OF ALTERITY 
In Levinas’ engagement with Lévy-Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss, his primary 
concern is never with how the “primitives” or their descendants should be 
understood. The question of understanding the cultural other is approached 
only indirectly in both cases: ethnography informs ontology, it helps to 
uncover the anthropological overtones of an ontology and only in this way 
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gives access to considerations concerning the relation between people(s).90 
And here, the objective is not to understand the other or to give guidelines 
for living together, but to develop a diagnosis of the violence in the con-
frontation between different people. The two ethnographers each help to 
identify a different problem in the co-existence of people. And it is of ut-
most importance to see this, since Levinas’ profound reflections on ontology 
and ethics are strongly formed by these diagnoses. I do not mean to claim 
that it is the reading of the ethnographers that structures Levinas work in 
an earlier and a later period, but that the different cultural-political diagnoses 
of the two main periods of his post-war work are accessible by a reading of 
his use of the two ethnographers. 
For the sake of clarity, the main political concern reflected in each of 
the two major phases of Levinas’ work should be schematised.91 The 
overwhelming political concern of Levinas’ earlier philosophy is the rise 
of Nazism and the effects of its totalitarian violence.92 If the fact of the 
existence of the colonies was a concern for Levinas, then it would be 
only in a secondary way and in so far as their existence reflected totali-
tarian violence. A specific ontological strategy is called for to address 
this problem from a philosophical point of view: this consists of affirming 
a non-totalisable alterity, despite the totalising and identity-creating 
force of Being, in other words, affirming the other, despite the same. 
From the political point of view, the fact that there is a discernible later 
philosophy of Levinas doesn’t mean that his earlier philosophy is invalid 
or even that it had been insufficiently treated, but that the political con-
cern of the earlier philosophy is not the only really disturbing one faced 
by Levinas and his contemporaries. The political concern of Levinas’ 
later philosophy is that of a world in which competing, contradictory 
claims to excellence or recognition exist directly next to each other, 
without any possibility of settling or resolving such claims in a non-
contingent manner. The appropriate ontological strategy for countering 
                                           
90 A fairly similar interpretational strategy could be indicated to be at work in (at 
least some of) Levinas’ efforts to make insights from literature useful for onto-
logical considerations. I have explored one such example – that of Levinas’ read-
ing of Céline’s famous novel – in “Le mal, le destin et l’éthique. Lévinas et le 
Voyage au bout de la nuit”, in Études littéraires 41/2 2010, pp. 133-145. 
91 This schematisation is justified only by the objective of developing my particular 
point of view. It should not be taken as a presentation of the intricacy and com-
plexity of Levinas’ thought on politics and its relation to his philosophy in general. 
An overview of this theme can be found in Howard Caygill’s Levinas and the Po-
litical, London and New York: Routledge, 2002.  
92 More will be said on this in Chapter 5. 
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this problem would consist in identifying an orientation or sense of the 
presumably indifferent multiplicity of cultural meanings. As much as the 
change from the earlier to the later Levinas could be ascribed to changes 
in his philosophical reflection in the sense of his strategy of justifying 
ethicity, it seems nonetheless valid to claim that the two phases corre-
spond also to two distinguishable political needs.  
Levinas’ entire philosophy is motivated by his concern about these 
two political risks, or even tendencies, that are both clearly present in the 
post-colonial world, but also elsewhere: the tendency of identity-enforcing 
totalitarian violence and that of indifferent plurality. Consequently his phi-
losophical project is aimed at finding the source of a non totalisable alter-
ity, that he also calls infinity, and to find something that is otherwise than 
the indifferent, multiple cultural renderings of Being. These two evidently 
political concerns could be summarised in the ontological terms “Totality 
and infinity” and “Otherwise than Being”. These two formulas are of 
course the titles of Levinas’ two most important books. The ontological 
register of the titles and even of the biggest part of the content should not 
mislead the reader to think that Levinas’ ultimate concern is about the verb 
“to be”, Sein, être, its meaning and its limits. The enormous challenge of 
Levinas’ philosophy is to provide one satisfactory solution that could hold 
for both of these problems – and this, as explained in Chapter 1, con-
fronted at the most profound level of reflection for Levinas: that of mean-
ing. The concern with “to be”, ontology, is in the service of a most radical 
confrontation with the problem. Levinas’ philosophy will have succeeded 
if he could affirm convincingly at the same time that the apparent indiffer-
ent plurality of cultural manifestations has a unitary orientation and that 
this unitary orientation is the interruption of the totalising unitary move-
ment of history. The continued existence of Jewish people against anti-
Semitic totalitarianism and the possibility of judging interaction between 
people despite decolonisation would be the political figures that capture 
this task. However, it is the survival of any oppressed other in the face of 
totalitarianism and the possibility of evaluation of all action in interaction 
that are at stake in these figures. 
Having thus strengthened our initial claim concerning the political nature 
of Levinas’ philosophical enterprise (see Chapter 1) and having explored 
two major figures by which the stakes of the political as philosophical 
problem are presented and confronted (Chapter 2), we have arrived at the 
conclusion that Levinas claims general validity for the philosophical dis-
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course in which he addresses these problems. It is the largest practical di-
mension of this general claim, which will be explored in the next Chapter. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
The range of the political: 
Decolonisation as a case in point 
 
 
 
1 FROM SITUATED THOUGHT  
TO GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES 
Levinas’ major concern is then with political events, or the threat thereof, 
that cause harm to the other. The origins of such events are not the ideas of 
social scientists or philosophers – neither those of Lévi-Strauss, nor those of 
Heidegger. It cannot be since – as has been shown from Levinas’ reading of 
Lévy-Bruhl – the mens and its ideas are brought forth and depend on a more 
original mentality.1 Mentality belongs not to the individual but rather to a 
group, and it predisposes the members, that share the mentality, to certain 
kinds of action. Typical mentalities judged by Levinas are identitary totalisa-
tion and indifferent pluralism. It is the text of ethnographers that help to iden-
tify those mentalities – not only in “primitives” but also by projection of the 
studies on the “primitives” on modern societies. But although large-scale 
political catastrophes result from mentality, rather than from ideas, aspects of 
mentalities can still be enforced by the cultural influence of ideas. Levinas’ 
accusation against Heidegger is exactly that his philosophy enforces an un-
desirable mentality. In the same manner intellectual support can be given for 
other or positive possibilities of mentalities and this is the ambition of Levi-
nas. It is not his thought that initiates or grounds the alternative action, but it 
identifies and gives intellectual support to an aspect of human “mentality” 
(Levinas will say a form of intelligibility) that exists before and independ-
ently from the philosopher. And it is exactly the work of the phenomenolo-
                                           
1 However, it should be borne in mind that this reading of Lévy-Bruhl is dependent 
on Levinas’ reading of Heidegger. 
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gist to lead us in reflection back (that is, to practice reduction, albeit then in a 
particular, Levinasian sense) to the constitution of this mentality – as has 
been indicated in the introductory Chapter. Furthermore, if I have insisted on 
the fact that for Levinas writing philosophy is already a political intervention 
(Chapter 1), then this is at the core of his practice: to re-enforce, by affirming 
and analysing, the ethical aspect of the constitution of human agency, that is, 
of agency as constituted by its responsibility for a plurality of others, in other 
words, of political agency. 
Levinas spent his philosophical life endeavouring to convince his 
readers that whatever our mentality might be, it is always already, con-
tinuously, and decisively tampered with by the other. This tampering is 
not in the first place the otherness that consists of a different language, 
physiognomy, cultural reference, or nationality but rather a tampering by 
the radical alterity of the ethical imperative coming from the other that 
has its origin neither in the subject’s position within the totalising force 
of history, nor in the cultural particularity of the subject. 
Yet, as already argued, this discourse always has political overtones and 
political objectives, even when it is explicitly concerned with ontology and 
alterity. “Political” in this context refers to the relationships between the plu-
rality of people, where these relationships are constituted by different kinds of 
power and have an influence on the fate of people’s existence, in such a man-
ner that could be susceptible to judgement in terms of justice. This circum-
scription is Levinasian in that it does not concern only the institutions of the 
State or those that in one way or another strive to impact on the exercise of 
State power (but certainly does not exclude these either), but concerns already 
the difficult task of deciding about the priority and nature of action due to all 
other people, as well as the effective realisation of this reflection in the world. 
If such is the use of the term “political”, it is now important to reflect on the 
scope of the political: how far does the relevance of Levinas’ thought stretch 
on alterity despite the totalising force of history, and on the non-indifferent 
ethical meaning in a world of indifferent cultural particularity? 
In order to respond to this question, let us return to the two guiding 
problems of political history as exemplified by the identitary violence of 
Nazism and the indifference reflected in decolonisation. A superficial 
consideration of the historical manifestation of Nazism already shows 
that although it is a form of nationalism and as such ideologically attached 
to a particular soil and blood, the energy of such a nationalism very 
quickly gives it an international momentum. That the identitary violence 
of Nazism had international and even global consequences hardly needs 
to be argued. But it is important to insist on the fact that even though this 
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problem is initially nationally situated, it is an event of international, if 
not global, dimensions. 
Since a lot has been written about Levinas and Nazism, I shall hence 
forth take it for granted that the ultimate horizon of the criticism of identitary 
violence is global and turn my attention to the question of decolonisation – 
that we encountered at the beginning of this Part in the guiding citation 
(page 33, above). It is also important to examine Levinas’ position on de-
colonisation (in as far as it is permissible to construct it from the very few 
texts on the theme), since one’s first impression is that he writes about de-
colonisation disapprovingly and thus implicitly supports the idea of 
Europe’s cultural superiority. But what does a closer look reveal? 
2 DECOLONISATION, COLONISATION:  
FIGURES OF THE GLOBAL 
From our guiding citation, it appears that it is of some importance to 
Levinas that the historical process of decolonisation be qualified as politi-
cal. In order to appreciate what the political stakes are for him in decolo-
nisation, we have to examine his declarations concerning decolonisation 
and colonisation – all of which are from his later philosophy.  
In his only other usage of the term “decolonisation”,2 Levinas criti-
cises the non-specified proponents of a non-specified anti-colonial dis-
course in the following terms  
“[o]ne reasons as if the equivalence of cultures and the discovery of their multi-
plicity [foisonnement] and recognition of their riches were not themselves the 
effects of an orientation and an unambiguous sense in which humanity stands. 
One reasons as if the multiplicity [multiplicité] of cultures had always been 
rooted in the era of decolonization, as if misunderstanding, war, and conquest did 
not flow just as naturally from the proximity of multiple expressions of Being, the 
numerous assemblages or arrangements it takes in various civilizations. One rea-
sons as if peaceful coexistence did not suppose that an orientation is traced in 
Being, endowing it with a unique sense [sens unique].”3  
The triple parallel helps us to equate or at least to associate decolonisation 
with the idea of the equivalence of cultures and their peaceful coexistence. 
But all three of these elements are suggested by Levinas to be secondary to 
and dependent on “an unambiguous sense”, “an orientation that endows a 
                                           
2 The other two being the guiding citation and the remark about Lévi-Strauss in EL 
(both cited above). 
3 HO 23 / HH 39, translation modified. 
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unique sense” and it is only since this is now forgotten in the anti-colonial 
discourse, that one reasons as if the multiplicity of cultures always co-
existed in this peaceful manner associated with, or believed to be possible 
in, the contemporary era of decolonisation. Over against this opinion, 
Levinas implicitly claims an original plurality of human cultures, as well 
as a non-peaceful existence between them; cultural plurality (he implicitly 
claims) is naturally coordinated by incomprehension, war and conquest. 
Levinas’ point – which is also the point of his later philosophy – is that the 
recognition of cultural diversity in the contemporary practice and discur-
sive support for decolonisation, betrays an implicit acceptance of a non 
cultural specific orientation to the plurality of cultural expressions.  
Decolonisation thus stands for two things in Levinas’ mind: (1) the his-
torical fact of a plurality of cultures, without common denominator and (2) a 
discourse in which recognition is given to the respective values of each of 
these. Of course, most often this discourse is “atheistic”, i.e., conducted in 
oblivion of the unique and one-directional meaning (sens unique). The ob-
ject of his criticism is neither the fact of the plurality of cultures, nor their 
recognition in the political form of decolonisation, but that which, to his 
mind, would be a naïve forgetfulness of that which makes the claim to the 
possibility of peaceful coexistence between cultures possible. A celebration 
of diversity without consideration for an orientation to that diversity amounts 
to a provocation of incomprehension, war and conquest. This seems to me to 
be Levinas’ opinion, on all levels of human interaction. However, when one 
speaks of “decolonisation” it is the relation between constellations of States 
that is evoked. I allow myself to refer to this level or reach of application of 
Levinas’ conviction as the global. 
It would be possible to expand our understanding of what Levinas has in 
mind with the political event of decolonisation by an examination of his use 
of the semantic field of colonisation, coloniser, colony, etc. Although these 
words are more frequently used in his work than decolonisation, this doesn’t 
amount to a full exploration of the colonial phenomenon. My intention is not 
to force his remarks on this theme to form a system, but to throw light on the 
current subject by reference to the four most important of these remarks. 
From the outset it should be mentioned that the words colony, coloniser, etc., 
are completely absent from Levinas’ earlier philosophy, in fact, they appear 
for the first time in the 1964 essay “Signification and sense”, that later 
formed the first chapter of Humanism of the other and from which the notion 
of decolonisation has been cited twice. In each of the cases that will be ex-
amined now, something will be added to our understanding of Levinas’ idea 
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of colonisation, but something will also be revealed about the manner in 
which he opposes a facile discourse of decolonisation and the rehabilitation 
of a universal reference for judgement. 
Referring to Merleau-Ponty’s conviction that, when a universal point 
of judgement of cultures or a common grammar is abandoned, universal-
ity can only be lateral, Levinas explains:  
“Such a conception of universality translates the radical opposition, characteristic 
of our times, against cultural expansion by colonization. Culture and colonization 
do not go together [se sépareraient foncièrement].”4  
And thus expands on his impression of anti- or decolonising discourse: the 
essence of his concern is not decolonisation as such, but the abandonment 
of the idea of a universal judgement. This becomes even clearer when 
Levinas reconstructs the tradition of Western thought, from Plato to Léon 
Brunschwicg, as characterised by the attempt of “purifying thought of 
cultural alluviums and language particularisms” and by situating its own 
dignity in “liberating the truth from its cultural presuppositions”.5 But 
since in this tradition there lurks the danger of committing violence and 
exploiting people in the name of such a liberation, philosophy had to 
unmask such hypocrisy and this had the effect of inversing the tendency of 
the venerable tradition: philosophy had to  
“show that significations arising on the horizon of cultures, and even the excellence of 
Western culture, are culturally and historically conditioned. So philosophy had to join 
up with contemporary anthropology [ethnologie]. Behold Platonism defeated!”6  
It is of crucial importance to note that Levinas shares the criticism of 
violence associated with the (hypocritical) use of an ideology of emanci-
pation that is nothing other than exploitation and violence in the name of 
universally valid values.7 In our later discussions of Levinas’ response to 
                                           
4 HO 37 / HH 59. 
5 HO 37 / HH 59 
6 HO 37 / HH 59. It is when Levinas subsequently (in HO 37 / HH 59) continued 
his line of thought by attributing this victory over politico-cultural Platonism to the 
generosity of Western thought, that he exposes himself to the ethno-centrist criti-
cism developed by Bernasconi (see discussion in Chapter 6, § 1). 
7 Despite appearances then, Levinas does not at all lament the decline of Europe as 
a global power, of “the Platonic privilege, until then uncontested, of a continent 
which believes it has the right to colonize the world” (DF 292 / DL 407). Rather, 
he seems to condemn this “entitlement to colonise” in terms that show some affin-
ity with that of Sartre when the latter described colonialism as a system (see “Le 
colonialisme est un système” [1956], in Situations V. Colonialisme et néo-
colonialisme. Paris: Gallimard, 1964, pp. 25–48). According to Sartre, colonial-
ism is a unificatory system in that the significant part of the advantage of the inter-
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the down-side of the loss of a point of judgement of the plurality of cul-
tures, we shall see that Merleau-Ponty will serve as an important aid to 
understand the manner in which “philosophy joined up with contemporary 
ethnology” (at least in Humanism of the other). Also if this alliance be-
tween philosophy and ethnology amounts to a victory over Platonism, 
Levinas counters by formulating the objective of his own philosophical 
project as a support for a kind of Platonism.8 
In “Signature” Levinas links this Platonism and its possible exploita-
tive abuse explicitly with Europe and the history of colonisation:  
“In spite of his intellectualism and his conviction about the excellence of the West, 
Husserl has thus brought into question the Platonic privilege, until then uncontested, 
of a continent which believes it has the right to colonize the world.”9  
Here again something is said about the overcoming of this assumed 
privilege: “Husserl sought to contest that the place of Truth is in Repre-
sentation.”10 Levinas’ own rehabilitation of Platonism will thus be one 
that passes through that which is learned from Husserl, namely, that 
what is decisive is not on the level of explicit formulations or statements 
                                           
action between the colonising State and the colonised regions is concentrated in 
the colonising country (p. 35). From this simple principle the form of existence 
and the mentality of both the colonisers and the colonised are shaped (p. 40, 43), 
since, as Sartre explains: “the colonist is created just as much as the native is: he is 
created by his function and by his interests” (p. 43). Levinas would have reformu-
lated this such that the history of colonial power imposes its totalising and iden-
tity-creating force on those that participate in it. 
8 When we work through my criticism of Levinas’ project later on, I shall point out 
the irony in Levinas’ figurative usage of the term “coloniser” in his explanation of 
Platonism: “the world of significations precedes the language and culture that ex-
press it; it is indifferent to the system of signs that can be invented to make this 
world present to thought. Consequently, it dominates historical cultures. […] there 
would exist a culture that consists of depreciating purely historical cultures and in 
a certain way colonizing the world” (HO 19 / HH 31, my italics). My criticism 
will consist, amongst others, of showing how the letter of this text turns against the 
spirit of the text. But before doing so, it could be noted that one finds the same set 
of ideas, affirmed in another way, in the notes that Levinas took for writing “Sig-
nification and sense” (Chapter 1 of HO) and that are now available under the title 
“Sens et signification” in the section “Notes philosophiques diverses” in the newly 
published Oeuvres complètes (volume 1). The ninth point apparently establishes 
an equivalence or relation of mutual implication between four terms: “9° Anti-
Platonism. Disorientation. Equivalence. Decolonisation.” (CdC 263). 
9 DF 292 / DL 407. 
10 DF 292 / DL 406. 
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(i.e., representations) of truth, but on the level of pre-representational 
“mentality” or intelligibility.11  
In a discussion of the “bad consciousness and conscience” (mauvaise 
conscience) of Europe in “Peace and proximity”, Levinas takes up the 
question of the arrogance of European reason. The latter would have prom-
ised the world peace and freedom as the consequence of its pursuit and ex-
pansion of universal reason, but it is difficult to believe in this promise after  
“its millennia of fratricidal struggles, political or bloody, of imperialism, scorn 
and exploitation of the human being, down to our century of world wars, the 
genocides of the Holocaust and terrorism; unemployment and continual desperate 
poverty of the Third World; ruthless doctrines and cruelty of fascism and national 
socialism, right down to the supreme paradox of the defence of man and his 
rights being perverted into Stalinism.”12  
It is not clear if Levinas intends to place the responsibility for the terrorism 
and genocides (of the twentieth century), for instance, also on Europe, or if 
he means that Europe merely failed to prevent these catastrophes. However, 
what is sure is that for Levinas these events decisively question the centrality 
of Europe and its culture in human history. This questioning of a supposed 
European centrality is not simply referred to by Levinas, but he evidently 
subscribes to it, at least in as far as it strikes at the arrogance of European 
reason (as he portrayed it). Hence the understanding he shows for “the affir-
mation and championing of specific cultures in all corners of the globe”.13 
But in accordance with Levinas’ philosophical aim of salvaging the possibil-
ity of judgement of cultures, he points out the irony that the equality of all 
cultures is exactly claimed in the name of universalism that typifies the age-
old European strategy for the encounter with the other. But now – and we 
shall later see how Levinas justifies this speculation – this universalism is not 
the child of reason, but “exaltation of a logic other than that of Aristotle, of a 
thought other than civilized”.14 What could the origin of such a different 
questioning be? It could be situated in “remorse fed by the memory of colo-
nial wars and the long oppression of those once called savages, a long indif-
ference to the sadness of a whole world”.15 This regret would then be an 
                                           
11 It is also what Levinas claims in Alterity and transcendence to have learned from 
Lévy-Bruhl: his reflections on representation in the “mentalité primitive” 
(amongst others) encouraged Levinas “to reflect on thought freed of all represen-
tation [pensée libérée de la pure représentation].” (A&T 129 / AT 137). 
12 A&T 132 / AT 139. 
13 A&T 132–133 / AT 140. 
14 AT 140. 
15 A&T 133 / AT 140. 
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element of European culture by which that very culture’s supposed centrality 
is disputed on the basis of the denunciations of its violence. It should be clear 
from this context in which the word “colonial” is used, that it serves as a me-
tonymy for the whole series of violent consequences of what Levinas con-
siders to be the arrogance of a particular form of European reason. As could 
be derived from the list of catastrophes evoked by Levinas, his issue is with 
the consequences of political organisation of societies and the relations be-
tween groups of human beings, from the local to the international and the 
global. We learn already from the fact that Levinas is interested in the suffer-
ing of the people concerned (much more than in the inherent value of their 
respective cultures), what his point of entry will be for the rehabilitation of 
an ethical Platonism: the fragility and mortality of people – wherever they 
may be. It is only in the name of the meaning of people’s suffering that the 
violent effects of a dominating culture (and for the same price, the violent 
plurality of cultures) may be contested and re-directed. 
It is of importance to note that this perspective is also echoed by a re-
flection on colonisation in one of Levinas’ Talmudic readings. In Quatre 
lectures talmudiques Levinas explains that the ancient Israelites did not 
take possession of the Promised Land like a territory that is colonised, 
but took charge of it in order to construct a just society on it. Having 
stated this principle, Levinas then asks if that is not the principle by 
which all conquerors and colonialists justified their actions (just as we 
have seen him ask in the texts cited from Humanism of the other16). His 
answer is that for those who take possession of a territory under the au-
thority of the Torah, a different orientation is valid:  
“to accept the Torah is to accept the norms of a universal justice. The first teaching 
of Judaism is the following: a moral teaching exists and certain things are more just 
than others. A society in which man is not exploited, a society in which men are 
equal […] is the very contestation of moral relativism. What we call the Torah pro-
vides norms for human justice. And it is in the name of some national justice or 
other that the Israelites lay claim to the land of Israel.”17  
Whether one accepts Levinas’ argument here or not, what is important 
for the current argument is to note that he refuses a Jewish nationalism 
that is anchored in its territory or in ethnicity. Its true anchor, or rather, 
                                           
16 The fact that the Talmud contains the same teaching as Levinas’ philosophy is in 
my judgement not sufficient proof that he is merely translating Jewish convictions 
into Greek. The influence is probably stronger in the inverse direction: from 
philosophical ideas to his interpretation of the Talmudic text. Besides, his phi-
losophical convictions are strong enough to stand (or fall) on their own. 
17 NTR 66 / QLT 141–142. 
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its true orientation that points beyond all relativism is universal justice, 
equality of people18 and the refusal of exploitation of people. Thinking 
of the previous discussion on atheism and monotheism, it should strike 
the reader as interesting that the essence of Judaism has, according to 
Levinas in this passage, nothing to do with a conviction concerning the 
reality of a transcendent entity called God. However, God is not absent 
here, since this transcendent orientation, this single imperative, is God.19 
It should be abundantly clear from this discussion of one passage on de-
colonisation and four on colonisation in Levinas, that in each case the focal 
point is the refusal of a cultural arrogance of whatever nation or group that 
imposes itself by whatever means as superior to others and thus as measure 
for the validity or value of others. But at the same time, Levinas refuses to 
abandon cultural plurality to an indifference in which no judgement would be 
possible. In this double concern – for which the issue of colonisation and de-
colonisation serves as excellent introduction – Levinas’ care about the relation 
between the self and the other is extended to the question concerning the rela-
tion between large groups of people – States or cultural groups. It is impossi-
ble to miss that this is a geopolitical perspective on Levinas’ most precious 
concerns.20 It is equally impossible to deny that what is at stake for Levinas in 
                                           
18 The intention of the word “homme” is probably to refer to all human beings. 
19 In the name of this God, certain tendencies in the contemporary State of Israel 
may be critically exposed – in a context where Levinas speaks of the undermining 
of the ideals of Judaism in the young State of Israel: “As for Israel, by dint of in-
sisting on its significance as a State, it has been entirely reduced to political cate-
gories. But its builders found themselves abruptly on the side of the colonialists. 
Israel’s independence was called imperialism, the oppression of native peoples, 
racism.” (DF 222 / DL 311). From the context it seems most probable that Levi-
nas refers here to criticism from the inside. 
20 Robert Bernasconi has argued, albeit with a different strategy, for the mutual rele-
vance of globalisation and Levinas’ ethics in “Globalisierung und Hunger” (in Im 
Angesicht der Anderen. Levinas’ Philosophie des Politischen. Pascal Delhom and 
Alfred Hirsch (eds.). Zürich and Berlin: Diaphanes, 2005, pp. 115–129) and his 
essay could certainly be considered as support for the point I am advocating here. 
 I do differ from him when he states that globalisation is to be understood as the 
overcoming of spatially structured limitations and that it is therefore necessarily in 
conflict with what is human (p. 122). It cannot be contested that action is concen-
trated in the locality of the acting body, but it is not correct to consider the over-
coming of this natural limitation as an infringement on our humanity. What is 
human is determined by, amongst others, the technology of a certain era – this has 
been the case ever since the dawn of humanity. The enhanced technical capacities 
of our era augment our capacity to do harm and good on a previously unimagined 
scale. Yet, I do agree that the growth in power, sophistication and complexity of 
technical processes exposes the process of decision making to greater uncertainty 
and risk. That this uncertainty has in our era the overwhelming tendency to do 
harm, is unfortunately true. 
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each of these cases is not the vibrancy or equality of cultures, not even the in-
teraction between a subject and a cultural other, but the suffering of countless 
others with whom the ethical subject would never be in direct contact. The 
bad conscience – a key term in Levinas’ later philosophy for evoking the 
proximity of the other to the self – is clearly shown to emerge also from the 
memory or knowledge of wars, oppression and “a long indifference to the 
sadness of a whole world.” (cited above). That this immediately also raises the 
question concerning the relevance for Levinas’ philosophy of ethicity of the 
means by which people are oppressed, or the means by which one could gain 
knowledge of such oppression and the means by which one could hope to op-
pose such oppression, will be thematised later, for it will first have to be ar-
gued that such considerations concerning means are not secondary to reflec-
tion on the meaning of the ethical. But let it for now at least be suggested that, 
if we accept Levinas’ underdeveloped idea about the global reach of the ethi-
cal, and thus of responsibility, it would in one form or another naturally have 
to lead to reflection concerning the means that mediate distant people, in other 
words the technical system of the world as we have it today. 
3 FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
Once this international and global dimension of the problems with which 
Levinas aspires to engage has been noticed, the insufficiency of a response 
to them that would only concern the politics of the State becomes evident. 
By making this claim, it is of course not denied that the reflection provided 
by Levinas on the liberal State, the State of which the legislation is con-
tinually challenged in the name of justice, is an essential part of the reflec-
tion on politics. My point is rather that in Levinas’ thinking concerning 
matters political, most often the politics of the State is taken as its largest 
horizon and the presentation of the international or global dimension of the 
political remains underdeveloped. This situation invites his readers to con-
template the inevitable global dimensions of the political from a Levina-
                                           
 By commenting on Levinas’ response to Kant’s practical philosophy, and in par-
ticular the essay on “Perpetual peace” (that is situated in contemporary geopoliti-
cal debates concerning the justification of war in the name of human rights), Al-
fred Hirsch also assumes and demonstrates the capacity and indeed the aptitude of 
Levinas’ philosophy to be confronted with its global relevance. See Alfred Hirsch, 
“Vom Menschenrechte zum ewigen Frieden. Grenzgänge zwischen Kant und Le-
vinas”, in Im Angesicht der Anderen, op. cit. pp. 229–244. 
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sian perspective and this, by starting from the sparse reflections in his 
work that lend themselves to such a reflection. 
A first way to examine the case for such a global Levinasian view 
would be to consider the numerous places in which Levinas lists the hu-
man catastrophes of his lifetime. Speaking of the century of his lifetime, 
Levinas summarises:  
“This is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the totalitari-
anism of right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and the 
genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia.”21  
And elsewhere,  
“[t]he world wars (and local ones), National Socialism, Stalinism (and even de-
Stalinization), the camps, the gas chambers, nuclear weapons, terrorism and un-
employment – that is a lot for just one generation, even for those who were but 
onlookers.”22 
From these and similar passages, it should be clear that when Levinas 
contemplates the catastrophes of his era that they are not simply phe-
nomena that took place in different countries and that they could for that 
reason be said to constitute an international phenomenon; rather, most of 
them are international and sometimes global phenomena and deserve to 
be reflected on in that dimension, since they would be simply unintelli-
gible without this perspective. Furthermore, as pointed out already in 
Chapter 1, it is remarkable that in these passages where Levinas lists the 
most spectacular catastrophes of his century, what happens in far away 
places is of ethical significance for a Levinasian subject of responsibil-
ity, even if he/she is not directly affected by such events. 
This can be shown to hold also in the rare texts of direct political com-
mentary from the pen of Levinas.23 He can hardly be more explicit about this 
than when he comments on the novelty introduced by the scientific and 
technical development of atom bombs and the threat of sparking nuclear war 
by the unleashing of unheard of powers of nature in “On the spirit of Ge-
neva” (1956).24 Since the force of nuclear attack involves a human-made 
force that transcends the power of States that would normally be the ultimate 
instance of protection of people against the forces unleashed by humans, 
                                           
21 ENT 97 / EN 107. 
22 PN 3 / NP 7. 
23 An overview of important themes of political interest in Levinas’ work is given in 
De l’éthique à la justice 135–136. 
24 Caygill gives a detailed analysis of this essay in Levinas and the Political, op. cit. 
pp. 69–71. 
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Levinas can summarise: “Politics is replaced by a cosmo-politics that is a 
physics.”25 The irony with which Levinas exposes the superficiality that in-
ternational political action can have, takes nothing away from the affirmation 
of the technically mediatedness and global dimension of this issue. This 
seems an elementary fact to state, but it means that if Levinas doesn’t want 
to leave politics to its own devices (as argued for in Chapter 1), he has to as-
pire to have something to say for such a cosmo-politics. And he does, in fact, 
open such a discourse by exposing the false start of such a cosmo-politics, 
namely by being the response to a “physics”, that is, by being nothing more 
than an attempt to re-arrange the blind forces of nature as remobilised by 
human effort. Cosmo-politics is in this sense (and in the terms exposed in 
Chapter 2) an “atheistic” enterprise, to which Levinas’ philosophy could ex-
actly contribute a recall to orientation by ethics.26 
Similarly, in an extension of his later meditation on the injustice inher-
ent in the obstinate claim to one’s own position in Being, Levinas asks:  
“My place in Being, the Da- of Dasein – isn’t it already usurpation, already vio-
lence with respect to the other? A preoccupation that has nothing ethereal, noth-
ing abstract about it: the press speaks to us of the Third World, and we are quite 
comfortable here; we’re sure of our daily meals. At whose cost? – we my ask.”27  
Such a remark about the fact of being put to question by the misery of 
far-away others would be completely unintelligible in the context of 
Levinas’ ethics of the face-to-face and of proximity, if one doesn’t accept 
                                           
25 IH 144. 
26 A very noteworthy attempt to make Levinas’ thoughts on ethics useful for a criti-
cal engagement with cosmopolitan political thought (in the usual sense of the 
term), is that of Eduard Jordaan in “Cosmopolitanism, freedom, and indifference: 
a Levinasian view” (Alternatives 34/2009, pp. 83–106). By deploying a Levina-
sian critique, Jordaan argues: “that despite the moral concern for the world’s poor 
which cosmopolitan thought exhibits and seeks to inspire in the rest of us, the 
writings of some influential cosmopolitan authors contain elements that strain 
against greater concern for the world’s poor, and, more worryingly still, might be 
said to entrench and even engender indifference towards the world’s poor.” (p. 
101). The result of this argument is not a “refutation” of cosmopolitan political 
thought, but rather a Levinasian call to greater sensitivity for the risk of indiffer-
ence lurking in the limitation of the responsibility of political agents, the suppres-
sion of otherness of the other and the weaknesses in emphasising equality in cos-
mopolitan theory (p. 84). By restricting his use of Levinas for such a critical expo-
sure, Jordaan shows a “negative” way to use Levinas for argumentation in global 
political relations. Whereas the validity of such a Levinasian approach is not ques-
tioned, it should be noted that my critique of Levinas’ idea of infinite responsibil-
ity and the need to reflect on the means of responsible action (Chapters 6 and 7) 
will set limits to the usefulness of such an approach. 
27 A&T 179 / AT 180, translation modified. 
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that for Levinas my injustice (that is, the manner in which my existence is 
violently integrated with the existence of others) and justice (as response 
to this injustice of my existence) is mediated and constituted even on a 
global scale. To put it bluntly, in Levinas’ example, that which makes 
the questioning of my right to be a matter that is not abstract but very 
concrete is not the proximity of the other, but the newspaper or television 
(i.e., the socio-technical system of news reporting) through which, by 
mediation of which, I am questioned by the far-off other. 
One could equally consider the notion of election and the particular 
universal interpretation that Levinas gives to it in his writings prepared 
for a Jewish context. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 4, the par-
ticularism of Judaism, the election of Israel, is in Levinas’ view the uni-
versal asymmetry of all subjects faced with the others and thus also a 
figure of the obligation to respond to the suffering of all others. The 
global presence of both ethical agents and the suffering others seems to 
fit in the extension of Levinas’ idea of election.  
Two themes of Levinas’ thought directly extend his ethics to an interna-
tional political dimension through their claim to universality and desire for 
universal validity: human rights and humanism. Since the Universal decla-
ration of human rights (1948), all discourse on human rights has to deal with 
this dimension. Having devoted a study previously to Levinas’ thought on 
human rights, I shall not look at this issue in this book.28 There is also more 
than a mere affinity for the global dimension of ethics in the theme of hu-
manism that is used in both Levinas’ philosophy and his writings prepared 
for Jewish readerships. That humanism tends to be a discourse that should at 
the very least be defined by its claim to an ethical relevance for the whole of 
humanity, warrants the attention that will be devoted to it in the whole of 
Part 2 of this book.  
Apart, then, from explicit references to international political issues 
one needs simply to reflect on key notions from Levinas’ philosophy in 
order to realise that it is in vain that one avoids the global dimension 
thereof. Peace, if it is to retain any correspondence with what is commonly 
understood by it, that is, what is commonly yearned for by people in a 
state of war or violent conflict, cannot be conceived of independently from 
international relations – and this, even if one doesn’t reduce reflection on 
peace to the subtle balance of warring parties, but instead refers it to the 
                                           
28 See my “The quest for justice versus the rights of the other?”, in In Levinas’ trace. 
Maria Dimitrova (ed.). Sofia: Avangard Prima Publishers, 2010, pp. 101–111. 
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alterity of the other, that would be more original than war.29 Food for 
one’s hungry neighbour is a simple idea, used by Levinas, but one that 
obviously refers to the establishment of nutritional security and what is 
today called environmental justice – that is, if it is not reduced to a sim-
plistic and moralistic handing out of sandwiches as alms (which of 
course doesn’t exclude the sharing of sandwiches). 
As has already been suggested at the end of § 2 (but will be argued 
in detail in Chapter 7), once it is affirmed within the Levinasian context 
that the means of ethical conduct is significant for ethics, then the entire 
question regarding the “how?” of the efficient use of means, the question 
of the just use of means, stretches as far as the effect of the use of these 
means. And since ethics involves all human action, ethics thus covers all 
technical action, i.e., all action as it is transformed, specialised or aug-
mented through the implementation of technical means. For this reason 
the question concerning the justice done to ethics is as big as the techni-
cal systems needed to realise justice or submitted to the evaluation of 
justice – which is the global scale. The global dimension of international 
relations, of media, of the economy, of marketing, of cultural exchange, 
of banks, transport and pollution, etc., forms the horizon within which 
justice should be thought through and pursued. 
That this is a valid conclusion for Levinas’ ethics could also be 
shown by transposing the question to the register of ontology and alter-
ity. The Saying is the Saying of the Said, claims Levinas, which means 
that the ethical stretches as far as the ontological. As far as there is a 
human network of capability of “I can”, so far is this capability ques-
tioned by the ethical. As far as there are beings that understand Being, 
but do so in interaction or exchange, albeit mediated by technical means, 
there is an exchange of the logos, or an interference in the logos of un-
derstanding that the different individuals carry. This is of course not, or 
not always on an explicit level, but very often implicit, or on the level of 
mentality (in the sense explained in Chapter 2). Furthermore, I can see 
no way in which there could be a limit in principle in the consideration 
of the thirds; it seems inevitable to conclude that the calculation of justice, 
as presented by Levinas, should at least in principle stretch as far as all 
the thirds, that is, the entire humanity.  
                                           
29 A development of the theme of peace in Levinas from a point of view that sup-
ports my “global” perspective can be found in the already mentioned essay of Al-
fred Hirsch, “Vom Menschenrechte zum ewigen Frieden.” op. cit.  
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To conclude, it is unjustified and undesirable to think of Levinas’ 
philosophy principally in terms of ethics (as argued in Chapter 1) and 
when thought of politically then it is unjustified to restrict reflection to 
the local, the neighbourhood or the State context. The ultimate horizon 
within which Levinas’ ethics and theory of justice presents itself to be 
thought through is that of the entire humanity and the international and 
global relations that bring people into interaction. That Levinas didn’t 
devote too much space to developing his thought in this direction cannot 
be considered an invalidation of this conclusion. Rather, his negligence 
in this regard should be the subject not only of our criticism, but also of 
our continued efforts to appropriate and engage with his thought. At the 
same time, my point is not to reduce the political implications of Levi-
nas’ thought to the global. Responsibility for a global world does not 
exclude responsibility for the local, but entails at least in principle an 
openness to the biggest scale in which to situate all reflection on respon-
sibility and all evaluation of responsible action. 
This international or global horizon of ethics is of course not an 
a-temporal aspect of ethics or implication of Levinas’ thought on the 
ethical – the inevitable international or global fabrication of our very 
lifeworld and of the political structure of contemporary life is simply the 
condition of our contemporary world. This is true not only for people 
living in the advanced industrial regions of the planet, but practically for 
everybody. Since the creation of a world of networked societies, the 
global dimension is rather the rule than the exception: practically all so-
cieties are bound up in global networks and, as Manuel Castells has 
shown with perspicacity, marginalisation is also a form of integration 
into the global network.30 
The historical situation in which the a-historical validity of the 
ethicity of Levinas has to realise itself, is implied in the very choice of 
the word “responsibility” for ethicity, since this prospective understanding 
of responsibility as the major figure for the reflection on obligation is 
itself the child of an era of unparalleled complexification and thus uncer-
tainty of the causal networks of human action. Although ethicity as such 
is an a-historical, context-independent signification, for Levinas,31 the 
                                           
30 See Manuel Castells, “The rise of the fourth world: informational capitalism, pov-
erty, and social exclusion”, in End of millennium, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, chap-
ter 2. 
31 However, since the ethical is only as old as the human, the question of ethico-
genesis might be interesting to explore. One finds a theory of ethico-genesis in the 
work of another critical Heidegger student, Hans Jonas. In his work too, one has 
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world in which one has to weigh the responsibility due to a plurality of 
others, the world in which one has to be just, is historically constituted. 
This might seem a very basic point to make, but with all of Levinas’ in-
sistence on the context-independent signification of the alterity of the 
other, this fact tends to fade into the background, not only in his own 
work, but also in that of a good number of his commentators. 
Typical of this contemporary political condition is the frequent, con-
stant and complex contact between people of different cultural and there-
fore ethico-evaluative backgrounds.32 A phenomenon that is probably as 
old as humanity, in our time it has taken on proportions probably never 
before experienced. That this is due to immigration, travelling, the in-
creasing density of commerce, military activity, refuge seeking, sport 
and cultural exchanges, all of these enforced by the development of 
technologies of transport, of communication and of the diffusion of cul-
tural products, could be considered general knowledge. A mixture of old 
and new forms of misery, and thus sources of ethical appeal and of politi-
cal demands of rights or claims to recognition spontaneously ensue from 
this situation. At the same time claims for the universal institutionalisa-
tion of, and at worse the widespread lip-service to, a fairly established 
set of human rights and the establishment of international agreements or 
institutions of justice, on the one hand and the spread of a relatively homo-
geneous economic model over the globe, on the other hand, enhance the 
compatibility and translatability between different cultures, sometimes 
creating the impression of homogenising cultural plurality to dialects of 
one language and seeming to limit the differences of a process of multi-
ple modernities.33 Once it is recognised that people are caught in the ten-
sion between such diversifying and unifying forces and the values they 
enforce in their lifeworld, one could, from this perspective, return to 
                                           
to distinguish between two theories of responsibility – the one ethicity, the other 
responsibility for a particular context or era of human history – see my “Respon-
sibility in an era of modern technology and nihilism. Part 2. Inter-connection and 
implications of the two notions of responsibility in Jonas”, in Dialogue. Canadian 
Philosophical Review 48/4, 2009, pp. 841–866. 
32 This fact, together with the preceding line of argumentation, draws the direction in 
which I shall attempt to think about political responsibility very close to the “so-
cial connection model” of responsibility developed by Iris Young in “Responsibil-
ity, Social connection, and Global labor justice”, in Global Challenges. War, Self-
determination, and responsibility for Justice. Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 
2007, pp. 159–186. 
33 See especially Shmuel Eisenstadt, “Multiple modernities” in Daedalus 129/1, 
2000, pp. 1–29. 
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Levinas to enquire about his contribution to ethics in such a world. This 
is what will be done in Part 2 of this book. 
But before we turn the page, let the preceding reflection serve to bring a 
final articulation to the reference to a “globalised world” in the title of the 
book. There is in this book no ambition to make a contribution to the state of 
the debate about the status of globalisation or the forms of modernisation. 
“Globalised” is the term that marks the intention to engage as well as is pos-
sible with the world in its current situation and of which I have just recalled 
some salient traits. It is my intention to emphatically situate my reflection on 
Levinas, within this world. This is, as far as I am concerned, part of the 
meaning of doing justice to responsibility. Reflection on the genocide in the 
Second World War and on the process and intellectual interpretation of 
decolonisation is still of great importance to this world, but I explicitly resist 
a reflection that is so philologically mesmerised by the texts of Levinas’ 
arguments, that it doesn’t dare to venture further to contemplate the contem-
porary relevance thereof. Even more important – and that is the second justi-
fication for the choice of placing the “globalised world” in the title – is the 
effort to avoid the moralistic and therefore context-alien appropriation of 
Levinas for the contemporary world. That a discourse about globalisation 
and ethics can equally succumb to moralization goes without saying. 
Whether I succeed in avoiding this, my reader will judge. 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
PART 2 
Levinas’ post-anti-humanist humanism 
and after 
 
 
 
As a way of accessing the guiding question of this Part, I combine the two 
uses of the term humanitas indicated by Aulus Gellius – either as philan-
thropia or as paideia1 – to give an approximation of the idea of humanism. 
Accordingly, humanism concerns schooling – in particular schooling in what 
are considered the most excellent cultural products of a particular group, in 
other words schooling in the authoritative tradition – with the intention of 
cultivating people that would live more virtuously with others. Often such an 
intellectual position is accompanied and enforced by a cultural politics that 
involves the study of this tradition and the promotion of this culture, with the 
claim that it would contribute to moral progress and serve as an antidote for 
corrupting attitudes and uncivilised behaviour. The declared intention is to 
open a way for laudable (or humane) interaction with all people and it is ex-
actly this humanist study that would give insight not only into what it means 
for some people to be human, but what it means for all to be human and 
what it means to be truly human in a normative sense. 
This approximation2 suffices to suggest that if Levinas, at a certain stage 
of his intellectual trajectory, presents his own philosophy as a humanism – 
                                           
1 Aulus Gellius, The Attic nights, Vol. 2. London: William Heinemann (Loeb clas-
sical library), [1927] 1982. Philanthropia is indicated by Gellius to be the com-
mon, but incorrect, meaning: “signifying a kind of friendly spirit and good-feeling 
towards all men without distinction”. The proper, Latin meaning corresponds with 
paideia, which is the exclusively human pursuit of “education and training in the 
liberal arts”. (Book XIII, xvii, pp. 457–458). 
2 I insist on the orientational value of this approximation; any proper encyclopaedia 
of the history of ideas will reveal the complex history of cultural practices and atti-
tudes that have been named “humanist”.  
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albeit then as a “humanism of the other” – then we can expect not only a 
claim to the universal validity of the responsibility at the core of his concern 
for the other, but also that we would find some indication of the kind of 
humanist culture, or an equivalent thereof, that would support this respon-
sibility. Such is the working hypothesis that will be put to the test in this 
second Part – to be partially confirmed and partially amended and discarded. 
Thematically the hypothesis links Part 2 of this book, not only to the theme 
of politics in the Introduction and the question concerning the global range of 
responsibility in Part 1, but also with my own elaboration on responsibility 
and the means by which responsible action is supported as detailed in Part 3. 
Since the diversity of humanisms and claims to the meaning of “real 
humanism” cannot easily be harmonised into a few general theses, it 
would require a particularly sophisticated knowledge of the historical 
development of the different species of humanism to do justice to a 
comparison between them and the work of Levinas. I don’t claim such 
competence and shall opt for a different approach that would be equally 
legitimate for the explorative purposes of the current study. In the centre 
of the current study will be an examination of the use that Levinas has 
made of the term “humanism” and “anti-humanism”.3 
Yet, even though this is a completely reasonable question to pose to 
the works of Levinas, it could hardly be said to be an evident question to 
put to it. Were it not for the fact that Levinas gave the title Humanisme 
de l’autre homme, “Humanism of the other (human)”, to a small selection 
of essays in 1972, it would certainly have been less obvious to enquire 
about humanism in his thought. The reason for this is the fact that the 
question of humanism is hardly present in his work. A consultation of 
the Levinas concordance4 shows that no use is made of the word “hu-
manism” in Existence and existents or in Totality and infinity. It is barely 
given more than a passing mention in Otherwise than Being, and in his 
other books it is very infrequently used – the notable exceptions, namely 
the last two essays of Difficult freedom and the book that carries the 
word in its title, Humanism of the other, will be brought to our attention 
later. Of all these disparate references, it is certainly not irrelevant to 
                                           
3 Since the issue here is the way in which Levinas’ develops his own position, and 
not a reconstruction of all the implicit and explicit debates with those thinkers of 
the “end of man”, I use “anti-humanism” in the way that Levinas does and thus 
without any claim from my side either of there being a unified position held by a 
number of authors, or reducing any of them to an anti-humanism. 
4 Cristian Ciocan and Georges Hansel. Levinas concordance. Dortrecht: Springer, 
2005. 
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note that more pertain to anti-humanism than to humanism and in total a 
larger volume of discussion is set aside for presenting Levinas’ agree-
ments with anti-humanism than with humanism, or his criticism of anti-
humanism than his actual support for humanism. 
If we suspend for a moment the two exceptions (alluded to above) to this 
general lack of interest in matters of humanism or even anti-humanism, one 
finds in the entire works of Levinas so little that is explicitly developed on 
humanism and anti-humanism that it cannot be credibly systematised. 
However, the most important theses retained in his works can be rendered 
fairly easily: 
(1) In both the Judaic texts and the philosophical texts the heart of hu-
manism is the human being and its value, its liberty and its material 
needs. This human being is in the first place the other human being.5 
(2) Of pre-modern, Greco-Roman humanism we learn that it was assi-
milated partially by Christianity and Judaism, and is an element that 
facilitates dialogue between these two religions.6 It is at the same 
time the required defence of society against revenge and violence, 
but can lose its vigilance for instituted violence.7  
(3) In as far as the philosophy of humanism is concerned, we hear about 
its socialist8 or Marxist9 versions, for which Levinas shows some 
support. The same affinity is expressed with regard to its existentia-
list articulation in Sartre10 or in Bloch’s neo-Marxist reformulation.11 
Sartre fares better on the all-important issue of human freedom than 
does Merleau-Ponty.12 This support includes the criticism formulated 
against previous schoolish humanism13 and of bourgeois humanism 
by Althusser,14 and implies some criticism of Heidegger’s apparent 
lack of attention to the material conditions of human existence.15 
That Heidegger’s thought is not humanist is claimed already for 
Being and time,16 but of course also for the ideas expressed in the 
                                           
5 BPW 14 / LC 71, NTR 98 / DSAS 17. 
6 DF 105, 160 / DL 151, 225. 
7 BV 40 / ADV 57. 
8 TO 61 / TA 42f. 
9 NTR 97 / DSAS 16f, GCM 48 / DVI 84. 
10 IH 106, IH 128. 
11 GDT 94 / DMT 109, GCM 33 / DVI 62. 
12 Compare IH 128f with ENT 112 / EN 122. 
13 IH 128. 
14 GCM 3 / DVI 18.  
15 TO 61 / TA 43. 
16 IH 186, ENT 210 / EN 207, GDT 24 / DMT 33. 
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Letter on “humanism”17 and his later philosophy in general.18 Anti-
humanism is appreciated for its attention to human misery,19 for the 
decentring of the subject20 and to a certain extent for exposing what 
hypocrisy there might have been in humanist literature.21 However, it 
is criticised for its moral laxity and lack of orientation.22 It is associa-
ted with the death of God, the end of a certain idea of the human 
being and the play of language without final significance.23  
(4) There exists also a special link between Judaism and humanism,24 
and Judaism could be considered as the humanism of a demanding 
God.25 It is from Judaism that one learns in the first place about the 
humanism in which the other is the centre piece.26 Humanism can 
have the meaning of “humanitarianism” – it is, for example, appro-
priate to call the ancient institution of “cities of refuge” humanistic.27 
The Torah and the study thereof could reanimate a humanism that 
has lost its vigilance.28  
Taken in isolation, the single references in this catalogue of opinions regard-
ing humanism and anti-humanism are hardly of any interest. Which is not to 
say that they are of no value. In their respective context these remarks make 
a contribution to the argument of the respective texts. Considered together, 
they indicate at least that Levinas showed some interest in the development 
of the debate about humanism and anti-humanism. However, in none of 
these instances is the issue a presentation or overview of humanism or a con-
sidered evaluation of whatever the main tenets of humanism might be.29 
The picture changes somewhat if we turn our attention now to the texts 
that have thus far been left out of consideration: the two essays at the end of 
Difficult freedom and Humanism of the other. In doing so, it seems prudent 
to respect from the outset the fact that Levinas practices in them two distinct 
                                           
17 GDT 24 / DMT 33, 68. 
18 PN 127f / SMB 10f. 
19 OS 131 / HS 178. 
20 OB 127 / AE 203, GDT 182 / DMT 213. 
21 PN 14–15 / NP 19, BV 32 / ADV 43. 
22 GCM 49 / DVI 86. 
23 PN 4 / NP 8, ENT 61 / EN 72. 
24 NTR 82 / QLT 175. 
25 DF 26 / DL 46. 
26 NTR 98 / DSAS 17. 
27 BV 42 / ADV 59. 
28 BV 38 / ADV 55. 
29 This does of course not exclude the possibility of examining each of these remarks 
in detail, as I have done with the even rarer remarks by Levinas on ethnography or 
decolonisation in Part 1 of this book. But this will not be my approach here. 
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discursive modes: in the first case we find a pedagogue that is concerned 
about the role of Jewish education in a secular (laïque) Western country and 
about the merits of Judaism as a religion – the writer is not insensitive to the 
philosophical ambiance in which he speaks about education; in the second 
case, the author is a philosopher who is concerned about the ethical, about 
finding the appropriate discourse in which to explore and advocate it, and 
who, while thinking, is inspired to a degree by his own understanding and 
practice of Judaism. One Levinas, two distinctive voices: Jewish pedagogue 
and French philosopher. Even though there are similarities in the two voices 
– as will be shown – the conclusions to be drawn from them are not identi-
cal. Since most of what has been catalogued above from the works of Levi-
nas concerning humanism and anti-humanism can be related to these texts, I 
shall proceed by discussing first the two essays from Difficult freedom, be-
fore attempting a full commentary on Humanism of the other. 
The first two chapters of this Part of the book are devoted to a careful 
exegesis and presentation of Levinas’ humanism, where humanism is un-
derstood to provide a perspective on Levinas’ main philosophical concerns 
in view of the question of the universal significance thereof (and of which 
Part 1 mapped the global, political significance). Accordingly, in Chapter 
4 the idea of a Hebraic humanism and the opposition between the study of 
the Talmud and anti-humanism will be explored. Similarly, in Chapter 5 a 
detailed interpretation of the 1972 book, Humanism of the other, is worked 
out. Also, the thought exposed in that book will be situated in the develop-
ment of Levinas’ philosophical thought with respect to the influential 
views on humanism by such divergent contemporaries of Levinas as Sartre, 
Heidegger and Althusser. The main ideas of Levinas’ later philosophy – as 
presented in the two preceding chapters – will be submitted to critical scru-
tiny especially with regard to the political implications thereof, in Chapter 
6. By doing so, I expose my agreements and disagreements with Levinas 
and justify my quest of an understanding of political responsibility for a 
globalised world, after Levinas. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Humanism and anti-humanism  
in Levinas’ reflection  
on Jewish education 
 
 
 
Humanism is explicitly thematised and advocated in the last two essays of 
Difficult freedom, and this in two quite different ways: the first as a plea “For a 
Hebraic humanism” (1956), the second as a meditation on “Anti-humanism 
and education” (1973). The two texts, one concerned with a particular form of 
humanism and the other only with humanism after or through anti-humanism, 
share a number of important concerns. First, both are concerned with educa-
tion and, in particular, the education of young Jews in the Jewish heritage or 
from a Jewish orientation. Second, this issue is responded to, at least formally, 
by an appeal to “humanism” (but the different articulations of the two essays 
will be pointed out later) and this in the face of the phenomenon of Jews inte-
grating into the ambient Western cultures, especially by equating their Jewish 
morality with humanist ideas of the West. Third, in opposition to this ten-
dency and in the face of the dissolution of Diaspora Judaism, Levinas pro-
poses in both essays an education that is not merely religious education, but 
the transmission of competence in an entire civilisation or culture. This means 
not just the acquisition of a certain knowledge, but especially a practice, 
namely that of working through the Bible and Rabbinic literature, and where 
this practice links both with the rituals of the Jewish religion and the practice 
of ethics for the advantage of all people. Finally, in both texts the Hebrew Bi-
ble and the subsequent reflection on it in Rabbinic literature gives a privileged 
and decisive access to what the human being is.1  
                                           
1 DF 275 and 284 / DL 383 and 395. 
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If there is a distinctive tension or progression between the two es-
says, then this can to a large extent be attributed to a change in Levinas’ 
attitude in associating Judaism with humanism. In order to appreciate 
this change with respect to the central reference to humanism, I shall 
now look more closely at the two essays in turn.  
1 “FOR A HEBRAIC HUMANISM” 
Against the background of Jewish assimilation and concerns about the 
desirability of learning Hebrew and the risk of imperilment that a He-
brew education might pose to the secular education (éducation laïque), 
Levinas suggests that Jewish education be rethought from the perspec-
tive of the meaning of Judaism in the contemporary world, that is, a 
world in which humanity is in question.2 It is, in Levinas’ view, a He-
braic humanism that is required to reanimate Judaism in a manner that is 
relevant for the contemporary world. In order to understand this claim, 
one first needs to understand what is meant by humanism in general. 
Humanism might be a questionable term, as Levinas points out, but this 
much can be said for the purposes of his essay: humanism is  
“a system of principles and disciplines that free human life from the prestige of 
myths, the discord they introduce into ideas and the cruelty they perpetuate in 
social customs.”3  
We have seen in Chapter 2 the importance of secular (desacralising) 
thought for Levinas, and the key role that it plays in his philosophy and 
social diagnoses – it is by attributing such a secularising quality to hu-
manism in general, that Levinas derives the secular (laïque) quality of 
the Hebraic humanism that he advocates. This doesn’t necessarily mean 
that for Levinas humanism can be reduced to its secularising or demy-
thologising nature, but that this is at least one central aspect of humanism, 
and that this quality should, in his view, suffice to appease his readers’ 
concern about the maintenance of secular education. To be true, there is 
                                           
2 “[T]he study of Hebrew itself lends support to what can today give a meaning to 
Judaism. It lends support to the Jewish humanism which cannot remain indifferent 
to the modern world in which it seeks a whole humanity.” (DF 273 / DL 381). It is 
because of this importance of the study of Hebrew and Hebrew texts, that I prefer 
to render the title of the essay as “For a Hebraic humanism” [Pour un humanisme 
hébraïque], rather than “For a Jewish humanism” as the English translator does. 
Besides, Levinas uses in the text both expressions: “Hebraic humanism” and 
“Jewish humanism”.  
3 DF 273 / DL 381. 
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certainly much more to Judaism than secularising thought, but this set of 
principles and disciplines that opposes cruelty, this secularity, is a com-
mon denominator of all forms of expression of Judaism. What makes 
this humanism “Hebraic” is the centre of its discipline: the study of a 
literature and a civilisation that turns around the commentary of the Jew-
ish Law and that is maintained in practice. 
As important as the study of texts may be, it is the practice that ensues 
from it, that is essential. For it is only in the practice of justice (of which 
this humanism is the incessant contemplation and study) that God can be 
seen. Indeed, according to Levinas, the monotheism of Judaism (from the 
Bible, throughout the Talmudic commentaries) that is the ultimate source 
of this Hebraic humanism, is not bent on facilitating a privileged vision of 
God for the faithful, but on steering them towards their work for other 
people. In this sense, Levinas can claim that “[m]onotheism is a human-
ism”.4 One could paraphrase that monotheism is a secularising (including, 
possibly, atheistic), never-ending reflection on justice for all people 
through the incessant study of the Talmud. But this humanism needs its 
humanists to give access to its treasures. This is the importance of Jewish 
humanism,5 which is at least as necessary for the contemporary world as 
the Greco-Roman heritage of the West. 
From this perspective, it should be clear that Levinas is grappling 
here with much more than teaching an old language. The education that 
he has in mind is an access to and an institutional support for a “civilisa-
tion of justice”. The Jewish institutions of the Diaspora can be mobilised 
for an ambitious cultural programme of uniting spirit and justice, some-
what parallel to Gellius’, paideia and philanthropia. And if this means 
that a particularity of Jews and Judaism has to be affirmed in the proc-
ess, it is at the service of excavating from the Jewish heritage that which 
is needed for the accord amongst all people. 
This, then, is Levinas’ message to the Jewish community in France 
in 1956: continue to have your children and students study Hebrew and 
everything that is associated with the discipline of studying the text of 
the Hebraic tradition. Sure enough, this will help you to keep Judaism 
alive and relevant, which might be important to you for whatever per-
sonal, religious or cultural reason, but the real objective thereof is not the 
continued existence of a religion or even the continued service to its 
God, but the fate of human beings, in other words, justice.  
                                           
4 DF 275 / DL 383. 
5 DF 275 / DL 383. 
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But since one cannot accept that the contemporary reader would simply 
agree with this point of view, it is important to reflect on what the structure 
of validation is that implicitly supports Levinas’ point of view: what is re-
quired from a reader to accept what Levinas proposes in this text? Since 
Levinas wrote the text for Jews in the Diaspora, one could suppose that he 
counted on a Jewish faith or an acceptance of the authority of the Jewish 
religion or at least on a pro-Jewish sentiment in order to make his point. 
From the content of the argument it seems that non-Jews that, for whatever 
reason, are convinced that Judaism or the Hebraic literature makes a decisive 
contribution to the schooling of humanity for justice, would also be likely to 
accept Levinas’ point. However, Levinas doesn’t make such reasons explicit 
(beyond what is summarised above) and his essay is not very clear on this 
issue of the reasons for agreeing with its point about Hebraic humanism. 
Since Levinas did develop similar ideas or a similar perspective on Judaism 
in other essays from the same period and for a similar audience, it seems 
legitimate to receive instruction from them regarding the structure of vali-
dation that Levinas supposes as sufficient support for this “Hebraic Juda-
ism”. This regards (1) the kind of Judaism, (2) the universality of Judaism 
and (3) the “atheism” of Judaism. 
In examining Levinas’ other pleas for the importance of Talmudic stud-
ies, one is struck, on the one hand by the specificity of what is required from 
his readership in terms of the kind of Judaism necessary in order to “play his 
game”, but on the other hand, by the fact that this specificity has not much to 
do with enthusiasm for a sectarian piety, but with the shock and horror of the 
fate of the Jews of Europe in the fifteen years and more preceding these 
essays. In “Education and prayer”6 Levinas expresses the conviction that, as 
important as prayer might be or might have been for Jews the  
“Judaism of the house of prayer has ceased to be transmittable. The old-fashioned Ju-
daism is dying off, or is already dead. This is why we must return to Jewish wisdom; 
this is why in our recitation of this wisdom we must reawaken the reason that has gone 
to sleep; this is why the Judaism of reason must take precedence over the Judaism of 
prayer: the Jew of the Talmud must take precedence over the Jew of the Psalms.”7  
The Judaism that Levinas has in mind is one that has given up the desire (or 
that never had it) to conquer a part of the public space by its edifices – it has 
                                           
6 According to the information on Espacethique (http://espacethique.free.fr/ in-
dex.php?lng=fr, consulted 9 June 2010), this essay first appeared under the title 
“Philosophie de la prière” in Bulletin intérieur du Consistoire Central des Israéli-
tes de France in 1964, pp. 57–59. Written between “For a Hebraic humanism” 
and “Anti-humanism and education” it is probably correct to state that it reflects a 
long standing perspective of Levinas on Jewish spiritual life. 
7 DF 271 / DL 377. 
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no infrastructure that can artificially support it, it is kept from dissolution 
by a Jewish science of texts, the meticulous study (in Hebrew) of which is 
comparable to visiting cathedrals.8 Hence the particular kind of practice, 
textual and reflective, that Levinas advocates as an indispensable component 
of Judaism – that is why the “Judaism with a historic reality – Judaism, 
neither more nor less – is rabbinic.”9 However, having noted Levinas’ in-
sistence on the particularity of Judaism or a particular kind of Judaism as 
essential for the support of an education that is guided by the dream of a 
Hebraic humanism, it should be pointed out at the same time that being Jew-
ish is actually not a specific enough requirement to go along with Levinas’ 
idea. The centrality of the study of the Talmud in Levinas’ educational pro-
gramme and in his idea of Judaism, serves to lead one back to what is Jewish 
about Jews: not their blood, history or land,10 in fact, not a religion or even 
God in the first place, but rather the study of the law and the relation to other 
people that it mediates: the singularity of Judaism resides exactly here:  
“the link between God and man is not an emotional communion that takes place 
within the love of a God incarnate, but a spiritual or intellectual relationship [une 
relation entre esprits] which takes place through an education by the Torah.”11  
Justice is the essence of this teaching and of the practice that should fol-
low from it; justice is the essence of Judaism.12 
From this point Levinas can insist that the very specific particularity of 
Judaism doesn’t obstruct, but rather furthers its universalism.13 Of this uni-
versalism, Levinas gives us a good idea in “A religion for adults” (1957).14 
Jewish universalism doesn’t mean the universalism of a truth that is equally 
valid for everybody, but it is universal because it is open to everybody. Open 
not in the sense of a desire to proselytise everybody, but to serve everybody. 
The particularity of Judaism is the flip side of this moral universalism: realis-
ing the obligation to serve particularises or singularises the person or group 
that realises this obligation. In this sense, the particularisation of Israel is an 
election, it is a setting it apart from other. But according to Levinas’ under-
                                           
8 DF 257 / DL 357. 
9 DF 13 / DL 28. 
10 DF 176, 23 / DL 246, 40f. 
11 DF 144 / DL 204, translation modified. 
12 “The justice rendered to the other, my neighbour, gives me an unsurpassable 
proximity to God. It is as intimate as the prayer and the liturgy which without jus-
tice are nothing. […] The pious person is the just person.” (DF 18 / DL 34, trans-
lation modified). 
13 DF 13 / DL 27. 
14 DF 11–23 / DL 24–42, in particular the ideas expressed in DF 21f / DL 38ff and 
repeated elsewhere in Difficult freedom. 
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standing of election, it is not a “historical, national, local or racial”15 cate-
gory; despite whatever impression might be created by the Hebrew Bible or 
by certain strands of interpretation of Judaism, the particularity or election of 
Israel has, according to Levinas, nothing to do with being the first monothe-
ism, or having authored a certain wisdom, or being the privileged instance of 
a whimsical divine decision. This setting apart is proper to every human sub-
ject in his or her capacity as obliged to serve the others. A synonym for this 
setting apart or particularism is (moral) asymmetry. The particularity in Jew-
ish particularism is the singularity of any human subject as situated excep-
tionally in an asymmetric position with regard to the others. If there is to be 
equality between people, it can be realised only on the basis of the assump-
tion of this inequality or asymmetry; if there is a universality of humanity, it 
can be realised only on the basis of particularism (provided that particularism 
is understood in the sense explained here). The ethnic or historical people 
called Israel, is in Levinas’ interpretation of Judaism, only one possible 
manifestation of a broader category of “Israel” to which any person may be-
long, and that carries the particular name “Israel” only because of the par-
ticular historical context in which the testimony of this election of all human 
subjects has been transmitted. But this tradition teaches that a pagan who 
knows the Torah – or rather a pagan that realises his or her election to serve 
all people – is equal to the High Priest.16 Levinas is, of course, not ignorant 
of the radicality of the interpretation that he gives here of Judaism, in fact, 
after a similar explanation of election in the Universalis article on “Judaism” 
(197117) Levinas exclaims: “This is the extreme humanism of a God who 
demands much of people”.18 This exclamation is deserved, not only because 
of the extreme demand placed on human agents by God, according to this 
interpretation of Judaism, but also because of Levinas’ labelling it as “hu-
manist”. The latter refers clearly to the centrality of the service due to human 
beings. But what then about God?  
This question is answered in a radio address, “Loving the Torah more 
than God” (1955)19 of which the concluding point is summarised in a simi-
lar exclamation about Judaism: “It is a complete and austere humanism, 
linked to a difficult adoration!”20 It is everything to understand why the 
adoration of such a God is difficult – it is historical circumstances that, 
                                           
15 DF 22 / DL 40. 
16 DF 22 / DL 40. 
17 Date of publication confirmed on Espacethique (http://espacethique.free.fr/ in-
dex.php?lng=fr, consulted 9 June 2010). 
18 DF 26 / DL 46, translation modified. 
19 DF 142–145 / DL 201–206. 
20 DF 145 / DL 206. 
LEVINAS’ POST-ANTI-HUMANIST HUMANISM AND AFTER | 89 
 
whilst making a certain kind devotion to God impossible, still require a 
service to humanity. The suffering of Jews in the last century has made 
more than evident the death of a certain God:  
“What can this suffering of the innocents mean? Is it not proof of a world without 
God, where only man measure Good and Evil? The simplest and most common 
answer would be atheism. This is also the sanest reaction for all those for whom 
previously a fairly primary sort of God had dished out prizes, inflicted punish-
ment or pardoned sins – a God who, in His goodness, treated men like children. 
But with what lesser demon or strange magician have you therefore filled our 
heaven, you who claim that it is empty?”21  
But even if by “God” Levinas has in mind the “adult’s God [who] is re-
vealed precisely through the void of the child’s heaven”,22 what makes 
him persevere in the use of this word? It is the belief that  
“[c]onfidence in a God Who is not made manifest through any worldly authority 
can rely only on internal evidence and the values of an education. To the credit of 
Judaism, there is nothing blind about this.”23  
And this loving of the Torah, more than God, would be a  
“protection against the madness of a direct contact with the Sacred that is unme-
diated by reason. But above all it is a confidence that does not rely on the triumph 
of any institution, it is the internal evidence of morality supplied by the Torah.”24  
This concession to atheism should be added onto the appropriation of the 
history of secularisation that is central to Judaism:  
“Judaism has decharmed [désensorcelé] the world, contesting the notion that re-
ligions apparently evolved out of enthusiasm and the sacred. […] Monotheism 
marks a break with a certain conception of the sacred. It neither unifies nor hier-
archizes the numerous and numinous gods; instead it denies them. As regards the 
divine, which they incarnate, it is merely atheism.”25  
                                           
21 DF 143 / DL 202. 
22 DF 143 / DL 203. 
23 DF 144 / DL 204, my emphasis. 
24 DF 144 / DL 204, my emphasis. 
25 DF 14–15 / DL 28–29, translation modified, my emphasis. At this point the con-
clusion of Levinas’ 1957 essay on Lévy-Bruhl should be called to mind: “But is 
monotheistic civilization incapable of responding to this crisis by an orientation 
liberated from the horrors of myths, the confusion of thought they produce, and 
the acts of cruelty they perpetuate in social customs?” (ENT 51 / EN 63). If the 
West has the capacity to resist the modern avatars of the mythical gods, then 
Levinas seems to claim implicitly, it is because it has emerged from monotheism, 
of which the excellence is also in this non-confessional context indicated to be its 
secularising potential. 
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There is for all intents and purposes, no meaningful discourse on God 
possible independent from the question of ethics. Ethics is that by which 
God is seen;26 but what can be known about God, God’s attributes, are 
all imperatives.27 And by this different way we arrive once again at the 
primacy of the Judaism that contemplates the Talmud, over the Judaism 
that praises the attributes of God in Psalms.28  
After this detour through Difficult freedom, let us get back to the ques-
tion posed at the end of our reading of “For a Hebraic humanism”: what is 
the structure of validation assumed by Levinas’ plea for a Hebraic human-
ism? The answer consists of three interdependent elements: (1) Talmudic 
study as the essence of Judaism, (2) a universalism that is both a task and a 
recognition to all those people of other traditions that recognise this task, and 
(3) an embracing of the history of secularisation, complemented by a large 
concession to atheism. The support that these three elements could gain 
stem, in turn, (1) from an inner affirmation of the validity of the texts and 
debates of the Talmud and the study and commentary thereof, (2) from the 
message of the Talmud concerning the universal reach of its meaning, as 
well as the capability demonstrated by people from other traditions to con-
tribute to the debate about justice and their capability to arrange their action 
accordingly and (3) from the evidence imposed by world historical events 
that place a question mark on certain kinds of religious practice. This means, 
for Jews, a clear relativisation and reinterpretation of theological claims to an 
exceptional, God-ordained election, as well as a considerable deflation of 
claims about God or revelation. For non-Jews, this means a strong claim as 
to the importance of the study of Judaic antiquity, next to and at least on a 
par with, for instance, Greco-Roman antiquity (one might say, a relativisa-
tion of the inferior position accorded generally in the contemporary study of 
antiquity to the Hebraic heritage), as well as a claim, not only to the universal 
validity of its ethical demand for justice, but also to incorporating the reflec-
tion of other traditions on justice into a Talmudic debate on justice, presented 
as universal. This holds for the adherents of other monotheisms,29 and be-
yond.30 However, in this debate, the study of classical texts – a study that 
avoids the dead-end of mere philology, but enters the game of debate about 
                                           
26 DF 17 / DL 33. 
27 DF 17 / DL 33. 
28 As in the citation of DF 271 / DL 377, above. 
29 DF 180 / DL 252. 
30 “Rest assured that the light is not reserved for Israel alone, and darkness for the 
rest of humanity.” (DF 240 / DL 335–336). 
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justice – is crucial and for this reason it is difficult to see what place non-
scriptural religions and cultures would take in this debate. 
In short, monotheism as humanism, and in particular its Hebraic ver-
sion, is the quasi-atheistic study of Talmudic text, with the view to a just 
human practice. The last element of this circumscription – just practice – 
is crucial and follows not only from the particular claim to universalism 
and a deflated theology, but – and this is dear to Levinas – from the 
teaching of the Talmud itself. About Jews, he can state that  
“the truth – the knowledge of God – is not a question of dogma for them, but one 
of action […] a Jew can communicate just as intimately and religiously with a 
non-Jew who practises morality […] as with another Jew”.31  
And this communion doesn’t only require the common recognition of 
the monotheistic heritage, but subsequently requires recourse  
“to the Greek civilization and what it engendered: logos, the coherent discourse 
of reason, life in a reasonable State”.32  
Note that this is Levinas’ conviction from a Jewish point of view. In this 
context, he still affirms the universality of Judaism, which has been defined 
as the irreplaceable responsibility for others.33 The importance of the reli-
gious tradition of Judaism is nothing more than that of having participated 
in the discussion about justice and in the effort to realise this responsibility 
for a long time. To this the Talmud bears witness and constitutes a part of 
the debate – it deserves a humanist discipline, not because it is Jewish, but 
because it speaks about the justice of humanity, which in any case was, 
according to Levinas, the Old Testament’s main cause.  
This use of other texts from Difficult freedom to clarify the nature of 
the Hebraic humanism pleaded for by Levinas in the education, especially, 
but not exclusively, of young Jews, does not only enforce our understand-
ing of Levinas’ idea of humanism, but should also guard us against a too 
hasty conclusion about its status. We have to do here with texts that have 
been written in or about the context of Jewish practice in the Diaspora; 
furthermore, it should be clear that when Levinas exclaims that Judaism is 
a humanism, his point is also to articulate the surprise of non-Jews about 
the importance of service to humans over against faith in theological 
statements (and to tease the Sartreans) and should not be reduced to a 
                                           
31 DF 176 / DL 247, translation modified. 
32 DF 176 / DL 246. To which Levinas will add: “That is the true terrain of all un-
derstanding.” (DF 176 / DL 246) – but, as we shall see later, his esteem for the 
State and for Greek thought about the State, will not always be so charitable. 
33 DF 177 / DL 247. 
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constant concern for the establishment of a humanism. The issue is the 
manner in which Judaism is to continue to exist after the Shoah – any con-
tribution to humanism is a secondary goal. “Humanism” is an important 
argumentative tool for Levinas, it is also a useful word to explain the study 
of the Talmud, next to other old traditions, but it would not be correct to 
say that Levinas’ point in all of these texts is primarily humanistic. His 
point is an ethical interpretation and practice of Judaism.  
Yet two aspects of his ideas about the form of existence of diasporic Ju-
daism merit the use of the word “humanist” and thus prevent one from inter-
preting the use of the word as merely rhetorical. (1) When speaking here of 
humanism, Levinas’ concern is the study of the Talmud with a universal 
ethical rather than theological objective, and “humanism” serves to articulate 
his argument for this practice. (2) Humanism is also an appropriate term to 
capture the spirit of Levinas’ train of thought in which the discourse concern-
ing justice across the differences of culture takes a central position. Whereas 
Levinas seems to indicate that the value of the Rabbinic texts can be ac-
cepted only if the difference of their message, textual practice and required 
interpretation strategy with respect to other traditions is accepted, this is not 
an insistence on particularity for the sake of maintaining and celebrating the 
difference with respect to other cultural expressions, but a confidence in the 
importance of the contribution that this particular position can make to the 
universal coexistence of people. If Levinas is convinced of the excellence of 
Jewish religious texts, this excellence is only incidental and in principle re-
placeable or copyable. This universalistic claim is not the universalism of 
“our truth should be held by all”, but of “all can be the beneficiaries of our 
truth and all, through their own traditions, have some access to it and can 
discuss with us about it”. One might therefore encapsulate Levinas’ position 
in a reformulation of Terence’s humanist thesis: I am an ethical subject and 
no concern about justice for others is alien to me. 
This presentation of Levinas’ Hebraic humanism of the 1950s certainly 
doesn’t capture all of the nuances of his position, but this is of no vital con-
cern for the current purposes. What should retain our attention is the fact that 
once Levinas has pleaded for this humanism – as textual practice and univer-
sal ethical reflection – in education and as a cultural political project, that he 
should have been quite troubled by the wave of anti-humanist philosophies 
from the 1960s (and of which his reading of Tristes tropiques, referred to in 
Chapter 2, was an early experience). The essay of 1973 testifies to Levinas’ 
reflection on this challenge posed to his thoughts on Jewish education. 
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2 “ANTI-HUMANISM AND EDUCATION” 
If the last essay in Difficult freedom also aims at advocating a “true hu-
manism”34 as the objective of Jewish education, the approach is nonethe-
less quite different from that of the previous essay, as the use of the word 
“anti-humanism” in the title already indicates. The change in perspective 
on how the humanistic character of Jewish education should be ap-
proached becomes clear if one considers Levinas’ effort to define human-
ism. Humanism, that has served for a long time as the strategy for the self-
justification of Western culture, entails:  
“the recognition of an invariable essence named ‘man’, the affirmation of his central 
place in the economy of the Real and of his value which engendered all values. This 
created respect for the person, both in itself and in the other, which made it necessary 
to safeguard his freedom; a blossoming of human nature, of intelligence in Science, 
creativity in Art, and pleasure in daily life; the satisfaction of desires without prejudice 
for the freedom and pleasures of other men and, consequently, the institution of a just 
law – that is to say, a reasonable and liberal State or, in other words, a State at peace 
with other states and – an important point – above all opening up for individuals as 
broad as possible a domain for private life, on the threshold of which the law stops. A 
limit to law is necessary to humanism, for humanism can perhaps see no laws other 
than those of the State and of nature.”35  
In practice, and in the narrower sense, humanism refers to the promotion 
of these principles, which happens in the study of certain texts.  
The first pitfall of humanism gapes in the centrality of the writing and 
studying of texts: the possibility of forgetting the beautiful ideas behind 
the texts and of becoming wrapped up in the celebration of eloquence.36 
Since there is no a priori reason why this illness cannot also infect a He-
braic humanism, Levinas needs to rethink, under the pressure of the anti-
humanist critique of humanism, if and how to affirm his appropriation of 
the term “humanism” for his politics of Jewish education. It is clear, in 
any case, that in doing so he rejects the implicit idea that he has to meas-
ure his vision of about Jewish education against the secularised version 
of Judeo-Christianity. Not only does this strategy do injustice to Juda-
ism, since it debases Judaism to a variant of Western humanism and thus 
compromises its particularity, but it also lacks credibility, since it 
doesn’t consider the “crisis of humanism”. If Jewish education is to have 
any significance, it will have to go beyond humanism, and especially 
                                           
34 DF 286 / DL 398. 
35 DF 277 / DL 385, translation corrected. 
36 Cf. also IH 80. 
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beyond the humanist reduction of Judaism (i.e., the desire to measure 
Judaism against the standard of ambient humanist values). 
As in the writings of the 1950s, Levinas cannot but start reflecting on 
this issue by taking his distance from a certain kind of religious dis-
course. Without justifying the conviction further, he states:  
“This was the century in which God died – that is to say, in a very precise sense, 
in which a certain discourse on God became increasingly impossible.”37  
If it is taken into consideration that the intellectual opposition to theology 
had gained significant impetus in the 18th century, Levinas’ reference to 
the 20th century most likely rather stresses the impact of the political ca-
tastrophes. However, when he then discusses these, it is done to illustrate 
the “crisis of humanism”; it should probably be concluded that the same 
events that engendered the crisis of humanism, also make a certain dis-
course about God impossible. The presentation of these events by Levinas 
is of significant importance to us, since it makes a connection between his-
torical events, and intellectual developments in a politico-intellectual diag-
nosis of his times, and that will be in force also in his philosophy:  
“The 1914 War, the Russian Revolution refuting itself in Stalinism, fascism, Hitlerism, 
the 1939–45 War, atomic bombings, genocide and uninterrupted war. On another 
level, a science that wants to embrace the world and threatens it with disintegration – a 
science that calculates the real without always thinking it, as if it were created on its 
own in the human brain, without man, who is reduced purely and simply to the fields 
in which the operations of numbers unfold. Or in a different atmosphere, the ambitious 
philosophical enterprise which charms many of us, the ambitious philosophical enter-
prise in aid of thought and against pure calculation, but subordinating the human to the 
anonymous gains of Being and, despite its ‘Letters on humanism’, bringing under-
standing to Hitlerism itself. A liberal politics and administration that suppresses neither 
exploitation nor war; a socialism that gets entangled in bureaucracy.”38  
Such are the events that have shown not only the fragility or incapacity of the 
humanist project to realise itself through States and to protect humanity, but 
the incapacity of a certain idea of the human essence to produce the values 
needed to prevent these disasters and finally, in addition, the increasing im-
possibility of a certain kind of discourse on God. Furthermore, in order to 
fully appreciate the critique of contemporary society and the response that 
Levinas will propose to it, one should notice that the three kinds of develop-
ments identified by Levinas have in common the fusion of the human being 
into a blind process, whether this is war and tyranny, the physical succession 
                                           
37 DF 280 / DL 389. 
38 DF 281 / DL 390–391. 
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of events of the cosmos or the flux of Being (être). We have seen in Chap-
ter 2 that such a fusion is for Levinas typical of the defenceless horror of 
exposure to the sacred in “primitive” religions and again quintessential of 
the return thereof in the indifference of modern atheism; in both cases it is 
ethical agency that is suffocated. If a certain kind of humanism is going to 
be proposed as an appropriate response to this situation, such a humanism 
is, implicitly, once more called to a task of desacralisation. In addition to 
this, the global reach of this societal diagnosis (clearly traced in the citation 
above) should again be underscored, as was done in Chapter 3, in order to be 
perceptive to the implied reach of the proposed response. 
As perpetual victims of the failures of Western humanism Jews have 
been privy to this “crisis of the human ideal”39 – this is a programming 
error: humanism is since its Greco-Roman inception the human ideal of 
the conqueror40 and doesn’t exhaust the meaning of the human. It is (at least 
initially) out of concern for a more complete or realistic idea of the meaning 
of the human and out of a realisation of the reduction committed against it, 
that a new wave of challenge to humanism and a “suspicion regarding a 
certain kind of language on the human”41 gains momentum. Of this wave of 
“anti-humanism”, Levinas retains the following important characteristics: 
first, the denunciation of literature and eloquence that hypocritically hides 
misery and inaction;42 second, it exposes the cracks in the humanist notion of 
an eternal human essence; third, in the prolongation of the previous point, as 
an extension of an uncovering of humans from the hold of a certain essence, 
is the liberation from economic, moral and legal constraints. Up to this point, 
Levinas clearly gives his support to the anti-humanist critique of humanism. 
However, he is not willing to continue too far along this line of thought: 
when the fight for freedom from forms of oppression risks turning into a 
fight without limit, Levinas insists on the need to educate children in the 
distinction between good and evil;43 when the liberation from traditional 
morals risks losing all responsibility and permitting anything, including in 
one’s action towards others, Levinas proposes a moral orientation based on 
Jewish values.44 Against the complete disintegration of an idea of the human 
essence, Levinas poses the irreducible essence of the human being (without 
elaborating on it) and the supremacy of the human being according to the 
                                           
39 DF 281 / DL 391. 
40 See also DF 170 / DL 239. 
41 DL 393, phrase missing in DF. 
42 DF 282, 283 / DL 393, 394. 
43 DF 285 / DL 397. 
44 DF 285 / DL 397. 
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Old Testament.45 Against an abusive, hypocritical eloquence and literature, 
he advocates the study of the Talmud, the Jewish study of the Law, and the 
practice that ensues from it.46  
If humanism as a strategy for the self-justification of the West has been 
shaken by these events, it seems simply naive to think that a simple religious 
education along traditional lines will be meaningful. Besides, submitting 
Jewish children and students to a religious education measured against 
humanism would be futile in the light of the crisis of humanism. Again the 
alternative that Levinas proposes is the same: the Jewish scriptures, with the 
Rabbinic commentary and the practices that go along with them.47 At the 
same time, Levinas yet again questions certain forms of Jewish expression 
for the relevance with which they act in the contemporary world (e.g., 
Jewish apologetics48). Whereas it is quite obvious that a humanistic study of 
the Talmud could succumb to the temptations of eloquence, Levinas im-
plicitly believes that the thorough study thereof and the practice that is asso-
ciated with it, would suffice to maintain this form of humanism, without 
succumbing to the criticism of anti-humanism. But Levinas’ claim for the 
Jewish Law is much more encompassing. In a time of human crisis  
“the Jewish wisdom of the Law, the external act, is no longer simply a reflection 
or pronouncement of European culture, or the pride of belonging to the oriental 
origins of the West. Here we have the unique means to preserve the humanity and 
the personality of people. This agency teaches us true humanism.”49  
What is at stake for Levinas in this crisis of humanism, that is also the crisis 
of a troubling era in human history, is the “rescue of the Human being 
[sauvetage de l’Homme]”50 of which the continued existence as person is 
threatened politically, intellectually and morally. An education that takes 
as its basis the tradition of Jewish wisdom concerning the Law and that 
creates the infrastructure for the maintenance and advancement of a Jewish 
culture (“a culture based on a word which through its elevation can be 
called the word of God”51), is what is needed. This is a universal obligation 
of Jews; in service of humanity, but not to proselytise humanity. But in the 
                                           
45 DF 284 / DL 395. 
46 DF 283 / DL 394. 
47 DF 280 / DL 389. 
48 DF 283 / DL 394. 
49 DF 286 / DL 397–398, translation modified. 
50 DF 286 / DL 398, my translation. This phrase should be emphasised, since we 
shall see that a salvaging of “the very humanity of the human being” (IH 33) is 
what Levinas calls for from 1934 onwards.  
51 DF 286 / DL 398, translation modified. 
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spirit of the Judaic tradition, this entails not a war against war in order to 
install its own humanism of the conqueror, but rather a “humanism of 
patience”.52 What Levinas has in mind with this humanism of patience is 
not clear. From the last cryptic remarks of his essay one gathers only the 
following. It is a humanism that holds to the particularism of its universal 
vocation and does so in the face of and in opposition to “doctrines, anthro-
pologies, axiologies and theologies”,53 but always in communion with 
other people, without distinction. Since the languages in the big cities have 
become confused again (evoking the confusion of languages in the story of 
the tower of Babel), a particularism “of Abraham”,54 i.e., of the father of 
all monotheists, is needed, in other words, a particularism of the possibility 
of a unifying discourse that is moral in nature. If we live in an Abrahamic 
time it is, according to Levinas, because  
“one must accept obedience personally [pour son compte], without counting the 
faithful [sans compter les fidèles]. This personal acceptance is not egoist.”55  
This non-egotistical obedience to the law is what excludes installing an-
other humanism of conquerors56 and what calls for a “humanism of pa-
                                           
52 DF 287 / DL 399. 
53 DF 288 / DL 401. 
54 DF 288 / DL 401. 
55 DF 288 / DL 401, translation modified. Levinas possibly refers to the story of 
Abraham’s dispute with God about the number of the faithful or the just that 
might be living in Sodom and Gomorrah and about their salvation – it turned out 
that there were none and those cities were destroyed, while Abraham and his fam-
ily were commanded to leave the scene without looking back. With this in mind, 
the “particularism of Abraham” seems to evoke the idea of being just, while sus-
pending judgement about the justice of others or despite the injustice of others. Al-
though not referring to this Biblical story, the clarifications concerning the “de-
scendants of Abraham” might illuminate the ethical quality of this Abrahamic par-
ticularism: “The heirs of Abraham – people to whom their ancestor bequeathed a 
difficult tradition of duties toward others, which one is never done with, an order 
in which one is never quits. In this order, above else, duty takes the form of obli-
gations toward the body, the obligation of feeding and sheltering. So defined, the 
heirs of Abraham are of all nations: any person that is truly human is no doubt of 
the line of Abraham. […] There is more in the family of Abraham than in the 
promises of the State. It is important to give, of course, but everything depends on 
how it is done. It is not through the State and through the political advances of 
humanity that the person shall be fulfilled – which, of course does not free the 
State from instituting the conditions necessary to this fulfilment. But it is the fam-
ily of Abraham that sets the norms.” (NTR 99–100 / DSAS 19–20, translation 
modified). I cite at length, because this passage on the “descendants of Abraham”, 
although not explicitly linked to the notion of humanism, is developed in the train 
of thought following Levinas’ significant qualification of humanism as being 
founded in the other (NTR 98 / DSAS 17). 
56 DF 287 / DL 399. 
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tience”, which would be one that is guided by the symbol of the suffer-
ing servant,57 a symbol of all the conquered and suffering of history – 
that demand justice.  
Still, this does not provide a clear image yet of what this alternative 
post-anti-humanist humanism is. But, in another very dense passage of 
an essay of the same time (“Jacob Gordin”, 1972–1973), Levinas uses 
most of the same terms to describe an alternative humanism. Reading 
the two texts together can help to amplify the basics of his idea. After 
criticising the humanism of the conqueror Levinas explains that  
“[o]ur age certainly no longer needs to be convinced of the value of non-violence. 
But it perhaps lacks a new reflection on passivity, and a certain weakness that is 
not cowardice, a certain patience that we must not preach to others, in which the 
ego [le Moi] must be held, one which cannot be treated in negative terms as 
though it were just the other side of finitude. Enough of Nietzscheanism, even 
when purged of its Hitlerian deformations! But who will dare to say such a thing? 
The humanism of the suffering servant – the history of Israel – invites us to create 
a new anthropology, a new historiography, and perhaps, by bringing about the 
end of Western ‘triumphalism’, a new history.”58  
This much can be derived from the two texts from the beginning of the 
1970s: after the bankruptcy of the “humanism of the conqueror” in the 
West, and with the evidence of the need to escape a kind of thinking that 
engenders violence, a kind of thought (philosophical or social scientific) 
that praises human interaction in terms of the will to power, of conflict 
between powerful expressions of creativity (as one would find in many 
variations of anti-humanism) will not do. A different humanism is 
needed, which is characterised by the figure of the suffering servant 
(which is a symbol of the history of Israel – probably meaning here the 
religious community, rather than the modern State – and of human suf-
fering in general) and by a patience, or endurance of suffering, or weak-
ness, that despite its importance is to be practised but not preached to 
others (supposedly, others outside of the community of Israel).  
This humanism, this quest for the justice of all suffering people 
should be practised against the current of contemporary political and in-
tellectual history; but in “Anti-humanism and education” nothing is said 
about this being an ideal for anybody outside of Judaism.59 Such a prac-
                                           
57 DF 287 / DL 399. 
58 DF 171 / DL 239–240. 
59 However, given the inclusive understanding of the particularity of the “descen-
dants of Abraham” it cannot be excluded that the “humanism of the suffering ser-
vant” is in principle proposed to all people. 
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tice doesn’t entail a subjectification or spiritualisation of principles of 
action,60 but rather constant externalisation of reflection on it, in con-
tinuation of the debate about justice in Rabbinic thought. This might be 
associated with religious observance, but the practice ensuing from this 
dialogue about justice doesn’t aim at pleasing God, but at “safeguard the 
human in humans”.61 Levinas’ advocacy of this humanism thus clearly 
implies a plea for a Jewish particularism, but, as previously, not for a 
limitation of ties to a nation, a State or fellow citizens.62  
Let us look more closely at the extent or ambition of Levinas’ claims in 
the later thought on an alternative humanism. The problem is dehumanisation 
and anti-humanism; Judaic schooling is the answer, but only for Jews. But 
this thesis brings with it a number of implications. First, as before, it implies a 
clear option for a certain kind of Judaism, as described above. Second, the 
question inevitably arises – what should non-Jews do with this? Clearly not 
nothing: the political and intellectual diagnosis can in principle be taken over 
as is. But no positive answer is given in these reflections. Third, the political 
catastrophes associated with humanism are particular geographically and his-
torically specific events; likewise, the intellectual phenomenon of anti-
humanism is a discourse that has a limited spatio-temporal sphere of influ-
ence. Combined, these two facts entail that in order even for a Diaspora Jew to 
accept Levinas’ point, a particular phase in French intellectual life will have to 
be taken, in combination with a specific configuration of prominent historical 
events, as background against which the option for this form of humanism 
becomes intelligible. In negative terms, it cannot be taken for granted that the 
humanism of the suffering servant or of patience is a model to be adopted by 
all Jews (although Levinas clearly desires this for Jews in his context) – let 
alone non-Jews – since they live in a historical, political and intellectual con-
text with different demands. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to Levinas’ first 
version of humanism, there is no suggestion of a universal participation in this 
conversation about a post-anti-humanist quest for justice. These observations 
are of considerable importance since, apart from the particularism avowed to 
by Levinas, this introduces another form of particularism to his plea for a hu-
manism of patience: it is a cultural or context specific humanism. The Juda-
ism advocated by Levinas in “Anti-humanism and education” is itself cultur-
ally specific, for other reasons than just for the fact that it is Jewish: even if the 
essence of this humanism of patience is accepted to be trans-historical, the 
                                           
60 DF 288 / DL 400. 
61 DF 288 / DL 401, translation modified. 
62 DF 288 / DL 401. 
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manner in which this message is expressed and the terms in which it presents 
itself are specific to a particular context. This context determinacy of the ex-
pression of this alternative humanism is not a secondary aspect thereof – this 
becomes quite clear if one again asks the question concerning what would 
motivate someone to accept it as valid: only two things: (1) such a humanism 
should be deemed in line with the message of the Hebrew Bible and the Rab-
binic tradition63 and (2) the horror of the dehumanising political catastrophes 
and the limitless, lawless freedom as consequence of anti-humanism should 
be considered as significant justification for a manner of thinking that goes 
against it. Religious authority (that is, not the authority of the religious func-
tionaries, but the moral – rather than theological – authority attributed to the 
writings transmitted by the Jewish religion) in combination with a grim poli-
tico-cultural diagnosis of a specific era seems to me to be the structure of vali-
dation supposed by this essay.  
3 UNIVERSALISM AND AUTHORITY:  
AN UNCERTAIN CONCLUSION 
If we look back from the 1973 essay on humanism and education to the 
1956 essay on the same subject, a number of remarkable things are worth 
adding to the list of general similarities between the two essays given at the 
                                           
63 This impression could be confirmed by the Talmudic readings of the same time – at 
least in as far as explicit references to humanism are made. In Beyond the verse, for 
instance, the Torah is presented as that which keeps learning or wisdom from be-
coming purely rhetorical – and in this continues the philosophical project of which 
the inception is already in Plato’s polemics with the sophists (BV 28 / ADV 44). 
The style of the Talmud is itself an antidote to the “sorcery of language” – in mak-
ing this statement, the original definition of humanism in Difficult freedom (1956) is 
joined, but reinforced by the anti-humanist critique of the hypocritical eloquence of 
the 1970s. Again Levinas denounces a “pure humanism, humanism without the 
Torah” (BV 28 / ADV 44, my translation) as that which suffocates culture. The 
claim is that the “real humanism” is not one that rejects Western or Greek wisdom, 
but one that is enforced by what is essential to human culture, namely the teaching 
of the Torah and the study thereof through the Talmudic tradition. 
 Or again, where Levinas discusses the humanism of the “cities of refuge”, he com-
ments on the form of thought of the Talmudic text: “A question that is often asked 
in the Gemara: what verse is to be quoted? It is not only so as not to affirm without 
foundation, but also so that the verse throws light for us on the spirit of the institu-
tions attached to it.” (BV 42 / ADV 59). In other words the Talmudic text does 
make a contribution to a certain debate, but not without some form of institutional 
authority. A detailed analysis of the notion of authority in Levinas’ readings of the 
Talmud would have to complete this remark, but falls outside of the scope of the 
present study. 
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beginning of this Chapter. Considering first the implicitly presupposed af-
firmations needed from his audience in order to accept the validity of his two 
respective presentations of humanism, we can note that the quasi-atheistic 
religious orientation of the earlier text is maintained in the later one and with 
it also the insistence on the appropriateness of a specific kind of Judaism, 
namely one of which the study of texts of Jewish antiquity forms the basis 
(not only for education, but for spiritual life in general). It is the third element 
of the structure of validation – universalism – that is quite different from 
what is supposed by the 1956 essay on humanism and education: in the later 
essay there is only the question of a universalism of vocation, not of a uni-
versal participation of the plurality of cultural traditions in a discourse on 
justice. This omission might simply be due to the practical contingencies 
under which the essay was written. However, it does leave a question open 
regarding the place of adherents of other religions and other cultural tradi-
tions. The broadest reading would be that Levinas here leaves the question in 
suspense; the narrow reading would be that he bases his claims about a hu-
manism for Jews on the authority of the Hebrew Bible and the tradition that 
comments on it and that not much is to be said either about those that do not 
accept the authority of this tradition, or about an internal evidence that the 
teaching contained in these texts could draw from its scholars. 
This is an important issue since it concerns the practices by which claims 
concerning just action are produced and practice itself is justified, planned 
and launched. I do not think that the exposition of the two texts of Difficult 
freedom (and those used to supplement them) suffices to establish a clear 
line of development in Levinas’ thought on this issue. In fact, our reading of 
Levinas’ thought on humanism in the religious context, leaves us with a 
question about two central issues. First, is the humanism pleaded for one that 
invites a universal participation by any and all people irrespective of their 
cultural heritage in a debate about justice, or is this humanism the roadmap 
for survival, exclusively for Jews, albeit in their capacity as servants of the 
whole of humanity and of suffering people in particular? Second, does this 
call to study the Talmud imply the broad claim that a collection of ancient 
texts testifies to a source of justice (which is not itself), which it excels in 
reflecting and to which all people can be invited to join, since their own re-
flection might give them access to the source of justice independently from 
the Talmud, or is the call to Talmudic studies limited to those that are linked 
to Judaism, either by their family history or by the acceptance of the author-
ity of the religious texts (or probably both) and in which the scriptures them-
selves form the indispensable access to reflection on justice? 
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4 CHANGING OF THE GUARDS:  
TALMUDIC HUMANISM AND A PHILOSOPHICAL 
POST-ANTI-HUMANIST HUMANISM 
Although I don’t claim to render the full nuance of these texts and those 
of the same period, it seems reasonable to state that the nature of these 
writings probably doesn’t allow for an absolutely clear and precise de-
scription of the evolution of Levinas’ position on these issues concerning 
Judaism and humanism. We have seen the different manners in which 
Levinas would probably have responded to these questions – our reflection 
is, of course, limited to the two important texts about humanism written 
in a religious context and outlined in this study. 
However, there is the philosophical text, Humanism of the other, in which 
humanism is again thematised. Here it is with a notably different discursive 
practice: as philosophical text, it constantly resubmits the authority of texts to 
questioning; there could be no question of referring to a “Book of all books”. 
The same criteria for accepting the validity of his arguments cannot hold. No 
tie with Judaism or a wish for a contemporary vitality of the Jewish commu-
nity as religious community can be taken as a point of departure (even though 
the arguments advanced may be of Jewish religious inspiration). This means 
at the same time that a key aspect of the two versions of Levinas’ humanism 
in Difficult freedom, namely the study of the Talmud, cannot simply be re-
quired as the central piece of this philosophical humanism – or, if it is part of 
this philosophical humanism, then the place given to the Talmud would be 
next to other traditions speaking about the same concerns and certainly not on 
the basis of a preconceived idea of the excellence of the texts, and even less on 
the basis of religious authority, but only in as far as it contributes to a theme of 
reflection. No desire to speak or reflect about God or religion can be supposed 
in his general readership – especially not in France in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Universalism would enter the argument, not in the sense that it would be re-
quired to write from no perspective, but rather in the sense that it would be 
indispensable for Levinas to show that he can relativise the position from 
which he writes (in relation to all other positions) and be lucid about what this 
position brings with him to the argument.  
Yet, with all of these differences with respect to the discursive prac-
tice, the essence of the theme is the same, namely responsibility for the 
other human being and justice. This can be shown clearly by comparing 
the title of the philosophy book – in which the decentring of a humanism 
to the concern of the “other human” is strikingly displayed in the title 
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Humanism of the other – with an explicit remark in Du sacré au saint 
about what Levinas identifies as an essential trait of Jewish humanism:  
“the person whose rights must be defended is in the first place the other human 
being; it is not initially myself. It is not the concept ‘human’ which is at the basis 
of this humanism; it is the other human beings.”64  
Even though the other human and the responsibility and justice due to 
other people have been the core of all Levinas’ philosophy since the war, 
he did not always refer to his thought as humanist. Also, after Humanism 
of the other Levinas never nurtured the term; particularly significant is the 
practical absence of any reference to humanism in Otherwise than Being, 
which is with Totality and infinity arguably Levinas’ most important book 
in philosophy and was written just a few years after Humanism of the 
other. The justification for the adoption of the title “humanism” is to be 
sought elsewhere than in the will to contribute to, remain true to and extend 
the tradition (or one of the traditions) of European cultural life that carries 
that name. One finds an indication of this in the interview “Philosophy, 
justice, and love” (1982), where Levinas explains his ideas concerning 
human subjectivity as constituted by responsibility – he declares:  
“My view is opposed to the tendency of one whole portion of contemporary phi-
losophy that prefers to see in man a simple articulation or a simple aspect of a 
rational, ontological system that has nothing human about it […]”.65  
He advances then with a short elaboration of the Heideggerian version of 
this tendency, highlights a trace of the same tendency in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work and then continues his reflection on the general tendency of his time:  
“In the same distrust with regard to humanism according to contemporary philo-
sophy there is a battle against the notion of the subject. What they want is a prin-
ciple of intelligibility that is no longer enveloped by the human; they want the 
subject to appeal to a principle that would not be enveloped by concern for hu-
man fate. On the contrary, when I say that consciousness in the relation with the 
other loses its first place, it is not in that sense; I mean to say that, in conscious-
ness thus conceived, there is the awakening to humanity. The humanity of con-
sciousness is definitely not in its power, but in its responsibility […] I advocate, 
as in the title of one of my books, the ‘humanism of the other’.”66  
These then are the concerns that warrant giving the title of “humanism” 
and particularly “humanism of the other (human)” – which is equally the 
essence of Jewish humanism – to one of his books (but not to his philo-
                                           
64 NTR 98 / DSAS 17, translation modified, similarly GDT 182 / DMT 213. 
65 ENT 111 / EN 121. 
66 ENT 112 / EN 122, translation modified. 
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sophy in general): a dispute with contemporary philosophy about the status 
of the subject, and a concession about the decentring of the subject, but 
this by a responsibility for the other and a care for human well-being. Every-
thing hinges on the “… of the other (human)” by which the polemical ap-
propriation of “humanism” is qualified. And in this, the resonance with 
“Jewish humanism” is willed. 
It is the contemporary intellectual tendency that occasions the polemi-
cal appropriation of the title “humanism”, but the title is equally justified 
by the “anti-anti-humanist” thematic.67 One could say that the “humanism” 
adopted in Humanism of the other is equally circumstantial as that of Diffi-
cult freedom, except that in the former there is no question of the humanistic 
study of the Talmud. This fact will have to be contemplated, since if there 
is a humanism advocated by Levinas, that could at least in principle side-
step the study of the Talmud, while remaining true to the ideal of his Judaic 
humanism (namely justice towards people), one would have to know 
where the resources for this other philosophical humanism come from. 
Furthermore, if there are such Talmudic-independent resources, we will 
have to consider in what position it leaves the Hebraic humanism or the 
humanism of patience.68 Let us then without further ado turn to Humanism 
of the other to explore these questions. 
                                           
67 See similarly PN 17 / NP 102. 
68 A response will be suggested to this dilemma in the two concluding points to 
Chapter 5, §4. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Levinas’ post-anti-humanist humanism: 
Humanism of the other1 
 
 
 
One’s first impression in searching for help from Levinas in reflecting about 
humanism might be one of joy. Remarkable as it may be, here is a French au-
thor, well informed about his contemporaneous philosophical scene, who in 
1972 publishes a book on humanism: it is entitled Humanism of the other. 
One’s joy will be quickly attenuated, though, on opening the book. Not only is 
there no definition or description given of what the author understands by 
“humanism”, not only is the anti-humanism dominant in the early 1970s 
French – or even simply “Parisian” as Levinas says2 – philosophical scene 
presented as the essential point of reference, but the aim of the book, in appar-
ent disdain for its title, is indicated not as the foundation of a new humanism, 
but as a research on a kind of meaning to be found in the “proximity of the 
one-for-the-other”3 of which the preface gives a brief sketch. The same kind 
of disappointment will be the fate of the reader seeking insight into notions 
like “self”, “other”, “identity”, “culture” and a string of other notions that we 
so direly need to reflect on in the world that is ours and from which one would 
expect a humanism to provide philosophical and cultural-political guidance. 
To be precise, these notions are not absent from Levinas’ work. Not only 
are they present as terminology in his texts, but the terms (as they are tradi-
tionally used) are to be found at the very origin of the statement of Levinas’ 
problem. What makes access to Levinas’ work difficult is exactly the way in 
                                           
1 A slightly different version of this Chapter (up to §4) was published under the title 
“Rethinking the conditions for inter-cultural interaction. A commentary on Levi-
nas’ Humanism of the other”, in a thematic issue on “The interaction between 
self and the others in the age of globalization” (guest editor, Jörn Rüsen) in 
the Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 7/2, December 2010, pp. 113-147.  
2 HO 58 / HH 95.  
3 HO 3 / HH 7. 
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which he uses these words. Invariably, the notions that we would like to in-
terrogate the philosopher on are used, but while crossing out, as it were, our 
common understandings of these notions. What Levinas says of the intro-
duction of his book applies too for his use of traditional philosophical termi-
nology: just as the preface is not only a repetition of the content of the book 
but a first “urgent” commentary on it so as to partially undo what is said in 
the book, so too when he uses terminology, he uses it in such a way as to 
undo something of what has been said about, or by means of, those terms by 
the tradition of philosophical reflection. If we then want to expose ourselves 
to the perspective that Levinas presents on humanism, we will have to exam-
ine this way of using terms and partially undoing them at the same time. One 
understands Levinas when one hears how a traditional philosophical term 
“rings” after its ringing has been interfered with in this way.  
In accordance with the general concern of Levinas’ entire philosophy, 
one wouldn’t be able to appreciate much of the after-ringing or reverberation 
of the notion “humanism” without that of “identity” and “alterity” or “same” 
and “other”. This shouldn’t be much of a surprise, because if it is true that 
the stakes of Humanism of the other are the same as those of Levinas’ phi-
losophy in general (as pointed out at the end of Chapter 4), then we need just 
recall what has been said about the general concern of this philosophy at the 
end of Chapter 2: Levinas’ entire philosophy is motivated by his concern 
about the threat of political disasters, which tend to manifest themselves in 
the form of identity-enforcing totalitarian violence and that of indifferent plu-
rality. It was argued that his philosophical project is a quest for the source of 
a non-totalisable alterity, which would interrupt the force of identity and give 
orientation to the indifferent, multiple cultural renderings of Being. Further-
more it is of considerable importance to recall that it was concluded that this 
double political concern is responded to in Levinas’ philosophy by recourse 
to the big notions of metaphysics – “same” and “other” or “identity” and “al-
terity” – which are meditated in the register of ontology and ethics. 
To appreciate Levinas’ use of these terms, and thus his contribution to 
our subject matter, one has to consider the conditions under which the ring-
ing of these words and the interference with them were initiated, long before 
writing Humanism of the other. One finds the first embryonic expression of 
this quest in two related essays: “Some reflections on the philosophy of Hit-
lerism” [Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l’hitlérisme] (19344) and 
“On escape” [De l’évasion] (1935). Read together, they reveal how Levinas 
situates his philosophical problem at a political as well as an ontological 
level, an understanding of which is indispensable for understanding what he 
has in mind in the humanism of the other. 
                                           
4 In IH 23–33. 
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1 FIRST ATTEMPTS AT A POLITICAL AND 
ONTOLOGICAL FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Levinas never made a secret of the fact that his philosophical agenda was 
inspired by his personal experiences.5 His concerns, political as well as per-
sonal, are such that the question of the self and the other is placed firmly in 
the centre of his philosophy: victim of anti-Semitism in Europe, Jew 
amongst Christians and atheists, Russian- and Hebrew-speaking in a French 
and German world, and reader of the Talmud in a world of Greek thinking. 
In other words, Levinas lived and worked in the tension between identity 
and alterity on the cultural, political, religious, ethnic, intellectual and lan-
guage planes. When, in the early 1930s, he observed the rise of Nazism, this 
tension gave birth to a philosophical problem that, through various reformu-
lations, will remain the major concern for Levinas throughout his way of 
thinking. This problem concerns the relationship between the subject and 
his/her history or, one could say, it concerns the place to be accorded to the 
different narratives (cultural, religious, ethnic, etc.) that constitute the identity 
and the manner of being of the subject. What Levinas considers to be the 
decisive core of this issue is our “conception of the human being”.6 It is only 
when one considers this core, namely one’s conception of the human being, 
that one is able to recognise that whenever the tension between the self and 
the other arises, what is at stake is the very humanity of the human being 
(l’humanité même de l’homme).7 
Thus, what Levinas considers philosophically interesting, or disturbing 
rather, in the “philosophy of Hitlerism” is that its rise in the political arena 
confronts one with the ineluctable task of contemplating the humanity of the 
human being. He does so in his essay by referring to a long and multifarious 
tradition of liberalism in Europe. Liberalism, that encapsulates for Levinas 
the essence of the European tradition of the conception of the human being, 
will be used by him in this essay as a standard against which to measure in-
novation or deviation. The most salient aspect of this tradition is its care for 
the idea of a human subject that disposes of one or another kind of liberty or 
freedom. Liberty is the capacity to make a present moment; it is the opposite 
of being drawn along by history. In fact, as Levinas states, in absolute terms 
                                           
5 See for instance the first pages of Ethics and infinity and the autobiographical es-
say, “Signature” in DF 291–295 / DL 405–412. 
6 IH 27 and repeated elsewhere. 
7 IH 33. Here we find again the term introduced in Chapter 4, when its echo in Dif-
ficult freedom was considered under the terms of the “rescue of the Human being” 
(DF 286 / DL 398, my translation). 
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the free individual “has no history”,8 though it is evidently not denied that 
the individual makes history. 
When Levinas highlights the most important moments of this liberal 
tradition of the West, he insists on the golden thread or “leitmotiv”,9 start-
ing curiously10 with Judaism, running through Christianity and taken up 
again in modern liberalism, that situates human dignity – the dignity of 
every particular human being – in the capacity of the soul to disengage 
itself of its own history, from whatever particular narrative that could sin-
gularise it, give it its particular identity.11 Marxism seems to be a breach 
with this tradition in that it considers the consciousness to be determined 
by Being,12 meaning that the life of the soul, in the great variety of its ex-
pressions, reflects the material conditions of being of the respective classes 
of society. However, even in Marxism the consciousness retains the capac-
ity to throw off the effect of the material conditions, and this capacity is 
situated in the act of taking cognisance of the social situation.13  
A real breach with the European notion of the human being would take 
place only if the historical situation, attachment or identity of the human be-
ing is not taken to be secondary to the free soul, but the very basis of it.14 
Such a notion of the human being would centre on the human body. Now, 
one should be very careful not to rashly identify the bearers of such a notion 
of the human being only with Hitler or the Hitlerians (as Levinas calls them). 
Sure enough, in the first sentence of the essay Levinas, in accordance with 
the title of the essay, speaks of the “philosophy of Hitler”.15 But on that same 
page, he also claims that, in as far as this philosophy evokes the question of 
the relationship between the soul and reality (or history), the “philosophy of 
Hitlerism goes beyond the philosophy of the Hitlerians”.16 Furthermore, the 
section of the essays that explains this new notion of the human being con-
tains no more precise indication of its bearers than a reference to “modern 
                                           
8 IH 24. 
9 IH 26 
10 “Curiously”, not in the sense that the Jewish roots of Western culture are ignored, 
but in the sense that it seems more logical to situate that root in what is today 
called the Middle East. 
11 Cf. IH 26: “The equal dignity of all souls, independently from the persons’ mate-
rial or social condition, does not follow from a theory that maintains beneath the 
individual difference an analogy of ‘psychological constitution’. Equal dignity 
should be attributed to the power given to the soul to free itself of what was, from 
all that tied it, from all that engendered it”.  
12 IH 27. 
13 IH 28. 
14 IH 28. 
15 IH 23. 
16 IH 23. 
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Germany”17 and “the Germanic ideal of the human being”.18 No “Hitlerian” 
author is cited explicitly or named (though the two references to Nietzsche 
are probably not incidental). I insist on this point because Levinas opens up 
an ambiguous space in which the reader should fill in a name of a bearer of 
such a philosophy in which history determines the fate of the human soul – 
and it is of crucial importance for the understanding of Levinas’ entire phi-
losophical project that one fills in the correct name: next to that of whatever 
Hitlerian, the name of Heidegger. This is the person from whom Levinas 
learned more about philosophy than from anybody else (except perhaps 
Husserl); it is also the person that Levinas believes provides the most illumi-
nating perspective on his contemporary intellectual environment. 
What makes it difficult to see Heidegger in this text – apart from the 
fact that he is never named – is that Levinas already transforms Heideg-
ger’s analysis of the human being (or rather, Dasein), at the moment he 
redeploys it. Levinas does what Heidegger avoided in Being and time: 
he identifies human existence with the fact of being a body. Between the 
lines of Levinas’ text, one reads that it is Heidegger’s philosophy of 
Dasein that would clarify what it means to be attached to one’s body. 
According to Levinas 
“[t]he body is not only closer and more familiar to us than the rest of the world, it 
doesn’t only command our psychological life, our mood and our activity. Beyond 
these commonplace observations, there is the feeling of identity.”19  
And he continues by stating that the adherence of the body to the self “is 
an adhesion from which one can’t escape” (est une adhérence à laquelle 
on n’échappe pas).20 The echo of one of Heidegger’s most important 
statements is still audible in Levinas’ text:  
“Dasein [Levinas says “the body” – EW] is ontically ‘closest’ to itself, ontologi-
cally furthest, but pre-ontologically nevertheless not foreign.”21  
Just as, in the new (Germanic) conception of the human being, one is at-
tached to one’s body,22 so in Heidegger’s philosophy one is attached to 
                                           
17 IH 33. 
18 IH 31. 
19 IH 29. 
20 IH 29 
21 Martin Heidegger, Being and time. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (transl.). 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, [1962] 1988, p. 37 / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Nie-
meyer Verlag. [1927] 1993, p. 16 (translation modified). A similar claim is made af-
ter the introduction of the notion of mineness (Jemeinigkeit) (Being and time. op. cit. 
p. 67–68 / Sein und Zeit. op. cit. p. 41–43), to which we turn next in our text. 
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one’s own being; in fact, what Levinas is doing here is to reformulate the 
most significant ontological insight provided by the ontic specifics of hu-
man existence (as analysed in Being and time) by an introduction of the 
body: as far as he is concerned, your body is the way in which your being 
is your own. Being [Sein, être] is always yours, in such a way that you 
cannot rid yourself of it. This fact of “being that is always someone’s”, 
Heidegger called “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) and this term forms the centre 
of Levinas’ polemics with his former teacher.23 In the opening sentences 
of § 9 of Being and time, entitled “The theme of the analytic of Dasein” 
Heidegger explains mineness in the following words:  
“We are ourselves always the entities or beings to be analysed. The Being of this entity 
is at every instant mine. In their very act of being these entities are themselves related 
to their being. As beings of the event of Being, these entities are entrusted to or deliv-
ered to their own being. The being is the concern for these entities.”24  
For Levinas this summarises the essence of the new conception of the 
human being, a conception that breaks with the European tradition:25 
through my body, Being or history is so much mine, that I am subjected to 
what Being or history imposes on me, to the identity (Selbstheit, ipséité) 
that is historically constituted – and from this there is no escape. The 
                                           
22 “[D]ans cet enchaînement au corps […] consiste toute l’essence de l’esprit” (IH 
30), says Levinas. 
23 I have argued this in De l’éthique à la justice, Chapter 1.  
24 Freely translated from Sein und Zeit. op. cit. p. 41–42: “Das Seiende, dessen Ana-
lyse zur Aufgabe steht, sind wir je selbst. Das Sein dieses Seienden is je meines. 
Im Sein dieses Seienden verhält sich dieses selbst zu seinem Sein. Als Seiendes 
dieses Seins ist es seinem eigenen Sein überantwortet. Das Sein ist es, darum es 
diesem Seienden je selbst geht.” / Being and time. op. cit. p. 67–68. 
 The link between Levinas’ essay on Hitlerism and Heidegger’s idea of mineness 
was affirmed much later (1990), when Levinas commented on his early essay: 
“This article proceeds from a conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism 
of National Socialism […] is inscribed in the ontology of Being, concerned to be 
[…].” Cited from the “Post-scriptum”, in Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie 
de l’hitlérisme. Rivages poche (Petit Bibliothèque) 1997, p. 25. 
25 It is not clear why Levinas, in this essay, puts so much emphasis on the long, con-
tinuous Western/European tradition of the liberty of the soul and condemns the 
breach with that tradition. One should notice that it is somewhat problematic, in 
that he formulates an argument for a conception of the human being that is pre-
cisely not determined by his/her history. In order to maintain the coherence of the 
essay one would have to take Levinas’ insistence on the continuity of this Euro-
pean tradition not as a legitimisation of his argument, but only as the historical 
background to his ideas of which he approves. However, it is clear that such a be-
nevolent reading would be somewhat forced. That Levinas had a very positive 
image of European culture is no secret and, as we shall see, even appeared at cer-
tain instances in the form of a Euro-centrism. 
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human being’s life is characterised by care (Sorge), but every caring action 
is one that has already been entrusted to or surrendered to Being, which 
draws it along. In other words: “The essence of the human being is no 
longer in freedom, but in a kind of enslavement [enchaînement]”26 and one 
can do no more than to accept this fatality. 
The political consequence of such a notion of humanity is the immediate 
exclusion of politics as a condition to which free spirits consent.27 Instead of 
the free play of ideas that would make truly human politics possible, ideas 
are imposed on individuals by their belonging to consanguine groups (or 
ethnic, cultural, religious and other groups by extension) – and this necessar-
ily leads to expansion and war: racism seeks universalism by means of con-
quest, according to Levinas. Or again in other words: a particular identity 
spontaneously seeks to impose itself on what doesn’t conform to it; identity 
spontaneously seeks to impose itself on non-identity, on alterity. These are, 
according to Levinas in 1934, the terms in which to consider the humanity of 
the human being that is being put at risk.28 We have also seen the extension 
of the same line of reflection on identity and alterity in Levinas’ remarks on 
ethnography, in Chapter 2, and on colonisation, in Chapter 3. 
Levinas’ reaction to this problem will not consist of simply returning to 
the tradition of the free soul (although his writings up to Totality and infinity 
could be considered to be, to a certain extent, a reworked appropriation of 
this tradition). His philosophical project starts from accepting the terms in 
which Heidegger conceives of human existence, but attempts to go beyond 
the fatality he sees in them.29 The first step was to advance the formulation 
of the problem in ontological terms. This Levinas did in the 1935 essay, On 
escape. Hence forth, the primary strategy by which to tackle the question of 
the tension between “identity” and “alterity”, “self” and “other”, will be a 
dispute with the Western tradition of thinking in which the question of Being 
is central. In other words, the contemplation of political catastrophes (or the 
threat thereof) is translated into ontological terms inherited and adopted from 
Heidegger. 
If indeed “the essence of the human being is no longer in freedom, but in 
a kind of enslavement”, if human existence is indeed first and foremost char-
acterised by mineness, what would this entail for human existence? In On 
                                           
26 IH 30. 
27 IH 30. 
28 The most important elements of the 1934 study will reappear in Levinas’ later 
analyses of political and cultural events. See for instance “On the deficiency with-
out care, in a new sense” [De la déficience sans souci au sens nouveau]” (GCM 
43–51 / DVI 77–89, my translation).  
29 Again, it is the same notion of fatality that Levinas identified in “primitive” relig-
ion and the means by which he identified it in Heidegger – as argued in Chapter 2. 
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escape Levinas provides what could be considered as a counter Daseinsana-
lyse (ontological analysis of the human being), in which he attempts to show 
some of the implications of Heidegger’s idea of mineness. Being means for 
the human that one’s identity is firstly to be considered not in terms of the 
reflection of the subject to itself, but in terms of continued existence (ipseity 
or selfness) – the perseverance in one’s existence (Spinoza’s conatus, that 
the later Levinas likes to use to gloss the ontological identity). Being means 
for human existence to be or to exist in such an intimate circuit of “ex-
change” with Being (i.e., mineness), that one always understands (pre-
predicatively) Being in the different ways in which one is. In fact, the entire 
human existence is a long happening of the understanding of Being, i.e., on-
tology.30 With one’s whole existence at every moment, one is a logos, a 
“discourse”, concerning the different ways in which one conjugates, as it 
were, the meanings of “to be”, that is, ways in which one understands Being. 
But whereas mineness is at the source of selfness and all understanding (as a 
subsidiary of the understanding of being), one is at the same time tightly – 
Levinas says brutally31 – bound to Being. There is no escape; one is attached 
to being without any exit – hence the title of the 1935 essay. All understand-
ing, and hence all meaning, is imposed on humans by virtue of the circula-
tion of understanding in which they find themselves with Being. In the terms 
used in Chapter 2: for Dasein, to be means to participate. 
Levinas proposes no solution to this dilemma in 1935. The hermeneutics 
of facticity of human existence offered in the analyses of shame and nausea 
sets out to express the need of the human being to escape from the appar-
ently inescapable burden of one’s own identity, that is  
“to break the most radical, the most inexorable, enslavement, namely the fact that 
the self is itself”.32 
The urgent problem of “finding the way out” could also be formulated as a 
question: “is ontology fundamental?”. In these words (the title of the seminal 
essay of 1951), Levinas restates the question of the escape: are all forms of 
meaning dependent on ontology, on one’s always brutally belonging to Be-
ing? Does the human being exhaust the meaning of his/her humanity and 
                                           
30 This is the centre of Levinas’ appropriation of Heidegger: “The whole human 
being is ontology [Tout l’homme est ontologie.].” (ENT 2 / EN 13, translation 
modified, similarly GDT 58 / DMT 68). 
31 That this idea of being narrowly attached to Being is opposed to a tradition of lib-
eralism is reaffirmed in the 1935 essay: “The revolt of traditional philosophy 
against the idea of Being, proceeds from the discrepancy between human liberty 
and the brutal fact of Being that strikes it.” (EV 91). 
32 “[D]e briser l’enchaînement le plus radical, le plus irrémissible, le fait que le moi 
est soi-même” (EV 98).  
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selfness by articulating the event (Er-eignis) of being?33 Is there not perhaps 
another form of meaning that transcends my attachment to myself, to my 
identity, to my body, to history, and ultimately to Being?  
Levinas’ project will consist of arguing that, next to ontological 
meaning, or rather more original than ontological meaning, there is a kind 
of meaning that arises between people that is not ontological and he will 
argue that it is ethical in nature.34 The entire question of human diversity, 
of the tensions involved in the relation between identity and alterity is 
made dependent on Levinas’ Heideggerian inspired notion of identity and 
an alterity that will infringe on that identity. Let it be stressed that the 
terms in which Levinas approaches this question are terms of meaning and 
not in the first place that of an economics or politics of difference. In fact, 
he explicitly states that the alterity in which he is interested, the alterity 
that makes an escape from the fatal violence of identity as perseverance in 
selfness possible, the alterity that would be at the root of a peaceful co-
existence amongst the diversity of peoples, is to be understood in a very 
particular way: the other is other –  
“[o]ther, not at all because he would have other attributes or be born elsewhere or 
at another time, or be of a different race […]. It is not at all the difference that 
makes alterity; it is alterity that makes the difference.”35  
I rephrase: it is not at all the difference of singularising attributes of identity 
(of a different culture, ethnicity, religion, etc.) that constitutes what is essen-
tial to alterity; it is the ethical meaning of alterity that makes the difference 
with regard to the ontological meaning of the relationships between people. 
The solution, or rather the response, that Levinas proposes to the problematic 
tension between identity and alterity, will not reside in an articulation of the 
differences susceptible to prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, inequity or 
                                           
33 These terms are borrowed from a later text – GCM 46 / DVI 82: “man exhausts 
the meaning of his humanity and his ipseity in articulating the Er-eignis of being.” 
34 These terms are to be found in “Ethics of the infinite”, in Dialogues with contem-
porary Continental thinkers. The phenomenological heritage. Richard Kearney. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, p. 49–69, here p. 57 / “De la 
phénoménologie à l’éthique”, in Esprit 234, 1997, pp. 121–140, here p. 129, 
where Levinas explicitly states that “it is my own personal task to identify this 
dual origin of meaning – der Ursprung des Sinnhaften – in the interhuman rela-
tionship “, these two sources of meaningfulness being phenomenological or onto-
logical and ethical, respectively. 
35 “Autre, pas du tout parce qu’il aurait d’autres attributs ou serait né ailleurs ou à un 
autre moment, ou parce qu’il serait de race différente. […]. Ce n’est pas du tout la 
différence qui fait l’altérité ; c’est l’altérité qui fait la différence.” Cited from the 
interview “La vocation de l’autre”, in Racismes. L’autre et son visage. Grands en-
tretiens réalisés par Emmanuel Hirsch. Paris: Cerf, 1988, p. 92.  
114 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
other forms of violence, but in indicating that there is something different to 
the other (and that is not reducible to the qualities of the other) and that the 
subject (or self) cannot be indifferent to this alterity of the other. The most 
profound alterity of the other is situated not in his/her perceptible difference, 
but in the non-in-difference that the self discovers regarding the other, who-
ever that other may be. This alterity as the non-in-difference that underlies all 
difference restores to humans the full sense of their humanity that is at risk in 
the ontological reduction prevalent, according to Levinas’ reading, in the 
Western tradition of thought. In other words, reflection on the problematic 
tension between identity and alterity should in final analysis be referred back 
to what constitutes humanity, namely ethicity, and it is only from this per-
spective of ethicity that a measure, or common discourse, is discovered 
that sets a limit to the engagements imposed by what would otherwise be 
an absolute cultural relativism. This latter point is Levinas’ major concern 
of the first essay in Humanism of the other, to which we now turn. 
2 THE CRISIS OF HUMANISM 
Humanism of the other is a collection of three essays (published respec-
tively in 1964, 1968 and 1970) to which a preface has been added for the 
publication in 1972. It represents (especially in the first essay) Levinas’ 
first attempts to go beyond what he considered the insufficiencies of his 
major work of 1961, Totality and infinity, but without rejecting the basic 
convictions defended in that book. Humanism of the other is part of the 
transition36 to the second phase of Levinas’ work in which Otherwise 
than Being (1974) stands in the centre and of which the central piece, the 
article “La substitution” (first published in 1968), is contemporaneous 
with Humanism of the other. However, in Humanism of the other Levi-
nas takes up the debate with Heidegger in terms similar to those formu-
lated three decades earlier and extends it to a debate with contemporary 
anti-humanism (or the crisis of humanism) in the social sciences. Let’s 
explore this statement in more detail. 
                                           
36 In situating Humanism of the other within the development of Levinas’ work, it is 
probably most prudent to insist on its place as a transitional collection. One should 
especially be careful not to be guided merely by the date of initial publication of 
the essay of HO, but to consider also the notes available for Chapter 1 in the re-
cently published first volume of the Oeuvres complètes. The 28 ideas that are 
formulated under the title “Sens et signification” evidently prepares this Chapter 
and are, according to the editorial note, written on an invitation card of 1954. 
However, according to the editor of these notes, Rodolphe Calin, it is unlikely that 
they were made before 1960 (personal communication to author). 
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In Humanism of the other, Levinas still considers Heidegger’s philoso-
phy as the best key to understanding what is really happening in his contem-
porary intellectual and even political scene.37 One could summarise Levinas’ 
reading of Heidegger in this book as follows. Firstly, ontologically human 
existence is first and foremost characterised by mineness – in particular, 
Levinas twice cites the phrase by which Heidegger captures the essence of 
the identity of the human being as care: in human existence the happening of 
being is what is the concern for the human being.38 Secondly, the existence, 
consisting of understanding Being, is at the source of all meaning.39 Thirdly, 
Being is so much mine, that my existence brings potential meanings of being 
to expression; but actually, what happens (and this comes better to the fore in 
the second Heidegger, in Levinas’ view) is that I am seized by being that 
expresses itself through me40 (this seems to be the point of convergence be-
tween Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger).41 Fourthly, this perspective on human 
existence necessarily problematises a notion of subjectivity as interiority and 
reflection; the end of the subject dawns when, as apparently for Heidegger,  
“the subject has nothing interior to express. It is altogether thought from Being 
and the truth of Being.”42  
The consequence of this is that  
“it is not the human being, that has an I don’t know what proper vocation that would 
invent or seek or possess the truth. It is the truth [of Being – EW] that arouses and 
holds the human being (without holding any commitment to the human being).”43  
                                           
37 The philosophy of after the so-called Kehre is interpreted by Levinas as an exten-
sion of implications of what is already implicit in Being and time. He refers to 
Heidegger’s philosophy as “the most influential philosophic thought of our cen-
tury, which already tries to be post philosophic.” (HO 60 / HH 99). And after hav-
ing reformulated what he considers the appropriate response to anti-humanism, 
Levinas confronts Heidegger directly so as to indicate the ambition of his recon-
sideration of ethics (HO 65ff / HH 107ff).  
38 HO 25, 29 / HH 41, 48 and paraphrased HO 47 / HH 76. 
39 HO 25 / HH 41. HO 49 / HH 79: “Action, freedom, beginning, present, represen-
tation – memory and history – articulate in various ways the ontological modality 
that is consciousness.” 
40 Cf. HO 47f / HH 76 where one finds a succinct summary of Levinas’ perspective 
on Heidegger: “Even if man’s existence – the being-there [= Dasein – EW] – con-
sisted in existing in view of that existence itself, that ex-sistence, all those move-
ments and reversals arousing and situating the human would be dedicated to care-
taking or illuminating or obscuring or forgetting Being [l’être], which is not in the 
being [étant]. Subjectivity would appear, in view of its own disappearance, a mo-
ment necessary to the manifestation of the structure of Being, of the Idea.” 
41 HO 17 / HH 29 and cf. ENT 112 / EN 122. 
42 HO 75 / HH 122n4. 
43 HO 47 / HH 76 – translation modified – and almost the same wording in HO 59 / 
HH 97. 
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One could call Heidegger’s position, summarised in these points, as one of 
the end of metaphysics, as far as metaphysics depends on the idea of the 
individualist, reflective and autonomous or free subject. But this end of 
metaphysics stretches much further than just the thinking of one philosopher. 
In fact, it encapsulates the state of affairs in the human sciences, domi-
nated by structuralism, at the time Levinas writes,44 in which the subject 
(or at least a certain notion of the subject) has commonly become suspect: 
just as in Heidegger, here too the subject is not considered to hold the 
truth, but the truth – in this case the structures directing human phenomena 
– expresses itself through the human being.45 The social scientific theories 
that are in accord with Heidegger’s end of metaphysics,46 are sometimes 
typified as representing a same end of the subject, “end of humanism” or 
“anti-humanism”. These could, in turn, all be considered symptoms of 
what is called in Nietzschean parlance the death of God.47  
This anti-humanism is presented in Humanism of the other from three 
perspectives: (1) the end of the human being as subject,48 (2) the putting to 
question of the human being as a “rational animal” by the political catas-
trophes of the twentieth century49 and (3) the crisis of culture due to the 
diversity of cultural expressions without common measure for evaluation.50  
2.1 End of the subject 
The first aspect of anti-humanism – the decentring of the human subject – 
has already been presented as an introduction to the crisis of humanism. This 
decentring consists of adjourning the autonomous subject with its lucid, re-
                                           
44 HO 58 / HH 95. 
45 HO 47, 72n3 / HH 76, 118n3. One should be vigilant when reading Levinas’ ren-
derings of the essence of structuralism. In HO 71f / HH 118n1 he refers with appro-
bation to the essay of Michel Serres, “Analyse symbolique et méthode structurale” 
(in Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 171, 1967, pp. 437–452), as 
an illuminating interpretation of structuralism. I suspect that a detailed research into 
the sources of Levinas’ knowledge and interpretation of structuralism would show 
that he owes a lot to this essay, if not perhaps as much as to Merleau-Ponty, for the 
development of his perspective on cultural relativism. The importance of such a re-
search could be indicated by contrasting Levinas’ remarks on the profoundest na-
ture of structuralism in Humanism of the other with his admission in an interview of 
1987 that “even today I still don’t understand structuralism” (EL 161). 
46 E.g., HO 61 / HH 100. 
47 HO 58 / HH 95. 
48 HO 58–61 / HH 95–101. 
49 HO 45–46 / HH 73–74. 
50 HO 9–25 / HH 17–41. 
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flective vision of its own interiority, and considering the human being, con-
sciousness and all, as subordinate to anonymous structures. The roots of this 
idea go back at least as far as Hegel.51 There is a substantial convergence 
between the (contemporary, structuralist) human sciences and Heidegger on 
this point, which amounts to the negation of interiority,52 reducing con-
sciousness to an epiphenomenon (but also shepherd, poet or messenger)53 of 
an underlying structural process. Emblematic of this change in paradigm is 
the decentring of the Cartesian cogito by psychoanalysis: what was supposed 
to be the substantial subject as fortress against the malin génie, is now re-
duced to a mask, a persona54 of dark forces that has taken control of it.55 
The same holds for the practice of ethnography that describes the objective 
structures underlying cultural phenomena, even whilst obeying such a struc-
ture.56 Of the transmitted safe fortress of interiority remains not much more 
than an exposure to the whims of unmasterable structures and forces. Or 
again in ontological terms: the subject, even whilst conjugating the verb to 
be, is so dominated by it that every conjugation is only an apparent mastery, 
only a being subjugated to a meaning imposed on it by Being. 
2.2 Questioning the rationality of the animal rationale 
This dissolution of the subject as master of itself is reflected in the political 
scene. The subject that would, as autonomous agent, embark on realising 
a pre-meditated project, seems in reality to be only rushed along to 
tragedies for others and for itself.  
“[T]hat politics and an administration guided by the humanist ideal maintain the 
exploitation of man by man, and war”57 
is a paradox that invites one to disbelieve and disqualify the causality of 
the human agent (which amounts to the rejection of the subject as causa 
sui). This tragic paradox becomes almost comical when one considers the 
unparalleled means over which humanity in the twentieth century disposes 
and the ambitions formulated by people. The human being becomes ineffi-
                                           
51 HO 72n3, 60 / HH 118n3, 97. 
52 HO 60, 61 / HH 99, 100. 
53 HO 61 / HH 100–101. 
54 Levinas plays with the French word “personne”: meaning either “person”, 
“somebody” or “nobody”. 
55 Cf. HO 45 / HH 74, which amounts to the rejection of the subject as subiectum or 
hypokeimenon. 
56 HO 47 / HH 77. 
57 HO 59f / HH 97. 
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cient to the point of being the toy of its technology and of its political pro-
grammes.58 The very idea of the human being as animal rationale is thus 
thrown into a crisis.59 The idea of the subject as master of his/her intentions 
is not capable of articulating the most pressing questions of the after war 
years; for Levinas’ contemporaries the deepest anguish  
“comes from seeing revolutions founder in bureaucracy and repression and of 
totalitarian violence passing for revolutions”.60  
And one can imagine that when the word “totalitarianism” is used, for 
Levinas the reminiscence of Hitler and the camps would not be far away. 
2.3 Cultural relativity or the death of God 
Although Levinas doesn’t call the third aspect of anti-humanism by this 
name, his presentation of it in a book on an alternative humanism as well 
as the exact equivalence in his way of countering it (equivalent to his re-
sponse to the other elements of anti-humanism), allow us to name it anti-
humanist. This problem, which takes up a very big part of the book,61 also 
leads us to what Levinas considers the core of anti-humanism, namely the 
so-called “death of God”.  
The first chapter of Humanism of the other thematises cultural relativ-
ity. As indicated above, Levinas will tackle this problem by referring it to 
the constitution of meaning. He proposes a basic introduction to the ques-
tion of cultural relativity by translating it into ontological terms according 
to which Being itself comes to expression in the multiplicity of cultural 
expressions;62 every cultural action or object speaks of Being. In this, ac-
cording to Levinas, contemporary philosophy is radically anti-Platonic:  
“for Plato, the world of significations precedes the language and the culture that 
express it; it [the Platonic world of meanings – EW] is indifferent to the system 
                                           
58 HO 45 / HH 73. 
59 HO 45, 48f / HH 74, 78. But one should be very careful in stating this point. 
Whereas Levinas remains sceptical as to the restoration of the animal rationale in 
the sense of mastering praxis (as set out here), his entire philosophical enterprise 
could be considered as rethinking the definition of the human being as zoon logon 
echon (of which animal rationale is the traditional Latin translation). Heidegger 
already undertook such an enterprise and Levinas never rejected the idea that the 
entire human being is a logos on being; what he did was to relativise the ontologi-
cal logos that one is oneself, by another logos, spoken by the face of the other (HO 
31 / HH 51).  
60 HO 60 / HH 98. 
61 HH 9–25 / HH 17–41 – much more than the previous two. 
62 HO 18 / HH 30. 
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of signs that can be invented to make this world present to thought. Conse-
quently, it [the world of meanings – EW] dominates the historical cultures.”63  
Contemporary philosophy, therefore, is anti-Platonic in the sense that it re-
jects outright any conception of such an ultimate and authoritative world of 
meaning behind the diversity of cultures, and subordinates meaning to the 
way in which it is expressed, in other words, all meaning is dependent on the 
culturally specific way of its expression; without this specificity there is no 
meaning. If this is accepted, it would mean that there is no way to judge or 
evaluate cultures, or at least there is no way in which to judge particular cul-
tures, without the judging itself being at the same time an expression of a 
particular culture. There would be no super-culture that transcends its ex-
pression. That this is maintained in modern ethnology and is also reflected in 
the politics of decolonisation (which is nothing less than the historico-
political manifestation of the rejection of a trans-cultural access of the colo-
nising forces to a trans-historical human ideal) has been discussed in Chap-
ters 2 and 3.64 Even Marxist theories that attempt to introduce a cross-
cultural criterion by reference to human needs, inevitably slide into this cul-
tural relativism since the discourse on needs is motivated by the will to create 
a new society and, thus, the very formulation and manifestation of needs is 
culturally determined.65  
What this leads to is what Levinas calls “the cultural, aesthetic notion of 
signification [la notion culturelle et esthétique de la signification]”.66 Such a 
notion of signification or meaning inevitably slides into absurdity, according 
to him – not the absurdity of absence of any meaning (since every culture 
would still have its internal coherence of references that would serve to give 
meaning to every cultural act or object), but, the absence of ultimate, trans-
cultural or super-cultural reference. Levinas certainly does not deny that one 
could establish criteria against which different cultures or cultural elements 
could be compared or graded (such as efficiency in the realisation of par-
ticular kinds of project, for instance), but such criteria would themselves 
be culture specific.67 Besides, such criteria would not be sufficient to deter-
mine if elements of cultures are of value at all. As far as the ontological per-
                                           
63 HO 18 / HH 31. See again Chapter 3, § 2 on Platonism and colonisation. 
64 Having presented this line of thought on the anti-Platonism of contemporary cul-
ture, one could again refer to the essential equivalence that consistently guides this 
reflection from the moment Levinas jotted down the preparatory notes for it (now 
available under the “Notes philosophiques diverses”): “9° Anti-Platonism. Disori-
entation. Equivalence. Decolonisation.” (CdC 263). 
65 HO 21–22 / HH 35–37. 
66 OH 22 / HH 38. 
67 HO 37 / HH 59. 
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spective on cultural diversity is adopted no finality could be reached on the 
significance or importance of a culture or of the practices that constitute a 
culture.68 Up to this point Levinas ascribes to a cultural relativism. What is 
lacking from this picture, according to him, is the meaning of meaning or 
rather the sense of signification (in the terms of the title of HO, chapter 1), 
i.e., that which would provide the cultural diversity with an orientation. This 
lack of orientation in the cultural diversity, which is inherent in the contem-
porary cultural and aesthetic notion of meaning, bears, since Nietzsche, 
another name in philosophy: the death of God;69 Levinas also calls it “the 
crisis of monotheism”.70  
Far from resuscitating a God from one of the world religions or one from 
the philosophical tradition (but not without being inspired by what he has 
learned from Judaism and from Western metaphysics), Levinas first contests 
the status of transcendence of such a “God”: he ascribes to the death of a 
certain God, but believes that if philosophy is to surmount the problem of 
                                           
68 “Absurdity does not lie in non-sense but in the isolation of countless significa-
tions, the absence of a sense that orients them. What is lacking is the sense of the 
senses” (HO 24 / HH 40). This statement is never justified by its author. Let it at 
least be noted that an interesting avenue for reconstructing a dialogue between 
Levinas and the Frankfurt School is opened by this remark: cf. Jürgen Habermas, 
“Zu Max Horkheimers Satz: “Einen unbedingten Sinn zu retten ohne Gott, ist 
eitel”, in Texte und Kontexte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991, pp. 110–126. 
 Levinas’ constant companion in the first Chapter of Humanism of the other is Mer-
leau-Ponty. Although no explicit reference to any text of Merleau-Ponty is made, it 
is not too difficult to find significant elements of the “cultural notion of meaning”, 
for instance in Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), where Merleau-Ponty elaborates 
not only on the unity and plurality of culture as an expression of the body (pp. 110–
112) and the fact that one is, through culture, linked with others and even responsi-
ble for others (p. 121), but proposes nothing more than history as the judge between 
these different cultural expressions. Likewise, Levinas’ politico-cultural diagnosis 
(in the absence of recognition of ethical alterity) from the first Chapter of Human-
ism of the other is captured succinctly in Merleau-Ponty’s Sens et Non-sens (Paris: 
Gallimard, [1966] 1996), “In politics, finally, the experience of these thirty years 
obliges one also to evoke the background of non-sense against which all universal 
undertaking stands out and that threatens is with failure.” (p. 8). 
69 It should be underscored that what is at stake here is first of all a crisis of the human 
sciences and of contemporary European culture, and only secondarily the question 
of the existence of a deity. Cf. Paul van Tongeren, Reinterpreting modern cul-
ture. An introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, West Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press, 2000, of which the main point is summarised as follows: “The 
main problem which Nietzsche confronts us with is not so much that God is dead 
but that we do not understand or do not admit what this means. […] His critique 
of religion is a critique of modern a-religiosity, a diagnosis of modern culture.” 
(p. 285). 
70 HO 24 / HH 40. 
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absurdity it must revert to the notion of God or at least the infinite.71 The 
God whom Levinas, the philosopher, believes is dead is the God of ontol-
ogy.72 The “God” that could orientate the plurality of cultures, on whom all 
cultures depend for the significance of their meaning, is the God of ethics. 
To summarise: cultural diversity and equivalence – to which contem-
porary philosophy, social science and political reality attest – lead to an 
absurdity without any transcendent, super-cultural source of meaning that 
could orientate them. This lack of transcendence is rooted in the ontological 
existence of the human being, to be precise, in the mineness, from which, 
as far as one remains Heideggerian (and if Levinas’ reading of him is ac-
cepted) there is no escape. The diversity of logoi that human beings are, all 
speak of Being (they are ontology), but without any escape from their 
disorientating diversity. Seeking a transcendent meaning or sense, means 
the same as seeking an escape from mineness, which also means the same 
as seeking to overcome the death of God. And this in turn means seeking 
to prevent humanity from getting lost by lapsing into absurdity. In the first 
chapter of Humanism of the other Levinas gives a formulation of his 
problem in terms of culture, ontology and meaning. However, in the second 
and third chapters of his book, he argues that it would be in vain to attempt 
to respond to this problem by recourse to the resources or the subject (as has 
been indicated above). Let it be stated clearly that Levinas accepts a good 
number of major anti-humanist ideas73 – as long as one leaves out of 
consideration what he will defend as ultimate meaning or the sense of all 
signification, namely ethicity. 
3 HUMANISM AND ETHICITY 
The problem, and the reason why Levinas feels himself called to write on 
the humanism of the other human being, is exactly that an infringement is 
taking place on the humanity of the self and the other. This happens in a 
                                           
71 Levinas refers to the Second World War as a “hole in history – [years] when all 
the visible gods had abandoned us, where god was truly dead or had gone back to 
his irrevelation.” (HO 28 / HH 46). Compare with HO 25 / HH 41: “We do not 
think that what makes sense can do without God […]” and HO 36 / HH 57 where 
he refers to the necessity of philosophical meditation “to resort to notions such as 
Infinity or God.” 
72 Furthermore, as has been shown in his commentary on the “primitive” religions, 
he considers the “gods” to be dead (Chapter 2), and his reservations about certain 
traditional forms of Jewish expression declare the traditional monotheistic God, at 
least for intellectual and ethical purposes, dead (Chapter 4). 
73 See also OB 127 / AE 203. 
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contemporary discourse in the social sciences that is typified as anti-
humanist. Levinas doesn’t hesitate to link this fact to the name of Hitler,74 
which means that theoretical anti-humanism is not simply an academic 
debate, it puts in jeopardy again, as Levinas said in 1934, the very humanity 
of the human being (the book Humanism of the other ends on exactly the 
same idea as that of the essay of 1934).75 But how does Levinas justify this 
idea? And what does his notion of humanity consist of? 
It becomes clear, right from the preface, that Levinas’ concern in this 
book is with political and human scientific events or tendencies that do vio-
lence to the humanity of the human being. To this he attempts to give a re-
sponse, which one knows from the title of the book he will identify in some 
way as a “humanism”, in particular a “humanism of the other human”.  
In the preface, Levinas qualifies the project of his book by the word 
“inactuel” or later “intempestif”. Sure enough, one could take this to 
mean non-topical, untimely or misplaced, and Levinas recognizes from 
the first page that his use of the word “humanism” could, in 1972, be 
considered to be out-of-date. But “inactuel” and “intempestif” are more 
of those words from the Western philosophical tradition that Levinas 
tries to provide with an overtone or a different reverberation. “Inactuel” 
and “intempestif” are in fact the French words with which one translates 
the German “unzeitgemäß”, in particular as in the title of Nietzsche’s 
book Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen. Levinas implicitly presents his book 
Humanism of the other as an Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung, an untimely 
meditation or an unfashionable observation (as the title of Nietzsche’s 
book has been translated in English).76 What is more, he will do so by 
opening up a new meaning of the word “inactuel”, non-actual.  
“Here the non-actual [l’inactuel] signifies the other of the actual [l’actuel] rather 
than ignorance and negation of it; the other of what, in the high Western tradition, is 
commonly called Being-in-act [être-en-acte] […] the other of Being-in-act, but also 
its cohort of virtualities that are potentials; the other of Being, of the esse of Being, 
of the gesture of Being, the other of fully Being [pleinement être] […] stated in this 
expression in act [en acte]; the other of Being itself – the untimely [l’intempestif] 
that interrupts the synthesis of presents that constitutes memorable time.”77  
                                           
74 OH 6 / HH 11; and cf. “Hitlerism” HO 29 / HH 47 and the reference to Léon 
Blum’s prison writings of 1941–42, HO 28 / HH 46–47. 
75 Cf. HO 69 / HH 113. 
76 It should be observed that there is no other text of Levinas in which references to 
Nietzsche take such a dominant place. 
77 HO 3 / HH 7–8, translation modified. 
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Without going into the detail of this dense statement, one should at least see 
that what Levinas defines as non-actual (inactuel and intempestif) and that 
is equivalent to “the humanism of the other human being”, is that which is 
other to the whole Western tradition of thinking78 – from Aristotle (cf. 
“Being-in-act”) to Heidegger (cf. “the esse of Being”79) – that places reflec-
tion on Being in its centre. As indicated above, in the book Humanism of the 
other, Levinas is still occupied with the fact of mineness, i.e., one’s attach-
ment to Being without any exit (“Being without issue”).80 Levinas is still 
concerned with the ontological issue of being drawn along fatally by Being. 
And his response is not of the order of Being, in fact it is foreign to Being in 
that he defends the case for a kind of meaning that emerges independently of 
ontology,81 and that is, for this reason, independent of Being-as-act, and 
therefore in-actual. Levinas’ humanism is untimely, not because it was 
unfashionable in the 1970s to defend humanism in philosophy, but it is 
untimely since it draws its sources from what is absolutely foreign to Being 
as time, and thus to all ontological sources of meaning. It is in-actual with 
reference to the human being whose concern in being would be caring for 
Being. What is untimely is a consideration of humanism viewed as ethicity 
(or what Levinas names “ethics itself [l’éthique même]”82) that is not re-
ducible to the logos of Being, to the cultural, social, religious, ethnic or 
whatever condition of the human being – as is done, for instance, in 
Nietzsche’s On the genealogy of morals – but an untimely consideration of 
                                           
78 Whereas Levinas will be inspired by another tradition – that of Judaism – his con-
cern here is not to confront Western culture with another culture, but to confront it 
with what is not only the other of Western culture, but also of all other cultures, 
including Judaism. Though, rarely, if ever, does Levinas state it so categorically. 
This does, of course, not take away from the fact that Judaism could be valued as 
testimony to that non-cultural meaning, a possibility that in turn should not be de-
nied a priori to any other culture. 
79 Cf. “essence of Being” (HO 61, 63 / HH 100, 103, where “essence” is used as an 
abstract noun describing the very verbality of Being). This use of the word “es-
sence”, rather than the traditional use, is explicitly announced in the preface to 
Otherwise than Being. 
80 As is said in HO 59 / HH 97. 
81 “[I]t means casting doubt on experience as source of sense” (HO 6 / HH 11) and 
HO 36 / HH 57: “the ‘term’ of such a movement, both critical and spontaneous 
[…] is no longer called Being.”; HO 67 / HH 110: “Non-essence of man” (a par-
ody of anti-humanist criticism of humanist essentialism, but Levinas of course 
means something different by “essence”). One here already recognises the theme 
that would be encapsulated in the title of the book Otherwise than Being or be-
yond essence. 
82 HO 28 / HH 46. 
124 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
ethicity as an irreducible imperative or putting to question83 addressed by the 
other human being to the (mostly pre-predicatively stated) ontological 
identity of the self. That is, a meaning, a logos, that is not in the indicative, 
but in the imperative or interrogative.  
If indeed such an originary ethical meaning is more than mere wish-
ful thinking, Levinas would have to present it in such a way that this 
meaning is not dependent on any specific culture.84 The essence of Levi-
nas’ justification of ethics now needs to be outlined; this will be done 
referring mostly to Humanism of the other.  
Levinas never renounces the great lesson from Heidegger, namely that 
meaning originates in the act of Being. What he does question is that this 
exhausts human access to meaningfulness. His whole project consists in 
demonstrating another, and more originary, source of meaning that is ethical. 
This twofold meaningfulness of human existence is analysed under the name 
of ageing (vieillissement).85 The human being might be considered to be 
persevering in his/her existence, or identity as selfness – of which the visible 
appearance is ageing – but at the same time, this perseverance is executed 
only despite oneself (malgré soi) or despite Being (malgré l’être),86 since the 
more one exists the more one consumes one’s existence. In ageing one 
sees existence as being gained and lost at the same time. This passivity 
from which one’s active existence cannot be detached is not the passivity 
of undergoing an experience (since this is, phenomenologically seen, only 
another form of activity), but what Levinas calls “a passivity that is more 
passive than any passivity”.87 Levinas’ wager is that this losing existence 
despite yourself, this extreme passivity, has its own meaning, namely one of 
inevitably ceding your existence to the other. What Levinas says about the 
contemporary consensus concerning language, and by implication about all 
signification, holds equally for Levinas’ perspective on the human being as 
incarnate logos (i.e., the active aspect of existence): certainly one should 
insist on its hermeneutic (and therefore also its historically contingent) 
                                           
83 Cf. HO 6 / HH 11, and Levinas insists that this questioning is “a challenge of con-
sciousness, not a consciousness of the challenge [la mise en question de la con-
science et non pas d’une conscience de la mise en question]” HO 33 / HH 53; and 
a slightly different wording in HO 36 / HH 57. 
84 HO 6 / HH 11. 
85 It is used only in passing in HO 65 / HH 106, but developed in more detail in OB 
51–56 / AE 86–94. It has already figured in our discussion in Chapter 1. I should 
here remind the reader of Levinas’ declaration that his philosophical objective was 
the justification for these two sources of meaning. 
86 OB 51 / AE 86, HO 68 / HH 110 or HO 51 / HH 82. 
87 E.g., HO 6 / HH 11. 
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structure and on the cultural determinedness of all expressions,88 but, he 
adds, one should not forget that the logos, in all its diversity, is addressed at 
someone, in the sense of being exposed to the other.89 Without consideration 
for this directedness of the logos that one is, its meaning will remain absurd, 
like the meaning of a turn of speech in a dialogue in which the fact of being 
addressed by and responding to someone is ignored. Due to the extreme 
passivity of one’s existence, despite yourself, your whole existence, your 
entire perseverance in a particular identity is exposed to or addressed to the 
other. This holds equally for all cultural expressions or utterances, it also 
holds for all actions (the ontological logos as praxis). Pre-predicatively, the 
human being is not only a logos, a “statement”, concerning Being, but the 
human being is such a logos always as directed to someone in a very particu-
lar way, namely as a response to the other, as “an offering of oneself” (une 
offrande de soi).90 The other enjoys a primary place in my existence such 
that the logos that I am, is always only a response to the other. This aspect of 
responsiveness is a surplus of meaning or sense91 over and above, or rather 
before, the meaning of the ontological existence. This surplus in the response 
is therefore characterised by Levinas as not ontological, as ethical, i.e., the 
response-character of my whole being constitutes my being as responsibility 
for the other. The same idea is expressed differently from the side of the 
other: the face of the other speaks;92 it imposes on the self an inalienable task 
of responsibility. In fact the other elects the self, as it were, as unique to 
this responsibility. No one could replace the self in this task and the re-
sponsibility remains infinite. This ethical appeal from the other to the self 
invests it with the first meaning: mere formal ethicity. This non-ontological 
meaning is completely independent from all hermeneutic and cultural 
conditions, but determines the latter decisively, since these conditions come 
                                           
88 HO 30 / HH 49–50. 
89 HO 63 / HH 104. “[B]efore it is celebration of Being, expression is a relation with 
the one to whom I express the expression and whose presence is already required 
so that my cultural gesture of expression can be produced. [… The other] is, pri-
mordially, sense because he [or she] lends it to expression itself, because only 
through him [or her] can a phenomenon such as signification introduce itself, of 
itself, into Being.” (HO 30 / HH 50).  
 The subject is thus not only decentred by the structures identified by the human 
scientists and thus exposed to the exterior rather than collected in its own interi-
ority (as described above), but also, and Levinas would say most importantly, one 
is exposed to the other. This exposure is the advent of ethicity. 
90 HO 75n4 / HH 122n4, my translation. 
91 HO 69 / HH 113. 
92 HO 31 / HH 51. 
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only “after” ethicity.93 This is the meaning and sense of all culture, it is the 
“God” that Levinas believes is to be salvaged.94 The world may be de-
Westernized, but not dis-orientated, according to Levinas’ play on words95 – 
a new form of Platonism is introduced in which the entire trans-cultural 
hinterworld consists only of the Good beyond Being.96 
This ethicity thus resides in an “intrigue” or “plot”97 that “occurs” be-
tween the self and the other: the alterity (of the other) is not to be understood 
as the difference of the other with respect to the self (since this would make 
it a relative alterity); it is the other putting to question the self (the ontological 
identity), making an appeal to the self for his/her responsibility, and thus 
investing the self with the most decisive mark of identity: being elected to 
respond to the other. This obligation of the self towards the other is a duty  
“that did not ask for consent, that come into me traumatically, from beneath all 
rememorable present, an-archically [used in the etymological sense of “not-
foundationally” – EW], without beginning. [The duty] came without being offered 
as a choice, came as an election where my contingent humanity becomes identity 
and unicity, through the impossibility of escaping from election.”98  
Thus is answered what the title of the book means: humanism is a discourse 
on humanity, but in which humanity, even though it says something about 
the unity of all human beings99 transcends the idea of “humanity” as indi-
cation of a genus of animal – humanity contains an inherent asymmetry: it 
doesn’t mean the same for the other and for the self. For the other “being 
human” means to exert a pre-predicative imperative or questioning on the 
self (i.e., neglecting the ethical alterity of the other equals infringing on 
that person’s humanity); for the self “being human” means to have one’s 
                                           
93 HO 36 / HH 58. 
94 But there is nothing obvious in this appellation: the Good, as ultimate sense of 
valuation, is a value “that, by abuse of language, is named. A value that is named 
God.” (HO 54 / HH 87 and see HO 56 / HH 89). 
95 HO 37 / HH 60. 
96 HO 54 / HH 86. 
97 The term “intrigue” is not used in Humanism of the other, but introduced in “La 
trace de l’autre” (first published in 1963, DEHH 187–202) and is used to describe 
the originary ethicity linking the self and the other in exactly the same terms as in 
the last part of Chapter 1 of HO. See also the use of “intrigue” in the definition 
given of ethics: “We call ‘ethical’ a relation between terms where both are linked 
neither by a synthesis of understanding, nor by a relation of a subject to an object, 
but where the one weighs on the other or is important for the other, or is meaning-
ful for the other, where they are linked by a plot that knowledge can neither ex-
haust, nor sort out [une intrigue que le savoir ne saurait ni épuiser ni démêler].” 
DEHH 225. 
98  HO 7 / HH 12–13. 
99  HO 6 / HH 11. 
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identity before anything else in the assignment to respond to the other (i.e., 
removing from the self its obligation to the other is an infringement on the 
humanity of the self);100 the logos (or identity) that the self inevitably is, 
now is a logos addressed to the other, in response to the other, and to the 
benefit of the other. The identity of the self is a sign for-the-other.101 Levi-
nas’ humanism is a humanism “of the other human being” in that it could 
not be a humanism of the single self. It is a humanism that depends on the 
other, it is “anchored” in alterity, and thus it is a humanism to which the 
other has the right, it is the other’s humanism and thus a humanism for the 
other.102 But the humanity of the other and the humanity of the self imply 
one another mutually in an inseparable way. If this is what Levinas under-
stands under his “humanism”, then it is this double decentring of human-
ism – its orientation from the other (rather than from the self) and from 
alterity (rather than from ontology) – that warrants qualifying Levinas’ 
stance as that of a post-anti-humanist humanism. 
4 “ETHICAL CULTURE” AND THE “CULTURAL AND 
AESTHETIC NOTION OF MEANING” 
In the circumscription of humanism in the opening paragraphs of this Part 
the very important place of cultural products in the life of humanism has 
been pointed out. Yet, from the preceding discussion, in which it was shown 
how Levinas renews the notion of humanism with recourse to the context-
independent meaning of the appeal to responsibility, imposed by the other on 
the self, it is still not indicated in what way the ethical would “make sense” 
of the plurality of cultures. Levinas therefore needs to explicate the tensions 
between these two positions. To be true, Levinas doesn’t conclude the dis-
cussion of the “cultural and aesthetic notion of meaning” without reinvesting 
the very notion of culture with a new meaning:  
                                           
100 HO 66 / HH 109. One sees this asymmetrical, but linked, salvaging of the self 
and the other in different terms also in the preface to Totality and infinity, 
amongst others. 
101 HO 7, 75n8 / HH 13, 122n8. 
102 See also Levinas’ clarification: “I don’t affirm human saintliness; I say that man 
cannot question the supreme value of saintliness. In 1968, the year of question-
ing in and around the universities, all values were ‘up for grabs’, with the excep-
tion of the value of the ‘other man’, to which one was to dedicate oneself. […] 
Man is the being who recognizes saintliness and the forgetting of self [l’oubli de 
soi]. […] Man is not only the being who understands what beings means […]” 
(A&T 180 / AT 181). 
128 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
“We will conclude by saying that before signification is situated in Culture and 
Aesthetics it is situated in Ethics, presupposition of all Culture and all significa-
tion. Morality does not belong to Culture; it allows us to judge, to uncover height. 
Height ordains being.103  
In a paper published in 1983, “The philosophical determination of the idea 
of culture”104 he takes this perspective on culture further by calling this 
ethics an “ethical Culture”. This notion seems to be justified by the fact 
that ethics, as the fact of always responding to the other, gives rise to a 
new notion of spirit/mind (esprit)105 that is defined by this responsibility to 
the other rather than by expressions in art and poetry. It is a culture that is 
defined in opposition to barbarism, but where barbarism is implicitly defined 
by the reduction of the human being to Being (one could recall the remark 
of Levinas’ in On escape that “every civilization that accepts Being, the 
tragic despair that it entails and the crimes that it justifies, deserves the 
name of barbaric”).106 The culture that is ethics is the  
“breach made by humanness in the barbarism of Being, even if no philosophy of 
history guarantees us against the return of barbarism”.107  
One might perhaps reformulate that this “ethical culture” is a humanism 
without an optimism of progress. It would also be a humanism without 
any Bildung or cultural formation towards a pre-established model of an 
ideal human being, but rather a humanism or an ethical culture that is 
constantly questioned by the other’s appeal to responsibility. In this re-
spect, the humanism of Humanism of the other differs from the two es-
says on education and humanism in Difficult freedom (see Chapter 4) 
and especially the earlier one, in that the philosophical text makes no 
plea for a humanistic study of certain cultural traditions of reflection on 
ethics (although it certainly doesn’t exclude it). 
But Humanism of the other gives us a better, albeit surprising, idea of 
what such an ethical culture is, that transcends all particular cultures and in 
the light of which all cultural events – including all forms of relationships 
and interactions between the self and the other – could be judged. Like all 
cultures, ethical culture identifies the self. But in Levinas’ notion of ethical 
culture this happens in a very paradoxical way. What is most intimate 
about one’s identity, the very non-founded foundation thereof, is the 
unique election to be responsible for the other (and in this notion the phi-
                                           
103 HO 36 / HH 58, translation modified. 
104 ENT 179–187 / EN 185–194. 
105 ENT 187 / EN 193. 
106 EV 127. 
107 ENT 187 / EN 194. 
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losophical re-appropriation of humanism is very close to that of the two 
texts from Difficult freedom). One’s identity is the other in the self, to the 
point where the meaning of my identity depends decisively on me being 
for-the-other, as if I were a sign for the other.108  
“To be Me/Ego, thenceforth signifies being unable to escape from responsibility, 
as if the whole edifice of creation stood on my shoulders.”109  
And this meaning that constitutes the identity decisively undermines my 
ontologically constituted identity. The most intimate of the identity of the 
self is the other that invests it with an infinite obligation. Consciousness, 
and for the same price, the whole existence of the self “loses its first 
place”,110 since it is disturbed by an originary alienating proximity of the 
other.111 And since the other has the primacy in the identity of the self, 
Levinas expresses this inversion (or substitution as he also calls it)112 with 
a grammatical imagery, claiming that 
“[t]he active I [Moi] returns to the passivity of a myself [soi], to the accusative of the 
me [se] that is derived from no nominative, to the accusation prior to any misdeed.”113  
This form of identity in the accusative is expressed in a Biblical formula 
by which to declare one’s ethical availability: “Me voici!” (“here I 
am!”), and that Levinas frequently cites114 (the English, “Here I am!” 
unfortunately restores the nominative form of the personal pronoun). I 
am me before I am I, because of the originary exposure to the other.  
My identity is thus not that last stronghold of my being-at-home in 
the world; it is rather the fact that as  
“[f]oreign(er) to itself, obsessed by others, un-quiet, the I is hostage, hostage in its 
very recurrence of a “me” endlessly failing to itself”.115  
                                           
108 HO 7 / HH 13, as stated above. 
109 HO 33 / HH 53. 
110 HO 32 / HH 53. 
111 “[I]n the approach to others, where others are form the start under my responsi-
bility, ‘something’ has overflowed my freely made decisions, has slipped into 
me unbeknownst to me, alienating my identity.” (HO 62 / HH 102). 
112 HO 6 / HH 111 
113 HO 64 / HH 105, similarly HO 68 / HH 111, translation modified. 
114 Although this formula is used in numerous places in the Hebrew Bible, it is per-
haps not insignificant to consider the note in the Carnets de Captivité where 
Levinas expresses his appreciation for the place that this formula has in the story 
of the calling of Samuel (CdC 78, 83). The child Samuel, who had not yet 
learned to hear the voice of God, thinks that it is the priest Eli that calls him. Al-
though Levinas doesn’t explicitly say so, the confusion of the call of God and 
the call of the other, is probably what makes this passage exceptional. 
115 HO 67 / HH 109, translation modified. 
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In fact the self’s identity consists originarily in being without identity,116 
since its very identity is constituted by a difference:  
“The difference that gapes between ego and self, the non-coincidence of the iden-
tical, is a thorough non-indifference with regard to people.”117  
Levinas shares the anti-humanist liking for the line of Rimbaud “Je est 
un autre” (“I is another”);118 he fully embraces a decentring of the sub-
ject, but in terms of his own, claiming to be even more radical than the 
other anti-humanist theorists. 
This is the identity with which the super-cultural ethical culture stamps 
all agents.119 It is also the conviction with which Levinas challenges Heideg-
ger120 and with him the entire Western tradition of philosophy and culture (in 
accordance with what has been stated from the outset – see §1, above). 
However, in this particular part of Chapter 3 of Humanism of the other (§IV 
entitled “L’étrangeté à l’être”, strangeness or foreignness to Being) Levinas 
clearly sets up two traditions against one another: on the one hand the tradi-
tion of the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Heidegger (and the lat-
ter’s readings of Hölderlin and Trakl) are named and referred to by the “être” 
(Being as a verb or to be) in the section’s title; on the other hand, represent-
ing the “étrangeté à …” (strangeness to …) is the Bible,121 more precisely 
the Tanakh (that is also referred to as the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament) 
and the tradition of its interpretation (that echoes the citation of the Babylo-
nian Talmud as epigraph to this chapter of Humanism of the other), of which 
the books of Genesis, Leviticus, Lamentations, Jeremiah and the Psalms are 
named. This opposition advances the idea of ethics as a strangeness to Being 
(that I have explained above; see also the discussion of the in-actuality of 
ethics, above). Not only is one’s identity originarily not determined by your 
place in the world or in history, but since the self is a stranger to him-
self/herself nobody is (originarily) at home (Personne n’est chez soi).122 
                                           
116 HO 68 / HH 110. 
117 HO 66 / HH 108–109, translation modified. 
118 HO 60 / HH 97 and especially HO 62 / HH 103. 
119 And the other is as if in the image of God – not an icon of God, but as it were, a 
trace of God (HO 44 / HH 69). 
120 HO 65ff / HH 107ff. 
121 As Levinas says in HO 66f / HH 108, 109. 
122 HO 66 / HH 108. With the theme of being a stranger Levinas implicitly polemi-
cises with Heidegger as the author of texts like Wohnen, Bauen, Denken and es-
pecially the Brief über den “Humanismus” (compare for instance the ethical 
strangeness with Heidegger’s idea of homelessness [Heimatlosigkeit] that is 
constituted by a forgetting of being [Seinsvergessenheit], as expressed in P 258 / 
W 339). A careful comparison of these two texts on humanism would bring a 
myriad of such implicit references to the fore. That would, however, make a 
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However, this opposition suggested by Levinas evokes two important 
questions: firstly, if it is true that the second of these traditions does better 
justice to ethical alterity, how should its relationship with the dominant 
Western tradition in Europe be considered? This is an intra-cultural 
question. The second question, which is trans-cultural, is the following: 
how could Levinas justify using a particular culture to present the case 
for the trans-cultural ethical culture? 
(1) Western culture is dominated by ontology or what Levinas else-
where calls gnoseology.123 The practice of placing this form of signi-
fication centrally and maintaining its dominance is possible only by 
forgetting the ethical meaning of people and veiling this meaning in 
philosophy.124 Levinas is probably thinking of the Jews in Europe 
(but not exclusively of them) when he indicates the price of this for-
getting and this veiling – the meaning of their suffering, the meaning 
that considers ethics to be primary and of which their writings testify  
“is not a philosopher’s construction; it is the unreal reality of persecuted peo-
ple in the everyday history of the world”.125  
 Suppression or violence on the level of ontology, reducing ethical 
meaning to ontology, is reflected in violence in political reality – such 
is the relation of the Jewish tradition to the Western world in which it 
has had to cope with a long history of adversity. Yet, as significant as 
the suffering of Jews in Europe might be for such a reflection on the 
political consequences of covering up ethical meaning (a claim that 
seems to support Levinas’ “humanism of the suffering servant” from 
Difficult freedom), this does not amount to any conclusion regarding 
the desirability of either a Hebraic humanism or a humanism of patience. 
In other words, the reminder of Jewish suffering in the philosophical 
                                           
separate study. Behind these polemics is a favourite image of Levinas – oppos-
ing Ulysses that returns to his patria to Abraham that forever leaves his behind – 
as symbols guiding Western civilization and Judaism respectively, but also as 
narrative reflection of the logic of ontology and ethics respectively. 
123 OB 64 / AE 104: “Western philosophy has never doubted the gnoseological, 
and consequently ontological, structure of signification.” 
124 HO 67f / HH 110. 
125 HO 67f / HH 110, translation modified. Compare with the remark in the essay in 
Difficult freedom on anti-humanism and education (and the discussion in Chap-
ter 4) where Levinas underscores the fact that Jews in Europe have had a fore-
taste of the “crisis of the human ideal” (DF 281 / DL 391). Furthermore, the 
Biblical theme of the suffering servant that Levinas interprets as a symbol of all 
the conquered and suffering that demand justice (DF 287 / DL 399 and dis-
cussed in Chapter 4) is echoed here. 
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text doesn’t permit us to settle the unresolved state in which Levinas’ 
humanism of Difficult freedom has been left at the end of Chapter 4. 
(2) But Levinas’ way of going about this matter should retain our attention. I 
have said that the third aspect of Levinas’ problem with anti-humanism 
is that of cultural relativism and that this could be solved only if a super-
cultural point of orientation could be found. However, it is impossible 
for Levinas to do so in a way other than culturally determined: he at-
tempts to develop a discourse on ethics that would be acceptable within 
the discourse of Greek thinking, i.e., Western philosophy. The choice of 
discursive partner or opponent is easily imposed by the historical contin-
gency of Levinas’ life, but also the dominance of Western civilisation in 
recent world history. He polemicises with this form of discourse exactly 
for its forgetting of a kind of meaning in the name of which Levinas 
challenges Western thinking, that is, in obedience to this primary mea-
ning. That meaning, Levinas finds better attested to or more sensitivity 
shown for, in the tradition of Jewish thought. But one should be careful 
to understand correctly what he does. On the one hand Levinas explicitly 
does not want to challenge philosophy with recourse to the authority of 
religion.126 On the other hand, Levinas is aware that his very allegiance 
to the game rules of Western philosophy becomes a question in the light 
of the theme of his philosophy, namely the primacy of ethics. This que-
stion opens up a space for introducing “the other” (written in inverted 
commas, since it is meant in the minor sense of cultural difference127) of 
Western philosophy, namely Jewish thought. And why not, asks Levi-
nas, draw on texts that are equally part of the European cultural heritage 
as those of Hölderlin and Trakl commented on by Heidegger, namely 
the books of the Jewish Bible?128 The whole question of the relation be-
tween Judaism and the West, between religion and philosophy, is put in-
to play here. Is the other tradition of the West just associated with it by 
accident, is it only a monster, a historical freak, that places Judaism as an 
                                           
126 HO 66 / HH 108: “Biblical verses do not function here as proof but as testimony 
of a tradition and an experience.” Compare this declaration with the conclusions 
concerning the form of authority of religious scriptures supposed by Levinas 
from the readers of his essays on humanism in Difficult freedom (Chapter 4, 
above). 
127 A tension in this minor use of the term “other” should be noticed: Judaism can-
not simply be considered the other of Western culture if it is at the same time 
claimed that it is part of the European cultural heritage. Its otherness is rather of 
the nature of having been partially absorbed, mostly through Christianity, into 
the Western heritage and in this way to a certain extent obscured. 
128 HO 66 / HH 108. 
LEVINAS’ POST-ANTI-HUMANIST HUMANISM AND AFTER | 133 
 
annex to the West?129 Or is the presence of Judaism testimony to the in-
sistence of the appeal of the other (in the context of the West), and of 
ethicity in the face of the other (testimony to it, but not the appeal it-
self!130)? Jewishness by its existence of living without a State (up to 
1948), i.e., living the condition of being a stranger or foreigner to the 
world, and bearing the consequences thereof, and by its primacy accor-
ded to ethics testifies to the non-Being or beyond Being131 suppressed by 
the West in culture, as in politics.  
Of course there is a question of cultural specificity in Humanism of the other. 
But the choice of the cultural specifics of his polemics is determined by the 
contingency of the author’s historical situation; and the choice for Judaic 
inspiration is never justified by a supposed superiority of that culture. For 
Levinas, the “Jewishness” to which the Biblical citations and Talmudic ref-
erences in his philosophical thought solicits some consent, does not simply 
mean believing in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, it does not require 
being a child of Abraham, or being a protagonist for Zionism or living in the 
State of Israel, it doesn’t mean speaking Hebrew (though it doesn’t exclude 
these either ) – it means having in final analysis, in what ultimately counts, 
no identity: being someone else, being without a homeland.132 For Levinas  
“Israel, beyond the Israel of flesh and blood, encompasses all people who refuse 
to accept the purely authoritarian verdict of History.”133  
                                           
129 HO 66 / HH 108. 
130 Although – and we shall see this problem in Chapter 6, §1 as exposed by Robert 
Bernasconi – doesn’t Levinas say that there are people (Jews as he implies) 
whose very existence is one of non-essence or beyond Being (HO 67f / HH 
110)? As far as this is insinuated, Levinas infringes on his own notion of the al-
terity of the other as not determined by ontological givens. In saying this, one 
should however not forget the close link between the mortality of the other (and 
thus his/her suffering), which is a non-ontological “phenomenon” and alterity. 
131 HO 54, 67 / HH 86, 110 
132 And to an important extent, this is true also for Levinas’ Judaic writings – as was 
argued in Chapter 4. The relation between philosophy and Judaism in Levinas’ 
work is quite complex and there exists up to now no clear consensus amongst 
scholars as to how one is to conceive of the articulation between the two ele-
ments. I have presented and motivated my own view on this issue, beyond what 
is possible to do here, in “Giving up your place in history. The ‘position’ of 
Levinas in philosophy and Jewish thought”, in Journal for Semitics 16/1, 2007, 
pp. 180–193. 
133 OS 65 / HS 88. This kind of expression of a universal, anonymous Israel, of 
which one finds also a “European” equivalent in Levinas, poses problems that 
will be exposed in Chapter 6. The important point is that whatever excellence 
can be attributed to Israel or the Jewish religious community, cannot be denied a 
priori in other religious or cultural forms. 
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And in this sense do not dwell in Being, as Heidegger would have it. But 
since Levinas draws his inspiration from the Jewish testimony and formu-
lates his plea in the language of Western philosophy – both of which are 
manifestations of Being – he is obliged, in obedience to originary ethicity, 
which is the theme of his plea, to cross out as it were everything he says. 
Hence the central importance of the first paragraph of the preface of the 
book, in which this crossing-out of what follows in the book, is announced 
(as discussed in the introduction to the current Chapter). The text in which 
Levinas pleas for the recognition of the originary ethicity of the other, is 
inevitably expressed in a particular cultural discourse and thus constitutes 
the risk that it might at the very moment of testifying to the other, be the 
first step to its veiling and forgetting. If this holds for Levinas’ philosophi-
cal text, it would likewise hold for his Talmudic readings and, in fact, for 
the Rabbinic literature itself. The humanism of the other, as the “ethical 
culture” of responsibility for the other, draws all of its meaning from a 
Talmudic-independent resource. No philosophical justification can be 
given for a Hebraic humanism or for a humanism of patience in which the 
study of the Talmud is central. However, if it can be argued that the Tal-
mud testifies truly and effectively to the “unique sense” that is the ethical 
alterity of the other, then it can be recommended for study by all people, 
independent of their cultural background – but this, together with the study 
of any other text that could plausibly be claimed to have the same merits. 
Thus we return to the preface from which the exploration of Humanism 
of the other was launched. Having followed the complex flow of arguments 
of this book, the examination of its import can be further examined by a 
strategy of comparison. 
5 “REAL HUMANISM”:  
AN UN-LIKELY FAMILY PORTRAIT 
Already from the title of the book, it is clear that Levinas is looking for a 
humanism that takes full cognition of the ambient anti-humanism. This 
humanism should be a defence of the (other) human being or of humanity, 
but in such a way that it could critically respond to anti-humanism.134 
Levinas’ humanism is presented as a radicalisation of and a going beyond 
anti-humanism, since it commences as the question:  
                                           
134 HO 69 / HH 112. 
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“couldn’t humanism take on some sense if we thought through to the very limit 
the denial that Being inflicts on freedom? […] Couldn’t this sense be found with-
out getting pushed to the “Being of beings”, to system, to matter?”135 
This question could function as a point of departure, since Levinas accepts 
and appreciates to a certain extent the criticism of subjectivity inherent in all 
anti-humanism:  
“Its inspired intuition is to have abandoned the idea of person, goal and origin of 
itself, in which the ego is still a thing because it is still a being.”136 
However, his anti-humanism respecting humanism consists of conceiving 
differently the subject (as is programmatically stated in the preface to 
Totality and infinity) and the humanity of the human being. 
Our understanding of Levinas’ enterprise can be advanced by com-
paring his humanism to the ideas on the same subject in the work of 
some of his contemporaries – and assuming the risk that the shortness of 
presentation may entail simplification.137 The ideas of Sartre, Heidegger 
and Althusser naturally spring to mind for this kind of exploration, as 
these authors were some of the most significant contemporary contributors 
to the debate on humanism.138 The aim of this sub-chapter is not to show 
                                           
135 HO 49f / HH 80. 
136 OB 127f / AE 203. 
137 One could certainly choose a number of different ways to situate the philosophy 
of Levinas in general and of Humanism of the other in particular. Phenomenol-
ogy, Marxism, postcolonial studies or the liberalism-communitarianism debate 
could equally provide a background against which to interpret this book of 
Levinas. 
 For all that follows Tom Rockmore’s Heidegger and French philosophy. Hu-
manism, anti-humanism and being. London and New York, Routledge, 1995 
(especially chapters 5, 6, 7 and 9) may be consulted. The older essay of Eugenio 
Garin, “Quel ‘humanisme’? (Variations historiques)” (Revue internationale de 
philosophie, 85–86/1968, pp. 263–275), gives a still very useful contemporary 
orientation to the humanism debate. A good overview of the French debate can 
be found in Sean Homer “Humanism and anti-humanism” in Encyclopedia of 
modern French thought. Christopher John Murray (ed.). New York and Lon-
don: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2004, pp. 331–334.  
138 The list is of course in no way exhaustive. For example, the position of Lévi-
Strauss is especially interesting in this context, but, being spoiled for choice, he 
is left out, having already figured in Chapter 2. For a valuable overview of Lévi-
Strauss’ position on humanism see Denis Kambouchner, “Lévi-Strauss and the 
question of humanism (followed by a letter from Claude Lévi-Strauss)”, in The 
Cambridge companion to Lévi-Strauss. Boris Wiseman (ed.). Cambridge, et. 
al.: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 19–38. First markers for a compari-
son of humanism in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas are given by Robert Bernas-
coni, “One-way traffic: the ontology of decolonization and its ethics”, in Ontol-
ogy and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty. Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith 
(eds.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990, pp. 67–80. 
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that Levinas is always right, but simply to draw more sharply the con-
tours of his humanism of the other human. A critical view on Levinas’ 
thought will have to wait till Chapter 6. 
5.1 Sartre: humanism as existentialism 
Existentialism was a humanism, and for that reason also (ever since Heideg-
ger’s Letter on “humanism”) bore much of the brunt of anti-humanism. In 
reading Existentialism and humanism,139 it becomes clear very quickly that, 
compared to Sartre, Levinas is much closer to anti-humanism. 
Sartrean humanism takes as its point of departure the human sub-
ject.140 This subjectivity reveals itself in action and is determined by no 
essence, according to the well-known formula “existence precedes essence 
[l’existence précède l’essence]”.141 In this undeterminedness resides the 
most profound dignity of the human being.142 The human being is nothing 
but that which he/she has made himself/herself to be,143 and has therefore 
to take responsibility for what he/she is.144 In freedom, one doesn’t only 
create or choose oneself, but also creates an image of what the human be-
ing could be.145 The conscious, willed project of self-creation is, however, 
to be executed without recourse to any pre-established set of principles. In 
this sense, Sartre swears his allegiance to the death of God. And since 
there is no God to guarantee transcendent principles,146 the human being is 
condemned to freedom, condemned to invent humanity at every instant of 
acting.147 Matters are thus as the human being decides them to be148 or 
again, “the destiny of the human being is in himself/herself”.149  
                                           
139 For an engaging reading of Sartre’s earlier philosophy in which the question of 
humanism takes an important place, see Alain Renaut. Sartre. Le dernier phi-
losophe. Paris: Grasset and Fasquelle, 1993. 
140 E&H 26, 44, 52 / EH 17, 63, 84. 
141 E&H 26 / EH 17. 
142 E&H 28, 45 / EH 22, 65. 
143 E&H 28, 41, 50 / EH 22, 55, 78. 
144 E&H 29 / EH 24. 
145 E&H 30 / EH 27. Cf. E&H 29 / EH 24–25: “Subjectivism means, on the one 
hand the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other that man cannot 
pass beyond human subjectivity. […] For in effect, of all the actions a man may 
take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not 
creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to 
be.” 
146 E&H 33 / EH 35. 
147 E&H 34 / EH 37–38. 
148 E&H 41 / EH 54. 
149 E&H 44 / EH 62. 
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That such a declaration of the death of God accompanied by a strong, 
free, autonomously acting subject would seem, from an anti-humanist per-
spective, nothing more than mere lip service doesn’t surprise us. In the place 
of the dead God arises the Sartrean subject that is (as Sartre himself recog-
nises) in continuation with the Cartesian cogito.150 Existentialism recon-
structs, in the centuries old tradition, humanism on the foundation of a meta-
physics of the subject.151 The self-conscious and free subject is the basis of 
truth, also of the truth of existentialism as a humanism and this is the very 
foundation of human dignity. Sure enough, there is an attempt by Sartre to 
overcome what he conceives as a solipsistic pitfall in the cogito: I need the 
other to become conscious of myself152 and it is in a “world of inter-
subjectivity” that the human being decides what he/she and the others are.153 
But this social cogito leaves intact the individual self. Besides, despite the 
absence of a universal human essence, there is a universal human condition 
that makes it perfectly possible for any human being of any culture to under-
stand the projects of others of other cultures154 – cultural diversity is no ob-
stacle in the world of inter-subjectivity. No wonder then that ethics could be 
envisaged from the point of authenticity, from the fact of living according to 
human liberty that gives morality a universal form, even though the content 
of it may vary.155 Such an authenticity would imply the compatibility of all 
people’s liberties.156 Any resistance to this universally accommodating lib-
erty would be an infringement on authenticity, i.e., acting in bad faith.  
Thus Sartre rejects an older form of humanism that takes as its basis a 
universal human essence,157 but espouses one in which the human being is 
still to be created.158 Despite this apparent uncertainty, and despite the death 
of God, humanity is not at stake, provided that the universality of human 
freedom embedded in the projecting character of the cogito is recognised. 
It should be clear that Levinas would consider such a humanism as ir-
revocably outdated. Sartre’s notion of the subject lives in the naivety of before 
any recognition of the decentring of the subject in the human sciences.159 
                                           
150 E&H 45 / EH 64. 
151 E&H 44 / EH 63. 
152 E&H 45 / EH 66. 
153 E&H 45 / EH 67. 
154 E&H 46 / EH 69–70. 
155 E&H 52 / EH 85. 
156 E&H 52 / EH 84. 
157 E&H 55 / EH 92. 
158 E&H 55–56 / EH 92–93. 
159 One could characterise this perspective as “naive” in the light of Freud’s famous 
1917 essay “Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse”, in Gesammelte Schriften 
138 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
Sartre resuscitates God (as a unified point of reference, or foundation, for all 
value and meaning) under the name of the free subject. If Levinas then still 
declares that he considers his own humanism as a way of taking the Sartrean 
notion of “being condemned to be free [être condamné à être libre]”160 fur-
ther, it is only to radicalise that condemnation – not in the same sense as the 
way in which Being or structures condemn human beings to not being free, 
but rather as condemned to serving the other. For this condition of condemna-
tion to freedom, he uses the term “hostage” (otage):161 the self is the hostage 
of the other, the self is irremissibly in “enslavement” or “subservience” (as-
servissement)162 with regard to the other and this condemnation exceeds 
whatever liberty the self might have163 – even to the point of being responsible 
for the responsibility of the other164 – in the sense of decisively determining 
the meaning of the liberty of the self. And it is only as such – invested and 
commanded by the other, “vulnerable” to the appeal of the other – that Levi-
nas would ever contemplate the significance of the freedom of the self. There 
is still something of a universality in Levinas’ ethics, as will be indicated later, 
but even if such be the case, ethics always refers back to an originary asym-
metry. And it is this very asymmetry that makes of the other not a foundation 
of meaning, but an an-archic or non-foundational source: the other is not God, 
but lives in the trace of an ever already-passed “God”.165  
5.2 Heidegger: “humanism” in the extreme sense 
Just like Sartre, Heidegger also distinguished two forms of humanism in his 
“Letter on ‘humanism’” (1946).166 The deciding factor in distinguishing his 
                                           
von Freud, zehnter Band. Leipzig, et al.: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Ver-
lag, pp. 347–356 – Sartre still considers the subject to be the “master of his/her 
own home”. 
160 HO 73n13 / HH 120n13, my translation. 
161 HO 57, 67, 58 / HH 91, 109, 110, 111. 
162 HO 53 / HH 85. 
163 Cf. “a responsibility overflowing freedom” (HO 53, 54 / HH 85, 86). 
164 HO 68 / HH 111. 
165 HO 44 / HH 69. 
166 P 236–276 / W 313–364. On the historical unfolding of the conflict between Sar-
tre and Heidegger on humanism, see Dominique Janicaud. Heidegger en France, 
tome I: Récit. Paris: Albin Michel, 2001, chapter 4: “L’humanisme dans les tur-
bulences”. A valuable overview of the meaning and reception of the Letter on 
Humanism is provided by Dirk Mende in “‘Brief über den ‘Humanismus.’’ Zu 
den Metaphern der späten Seinsphilosophie”, in Dieter Tomä (ed.). Heidegger-
Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung. Stuttgart and Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 
2003, pp. 247–258. For an interpretation of this text within the broader frame-
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two forms of humanism is the question of metaphysics: typical of the history 
of metaphysics is that it is, according to Heidegger’s reading, the history of 
forgetting167 and hiding the fact that Being is a verb (it happens) and not a 
noun (a thing).168 Subsequently there is (1) a metaphysical humanism that 
reduces the human being to the noun-character of Being whilst ignoring that 
Being is first of all a verb and (2) a non-metaphysical humanism that realises 
the importance of the verbal character of Being and gives it priority over the 
noun-character in matters human.169 
In the first of these approaches to the human being, of which Sartre 
would be a late representative, one sees that it is exactly in the notion of the 
subject that one could identify the metaphysical character of the first human-
ism. It obstructs the urgent question of Being that determines humanity, and 
instead presents the human being as animal rationale,170 which inevitably 
leads to the error of thinking  
“the human being from out of the animalitas instead of thinking towards the hu-
manitas of the human being”.171  
What gets lost in the process is the “essence” of the human being. This es-
sence is the fact that the human being is the place where the difference be-
tween the noun-character (Seiende) and the verbal character (Sein) of Being 
is made; this happening of differentiation in Being being called ek-
sistence.172 This understanding of the “essence” of the human being doesn’t 
so much negate the humanist idea of the human being as animal rationale, 
rather, it puts that idea in the right perspective173 by thinking more originarily 
about humanity.174 In fact – and this is where the second or true humanism 
                                           
work of Heidegger’s work and his intellectual environment, see Gianni Vattimo: 
“La crise de l’humanisme”, in Exercises de la Patience 5, 1983, pp. 19–30. 
167 P 253 / W 332. 
168 P 255 / W 334. 
169 Cf. P 246 / W 322. See also P 245 / W 321: “Every determination of the essence 
of the human being that already presupposes an interpretation of beings without 
asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is metaphysical.” 
170 P 246 / W 322f. 
171 P 246f / W 323, translation modified. Heidegger doesn’t reject the Greek ante-
cedent of the Latin animal rationale, but fears that its true meaning has been 
covered up by the history of metaphysics (cf. P 245f / W 322, also Being and 
time. op. cit. p. 208 / Sein und Zeit. op. cit. p. 165). 
172 P 248 / W 325. 
173 P 251 / W 330. 
174 Cf. “more primordially” P 267, anfänglicher, W 351. 
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according to Heidegger comes in175 – the highest determination of the es-
sence and dignity of the human being can be thought only when the human 
being is considered as belonging to Being.176 Heidegger’s idea of true hu-
manism consists of evacuating the place accorded by the first humanism to 
the subject and restoring it as the place of Being; and it is only when this per-
spective on the human being is adopted that real humanity comes to light: 
the human being lives in the proximity of Being, which means that humanity 
has an opening in which meaning could unfold.177 This is equivalent to say-
ing that humanity consists originarily of being addressed by Being;178 it is 
Being that gives content to the formal ek-sistence of human beings. Human-
ity exists in the service of thinking the truth of Being.179 Language is the 
place in which the truth of Being unfolds itself, it is the “house of Being”.180 
This address and the meaning in which the human being dwells do not lead 
to an ethics. Heidegger will even claim that what he is thinking is neither 
ontology (in the traditional sense), nor ethics. All that his considerations 
about humanity would lead to is a letting go with reference to the task of 
constructing rules and values (since these inevitably presuppose a fixed no-
tion of the subject on which they are founded) and an existence of letting 
Being be.181 As such it thinkingly constructs the house of Being,182 it ar-
ranges the space in which one existingly dwells and thus, according to Hei-
degger, one is already busy with the original ethics.183 
                                           
175 This is a “humanism” that thinks against humanism or that contradicts all previ-
ous humanisms (P 251; 263 / W 330; 345), but without falling into an inhuman-
ity (P 265 / W 348). At the same time Heidegger claims that it restores the es-
sence and dignity of the human being to such an extent that what he presents is 
nothing else than “‘Humanism’ in the extreme sense” [‘Humanismus’ im äußer-
sten Sinn] (P 261 / W 342 and see the following page for a definition of Heideg-
ger’s humanism). Heidegger, however, concedes that this is a humanism of a 
peculiar kind (P 263 / W 345). 
176 P 252 / W 330. 
177 P 261 / W 342–343, also P 254 / W 333–334. 
178 Cf. P 246 / W 323. 
179 Cf. P 268 / W 352. 
180 Refrain of the whole Letter, e.g., P 254 / W 333. And this is Heidegger’s render-
ing of the zoon logon echon: “the human being is not only a living creature who 
possesses language along with other capacities. Rather, language is the house of 
Being in which the human being ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the 
truth of Being, guarding it.” (P 254 / W 333) 
181 P 272 / W 358. 
182 P 272 / W 358. 
183 Cf. P 271 / W 356: “If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of 
the world éthos, should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human be-
ing, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element 
of the human being, as one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics.” 
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It would not be possible to go into the detail of the relationship be-
tween Levinas’ humanism text and that of Heidegger, since even a su-
perficial comparison would quickly show that the former was written in 
constant critical reference to the latter. This is no surprise if one considers 
on the one hand the determining influence that Heidegger has had on 
Levinas’ way of thinking, and on the other hand, the massive wave of 
appropriation of Heidegger in French philosophy since the 1960s.184 
What deserves our attention is that Levinas’ humanism is designed to 
take Heidegger’s criticism of humanism as a metaphysics seriously and 
to sidestep the pitfalls thereof.185 Levinas never lets go of the ontological 
difference, which he learned about from Heidegger; he claims only that 
this is not the most decisive thing about humanity. He does so, as we 
have seen, neither by restoring subjectivity, nor by rehabilitating the 
human being as animal rationale, but by claiming that more primor-
dially, before the human being dwells in the truth of Being (if this is in-
deed the case), he/she is expelled, homeless, in a meaning imposed from 
beyond Being. Levinas would claim that Heidegger, whilst breaking 
with a certain tradition of Western thinking, perseveres in another, 
namely that of the forgetting of the ethical difference: the human being 
as the place in which the non-in-difference between the self and the 
other is decisive for all meaningful existence. Levinas’ idea of the self is 
consequently stamped by heteronomy, by an imposition of responsibility 
by the other, and what is the most humane about humanity is not the 
subject, nor is it Being as Heidegger claimed, it is the other. Therefore 
ethics or rather ethicity is what is to be thought primarily in a considera-
tion of humanism. And this is to be done in response and obedience to 
the appeal from the other. One could, thus, call Levinas’ humanism a 
post-metaphysical humanism. And this post-metaphysical humanism 
directs its criticism to the Heideggerian “humanism”. The latter is not 
only insufficient, but dangerous, for reasons that have been expounded 
and of which the main thrust could be summarised as follows:  
                                           
184 Cf. D. Janicaud, Heidegger en France, op. cit. p. 132: “The Letter is indeed the 
text of Heidegger that has probably had the greatest influence in France, espe-
cially in the 1960s”. 
185 This is clearly attested to in Levinas’ lecture of 6 February 1976, entitled “The 
radical question: Kant against Heidegger”, where Levinas presents a short inter-
pretation of the “Letter on ‘humanism’” (especially GDT 58 / DMT 68). One 
reads his concern to take the main tenets of Heidegger’s later philosophy in gen-
eral seriously in PN 127f / SMB 10f. 
142 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
“There is in Heidegger the dream of nobility of blood and sword. But humanism 
is something completely different. It is more a response to the other that lets the 
other go first, that yields to the other instead of fighting the other.”186  
5.3 Althusser: humanism as ideology 
Putting aside the circumstances that provoked Althusser to write his 1963 
essay “Marxism and humanism”,187 he starts off by describing the fate of 
humanism in Marx’s intellectual itinerary: from humanist or practitioner of a 
“philosophy of the human being [philosophie de l’homme]”188 to a radical 
anti-humanist. It is especially this second phase of Marx’s philosophy and 
Althusser’s interpretation thereof that is important to us. The anti-humanism 
of Marx’s second phase breaks with the former thought as based on a notion 
of the essence of the human being in that 
“the essence criticized [and by implication humanism – EW] is defined as ideology, 
a category belonging to the new theory of society and history.”189  
Thus, according to the subsequently formulated theoretical anti-humanism, 
in order to understand the human world and possibly to change it, one should 
depart from a strategy based on a quest for the essence of the human being:  
“It is impossible to know anything about men except on the absolute precondition 
that the philosophical (theoretical) myth of man is reduced to ashes.”190  
However, it is of central importance to note that this reduction of humanism 
to ashes, on the level of theory, doesn’t mean the negation of the practical 
reality of humanism, namely in the form of ideology.191 Having knowledge 
of this ideology doesn’t amount to making it evaporate. Rather, the knowl-
edge of the ideology of humanism sought by Marx (according to Althusser) 
is knowledge of the conditions of the necessity thereof, conditions that also 
determine the Marxist response to this humanism.192  
                                           
186 IH 186. 
187 FM 221–247 / PM 227–248. One could consult Vincent Descombes. Le même 
et l’autre. Quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933–1978). Paris: Mi-
nuit, 1979 (especially “La querelle de l’humanisme”, pp. 124–130) for elements 
of a historical orientation to the anti-humanism debate in France. A useful dis-
cussion of Althusser’s position is Kate Soper’s Humanism and anti-humanism. 
London, et al.: Hutchinson, 1986, pp. 96–119. 
188 FM 226 / PM 232, translation modified. 
189 FM 227 / PM 233–234. 
190 FM 229 / PM 236. 
191 FM 230 / PM 236. 
192 FM 230–231 / PM 236–237. 
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Gaining knowledge of humanism as ideology in this manner entails 
the development of theoretical anti-humanism. Therefore, it is essential 
to understand what “ideology” is. An ideology, Althusser summarises,  
“is a system (with its own logic and rigour) of representations (images, myths, 
ideas or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a historical existence and 
role within a given society”.193  
Every society, even the ultimate communist society, bathes within ideol-
ogy.194 To be precise, the “mode of existence” of ideology (and thus, by 
implication, of humanism as discourse based on a notion of the essence of 
human beings) is not a matter of consciousness, but of unconsciousness, 
and that in a very particular sense: ideology imposes itself on people as 
“structures”,195 it is formed by the historical conditions in which people 
live. That means that the representations of which ideology is a system,  
“are perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects and act functionally on men by means 
of a process that escapes them. Human beings ‘live’ their ideologies […] not at all as a 
form of consciousness, but as an object of their ‘world’ – as their ‘world’ itself.”196  
The very manner in which people live their lives and their relation to 
their world is ideologically mediated and incarnates ideology. This could 
be illustrated by a topical example:  
“In the ideology of freedom, to be precise, the bourgeoisie live their relation to the 
conditions of their existence, in other words, their relation that is real (the law of a lib-
eral capitalist economy) but invested in an imaginary relation (all men are free, includ-
ing the free labourers). Their ideology consists of this play on the word freedom.”197  
From this one could see that the person, or rather the class, that uses ideol-
ogy is itself being used by ideology.198 It is only by means of such a the-
ory, an anti-humanist theory, that strategies could be adopted to transform 
society, to transform the conditions that produce a humanism, which func-
tions as legitimisation of the bourgeoisie.199 And such strategies could not 
exclude adopting in practice one form of humanism or another. 
It is clear that Althusser’s anti-humanism draws the human being, con-
sciousness and all, into the non-masterable flow of history. Agency and con-
                                           
193 FM 231 / PM 238. 
194 FM 232 / PM 239. 
195 FM 233 / PM 240. 
196 FM 233 / PM 240, translation modified. 
197 FM 234f / PM 241, my translation. 
198 FM 235 / PM 242. 
199 FM 241 / PM 249 and Levinas implicitly refers to the Althusserian critique of 
this ideology in GCM 3 / DVI 18. 
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sciousness are decentred, and humanism is withdrawn from anthropology 
and relegated to strategy. Levinas, in so far as he accords a place to ontology, 
would be willing to agree with this perspective, in fact, in his reading this 
anti-humanist theory would be nothing more than another mode of appear-
ance of the domination of the human being by Being as described by Hei-
degger. As such it has, as do the other theories of the decentred subject, a 
descriptive potential with regard to the terrifying history of human “defi-
ciency” in the twentieth century.200 Levinas would even agree with Althusser 
that if there is to be a transformation of society, it would not draw its re-
sources from a theory of the human essence, but from a source that decentres 
the self. However, for Levinas, beyond the decentring of the human being by 
social and historical conditions, and therefore more intimate and determining 
for the self, is the decentring by the alterity of the other, by the ethical appeal. 
It is not from a theory that social transformation could be energised, but in 
the obedient response to the appeal for responsibility to the other. That the-
ory, class struggle, or whatever Marxist notion of transformation could be 
incorporated into such an obedient response, is not excluded – neither is any 
other idea about social justice a priori excluded.201 
                                           
200 GCM 47–49 / DVI 83–85. 
201 But Levinas’ affinity for Marxism should not be overlooked. In an important 
passage from the Talmudic reading “Judaism and revolution” (BV 94–119 / 
DSAS 11–53), Levinas illuminates his remark “Authentic humanism, material-
ist humanism” (BV 97 / DSAS 16) as follows: “Our old text upholds the right of 
the person, as in our days Marxism upholds it. I refer to Marxist humanism, the 
one which continues to say that ‘man is the supreme good for man’ and ‘in order 
that man be the supreme good for man he must be truly man’ and which asks it-
self: ‘How could man, the friend of man, in specific circumstances, have be-
come the enemy of man?’[…]” (BV97f / DSAS 17). This passage ends with the 
decisive affirmation that the other is the basis of humanism (BV 98 / DSAS 17), 
an idea that will find its way to the title of Humanism of the other. 
 But apart from the explicit remarks, it is significant to take note of his (quite 
rare) reference to contemporary academic articles. A footnote after the phrase 
“Marxist humanism” (in the citation above) gives two essays as valuable for un-
derstanding Marxist humanism, both from the Revue internationale de philoso-
phie 85–86/1968 – a volume that was dedicated to the question of the crisis of 
humanism and to which Levinas contributed the essay that became Chapter 2 of 
Humanism of the other “Humanism and an-archy” (pp. 323–337 in the journal). 
The first article recommended by Levinas is Jacques D’Hondt’s, “La crise de 
l’humanisme dans le marxisme contemporain” (pp. 369–378), an unambiguous 
rejection of Althusser’s anti-humanist reading of Marx. “Would Marx have 
been mistaken about the meaning of his own work?” asks D’Hondt (p. 378) and 
thus supports the traditional humanist reading of Marx. The second article rec-
ommended by Levinas is Jean Lacroix’s “L’humanisme de Marx selon Adam 
Schaff” (pp. 379–386). Lacroix challenges Althusser’s “evocative and deep, but 
also questionable interpretation” of Marxism (p. 379) by recourse to that of 
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Having devoted this fifth Chapter to a scrutiny of Levinas’ philosophical 
articulation of his post-anti-humanist humanism, it should now be sub-
mitted to critical examination. This is the goal of the next Chapter. 
                                           
Adam Schaff (in Le Marxisme et l’Individu: Contribution a la philosophie 
marxiste de l’homme, Paris, Armand Colin, 1968; Polish original published in 
Warsaw, 1965) that insists on Marxism as the sole integral humanism. Lacroix 
doesn’t go as far as a critical comparison of Althusser and Schaff, but keeps to a 
sympathetic presentation of Schaff’s humanist Marxism as a realistic and libera-
tion-oriented theory of human existence. It is from a citation by Lacroix of 
Schaff that Levinas draws the “assertion of Marx that the human being 
[l’homme] is the highest good for humanity [pour l’homme]” (p. 386), to which 
he refers in the citation above. 
 It seems reasonable to believe from this information that Levinas finds himself 
in agreement with the spirit of Marxist humanism, although he questions the ca-
pacity of Marxism to provide the ultimate orientation in cultural diversity (HO 
Chapter 1) and although he embraced, to some extent, the notion of anti-
humanism. Furthermore, these references make us attentive to the fact that 
Levinas’ reflection on humanism and anti-humanism constitutes one of the im-
portant loci for his positioning with respect to Marxism. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
After Levinas:  
The risk of irresponsible responsibility 
 
 
 
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that for Levinas the dos-
sier on humanism could be reopened only on the condition that human-
ism is radically re-conceived. But how radical, how new and, above all, 
how desirable is Levinas’ post-anti-humanist humanism? The present 
Chapter seeks to submit Levinas’ thought on the alterity of the other – 
the corner stone of his humanism – to critical examination. In accor-
dance with the line of interrogation demarcated for this book, the focus 
will be on how the political implications of Levinas’ philosophy are to 
be assessed. In the light of the critique that will be developed here, the 
question of thinking responsibility in its political dimension “after” 
Levinas, will ensue from this examination. 
As a first orientation to the problems of gauging the political impli-
cations of Levinas’ ethics, two insightful essays by two eminent Levinas 
readers will be presented. By juxtaposing the divergent reading of Marion 
and Bernasconi, the perilous nature of this undertaking will be signalled. 
1 UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM:  
MARION AND BERNASCONI 
Humanism, according to the conviction articulated in Humanism of the 
other, is the defence of the idea that all meaning is orientated by the appeal 
of the other, of the other that bears the alterity of not being reducible to the 
subject’s ontologico-hermeutic existence.  
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That is why the  
“best way of encountering the other, is not even to notice the colour of his/her 
eyes! When one observes the colour of the eyes, one is not in social relationship 
with the other. The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, 
but what is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that.”1  
It is the face of the other – metonymy for the alterity of the other – that inter-
feres with the sweeping flow of Being. The alterity of the other would also 
be what invests me with primal or originary meaning, founding my subjec-
tivity, my identity, my self and individuality – primarily as called to respond 
to the other. But who exactly is the other that invests me with singular iden-
tity in this way? Since it is the face without characteristics, this means that 
the alterity of the other is stripped of all individualising qualities. The other 
that makes the ethical appeal is nobody, or at least nobody in particular. This 
is the insight of Jean-Luc Marion: in Levinas’ philosophy the other is noth-
ing but universal, non-particular, humanity behind the particularities of the 
individual person.2 The other, after having torn the self from the anonymous 
flux of Being, is swallowed by the anonymity of a humanity3 without quali-
ties. The face of the other cannot say of whom it is the face, since it speaks 
only in the name of a trans-individual humanity. Consequently, when con-
fronted with the question of just responsibility towards the plurality of others, 
Marion is convinced that the ethical anonymity of the other inevitably trans-
lates into neutralising the other (as one is neutralised in front of the law), and 
that the identity of the ethical subject is in the same movement compromised 
and neutralised, since the subject has to respond to the other in the same way 
as anybody else.4 In my view Marion’s decision not to use the minor, but 
significant, theory of justice of the later Levinas5 weakens his argument 
since it obscures the possibility, foreseen by Levinas, of making singularis-
ing exceptions in order to call the neutrality of the law to greater justice. This 
will be discussed later. Let it for now be granted that from the anonymity of 
the face of the other, taken absolutely, one has to arrive with Marion at uni-
versality and neutrality as the essential outcome of Levinas’ ethics on the 
plane of the political.  
                                           
1 E&I 85–86 / EI 79–80, translation modified. 
2 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “D’autrui à l’individu”, in: Emmanuel Lévinas. Positivité et 
transcendance. Paris: PUF (Epiméthée), 2000, pp. 287–308, in particular pp. 296–
300. 
3 E&I 86 / EI 81. 
4 Cf. “D’autrui à l’individu”, op. cit. p. 300. 
5 And of which the only trace in Humanism of the other is to be found in HO 76n11 
/ HH 123n11. 
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Robert Bernasconi,6 to the contrary, demonstrated that in a number of 
places Levinas’ alleged non-specificity of the face of the other actually mani-
fested as a “continuity with abstract humanism and its complicity with ho-
mogenization”,7 i. e., instead of the other’s alterity being devoid of any con-
tent, Levinas sometimes universalised a Western or Jewish cultural identity 
in such a way as to make either of them the measure for the humanity of the 
other or of the self. In Humanism of the other, this is blatant when Levinas, 
whilst insisting on the relativity of particular cultures, still maintains a spe-
cific “generosity of the Western civilisation” that not only exposed this rela-
tivity, but in so doing helped other cultures to understand themselves, which, 
according to Levinas, they couldn’t do before the Western intervention.8 
This process is claimed by Levinas to be one of generosity and is apparently 
dissociated from the colonising violence that he denounces.9 This perspec-
tive echoes Husserl’s 1935 Vienna lectures (of which the influence on Levi-
nas is demonstrated by Bernasconi) in which an even clearer historical tele-
ology is developed by which cultures are hierarchically ordered according to 
their fidelity to the (Western) idea of the human being as rational animal.10 
This complacency that Levinas exhibits regarding the notion of Western (or 
Jewish) superiority comes to the fore again, and more clearly, in scattered 
remarks in his interviews and Judaic writings. 
The commentator arrives at the following conclusion:  
“If at times Levinas still seems to judge other cultures simply by their proximity 
to his own, this should not be considered sufficient reason to dismiss his thought, 
before the resources of that thought have been explored. Foremost among these 
resources is Levinas’s acknowledgement that the self-questioning that originates 
from the gaze of the Other always takes place as an interruption of my compla-
cency. What disturbs the self-evidence that supports my unquestioned attachment 
to my own cultural values is not just the Other as such. It is the Other in his or her 
                                           
6 “Who is my neighbor? Who is the other? Questioning ‘the generosity of Western 
thought’”, in Ethics and responsibility in the phenomenological tradition. The 
ninth annual symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenological Center. Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University, 1992, pp. 1–31. 
7 “Who is my neighbor?…”, op. cit. p. 5. 
8 HO 37 / HH 59–60. 
9 “But it [Platonism] is overcome in the name of the generosity of Western thought 
itself, which, catching sight of the abstract man in men, proclaimed the absolute 
value of the person, and then encompassed in the respect it bears it the cultures in 
which these persons stand or in which they express themselves. Platonism is over-
come with the very means which the universal thought issued from Plato sup-
plied. It is overcome by this so much disparaged Western civilization, which was 
able to understand the particular cultures, which never understood themselves 
[lesquelles n’ont jamais rien compris à elles-mêmes].” (CPP 101 / HH 59–60). 
10 According to Bernasconi, “Who is my neighbor?…”, op. cit. p. 11. 
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specific cultural difference from me that presents a direct challenge to my own 
cultural adherences and calls me to respond without any certainty of the appro-
priate way in which to respond or the idiom in which to do so.”11  
It is this very last sentence which is the core of Bernasconi’s reading of 
Levinas: the alterity of the other has a content, determined amongst others 
by that person’s cultural or ethnic specificity – it is Levinas’ erring on the 
side of implicitly claiming a cultural superiority that leads to this conclusion. 
Although I am not sure if this amounts to allowing the introduction of an 
“alterity-content” in the face of the other,12 it does show that (at least) in 
the movement of responding to the other, the same Levinas allows one to 
conclude that the cultural particularity of the other and of the self matters 
in ethical consideration, and therefore this particularity surely does matter 
in the interaction with the plurality of others, in politics. 
It is not my intention to arbitrate between these conclusions regarding 
Levinas’ implications for politics as neutral universality or interested particu-
larity. In fact, in what follows, it will become evident that I think that 
Levinas’ theory of justice (which had not been sufficiently called to aid in 
Marion’s or in Bernasconi’s essay) probably opens up the matter to the 
entire spectrum of possibilities between these two extremes. In Levinas’ own 
presentation of justice, he willingly concedes that even when the context-
independent alterity of the singular other is maintained, the identity and 
specificity of the other do come into play once the subject is obliged to 
compare the plurality of others: as soon as there is a plurality of others, the 
subject’s eyes are opened, as it were, to the particularity of the others and 
thus the cultural and ethnic, religious and economic, gender and age identity 
of the other becomes important. The subject’s eyes are opened to the particu-
larity of the suffering of the other. But the ethical responsibility of the sub-
ject to the other has not been made dependent on the particular qualities. 
This is of enormous importance, since it means that at any stage in my 
execution of my responsibilities to the others, any single other, whatever 
that person’s identity or condition might be, could and does make an appeal 
to my responsibility, i.e., puts into question the manner in which I respond 
                                           
11 Bernasconi, “Who is my neighbor?…”, op. cit. pp. 26–27.  
12 One cannot from Levinas’ personal, cultural or religious convictions and the dis-
parate abusive expressions thereof conclude that his philosophy should be 
changed on this matter. That is why I consider it important to let the resources of 
the text itself override the (conceded, important) mistakes of the author (which 
would harmonise with the preface of HO that insists on crossing out, or question-
ing, any expression of the alterity of the other). At the very least, it should be rec-
ognised that conceding to an alterity-content would amount to changing the very 
heart of Levinas’ philosophy. 
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to the multiplicity of others and thus calls me either to greater attention to 
the particularity of some or to the greater equality of everybody. For this 
reason Levinas’ subject could be an imperialist or anarchist, a liberal or a 
revolutionary – provided that such a conviction is justified with reference 
to the efficiency of serving the others.  
The juxtaposition of these two strong readings of Levinas should 
suffice to point out the problem of the indeterminate status of justice as it 
is engendered from the plurality of responsibilities of the subject in the 
philosophy of Levinas. In stead of solving this problem, I shall attempt 
to measure its depth. 
2 RESPONSIBILITY AND IRRESPONSIBILITY 
A major uncertainty seems to arise in Levinas’ humanism of the other hu-
man being on the level of justice, i.e., in the face of the plurality of others 
(and that has been introduced in this book already in Chapter 1). Central to 
this situation is the investment (or election) of the self by the other: the most 
intimate identity of the self is its infinite responsibility to the other in which 
nobody could replace that subject. But we have insisted in the first Chapter 
on the fact that there are always at least three – the ethical subject, the other 
and another other – I cite again:  
“There are always at least three people. […] As soon as there are three people, 
the ethical relationship to the other becomes political and enters into the totalizing 
discourse of ontology.”13  
Now, when the plurality of the others comes into play, the other is drawn out 
of this universal anonymity (if one follows Marion) and his/her identity, 
singularity and particular circumstances enter into the multitude of contem-
poraneous and equally valid claims from all of the others on the subject, 
who then has to ask the question of how to distribute his/her loyalty, efforts 
and means; in the same movement in which the particularity of the multitude 
of others becomes ethically relevant, the scope of the question concerning 
justice extends from the restricted relation between the self and the other, to 
that between the self and (in principle) anybody else on the planet (see Chap-
ter 3). This question of distribution or allocation is the question of justice, 
which situates the apparent context-independent appeal of the other in the 
context of other legitimate appeals of all the other others. This raises in my 
                                           
13 “Ethics of the infinite”, op. cit. pp. 57–58 / “De la phénoménologie à l’éthique”, 
op. cit. p. 129 (translation modified). 
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mind one of the most important difficulties in Levinas’ philosophy: once the 
subject’s ontological existence has been directed ethically “for-the-other”, or 
in fact, once it has been directed by the plurality of others, how should this 
ontological and political existence be formed to the advantage of the others? 
Levinas, however, probably in an effort to take contemporary anti-
humanism into consideration, has so embraced its moving away from ideas 
of human essence and foundational ethics, that his humanism of the other 
has been stripped of whatever means could accompany reflectingly the ques-
tion concerning that which should practically be done. Accordingly, the 
question of the competence of Levinas’ subject to establish what justice en-
tails in a particular context and to realise it seems to be to him of no concern 
– he wants the subject to be sent on his/her way of responsibility towards the 
others, but without even posing the question of the means. Thereby Levinas 
implicitly claims that considerations concerning the competence of ethical 
subjects and the means they develop to serve what they consider justice to 
be, are of negligible relevance to the meaning of the ethical.  
The conviction that I defend is quite opposite: it should be considered 
of utmost importance to reflect on the secondary position accorded by 
Levinas to the competence of the ethical agent and the means deployed by 
the ethical agent in his/her efforts to obey the imperative to unlimited re-
sponsibility. It is when this is done that the implications of the difficult 
translation of ethics into justice (see Chapter 1, § 2.2) enters into our field 
of vision – perhaps in an unexpected and disquieting way. In order to test 
this issue, let us take as a theme of reflection the example of killing other 
people. At first glance, nothing seems further away from Levinas’ thought 
than a legitimisation of killing. He is, after all, a philosopher of peace and 
of the “thou shalt not kill!” in the face of the other. 
2.1 Can a Levinasian kill?  
From the original contradiction to the participation 
of practice in the meaning of the ethical 
Does the radical ethics of Levinas, of which he sometimes captures the 
essence in the imperative “thou shalt not kill!”, make provision for the killing 
of people? In order to answer this question properly, it seems appropriate to 
transpose the terms in which it is posed to that of the key Levinasian terms 
of the Saying and the Said. 
It should be called to mind that this ethical imperative that emanates 
from the other and by which one’s subjectivity is decisively constituted, is 
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the Saying by which the Said of one’s ontological existence is given sense. 
However, we also know that the prohibition against murder that, according 
to Levinas, is the meaning of the face of the other, is just a formal imperative 
and for this reason every translation of this Saying into the Said, every reali-
sation of the imperative in acts of obedience to it, every effort to make the 
Saying said, is only a provisional translation, or as Levinas says, a translation 
that is a partial treason or betrayal14 and that for this reason needs to be un-
said. Since the Saying is ultimately unsayable or unutterable (indicible) or 
purely formal, it cannot be fixed in a Said and each attempt at fixing it in a 
Said has to be un-said (dédire). If I transpose the question concerning the 
possible use of killing as a legitimate ethical action to the level of discourse 
on the Saying and the Said, it is because very often, if not always, Levinas’ 
commentators fail to reflect on the whole series of terms that are associated: 
next to Saying, unsayable, Said and unsaying (dire, indicible, dit, dédire) one 
has to consider contradiction (contradiction). This is what Levinas teaches:  
“The third introduces a contradiction in the Saying of which the meaning before 
the other until then went in one direction. This is, in itself, the limit of responsi-
bility, the birth of the question: What do I have to do in justice?”15  
This is a major point. One can weigh its importance by connecting this 
remark with the similar one on the “entry” of the third, cited above and 
already commented on in Chapter 1:  
“There are always at least three people. […] As soon as there are three people, 
the ethical relation to the other becomes political and enters into the totalizing 
discourse of ontology.”  
If there are always at least three people, then the third always introduces 
a contradiction in the Saying, and there is in the life of the subject no 
time before the question of justice, namely “who of the others comes 
before whom?”. If there are always at least three people and the interre-
lation between the second and the third, with respect to the first person, 
is that of contradiction, then the original relation between the self and 
the others is one of contradiction.16 Contradiction of what? It is a con-
                                           
14 OB 6 / AE 17–18. 
15 OB 157, translation modified. “Le tiers introduit une contradiction dans le Dire 
dont la signification devant l’autre allait, jusqu’alors, dans un sens unique. C’est, 
de soi, limite de la responsabilité naissance de la question: Qu’ai-je à faire avec 
justice?” (AE 245). 
16 See De l’éthique à la justice 346–349, where I have exposed the methodological 
incongruity that allows Levinas to bracket out the alterity of the third, while dis-
cussing the alterity of the other. 
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tradiction between the imperatives, the appeals to the responsibility of 
the subject, made with equal legitimacy by the second and the third. It is 
exactly because of this contradiction that one appeal infringes on an-
other, without however, taking anything away from the validity of either. 
And thus the question of justice, is the question of contradiction and the 
question of “who comes before whom?”, is the question of “who comes 
after whom?”, in other words “whose demanding and valid appeal to my 
responsibility should be considered less urgent than that of another, and 
should therefore be sacrificed in the name of justice?”. 
Returning now to the dilemma of killing, it should be concluded that 
the prohibition to kill one person stands in a relation of “contradiction” 
with the same prohibition emitted by all the others. And under such a 
regime of contradiction, immediate and obvious obedience to any single 
other is not possible – all responsibility is already taken up in a complex 
procedure of weighing, that is, sacrificing, in search of justice, since all 
responsibility is political. 
That is why Levinas doesn’t hesitate, when he speaks of the actuali-
sation of justice, to introduce the idea of a struggle with evil and he ex-
plicitly distances himself from “the idea of nonresistance to evil [l’idée 
de la non-résistence au mal]”.17 Levinas is not Gandhi.  
“If self-defence is a problem, the ‘executioner’ is the one who threatens my 
neighbour and, in this sense, calls for violence and doesn’t have a Face.”18  
This declaration, which in my judgement is completely in agreement 
with Levinas’ understanding of ethics and justice, should be considered 
very carefully. All people have faces; to all people infinite responsibility 
is due. But under the complicated circumstances under which the ques-
tion of justice is born, that is, when faced with the contradiction of dif-
ferent equally valid appeals, which in practice excludes contemporane-
ous obedience, the other might lose his or her face. That means, through 
the difficult calculation of justice, someone might be sacrificed, that is, 
someone might be treated as not emitting an imperative prohibiting 
murder. Such a person might be killed. Under certain circumstances re-
sisting evil, even killing evildoers, might thus be a valid way of obeying 
the originary imperative: “thou shalt not kill!”. 
                                           
17 ENT 105 / EN 115 
18 ENT 105. “Si l’autodéfence fait problème, le ‘boureau’ est celui qui menace le 
prochain et, dans ce sens, appelle la violence et n’a plus de Visage.” (EN 115). 
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If it is considered that this original imperative is the very meaning or 
sense of all meaning, it should be evident that we are dealing with an ex-
tremely important finding about ethics. If killing someone cannot be ex-
cluded as a means by which to obey the original sense or significance of 
one’s being that is captured in the prohibition of murder, if killing someone 
could be under given circumstances the most appropriate way of translating 
the Saying into the Said, then the means of ethical conduct interferes with the 
original ethical meaning and as such is part of it.19 Levinas is thus mistaken 
when he claims that the question of the application of ethics is secondary.20 
If killing someone could be shown to be a valid response to the imperative 
“thou shalt not kill”, how can the fact of responding – practical ethics – not 
be part of the meaning of the ethical? Rather, the question of the means by 
which one obeys the contradictory appeals of the others should be consid-
ered an essential part of the very meaning of the ethical. 
If these conclusions are correct, then surely the competence of the 
ethical agent for ethical conduct and the means to be deployed in ethical 
conduct cannot be considered trivial, marginal or of secondary impor-
tance in reflection on the ethical. On the one hand it is consenting to an 
invalid assumption to say that Levinas restricted himself to the ethical 
origin of meaning, since the practice of ethics interferes, and therefore 
contributes to what the sense of the ethical is;21 on the other hand it is a 
too facile rejection of the question of practical ethics to pretend that it 
can simply be reduced to an ethical programme, or a casuistic or a do-
main-specific deontology – as if these would be the only forms that re-
flection on the practice of ethics can take.  
                                           
19 Although arguing his case somewhat differently from what I do here, or did in De 
l’éthique à la justice, and developing the consequences thereof in a somewhat dif-
ferent manner, Michel Vanni arrived at very similar conclusions concerning the in-
sertion of Levinas’ ethics in practice (“En guerre pour autrui”, in Internationale 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 1, 2004, pp. 78–93). Vanni’s essay was published inde-
pendently from my argument, as I formulated it for the first time in my doctoral dis-
sertation of 2004 (and I discovered the article too late to use in De l’éthique à la jus-
tice). This independence of his conclusions, and of course the strength of his argu-
ment, should be considered a significant support for my present line of reasoning. 
20 This idea will be developed further in Chapter 7, § 2.2. 
21 Or as Vanni correctly concludes: “Actually one cannot simply say any more that 
acts of aggression, withdrawal or contemptuous indifference constitute a covering 
or a treason of the ‘pre-originary’ appeal (according to the formula of Levinas). If 
we don’t want to maintain a completely abstract and a-praxical view of this ap-
peal, we should rather say that it leads straightaway to conflict and friction, that it 
is straightaway situated in the middle of conflict, without being able to claim, by 
using one or other treason as excuse, that it can be detached from this conflict.” 
“En guerre pour autrui”, op. cit. p. 84.  
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Perhaps this doesn’t mean that Levinas was obliged to work out a phi-
losophy of the practice of ethics, but a restriction to reflection on ethicity (in 
abstraction from the fact that it cannot exclude reflection on the practice of 
ethics) could be justified only strategically and not ultimately by the responsi-
bility that the author had for the others – the exclusion of reflection on the 
practise of ethics would entail a performative contradiction in that the phi-
losophy of ethicity would be practised as if it is not a response to the appeal of 
the other, of whom some might be threatened by legitimated killing. Further-
more, if it is unacceptable to confront a thinker of the meaning of ethicity with 
the implications of the practice of ethics, if such considerations need not be of 
any concern for those working on the meaning of ethicity, then Levinas mis-
understood himself when he wrote with indignation about historical events of 
the era in which he lived and presented his philosophy as a response to it and, 
besides, his claim to the urgency of ethics as first philosophy22 would be sim-
ply unintelligible. On the contrary, I take the expression of indignation in 
Levinas’ work to be a clear indication that he assumed, at the very least, that 
fidelity to the originary meaning of the proximity of the other would fare bet-
ter in helping the fate of other people (than did whatever was responsible for 
the catastrophes), in other words, that it had practical relevance and that such 
relevance was significant for the meaning of the philosophy that he was writ-
ing. What I want to claim for the practical realisation of responsibility, or for 
doing justice to responsibility, is similar to what Levinas claimed for the Rab-
binic tradition of commentary on the Biblical verse:  
“The expression of signification belongs to its very significance [L’expression de 
la signification appartient à sa signifiance même].”23  
                                           
22 LR 78 / EPP 77. 
23 NLT 33. With recourse to Levinas’ phenomenology of writing in the Judaic writ-
ings, Rodolphe Calin has made a subtle attempt to indicate an instance of concrete 
expression of shared responsibility and thus of the movement of the single respon-
sible subject to a collective of responsible subjects (in Levinas et l’exception du soi. 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005, especially Chapter IX – La commu-
nauté inspirée, pp. 331–359). The point of departure of his proposition for such a 
conception of ethical agents as an “inspired community” is Levinas’ coordination 
between revelation and writing: “if Scripture/Writing [l’Écriture] is revelation, it is 
in the sense that the speech that reveals and that reveals itself cannot do so without 
being written [s’écrire], in other words without being inscribed [s’inscrire] in the 
very texture of the text and in the materiality of the letter, of which the corporeity is 
nevertheless not that of a signifier that refers to a meaning, but […] that of the trace: 
the paradoxical and precarious presence of the one that has radically escaped being 
and presence.” (p. 336). This inscription of the ethical trace gradually exposes itself 
to the diversity of interpretations in the community of ethical agents; the ethical 
community being bound together by the incessant reinterpretation of shared re-
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That is to say, just as the repeated commentary on a verse forms part of 
the meaning of that verse, so the ways in which to obey the originary 
imperative belong to its very significance.24 
In the following paragraph, I shall illustrate how far the complications 
of this negligence of Levinas’ can stretch, by reconsidering what the difficult 
translation of the Saying into the Said may entail. 
2.2 Infinite responsibility and the polysemy  
of transgression 
In Chapter 1, the presentation of Levinas’ political thought culminated in 
a discussion of a passage in which the radical demandingness of Levinas’ 
ethics for politics has been expressed. I cite this passage again here, with 
                                           
sponsibility (p. 356). I have three reservations about the possibility of exploiting the 
insights derived from his study for my question concerning justice in Levinas’ 
work. First, although Calin’s use of Levinas’ Judaic writings is instructive, it has to 
be asked why such an attempt is absent from Levinas’ philosophy – the reflection 
on the inspired community still has to be developed into a theory of society search-
ing for justice. Second, whereas the formal phenomenology of writing could suffice 
to hold together an inspired community, even in isolation from the content of the 
writing, it is not clear if this formal aspect of writing could be developed for multi-
cultural societies. Furthermore, the content question of distinguishing properly be-
tween true and false prophecy or inspiration seems to haunt this formal considera-
tion of writing (see De l’éthique à la justice 320–324, 344–346). Three, it is not cer-
tain that the “fragmentation of the infinite” in the plurality of readers or interpreters 
can do justice to the conflict of interpretations and, by analogy, to the quests for jus-
tice and the tragic nature of political action. Underlying all three of these issues is 
the question concerning the relation between Levinas’ philosophy and Talmudic 
writings – a question that I cannot address here. 
24 Whatever else one might think of Husserl’s ideas about self-responsibility, in two 
points at least they seem to be more sophisticated than those of Levinas on respon-
sibility. (1) Husserl considers the fact that the responsible agent is part of a commu-
nity of responsible agents an indispensable part of reflection on responsibility – the 
agent is socially constituted and responsibility is always co-responsibility (“Medita-
tion über die Idee eines individuellen und Gemeinschaftslebens in absoluter 
Selbstverantwortung”, in Erste Philosophie (1923/1924), Zweiter Teil: Theorie der 
phänomenologischen Reduktion, Husserl Gesammelte Werke Band VIII Rudolf 
Boehm (ed.). Haag: Martinus Nijhof, 1959, pp. 193–202, here pp. 197–198), 
whereas for Levinas, as argued above, the agent of responsibility is an isolated 
bearer of an infinite obligation (even though, of course, constituted pre-originally 
by a plurality of others). (2) For Husserl, vagueness, uncertainty, and the possibility 
of mistakes and misdeeds remain essential constitutive aspects of responsibility 
(p. 202), whereas for Levinas the question of the capacity of the agent of responsi-
bility to execute that obligation is never submitted to scrutiny.  
 This comparison clearly needs to be worked out more carefully in another study. 
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a change of accent, because it captures quite correctly the political im-
plications of Levinas’ ethics:  
“Usually the State is preferable to anarchy – but not always. In certain cases, in fas-
cism or totalitarianism for instance, the political order of the State may well have to 
be challenged according to the criterion of our ethical responsibility to the other.”25 
If you exert yourself to find the greatest realisation of justice “according to 
the criterion of our ethical responsibility to the other”, it might happen that 
anarchy,26 is preferable to the State, that is, to whatever institutionalised 
legal or normative system that might be in force in a specific context. It 
would not be too difficult to find examples of such a preferability of un-
dermining the law, of anarchy: one could think of people conspiring to 
overthrow the Nazi-State or, closer to my home, the armed struggle 
against Apartheid. Such examples often do not bother us, in fact, they in-
spire many people as instances of moral excellence, despite the fact that 
they involve transgression of institutionalised laws, and even when they 
may involve killing people – hence the relevance of our reflection on killing 
in the context of Levinas’ ethics. Opposing evil, even by violent means, is 
not excluded by Levinas’ ethics, as we have seen above. 
If this is the case, it would be of the greatest importance to know when it 
would be in accordance with “the criterion of our ethical responsibility to the 
other” to consider anarchy as more preferable to the State. What does 
Levinas say? According to the citation above, this is in cases of “fascism or 
totalitarianism, for instance”. For instance! My question to Levinas would 
be: who is to decide how to fill in the blank of his “for instance”. 
The answer is I. We shall know when and how this blank is to be 
filled when we understand who is the I that decides when anarchy is 
preferable to the State. I am the subject subjected in absolute heteron-
omy to the ethical appeal of the other. This appeal is characterised, as we 
have seen in Chapter 1, by its infinity and by the fact that it elects me as 
uniquely, irreplaceably responsible.  
Yet, someone might object that my infinite responsibility is limited when 
the third enters. This is indeed what Levinas believes, and with him a great 
number of his commentators. But his reasoning on the matter is incorrect. 
Faced with the infinite appeal of not just one other but with that of numerous 
others that contradict one another, my responsibility to this particular other 
                                           
25  “De la phénoménologie à l’éthique”, op. cit. 137 (my italics and translation) / 
“Ethics of the infinite”, op. cit. p.66. The argument that follows has been devel-
oped in detail in De l’éthique à la justice, Chapter 9, §§ 5–7. 
26  “Anarchy” is used here in the usual sense, not as Levinas’ an-archy. 
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here or that particular other there might be limited, but the sum of my re-
sponsibility remains infinite. The State does not limit my responsibility as 
such and, therefore, in the face of the thirds I have an infinite responsibility 
to actualise or achieve justice. And nobody can decide in my place what this 
means. At every moment I am constituted as subject by the question of jus-
tice: “who comes before whom?”, weighing the demands of these others 
with those others, and with those efforts of other people to answer the same 
question and that have been institutionalised in legal and normative systems, 
including States. In this sense the Levinasian ethical subject is constituted by 
the plurality of contradicting heteronomous ethical relations as the sovereign 
power of all politics and justice.  
Having arrived at this point, we should ask ourselves about the possible 
scenarios that could arise from such a political condition of the subject. Of 
course it could lead me to unsay (dédire) my being by acts of saintly self-
sacrifice. Levinas gives an example thereof: people helping others in the 
event of a natural catastrophe, to a far greater degree than institutionally 
expected of them.27 He also describes Edmond Jabès’ life as being one of 
“unsaying”: ceding or losing his place in the world, rather than persevering 
in holding his place in it.28 But equally congruous with what we have seen 
thus far in Levinas would be whatever fanatical effort to actualise what I 
would consider the best justice for a particular society. Nobody protects 
society against my ideas about justice. Nothing in Levinas’ philosophy 
protects the State against my ideas of how best to answer my infinite respon-
sibility to actualise justice to the point of unsaying myself in saintliness. If 
politics left to itself contains the possibility of totalitarianism, then saintli-
ness left to itself carries in it the possibility of all sorts of fanaticism. That 
is why the term “saint” is such an ambiguous one, as are its equivalents: 
fanatic, kamikaze, terrorist, revolutionary, martyr – all terms that are used 
to designate people who, rightly or wrongly, consider their own idea of 
justice to overrule that of one or other State, who consider ethics to be 
more demanding than the form of justice institutionalised in their particular 
context.29 It should not surprise us to find in Levinas’ writings very am-
biguous expressions in which the letter of the text expresses equally well a 
                                           
27 IH 143. 
28 PN 63 / NP 93. 
29 And while considering the possible turning of the letter against the spirit of the 
text, one should add to this list the Messiah, if this is nobody other than every per-
son, as Levinas explains, and especially if the Messiah is defined as the “just that 
suffers for others” (DF 89 / DL 129).  
 See also my argument in De l’éthique à la justice 397-399. 
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possibility of his thought than the spirit of the text: non-resistance to evil, 
the just war waged against war, or permanent revolt or revolution in the 
name of the other.30 Ethics, because of its limitlessness and because of the 
irreplaceable position of the ethical subject, could be open towards inter-
pretations of it that would be executed in serious attempts to act in accor-
dance with the ethical appeal, but that would nonetheless be undesirable, 
or at least, highly ambiguous.31 
And this does not apply only to me, but to every human being. In 
Levinas’ society man is not a wolf for man, but a prophet and a saint for the 
other; Levinas’ society is the eternal struggle of ideas about how to actualise 
justice and efforts to do so by everyone – of course never in anybody’s own 
name, but always justified by the reference to the other, the other who jus-
tifies one’s response to the question of who comes before whom. 
Yet, one would not find much in Levinas to support reflection on 
this dilemma. His project is to reflect on the meaning of the appeal made 
by the others on me – the meaning of ethics – and not to consider where 
the contradicting inspirations, that constitute the political subjects, could 
take them. The real situation in which the ethical subject finds 
him/herself – “there are always at least three persons…” – seems to be 
of very limited interest to Levinas.32 In any case, any contribution what-
soever from whomever to influence my understanding of the justice to 
be actualised, will only make up one more element in the big calculation 
of “who comes before whom?” to which I alone may give the answer.  
I shall consider these remarks sufficient to contest an observation 
made by Jacques Roland:  
“I have always thought that the harsh pages 200 to 205 of Autrement qu’être, in 
the chapter ‘From the Saying to the Said or the wisdom of desire’, offer (also) the 
outlines for a philosophical discourse on the political, that hasn’t been developed, 
                                           
30 ENT 105 / EN 115, OB 185 / AE 283, GCM 9–10 / DVI 26–27, respectively. 
31 In this way the letter of Levinas’ Platonism turns against the spirit thereof and the 
Platonic supremacy arrogantly claimed by Western culture (in Levinas’ criticism 
thereof – see Chapter 3, §2), becomes telling of the force of an ethical meaning 
“beyond Being” (according to Levinas’ appropriation of the Platonist term): “for 
Plato, the world of significations [and thus, likewise, the ethical beyond Being – 
EW] precedes the language and culture that express it; it is indifferent to the sys-
tem of signs that can be invented to make this world present to thought. Conse-
quently, it dominates historical cultures. […] there would exists a culture that con-
sists of depreciating the purely historical cultures and in a certain way colonizing 
the world […]” (HO 18f / HH 31, my italics). What is surprising is that Levinas 
saw with much more clarity the danger lurking in the Western Platonism that he 
denounces (HO 37 / HH 59), than that of his own re-appropriation of Plato. 
32 E&I 90 / EI 85. 
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but that could have been in a justified and well articulated manner. Today I un-
derstand better that if this has not been the case, it is because the development [of 
such a philosophical discourse on the political – EW] meets no need from the 
perspective of the internal balance of [Levinas’ – EW] thought.”33  
In fact, I defend exactly the opposite thesis. It is not my present objective 
to question the constitution of the political by the ethical, as Levinas 
does, but to question the coherence with which he does it and to point 
out significant concerns about the implications of this perspective. Levinas 
wrote in the 1990 “Post-scriptum” to his 1934 essay “Some reflections 
on the philosophy of Hitlerism” that this article  
“proceeds from a conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism of National 
Socialism is not in one or other contingent anomaly of human reasoning, neither 
is it in one or other accidental ideological misunderstanding. There is in this article 
the conviction that this source is due to an essential possibility of elemental Evil 
[Mal élémental] whereto good logics could lead and against which Western phi-
losophy has not secured itself enough. This possibility is inscribed in the ontology 
of Being, concerned to be […]”.34 
The task of finding the meaning of ethicity to safeguard Western philosophy 
against the tyrannical meaning of Being, is Levinas’ life work. The aim of 
my criticism of Levinas is not to question his good will and seriousness, and 
certainly not the radicalism with which he tackled this problem. What I do 
believe though, as I have argued here, is that Levinas, in his project of ex-
ploring the origin of ethical meaning, did not nearly enough take into con-
sideration the seriousness of the meaning of ethicity as it impregnates 
practice, that means, politics. This is not a secondary aspect of his research 
that could be completed afterwards by a willing assistant; it is not a question 
of tidying up the last remote corners of his thought. It is the very meaning 
of the ethical that is at stake. I come to the uncomfortable conclusion that 
the meaning of ethics is originally ambiguous. Ethics left to its own de-
vices carries in it all that is ambiguous about saintliness.  
                                           
33 Jacques Rolland, “Pas de conseils pour le tyran. Lévinas et la question politique”, 
in Revue philosophique de Louvain 100, Feb–May 2002, pp. 32–64, citation p. 42 
(my emphasis).  
34  “Post-scriptum”, in Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l’hitlérisme. Suivi 
d’un essai de Miguel Abensour. Rivages poche. Petit Bibliothèque: Paris, 1997, 
citation, p. 25. 
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2.3 Mediation: the irreducible political condition  
of responsibility 
But the struggle of fanatics of different natures is evidently not where 
Levinas sees his first philosophy leading us in politics. In rare instances 
he even indicates a sensitivity for the possibility that the opposition 
against evil could itself engender evil and therefore cautions that the  
“hand that grasps the weapon must suffer in the very violence of that gesture. To 
anaesthetize this pain brings the revolutionary to the frontiers of fascism.”35  
But generally speaking one could consider the possibility indicated of a 
fanatical slide in the assumption of responsibility for the plurality of others, 
as a symptom for the lack of attention that Levinas gave to the question (1) 
of the inevitable recourse to the means (institutional and other) by which the 
ethical is to be translated into the political and (2) of the mediation of the 
contradictory ethical appeals in view of the interference of the ethical in the 
political. It is possible to demonstrate how Levinas sidesteps this task by 
considering (1) an example of how he neglects reflection on the context-
embeddedness of ethical action and (2) an example of how he fails to 
compare even-handedly the political recourse to means and the prophetic 
criticism of the side effects of the recourse to certain means, which betrays a 
weakness in reflecting on the conjunction of the political and the ethical.  
(1) Let us, then, first consider the manner in which he often illustrated 
the dramatic intensity of the ethical constitution of the subject face-to-face 
with the other by citing a well-know passage from Dostoyevsky:  
“Each of us is guilty before all, for all and for everything, and I more than the others.”36  
When Levinas at least once in an interview cites the passage incorrectly as  
“[w]e are all responsible for everything and for everybody and before everybody, 
and I more than all the others”,37  
the slide from the novelist’s “guilty” to the philosopher’s “responsible” 
is significant in that it reveals the essence of Levinas’ conviction con-
cerning the demanding nature of ethics. 
                                           
35 DF 155 / DL 219. I shall leave out of consideration the question of whether this 
suffering due to the inevitable violence to be committed is not also the suffering of 
someone that sacrifices himself/herself for what they consider indisputably just. 
36 GCM 84 / DVI 134–135. Levinas’ citation corresponds with the translation in the 
French Pléiades edition of Les frères Karamazov of 1952, p. 310.  
37 E&I 101 / EI 98, translation corrected, my emphasis. We know, of course, that 
Levinas read Russian, but three pages earlier in the same text he explicitly cites 
the Pléiades translation. 
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“We are all responsible for everything and for everybody and before everybody, 
and I more than all the others”, 
according to Levinas. What strikes me as astounding about Levinas’ repeated 
use of these words from the pen of Dostoyevsky – in its correct or adapted 
version – is that the context in which the novelist places these words is never 
evoked by the philosopher, even when citing explicitly from the novel. This is 
despite the fact that the context could help reveal something of the status that 
the ethical has in the political for Levinas. According to Alexei Karamazov’s 
narration,38 the idea was discovered by a dying young man, Marcel, (was it 
the ultimate meaning of life revealed to him, or was it an idea produced in a 
state of delirium?) and was taken up some years later by his younger brother, 
Zenob, as exegesis of the catharsis that he underwent when realising the unac-
ceptability of the violence that he had committed against his servant and the 
futility of violence in general. So powerful is the realisation of the validity of 
this idea for Zenob that he decides to give up his military career to become a 
monk. It is as the starets Zosima that he is encountered from the beginning of 
The brothers Karamazov. In Book IV, Chapter i, Dostoyevsky describes the 
scene in which the aged and dying starets gives his last teaching and it is also 
here that we encounter the cited idea for the first time in the novel. The place 
of teaching is not the monastery of the city in which the Karamazovs lived, 
but the hermitage next to it and the people to whom these teachings are ad-
dressed are not citizens (in the first place), but monks and priests. All of them, 
in other words, have sworn oaths of fidelity to a religious hierarchy and some 
of them are linked by a special tie of absolute obedience to the starets himself 
(like Alexei, the author of the starets’ biography). It is a community consti-
tuted by absolute religious obedience and, as such, should be considered an a-
political, or at least a private, setting. In this context, the teaching about one’s 
guilt for everything and everybody is a teaching of saintliness for people that, 
although they live in the world, do so as not belonging to the world and not 
obeying the logic that governs the world. It is a teaching that has its applica-
tion in the domain of the privation of the political.  
From these two episodes of the novel it seems then that when the idea 
of universal guilt (or responsibility) as presented by Dostoyevsky is taken 
as valid, it would lead one to taking up the frock, or at the very least to 
convert to a kind of saintliness lived out in this world. Returning from The 
brothers Karamazov to Levinas, Dostoyevsky helps us to identify the bias 
                                           
38 Book VI, chapter ii.a of The brothers Karamazov. This is the section to which 
Levinas refers explicitly when making the citation in OB 146 / AE 228 and he re-
fers to the specific page number in E&I 98 / EI 95. 
164 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
with which Levinas wrote his philosophy. Levinas’ ethicity seems to find 
its origin in a space opened up in the “privation” from the political; ethics 
is, first and foremost, entre nous, between ourselves, a matter of intimate 
privacy – yet, he claims that it is this intimate ethical privacy that constitutes 
the essence of the political, of politics and of the State.39  
(2) One can measure the unworldliness of Levinas’ idea of responsibil-
ity for the others (or the neglect in reflecting about the mediation and 
means of ethics as it signifies in the political), by pointing out the unfairness 
with which he allows himself to compare State politics and prophecy. In 
“Human rights and the rights of the other” (“Les droits de l’homme et les 
droits d’autrui” – 1985) Levinas questions the profundity by which human 
rights40 can install true peace, since these rights have to be defended by the 
State and the means of the State necessarily complicates the fate of the 
bearers of rights, since the State and its political order of justice can act 
only according to the “necessities peculiar to the State”:  
“Necessities constituting a determinism as rigorous as that of nature indifferent to 
man, even though justice […] may have, at the start, served as an end or pretext 
for the political necessities. An end soon unrecognised in the deviations imposed 
by the practicalities of the state [la pratique de l’État], soon lost in the deployment 
of means brought to bear [le déploiement des moyens mis en oeuvre].”41  
And this is when things go well, since the State can also slide into totali-
tarianism… For this reason, according to Levinas, the defence of human 
rights has to be assumed also by an instance outside of the State:  
“disposing, in a political society, of a kind of extra-territoriality [extra-
territorialité], like that of prophecy in the face of the political powers of the Old 
Testament, a vigilance totally different from political intelligence, a lucidity not 
limited to yielding before the formalism of universality, but upholding justice 
itself in its limitations. The capacity to guarantee that extra-territoriality and that 
independence defines the liberal state and describes the modality according to 
which the conjunction of politics and ethics is intrinsically possible.”42  
To summarise: politics is characterised by proper practice and the means 
of this practice, which it necessarily uses under the conditions of a rigorous 
                                           
39 T&I 300 / TI 334. 
40 I have elsewhere elaborated on the problems that emerge from the reinterpretation 
given to human rights in Levinas’ later philosophy in terms similar to those de-
ployed in the present Chapter – see “The quest for justice versus the rights of the 
other?” in In Levinas’ trace, Maria Dimitrova (ed.). Sofia: Avangard Prima Pub-
lishers, 2010, pp. 101–111.  
41 OS 123 / HS 167. 
42 OS 123 / HS 167. 
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determinism, inevitably obscure the original finality of justice; prophecy 
is characterised by an unformalisable vigilance and lucidity concerning 
justice and the liberal State itself depends on guaranteeing the conditions 
for the practice of prophecy. What should strike us in this reflection of 
Levinas’ is the perspicacity with which he identifies the risks of the use 
of the means of politics on the one hand, and on the other hand, when 
proposing prophecy in response, the question of means simply becomes 
either immaterial, or is again referred back to the State. What bothers me 
here is thus not the fact that Levinas draws his inspiration for reflecting 
on human rights from religious texts,43 but that he is not even-handed in 
his considerations concerning mediation and means when speaking 
about politics and when speaking about prophecy.  
One can identify the same weakness in one of the best know strategies 
by which Levinas reflects on the “conjunction of politics and ethics”. 
Levinas believes in the to and fro, the balance, between two archetypal 
ways of conceiving justice: Jerusalem and Athens.44 But this is not, as 
many readers have been tempted to think (and as is perhaps suggested by 
the passage from Outside the subject, above), a balance between ethics and 
politics where ethics interrupts or questions politics. Jerusalem is not eth-
ics, and cannot be ethics, because nowhere has ethics a direct influence on 
politics, nowhere could it impact on or interrupt politics without the media-
tion of the question of justice. At every stage in the historical development of 
the Levinasian State every subject – including the prophets – should calcu-
late how best to actualise justice. Acting according to the logics of Jerusa-
lem or those of Athens are just two expressions of this same calculation. 
The balance between Jerusalem and Athens that Levinas hopes to see, is 
thus a balance of two ideal types of responses to the question of justice, 
two interpretations of what the plurality of ethical appeals means in a cer-
tain context. If that then is the case, why would this balance hold? What is 
there in Levinas’ philosophy that guarantees this?  
Since the originary imperative from the other is purely formal and 
since its meaning is presented by Levinas as an-archic, one has to come to 
                                           
43 However, I have shown elsewhere (De l’éthique à la justice 345–346) that if 
Levinas had given more attention to the evolution of the practice of prophecy in 
Ancient Israel, he would perhaps have been more careful in his use of this term in 
his own thought. Yet, given his conviction that nothing of spiritual value can be 
learned from a historico-critical reading of religious texts, he would not have been 
predisposed to receive this instruction. 
44 BPW 24 / LC 99–100, and see Chapter 1, § 2.2. See also De l’éthique à la justice, 
Chapter 9, §7, for the point that follows. 
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the conclusion that there is nothing in his philosophy that obliges ethical 
agents to keep this balance, at least, nothing explicit. Implicit in Levinas’ 
philosophy is a categorical imperative that would always curb saintly 
fanatics’ initiative to achieve justice. This imperative is: always act in such 
a way that your search for justice holds in balance calculating, institution-
alising politics (Athens) and subversive prophetic and saintly interventions 
(Jerusalem). But the an-archy of the Saying makes it impossible to justify 
this categorical imperative. The balance of Athens and Jerusalem is only 
one amongst many possible betraying translations of the plurality of 
Sayings into a just Said and therefore this balance also cannot be proposed 
as a counter to possible fanatical slides. 
If this is not what we read in Levinas, it is because he persists in think-
ing about what is essentially a political or mediated relation in terms that 
are private (as illustrated by the text of Dostoyevsky) and unmediated (as 
indicated in the chosen passage on prophecy). The meaning and sense of 
all human interaction is ultimately shown to be dependent on this asym-
metric relation between the self and the other, but the way in which this 
disruptive meaning is itself troubled by original contradiction is not what 
draws Levinas’ attention. This seems to me the main problem with thinking 
responsibility for the plurality of others and therefore political responsibility, 
with Levinas. The possibility of fanatical slides seem to me a marginal (but 
real) possibility of a broader problem, namely the lack of accompanying re-
flection on the inevitable mediation of the plurality of responsibilities and 
thus the lack of reflection on the competence and means of the agent of 
responsibility that has to act in a particular context. 
3 AFTER LEVINAS 
The time has come to take stock of what has been explored and argued, 
not only in the preceding paragraphs of this Chapter, but also in the pre-
ceding chapters of this Part on Levinas’ post-anti-humanist humanism. 
The subtitle of the present book is “After Levinas’ humanism” and it has 
been indicated since the preface that the word “after” is meant here in a 
positive and a negative sense: positive, by continuing to pursue a phi-
losophical objective in a way that follows significant aspects of Levinas’ 
work and, negative by attempting to find a way out of what is considered 
an undesirable heritage. In both the positive and the negative aspects of 
this reception of Levinas, I have attempted to remain true to his text, but 
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without any desire to embrace a Levinasian orthodoxy, since I treat his 
work – as he once said of that of Husserl – as that of a living philoso-
pher. Both of these sides of my reception of Levinas prepare the explora-
tion in Part 3 of the present book in view of a political responsibility for 
a globalised world. This is the agenda with which I have undertaken the 
reading of Levinas since Chapter 1. 
While the criticisms I have levelled against the political implications of 
Levinas’ philosophy are still fresh after the previous paragraphs of this 
Chapter, it would probably be prudent to offer a summary of the positive 
aspects of Levinas’ philosophy that I follow through on here. From Levi-
nas’ project of philosophising the ethical, I retain (1) the importance of 
remaining vigilant against all forms of totalitarian tendencies in politics 
and in social life, (2) to do so from a position that should ultimately be 
called ethical and that drives the reflection of a non-indifferent philoso-
phising about politics and social life. (3) In this context, ethics refers not to 
a set of fixed principles for human conduct or for an attempt to program 
harmless human interaction, but as the significance of human interaction. 
(4) Thus is taken into consideration the importance that a notion of ethics 
necessarily has for justice, both in its institutionalised form and in the 
exercise of power that institutes justice. (5) In all of this, as important as 
reflection might be, the pre-reflexive level of signification that is inscribed 
in human praxis plays a decisive role. 
These positive elements seem to me to be sufficiently present in the 
core of Levinas’ concern (and sufficiently commented on in Chapters 1, 4 
and 5) to justify calling the work done here “after Levinas”, in the positive 
sense of following him. These elements do not form the framework of a 
theory of political responsibility and need to be developed by other means 
after they have been confronted with the criticism of Levinas’ thought.  
The most significant elements of such a criticism that have been pointed 
out are: (1) even if one concedes to the ethical meaning of the alterity of the 
other, the infinity of the asymmetry between the self and the other hurtles 
towards a measureless self-sacrifice of the political subject. (2) Levinas’ 
own attempt at limiting this ethical responsibility in justice, through the 
confrontation with the plurality of others, not only misses the first point, but 
is furthermore invalid. (3) On the contrary, nothing is said that could help 
reflect on the limitation of the initiative that someone could be justified (or 
someone could justify himself/herself) to take in confrontation with insti-
tuted justice and in the name of the responsibility for the others, in view of 
the transformation or overthrow of such institutions. (4) Such fanatical de-
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viations in politics are the symptom of the absence of reflection of the me-
diation between ethics and politics and the means by which ethics intervenes 
in politics; the competence required for assuming the considerable load of 
responsibility in politics is not submitted to reflection. (5) Although each 
political agent takes responsibility for all of the others, he/she remains not 
only the ultimate instance of decision-making concerning the requirements 
of justice and the means by which to pursue it in a particular context, but also 
the ultimate instance of the realisation of that justice – in this sense, Levinas’ 
ethical responsibility could be said to be politically irresponsible.  
To these points of criticism should be added two more that fall out-
side of the scope of examination of the present book, but that nonethe-
less call for some explanation. Without entering into the justification 
thereof, I state45 (i) that Levinas’ entire philosophy is subtended by an 
unjustifiable affirmation that Being is ethically evil and (ii) that the 
analyses made by Levinas of the alterity of the other do not succeed in 
supporting sufficiently the ethical nature of that alterity. The reader will 
immediately notice that especially the last point seriously places the core 
of Levinas’ philosophy in question and it might therefore seem to some 
readers more coherent to reject Levinas’ philosophy en bloc, than to 
claim that in what I am doing here, I am still in an important way in 
agreement with Levinas. Thus, even though a “phenomenology” of the 
alterity of the other is not part of the present project, something needs to 
be said to justify the continued reflection with Levinas on responsibility. 
The conclusion arrived at in De l’éthique à la justice (Chapter 8, § 3.4) is 
that even if one were to accept all of Levinas’ phenomenologically styled 
analyses of the other, and concede to an alterity of the other, to an alterity 
that would make of it something non-ontological and even concede to that 
alterity having a linguistic or sign structure, that tampers with the constitu-
tion of the self, then there is still no forceful reason why this alterity should 
be ethical. The only way in which Levinas succeeds in identifying the alter-
ity of the other as ethical, of calling it an imperative or a questioning of the 
self, is by secretly introducing a hermeneutics of the alterity of the other 
where he explicitly claims there could be none. If one then refuses this ille-
gitimate introduction of a hermeneutics of alterity, one will have to accept 
that the linguistically structured, non-ontological alterity of the other is what 
I call a hieroglyph: something of which one could be quite sure that it carries 
a significance, but of which it is impossible to say what that meaning is. This 
                                           
45 They have been worked out in detail in De l’éthique à la justice, see particularly 
Chapters 8 and 9. 
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doesn’t exclude the possibility of it being ethical, but there is no way to af-
firm this and the philosopher is bound to remain agnostic on this issue. 
It should be quite evident that if this is the case, that it touches at the 
heart of any attempt to take up Levinas’ philosophy. What seems to me 
equally clear is that the ground lost in insight about the passive constitu-
tion of the self (by questioning the claim to its ethical constitution) can-
not be simply reclaimed by attributing that alterity to the processes of 
deciphering of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.46 The reason for this is that 
there is no way to show that the cumulative effect of their theories of 
suspicious hermeneutics of the subject is an exhaustive account of the 
passive constitution of the subject. In other words, next to the masters of 
suspicion, it seems that, at the very least, Levinas exposes the irreducibly 
hieroglyphic aspect of passive constitution. The implication of this is 
that there always remains a significant aspect of one’s being affected and 
constituted by the other, of which the meaning might be significant, but 
which doesn’t give itself for a hermeneutics. In this sense there is no 
foundation to be uncovered about the meaning of the other for the self; 
the proximity of the other is, as Levinas correctly claims, anarchical. 
If this is the case, then the place in which to situate the ethical signifi-
cance of the other, is not the other, but Levinas’ text. When Levinas de-
fines prophetism or inspiration as  
“this intrigue of infinity in which I make myself the author of what I hear [cette 
intrigue de l’infini où je me fais l’auteur de ce que j’entends]”,47 
I suspect that Levinas really hears nothing, or at least nothing decipher-
able, and that he is the proper author of the ethical meaning of the other. 
Or to be more precise, it might be that the other has this ethical meaning, 
but there is no way to affirm this with certainty and any claim to be able 
to make such an affirmation says more about the claim than about the 
hieroglyph that is the other. The place of the affirmation of the ethical 
meaning of the alterity of the other, the place where the uncertainty or 
agnosticism is solved, is in the text of Levinas. 
While this conclusion certainly relativises the force of Levinas’ claim, it 
doesn’t have to follow that the texts in which he makes this claim are there-
fore of no value. In what follows I shall elaborate on what is meant by this 
statement. However, it needs to be stressed that this is not Levinas’ claim – 
                                           
46 Cf. De l’éthique à la justice 328–331. 
47 GCM 76 / DVI 124. See also my discussion of this phrase in De l’éthique à la 
justice 325–327. 
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his philosophy is an exploration of a “strong” alterity in the face of the other, 
or in the proximity of the other, and of which the philosophical text can only 
witness;48 I argue that such a “strong” alterity is a hieroglyph, of which the 
indeterminacy of its meaning allows for the creation of a “weak” alterity, a 
suggestion of ethical alterity, through what is written (realising well that, for 
Levinas, this will mean not much more than a sophisticated rearrangement in 
the flux of Being). By means of an analogy, I would like to argue that there 
is something legitimate and even of decisive significance in such an under-
taking of creating a “weak” alterity in writing.  
Let’s consider the central Nietzschean notion of the will to power. Al-
though Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism involves denying that there would be a true 
reality beyond the phenomenal one, he still affirms that the world is – despite 
appearances or not – the will to power. It is equally true that Nietzsche often 
presents the notion of the will to power in a dogmatic manner. How is the 
strong affirmation of the will to power as the intelligibility of the world to be 
harmonised with Nietzsche’s explicit anti-metaphysical stance?  
This question could be answered with reference to aphorism 36 of 
Beyond good and evil, of which the point is encapsulated in the phrase:  
“The world viewed from the inside, the world defined and determined according 
to its ‘intelligible character’ – it would be ‘will to power’ and nothing else.”49  
In his interpretation of this aphorism, Paul van Tongeren50 insists on the 
importance of the hypothetical form of the statement (“it would be”, “sie 
wäre…”), and of others from the same aphorism: what seems at first 
glance to be a metaphysical principle, is a hypothetical conclusion to a series 
of hypotheses and thought experiments. This hypothetical conclusion is 
formulated in opposition to metaphysical claims of access to an ultimate 
                                           
48 I have demonstrated that there is in Levinas no claim that texts can “produce” or 
“carry” alterity. This has been argued separately for Totality and infinity (De 
l’éthique à la justice 228–233), for Otherwise than Being (De l’éthique à la justice 
287–292), and also for Levinas’ presentation of texts of literature in Proper names 
(De l’éthique à la justice 292–299). 
49 Basic writings of Nietzsche. Walther Kaufmann (transl.). New York: The modern 
library, 1968, p. 238 / “Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt auf ihren ‘intelligi-
blen Character’ hin bestimmt und bezeichnet – sie wäre eben ‘Wille zur Macht’ 
und nichts ausserdem.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse. In G. 
Colli and M. Montinari (eds.), Kritische Studienausgabe 5. Berlin and New York: 
De Gruyter, [1885] 1999, p. 55. 
50 In my presentation of the notion of the will to power I am guided by Van Ton-
geren’s remarkable book Reinterpreting modern culture. An introduction to Frie-
drich Nietzsche’s Philosophy. Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1999, in particu-
lar pp. 154–170. 
LEVINAS’ POST-ANTI-HUMANIST HUMANISM AND AFTER | 171 
 
reality and thus the hypothetical form is the very performance of the anti-
metaphysical nature of the notion of the will to power. Seen in this man-
ner, the will to power is not a necessary discovery of the ultimate meaning 
of the world, but rather a possible name for the world, a possible perspective 
on the world that opposes other interpretations of the world. It is an inter-
pretation amongst other interpretations of the world, where none can right-
fully claim to be anything more than just an interpretation of the world, 
none can rightfully claim to be the final, authoritative perspective on the 
world. And since will is a unity only in concept,51 the claim that the intelligi-
bility of the world is the will to power is not a claim to the ultimate perspec-
tive on reality, but rather an affirmation of the plurality of interpretations. 
Yet, the weak, hypothetical “epistemological status” of the affirmation of 
the will to power is sufficient for it to act as a disruptive force of suspicion 
on the claims of objectivity and truth of other perspectives. 
What is of relevance for my recuperation of Levinas is not the theory of 
the will to power itself, but the form of argument by which it is affirmed. What 
is required for the philosopher Nietzsche to be able to disrupt contemporary 
discourse on reality is not a better access to ultimate reality, but a suggestive 
discursive practice that puts other claims under a perspective of suspicion. It is 
the philosopher (in this case) that has this anarchical potential. I call it “anar-
chical” since it doesn’t lay claim to having access to an arché or metaphysical 
principle, yet in the absence of the capacity to gain such a principle, it has the 
power to disrupt, by shedding doubt through its hypothetical performance. 
If I consider it worthwhile to continue reflecting with Levinas in the direc-
tion opened up by his philosophy of the ethical alterity of the other – even 
while remaining agnostic about the ethicity of the other – then it is because I 
think that that ethicity is situated (at least in its strong affirmative sense) in the 
text of Levinas and that this is not necessarily a disqualification of his philoso-
phy. When he says that “I make myself the author of what I heard”, I say, 
Levinas could not have been sure of what he heard or learned from the hiero-
glyph of the other, but made himself nonetheless the author of that undeci-
pherable message. In the absence of the capacity to determine the meaning of 
the alterity of the other, the strength of Levinas’ philosophy seems to me to 
reside in the doubt that it sheds on the supposition that there is no such ethical 
alterity or, positively formulated, that his hypothetical idea that the other signi-
fies ethically has sufficient suggestive strength to unsettle any discourse that 
would simply take the negation of this idea for granted. Without a doubt this is 
                                           
51 Cf. Basic writings of Nietzsche. op. cit. p. 215 / Jenseits von Gut und Böse, op. cit. 
p. 32 (aphorism 19). 
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not Levinas’ own vision about his philosophical achievement or ambition.52 
However, I would claim that such a reading of his work has at least sufficient 
performative force to act in an anarchical manner. Levinas’ philosophy is then 
not an anarcheology,53 a testimony to an an-archical alterity (in the strong 
sense), as he would like it to be, but as a discourse suggestive of an an-archical 
alterity it produces an anarchical event itself (albeit in a weaker sense). By this 
I certainly do not mean a romanticising of a mysterious ethical force in texts – 
it is not the text that has this disruptive and suggestive quality, but that which 
is expressed by Levinas in the text. With his hypothesis of the ethical impera-
tive of the alterity of the other, he opens a perspective on reality. Again, even 
though I claim that the affirmation of the ethicity of the other is created by 
Levinas’ philosophy, it is not exclusively on the basis of his intellectual power 
or performative brilliance, but also due to the very enigmatic nature of the 
other, due to the alterity of the other as impenetrable hieroglyph, that this sug-
gestion could gain force. In this sense – and by the purposeful choice of the 
word “enigma” – the idea of the suggestive force of Levinas’ argument is at 
least not completely foreign to the spirit of Levinas’ philosophy. 
Levinas’ philosophy is of such a nature that it unsettles accepted manners 
of seeing and thinking and can be considered an un-saying (dédire) thereof. In 
this, it is appropriate to recall that in more than one instance, Levinas made 
reference to Nietzsche’s discursive practice in order to present his own view 
of unsaying. Through unsaying – the repeated effort to reduce or re-conduct 
the Said to the Saying – the philosopher finds a certain lightness with regard to 
the apparent seriousness of philosophising. In fact, all human expression loses 
some of its seriousness under the repeated reconduction to what is supremely 
urgent and serious: the Saying, the imperative to take responsibility for the 
other. In this it corresponds with the Nietzschean “reduction”:  
“‘reducing’ being not by putting in brackets, but by the violence of an unheard-of 
verb [verbe], undoing by the non-saying [non-dire] of dance54 and laughter.”55 
                                           
52  As argued in De l’éthique à la justice 228–233, 287–292. 
53 OB 7 / AE 19. 
54 It should be mentioned at least in passing that this phenomenologising appropria-
tion of Nietzsche by Levinas interferes quite remarkably with his much com-
mented and rightfully criticised statement that what is essential about humanity 
would be the Greeks and the Bible and that all the rest would be merely exotic 
dance, i.e., frivolous or insignificant. In this Nietzschean reduction, dancing is as-
signed the lofty task of suspension of the care for Being, and of leading one back 
to the Saying! In a Levinasian mindset, the excellence of any cultural expression 
(including Hellenistic and Talmudic studies) would be measured by the degree to 
which it conforms to dancing, defined in this way. 
55 HO 65 / HH 106, translation modified. 
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And likewise,  
“One should have to go all the way to the nihilism of Nietzsche’s poetic writing, 
reversing irreversible time in vortices – up to the laughter which refuses language 
[jusqu’au rire qui refuse le langage].”56  
True enough, for Levinas this unsaying is first of all due to the unsay-
ability, unutterability or unspeakability (indicibilité) of the Saying;57 in 
the absence of belief in the meaning imposed by the Saying, I place 
more emphasis on the philosophical (or other) work of unsaying and its 
suggestive power. Just as no philosophical argument or presentation of 
the world can remain untouched by the Nietzschean laugh, so it seems to 
me, no argument or truth, no gnoseology can remain untouched by the 
suggestion of the decentring imposed by the possible ethical imperative 
of the face of the other as it is found in Levinas’ texts. 
It goes without saying that this suggestion of the primordial ethicity could 
in turn be made suspect, could be submitted to doubt and its weak “epistemo-
logical status” be criticised. But such is the nature of debate about ethics. 
Probably my proposal on the suggestive power of Levinas’ texts, by analogy 
to that of Nietzsche’s texts, will not satisfy many of Levinas’ readers – if any – 
since, I concede, something important is lost with respect to what Levinas 
wanted to offer. However, I think it would be reasonable to accept this expla-
nation as justification for continuing to engage with his work and to hold the 
place of alterity while my reflection on this issue is still “under construction”. 
It is in the field of tension created between, on the one hand, the com-
pletely admirable and justifiable aspects of Levinas (concentrated in the 
identification of certain elements of a philosophical project of reflection on 
the ethical and the political) and, on the other hand, the questionable aspects 
(the failure to recognise the hermeneutical limits to the presentation of al-
terity and the failure to formulate a plausible and desirable transition from 
the ethical to the political), that I aspire to make a contribution. The most 
suitable general term to unite my reflections “after Levinas” is that of re-
sponsibility. This notion will have to be explored with its political dimension 
in mind and with the global world not only as the largest horizon of its de-
sired relevance, but also the practical situation that will condition its reali-
sation. While a fully developed presentation of such a theory of responsi-
bility will not be given in this book, I shall attempt, in Part 3, to elucidate, 
still in dialogue with Levinas, the requirements for such a project. 
 
                                           
56 OB 8 / AE 22, translation modified. 
57 HO 65 / HH 106. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
PART 3 
Political Responsibility  
for a Globalised World 
 
 
 
There is a famous passage in which Derrida describes Levinas’ style of 
argumentation with a lyrical image: it  
“proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a beach: return and repetition, 
always, of the same wave against the same shore, in which, however, as each 
return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews and enriches itself.”1 
From the position of a less gifted reader that nonetheless makes every effort 
to engage in a thoroughly critical examination of the validity of Levinas’ 
ethics, as I hope should be evident from the preceding Chapters, I often feel 
more inclined to compare his work with a swarm of bees from which one 
might succeed in swatting a few, but not without constantly getting stung by 
others from behind. Emmanuel Levinas developed a particularly innovative 
and forcefully argued philosophy of ethics. Of the thought provoking and 
challenging potential of this philosophy the enormous international and in-
terdisciplinary reception that his work enjoys today, could serve as ample 
proof. Providing adequate responses to whatever objections one might have 
to a theory of such standing will always be a daunting task. I shall not be so 
rash as to propose a “solution” to the criticism formulated against Levinas in 
the previous Chapter. Instead, in cognisance of the magnitude of such an 
enterprise, I shall use this Part to prepare the ambitious project of enforcing 
the positive aspects of Levinas’ ethics and to explore ways of weakening 
what have been indicated as undesirable side effects thereof.  
                                           
1 Jacques Derrida, Writing and difference. Alan Bass (transl.). London and New 
York: Routledge, 2001, p. 398n7 / L’écriture et la différence, Paris: Seuil, 1967, 
p. 124n1 – Derrida refers here particularly to TI. 
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The theme of this preliminary discussion will be the question of an 
ethico-political notion of responsibility for the contemporary globalised 
world. It has been prepared by all of the preceding discussions. Chapter 1 
was devoted to defending the eminently political nature of Levinas’ phi-
losophical enterprise in which the responsibility of the self for the other is 
the centrepiece. In Chapters 2 and 3 an attempt was made to exploit as far 
as possible some of the means of Levinas’ own work to argue for the 
global horizon for such political reflection. Finally in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
Levinas’ own presentation and justification of his thought on the self and 
the other, as an attempt at uncovering the ultimate nature and sense of such 
a global political responsibility has been examined under the title of a 
“humanism of the other human” and the failure of Levinas’ ethico-political 
thought to reflect on the mediations, context, means and consequences of 
practical obedience to the plurality of others as part of the very meaning of 
ethicity has been exposed. All of these conclusions should be considered 
as the essential background to and necessary point of departure for every-
thing written in the current Part. Max Weber, particularly in his capacity 
as theoretician of responsibility, has been chosen as the appropriate inter-
locutor through which to augment the explorative power of this Part. A 
similar role is assigned to two contemporary philosophers that have appro-
priated significant aspects of Weber’s thought on responsibility, namely 
Karl-Otto Apel and Paul Ricoeur. What these three authors have in com-
mon and what opposes the Weberian heritage of thought on responsibility 
to Levinas, is their conviction that the practical complications of responsible 
action in a world of uncertainty belongs to the core meaning of ethics. For 
this reason, confronting Levinas with Weber and his two heirs will help to 
advance our understanding of the political implications of Levinas’ notion 
of responsibility and to further our own post-Levinasian reflection on 
responsibility for the contemporary context.  
In the three Chapters that follow, a framework for the development of 
an ethico-political notion of responsibility for a globalised world will be 
proposed through a three-stage argument. In the first stage, Chapter 7, 
I shall resume reflection on Levinas’ notion of responsibility as it enters 
the political, where it was left in Chapter 6. Instead of resolving the diffi-
culties created by the contradiction between the plurality of others, the 
results from my critical reading of Levinas will simply be assumed and 
submitted to further examination. By means of a detailed comparison 
between Max Weber’s distinction of two ethical-political orientations – 
the ethic of principle and the ethic of responsibility – Levinas’ notion of 
political responsibility, or responsibility that seeks justice, will be magni-
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fied in order to show in more detail what the profile thereof is. On the ba-
sis of this profile, I will then attempt, in the second stage of this Part, 
Chapter 8, to identify the minimum objectives or requirements for the de-
velopment of this profile into a theory of political responsibility for a glob-
alised world. Apel’s appropriation of Weber’s notion of responsibility will 
serve here as a suggestive parallel. Finally, in the third stage, Chapter 9, 
the four requirements identified in Chapter 8 will themselves be explored 
and expanded. Using Ricoeur’s practical philosophy, which will be shown 
to be true to Weber’s reflection on political responsibility in pertinent 
ways, the potential of working on these requirements, in view of a theory 
of ethico-political responsibility for a globalised world, will be demon-
strated and the contours of these requirements will be better mapped out. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Levinas and Max Weber  
on being called for politics 
 
 
 
It is well known that Max Weber’s later work, in particular the essay Politics 
as a vocation, plays a major role in the historical development of reflection 
on responsibility and notably of a prospective political notion of responsi-
bility. The choice of Weber as the privileged interlocutor of Levinas on 
political responsibility is not justified by an idea that he would in one way 
or another bring the desired correctives to the defects of Levinas’ ethics. 
Rather, it seems that Weber’s theory of responsibility could serve as a 
magnifying glass through which the implications of Levinas’ ethical notion 
of responsibility and its implications for political action could be perceived 
with far greater clarity. Furthermore, Weber’s theory will serve to support 
our reflection on the socio-historical context in which such a responsibility 
is to have effect and in this way, the comparison of Weber and Levinas 
will prepare the way for the subsequent explorations of this Part. It is not 
my ambition to develop a full comparison of Weber and Levinas, but to 
clarify the issue of responsibility and its social setting by looking at Levinas 
through the lens of the twin essays Politics as a vocation (Politik als 
Beruf) and Science as a vocation (Wissenschaft als Beruf). 
1 AN INHOSPITABLE WORLD: DISENCHANTMENT 
AND POLYTHEISM IN WEBER AND LEVINAS 
These two texts should of course be read together, since it is not possible 
to appreciate Weber’s exposition on responsibility in the first without the 
socio-historical background provided in the second. The most important 
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aspect of the socio-historical background is a twofold diagnosis of con-
temporary social reality. On the one hand, the complex history of rationali-
sation that has left (Western) humanity in a disenchanted world governed 
by calculative and goal-aiming rationality, the execution of which under-
mines human experience of meaning and the technical implementation of 
which reduces human freedom like an iron cage. On the other hand, claims 
to direction giving values grow to a conflicting multitude – to which he 
refers as a polytheism. Weber takes it as a  
“fundamental fact, that so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its 
own terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another. 
Or speaking directly [unbildlich], the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are 
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion.”1 
It would evidently make no sense to attribute the detail of Weber’s the-
ory of rationalisation to Levinas.2 However, it could be pointed out that 
Levinas shared a number of convictions with Weber and that these are 
crucial for his understanding of responsibility. The exposition of secu-
                                           
1 SaV 152 / WaB 550. On this twofold diagnosis, see Danilo Martuccelli, Sociolo-
gies de la modernité, Paris: Gallimard, 1999, pp. 203–216 and Jürgen Habermas, 
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1. Handlungsrationalität und ge-
sellschaftliche Rationalisierung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp [1981] 1995, 
pp. 332–345. 
 It is probably not inadmissible to clarify a major concern of these two texts of 
Weber, using a citation from a much earlier intervention, where he exclaimed: 
“The reason why I react so extremely sharply on every occasion, with a certain 
pedantry as far as I am concerned, against the amalgamation of ‘ought-to-be’ with 
‘what-is’ [die Verquickung des Seinsollens mit dem Seienden] is not that I under-
estimate the question concerning “ought”, but exactly the opposite: because I can-
not bear it when problems of world-shattering importance, of greatest ideal range, 
in a certain sense the highest problems, that can move a human heart, are changed 
here into an issue of technico-economic ‘productivity’ and made to a subject of 
specialist discipline [Fachdisziplin], as national economy is.” (Gesammelte Auf-
sätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik von Max Weber, p. 421, pointed out by Wil-
li Oelmüller in “Gibt es überzeugende Orientierungsysteme für unser politisches 
Handeln?”, Diskurs: Politik. W. Oelmüller, et al. (eds.). Paderborn, et al.: Ferdi-
nand Schöningh, 1980, p. 15). 
 This question of world-shattering importance that fills Weber with so much pas-
sion, his concern for “ought-to-be”, for how one is supposed to act, for ethics, is 
identified here by a refusal of the temptation to answer it by the means of scien-
tific disciplines. The reason for this is because of Weber’ well-known conviction 
that the sciences can and should ultimately be neutral with regard to value (wert-
frei). This conviction stands in close connection with the theory of the kind of 
world in which the scientific disciplines as forms of reason have come to being. 
2 In the works of Levinas there is not explicit reference to Weber. 
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larisation that Levinas developed3 has little in common with Weber’s 
reconstruction of the rationalisation of religions,4 but it does correspond 
with Weber in that it is about a description of the contemporary world as 
disenchanted and rejects a unilaterally positive appraisal of reason and 
the development of technology5 and with it refuses to believe in a certain 
Enlightenment faith in progress.6 That this process leads to a disen-
chanted world is common to Levinas’ ideas of secularisation and We-
ber’s on rationalisation, whatever the different accents of this notion 
might be for each of them. Although there is no theory of the modern 
State and bureaucracy in Levinas, he apparently shares Weber’s disillu-
sionment in both of them, as is clear when he states:  
“For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the State, in the hierar-
chy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when everyone submits 
to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed 
from the necessity of the reasonable Order. There are, if you like, the tears that a 
civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other”.7  
Likewise, although there is no comparable social theory of science in 
Levinas, he apparently shares Weber’s conviction that in the modern 
disenchanted world the sciences are not capable of giving decisive direc-
tion to our choices of actions since, for Levinas, they remain “gnose-
ologically” oriented (as does Western philosophy) and place the question 
of ethics second.8  
The fact that practically all of Levinas’ efforts are devoted to the affirma-
tion of one particular direction-giving meaning should not obscure the fact 
that he was convinced that he lived in a polytheistic world. This should be 
evident from his elaborations on the “crisis of monotheism” as presented in 
Merleau-Pontian terms in Humanism of the other (see Chapter 5, above). 
Even if it is Levinas’ contention that there is a unifying point of reconciliation 
                                           
3 In “Sécularisation et faim”, (Emmanuel Lévinas. Cahier de l’Herne. Catherine Cha-
lier and Miguel Abensour (eds.). Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1991, pp. 19–28) and in 
“Transcendance, idolatry and secularization” (GDT, 163–166 / DMT 190–194).  
4 Cf. Wolfgang Schluchter’s excellent synthesis in “Die Paradoxie der Rationalisie-
rung. Zum Verhältnis von ‘Ethik’ und ‘Welt’ bei Max Weber”, in Rationalismus 
und Weltbeherrschung. Studien zu Max Weber. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1980, pp. 9–40. 
5 Making place for an incomplete dialectic between the gains and losses of techno-
logical development DF 231 / DL 323, IH 142, commented on in De l’éthique à 
la justice 145–147. 
6 Cf. Danilo Martuccelli, Sociologies de la modernité, op. cit. p. 204. 
7 BPW 23 / LC 97. 
8 OB 64 / AE 104. 
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of all meaningful action, the manner in which he develops this idea shows 
some affinities with Weber’s theoretical writings on religion. For Weber the 
diverse religious traditions of theodicy point to the impossibility of harmonis-
ing the religious attitude of salvation religions and the factual causality of this 
world – there is no necessary connection between good action and good con-
sequences;9 for Levinas, if the “old-fashioned Judaism is dying off, or is al-
ready dead”,10 if the simple religious adoration of God in Judaism has become 
impossible in the aftermath of the genocide, it is because there is no argument 
that could put an omnipotent God in the right for these happenings and in this 
sense, as Levinas said: God “committed suicide at Auschwitz”.11 Therefore, 
there is in his philosophical thinking no pre-conceived expectation of a guar-
antee that well-intended action will lead to good results. In other words, the 
recognition of the crisis of monotheism amounts to the acceptance of polythe-
ism as a socio-descriptive category. It is in answer to this “polytheism” that 
Levinas proposes the unique sense (sense unique) that is ethicity. 
There is a second, double, way in which Levinas’ ethics itself is bound 
to the idea of polytheism, and this should crystallise from the critical read-
ing of his ethics that I have presented in Chapter 6. On the one hand, the 
third introduces a contradiction with respect to the ethical appeal of the 
singular other which means that, on “entering” the political, responsibility 
equals deciding who should come first – which one of the competing and, 
in principle, equally valid “gods” should be given priority. The word 
“god” is appropriate here, since it is the affirmation of the ethical alterity 
of the other that constitutes Levinas’ response to the “crisis of monothe-
ism”. The plurality of mutually contradictory, infinite appeals to the re-
sponsibility of the subject, could thus be said to represent an ethical poly-
theism. On the other hand, every ethical subject, once he/she has estab-
lished what the appropriate way is to cope with the plurality of contradict-
ing claims of the others, has to put through this idea of what justice entails 
in a social reality of competing claims to what justice entails. And since 
nobody can claim to directly present the unified appeal of the other, and 
everybody presents always only ideas of what the compromise between 
different claims to responsibility entails, it is not realistic to count on a 
consensus based on the “appeal of the other”. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that one is at a loss for finding any guidance in Levinas’ philosophy 
                                           
9 PaV 122f / PaB 443f; cf. ENT 188 / EN 194. 
10 DF 271 / DL 377. 
11 Visage et violence première”, interview in La différence comme non-indifférence. 
Ethique et altérité chez Emmanuel Lévinas. Paris: Kimé, 1995, pp. 129–143, cita-
tion p. 135. See also the discussion of “atheism” in Levinas’ Judaism, in Chapter 4. 
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD | 183 
 
on either of these two forms of plurality. In this way, the plurality of ethi-
cal subjects that compete for the realisation of what they hold justice to 
entail, amounts to an ethico-political polytheism or a polytheism of justice. 
It should be highlighted once again that the picture that one forms of 
Levinas’ ethics – in this case especially in relation to the question of poly-
theism – depends on the distinction between two levels of his thought: that 
of ethics and that of politics. If I argue for a polytheism in Levinas’ politics, I 
do not deny his (in my mind, failed) attempt to defend a monotheism in his 
ethics that is partially based on a critique of social processes through the de-
ployment of the metaphor of a plurality of sacred deities (see Chapter 2). 
Whatever the differences might be that distinguish these two authors 
(despite the indicated similarities), both consider responsibility as the 
appropriate response for people to this inhospitable world. 
2 LEVINAS: A GESINNUNGSETHIKER  
OR A VERANTWORTUNGSETHIKER? 
It would be imprudent to equate Weber’s and Levinas’ notions of “responsi-
bility” simply on the basis of their use of the same (translated) word. In fact, 
if one considers Weber’s presentation of the “two fundamentally differing 
and irreconcilably opposed maxims [zwei voneinander grundverschiedenen, 
unaustragbar gegensätzlichen Maximen]” under which “all ethically ori-
ented conduct [alles ethisch orientierte Handeln]”12 may be classified – the 
ethic of (ultimate) principle(s) [Gesinnungsethik], that insists on the right 
intention or principle as determining the ethical goodness of an action, and 
the ethic of responsibility [Verantwortungsethik], that determines ethically 
desired courses of action by weighing the likely consequences and adopting 
the appropriate means by which to attain the desired outcome13 – it would 
                                           
12 PaV 120 / PaB 441. 
13 It is not easy to find the appropriate terms by which to translate these Weberian 
notions in English. Of the uncertainty of the precise meaning of the two notions, 
Hans Lenk, one of the foremost German specialists of the philosophy of responsi-
bility, writes in Konkrete Humanität. Vorlesungen über Verantwortung und 
Menschlichkeit. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998, p. 138): he suggests that 
Verantwortungsethik be considered in the case of Weber as equivalent to Fol-
genethik (ethics of consequences) or Konsequenzethik (consequentialism) and 
gives Prinzipienethik (ethics of principles) as equivalent to Gesinnungsethik. In 
what follows, I shall simply translate Verantwortungsethik as ethic of responsibil-
ity and follow Lenk’s suggestion to translate Gesinnungsethik as ethic of (ulti-
mate) principle(s). The use of “ethic of ultimate ends“ for Gesinnungsethik in the 
translation of Politics as a vocation, seems completely misleading if “ends” refer 
184 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
seem at first sight, that Levinas’ notion of responsibility stands much closer 
to Weber’s notion of an ethics of principle.  
2.1 The prima facie case for Levinas  
as “ethicist of principle” 
How strong this prima facie case is, could be indicated with reference to 
Weber’s famous Zwischenbrachtung.14 Here the sociologist argues that an 
ethics of principle is the culmination of a certain history of religious evolu-
tion and equates it to an ethic of brotherliness. He devotes a good number of 
pages to motivate and illustrate his point that 
“[t]he religion of brotherliness [religiöse Brüderlichkeit] has always clashed with the 
orders and values of this world […].”15  
Now, although Levinas’ ethics should not be misconstrued as a “religion of 
brotherliness” or “religious brotherliness”, it could be argued that his notion 
of responsibility corresponds point by point with such a “brotherly ethic”16 
or ethic of principle, at least as far as it is negatively situated in relation to the 
widely accepted values of different life spheres. 
                                           
to the consideration of outcomes of action; another possible translation for Gesin-
nungsethik, namely “ethic of conviction” is better and has the advantage of ex-
pressing the idea of attitude in Gesinnungsethik, but should perhaps rather be 
avoided since the ethicist of responsibility also acts out of conviction – this time 
not convictions regarding context-independent principles, but convictions regard-
ing means and consequences. Furthermore, the option of the translation of “ethic 
of principle” avoids confusion later when Ricoeur’s notion of conviction will have 
to be distinguished from his interpretation of Gesinnungsethik, even if he trans-
lates the latter notion with “éthique de conviction”. 
 Since the aim of examining these notions of Weber (in this entire Part) is to come 
to a better understanding of what the practical implications of political responsibil-
ity are, it is not important to distinguish between a Weberian theory of ethic (with 
the accent of the description of a habitual way of acting) and, say, a Levinasian 
theory of ethics (with its accent on the imperative and meta-ethical import); evalu-
ating an ethic of responsibility (as Weber undertakes) simply overlaps with reflec-
tion on a justifiable ethics of responsibility (as Levinas attempts), at least in as far 
as the implications of their insertion in practical contexts is concerned. For this 
reason I make use of (a theory of the evaluation of) ethic and (a theory of the justi-
fication of) ethics as interchangeable notions.  
14  Although this text is slightly earlier than PaB (1919) and WaB (1917) there are 
numerous points of correspondence in the text that show the closeness with Poli-
tics as a vocation. 
15 RRW 330 / ZB 544. 
16  Cf. “It is my responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely foreign […] 
that constitutes the original fact of fraternity.” (T&I 214 / TI 235). 
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The five different life spheres with which such a brotherly ethic is ex-
plained by Weber to be in conflict are: economics, politics, aesthetics, erotics 
and the intellectual sphere. Now consider a number of specifications con-
cerning ethics in the work of Levinas. In each case, something is said of the 
tension between ethicity and the normal logic of the particular life sphere.  
(1) Economy:  
“The commercial value of services and human labour gives credence to the 
strong idea of being as totalised and one and (when integrated to the economy 
and the arithmetic of money) as the order or system that hides or conceals the 
disorder of the merciless struggles of profit-sharing [intéressement]”,  
 to which Levinas opposes the “axiology of dis-interestedness [dés-
inter-essement] […] which is the kindness of giving”.17 
(2) Politics:  
 Whereas the “necessities peculiar to the State” constitute  
“a determinism as rigorous as that of nature indifferent to man, even though 
justice […] may have, at the start, served as an end or pretext for the political 
necessities”,  
 Levinas defends the prophetic constitution of ethics as an instance out-
side of the State that is characterised by  
“a vigilance totally different from political intelligence, a lucidity not limited 
to yielding before the formalism of universality, but upholding justice itself 
in its limitations”.18  
 Likewise, if we consider that Weber discusses the “depersonalisation” 
[Sachlichkeit] of the bureaucratic State also under this heading,19 
Levinas’ conviction should be again evoked that 
“[t]here are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the neces-
sity of the reasonable Order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil ser-
vant cannot see: the tears of the Other.”20 
(3) Aesthetics:  
“before Culture and Aesthetics, meaning is situated in the Ethical, presup-
posed by all Culture and all meaning.”21  
                                           
17  “Socialité et argent”, in Emmanuel Lévinas. Cahier de l’Herne. Catherine Chalier 
and Miguel Abensour (eds.). Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1991, pp. 106–112, cita-
tions pp. 109 and 110 respectively. 
18 OS 123 / HS 167. 
19 RWW334 / ZB 546. 
20 BPW 23 / LC 97. 
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 It can be conceded that art is a “renewal of the interest for the other”, 
only if it has been recognised first that 
“the look of the artist aims at finding novelty, the first contact with. It is not 
on the level of the relation to the Other that this process is situated, but on the 
level of the discovery of the world.”22 
(4) Erotics:  
“The referral to the other is an awakening to nearness, which is responsibility 
for the neighbour to the point of substitution, which is the enucleation of the 
transcendental subject. Here we find the notion of a love without eros.”23  
 And this notion is clarified elsewhere as  
“love without Eros, charity, love in which the ethical aspect dominates the 
passionate aspect, love without concupiscence”.24  
(5) Intellectual sphere:  
 Levinas critiques Western philosophy that  
“has never doubted the gnoseological, and consequently ontological, struc-
ture of signification”  
 by calling for the recognition of “a sense somewhere else than in ontol-
ogy” and by implication, somewhat different from the gnoseological.25 
Likewise,  
“this way of grappling with the perfection of the infinite is not a theoretical 
consideration in turn in which liberty would spontaneously re-assume its 
rights. It is a shame that liberty has of itself, when it discovers its very exercise 
to be murder and usurpation.”26  
These references, isolated from their context, certainly do not represent 
Levinas’ often complex (and developing) vision of these aspects of social 
reality, and I don’t ignore the fact that one could therefore evoke a number 
of passages that would contradict some of those cited here27 – in fact, my 
presentation of Levinas’ philosophy on two plains, that of ethics and that 
                                           
21 HO 36 / HH 58, translation modified. 
22 “Deux dialogues avec Emmanuel Lévinas”, in Augusto Ponzio. Sujet et altérité. 
Sur Emmanuel Lévinas. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996, pp. 143–151, citations p. 149. 
23 GDT 233 / DMT 257. 
24 ENT 103 / EN 114. 
25 OB 64 / AE 104. 
26 DEHH 176. 
27 See for instance my discussion of Levinas’ thought on the economy in De 
l’éthique à la justice 166–171. 
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of politics, could contribute to an explanation of why that is the case. But 
that is not the issue here. The citations do suffice to make the prima facie 
case for associating him rather with an ethic of brotherly love and thus 
with Weber’s ethic of principle and to justify my call for vigilance in com-
paring Levinas’ “résponsabilité” with Weber’s “Verantwortungsethik”. 
Without identifying Levinas’ ethics with Weber’s ethic of principle, 
Dorando Michelini28 has argued that  
“the interest of the Levinasian reflection on responsibility lies in a perspective 
that is diametrically opposed to that of Weber – given that Levinas is not that 
much interested in drawing up an ethical system to consider ethical actions and 
decisions, but rather to reflect on the radical origin of all responsibility as answer 
to the appeal of the other.”29  
Since this articulation, at least of the formal characteristics of Levinas’ 
intention, is perfectly correct, it would be interesting to show how Mich-
elini construes the opposition between the Weberian and the Levinasian 
perspectives on responsibility.  
Whereas direct and indirect consequences of actions are central for 
Weber, according to Michelini’s observation they play only a secondary 
role in Levinas (meaning probably both secondary in volume discussed 
and secondary to ethical alterity). In fact,  
“unlike Weber and Jonas, Levinas understands ethics and responsibility not from 
the consequences of human action but from the relation to the other.”30  
It is, according to Michelini, probably due to the French philosopher’s 
insistence on the radical alterity of the other and this lack of regard for 
the consequences of action that it is not simple to formulate a social ethic 
from a Levinasian perspective. Four weaknesses of Levinas’ notion of 
responsibility could be derived from this general remark. In all of them 
the absence of a truly Weberian attention to the consequences of action 
leads to defects in the application of Levinas’ ethics:31  
                                           
28 Dorando Michelini, “Ética de la responsabilidad. Modelos de fondamentación y 
aplicatión” in Concordia 41, 2002, pp. 83–103 (henceforth = EdlR). Despite the 
fact that the Weber-Levinas comparison forms only a limited part of Michelini’s 
larger project, namely to trace the similarities and divergences between the ap-
proaches of Weber, Jonas, Levinas and Apel, I was not able to find any more sig-
nificant – and no sustained – comparison of Weber and Levinas on the question of 
responsibility.  
29 EdlR 84–85. 
30 EdlR 92. 
31 EdlR 94. 
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(1) The root of Levinasian responsibility is not in the “I” but in the 
other, which entails a serious undermining of autonomy. 
(2) It is an individual responsibility of the I for the other, which provides 
no significant contribution to social ethics and is thus not capable of 
contributing towards  
“a realistic and minimally objective consideration of the problems of power 
and the systems of autoaffirmation, like the economy, law or politics”.32  
(3) The notion of a face-to-face responsibility is a-historical, since it doesn’t 
take into account the complex and multiple mediations between the I and 
the other in everyday life. 
(4) Following Habermas, Michelini claims that in situations where mul-
tiple ethical options are constituted by complex ideological or cultural 
differences, rational decision-making depends on inclusive, critical 
discourse that aims at consensus seeking and that is an indispensable 
requisite for a justifiable inter-subjective practice. Yet, these are not 
developed or taken into account by Levinas. 
Therefore, despite his effort to find a more radical justification of respon-
sibility, Levinas’ version of responsibility is, in Michelini’s judgement, not 
able to help in the solution of contemporary moral problems;33 the anarchical 
and non-reciprocal construal of responsibility  
“diametrically contradicts a conception of responsibility conceived as awareness 
and capacity to moral judgement that is socially and historically formed.”34 
Although Michelini doesn’t attribute these incapacitating defects of Levinas’ 
philosophy to its religious roots,35 his whole presentation of responsibility in 
Levinas is subtended by the conviction that its religious foundation36 is con-
trasted to Weber’s monological, narrowly strategically- and instrumentally-
based conception of responsibility.37 If one considers that the relation to the 
                                           
32 EdlR 94. 
33 This is a criticism often directed at Levinas. Although my own critique of his eth-
ics goes in the same direction, it needs to be stressed that if Levinas was able to 
provide as little as only a justification for the claim to the tenability of the ethical, 
he would have rendered an enormous service, not only to the philosophical con-
templation of ethics, but also to the quite practical question of how to start speak-
ing about the ethical in a domain of the everyday world, namely philosophy, 
where the conviction of the death of God reigns. The latter could be considered 
the most important and difficult of all meta-ethical problems. 
34 EdlR 101. 
35 EdlR 91. 
36 Thus Michelini, EdlR 101. 
37 EdlR 101. 
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other (the brother, as Levinas says) is central to Levinas’ ethics, and connects 
with it Michelini’s interpretation of the religiosity of Levinas’ work, then it 
seems permissible to conclude that Michelini would tend to link Levinas’ 
ethics rather to Weber’s ethic of principle or ethic of brotherliness (although 
he doesn’t do so explicitly). Be that as it may, what is important is that 
Michelini argues for a marked distinction or even conflict between the no-
tion of responsibility in Levinas and in Weber. 
Having now shown that a prima facie case could be made for pairing 
Levinas’ notion of responsibility with Weber’s notion of an ethic of 
principle and having presented Michelini’s case for a patent distinction 
between the notion of responsibility in Levinas and Weber, I would like 
to make the opposite case. I shall not at all attempt to show that Levinas 
was a Weberian; rather, in accord with the aims set out for this compari-
son, I shall use Weber’s notions of responsibility as a lens through which 
to magnify certain aspects of Levinas’ thought on responsibility.  
I have argued above that Levinas shares with Weber significant as-
pects of the diagnosis of contemporary society (or Gegenwartsdiagnose) 
of disenchantment and polytheism, with their concomitant experiences of 
loss of freedom and loss of meaning. Again, in figuring out how to situate 
Levinas with respect to Weber’s notion of responsibility, it will be of utmost 
importance to distinguish whether one considers the ethical plain of Levinas’ 
thought or the plain of the political implications thereof. I shall argue that 
if, for the purposes of this examination, we were to accept Weber’s catego-
risation, Levinas would seem to a considerable extent to be an ethicist of 
ultimate principles (Gesinnungsethiker) on the plane of his ethics. Yet, as 
argued since Chapter 1, a purely ethical subject never exists – a consequent 
Levinasian reading would have to concede that the subject is always political 
– and in his reflection on the political plain and the implications thereof 
pointed out in Chapter 6, Levinas then seems more an ethicist of responsi-
bility (Verantwortungsethiker) in the Weberian sense.  
2.2 Levinas as political “ethicist of responsibility” 
However, before one could undertake such a comparison between Levinas 
and Weber, it would be necessary to gain clarity on the exact nature of the 
categorisation of the ethic of principle and the ethic of responsibility, since 
this has implications for the manner in which this comparison can be plau-
sibly undertaken. A number of features of Weber’s presentation of the two 
ethical categories in Politics as a vocation would suggest that they are 
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categories specifically for political action. The distinction fits into the 
overall theme of the essay on the nature of the vocation of politics.38 The 
first place in the essay where the question of responsibility is raised consists 
of a distinction between the responsibility of a bureaucrat or civil servant 
and the responsibility of a political leader.39 Then, after lengthy sociological 
analyses of the modern State and the different manners in which one could 
live off or for politics in the State,40 Weber reintroduces the question of 
responsibility by a question that he typifies as “ethical”:  
“What kind of a person must one be to dare to put his hand on/in the wheel of 
history?”41  
Responsibility, passion and a sense of proportion are the characteristics of 
such a person – clearly those of a political leader and not of every human 
being. Besides, from the entire essay it is clear that “responsibility” is the 
attitude that Weber sees as necessary for someone who operates with the 
means particular to politics, namely “power backed up by violence”.42 Even 
then, when the issue of the inevitable means of politics provokes the ques-
tion concerning the relationship between ethics and politics43 and an ethic 
that is conscious of the means to be used (responsibility) is opposed to an 
ethic that insists on the right intention of action (ethic of principle), the theme 
is clearly still that of a political ethic. Yet, when the distinction between the 
two kinds of ethics is introduced explicitly for the first time in the essay, 
Weber unmistakably states  
“the fact that all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two funda-
mentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented 
to an ‘ethic of ultimate principles’ or to an ‘ethic of responsibility’.”44  
And at the climax of the essay where Weber sings the praises of a truly 
mature person’s responsibility, assumed to the point of saying figura-
tively “I can do no other; here I stand”, he implores his readers: 
                                           
38  See also the valuable commentaries of Bradley E. Starr, “The structure of Max 
Weber’s ethic of responsibility”, in The journal of religious ethics, 27/3 1999, 
pp. 407–434 and Wolfgang Schluchter, Wertfreiheit und Verantwortungsethik. 
Zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Politik bei Max Weber. Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971. 
39 PaV 95 / PaB 414f. 
40 PaV 77–115 / PaB 396–435. 
41 PaV 115 / PaB 435, translation modified. 
42 PaV 119 / PaB 439. 
43 PaV 118 / PaB 439. 
44 PaV 120 / PaB 441, translation modified, my italics. 
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“every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realise the possibility of finding 
himself at some time in that position.”45  
Conceded, this is not always everybody’s situation, but it could happen 
to everybody, whereas evidently it could not realistically be expected 
that the vocation of politics (in Weber’s sense) will fall on everybody.  
These two uses of Weber’s categorisation can’t be easily or obviously 
reconciled. But since the current objective is not to solve a difficulty in We-
ber’s text, but rather to use his text as a lens through which to gaze at Levinas’ 
text, I suggest the following coordination of the two uses. What Weber says 
about the ethic of responsibility and about the ethic of ultimate principles is 
intended as insight into the nature of action for the modern world of advanced 
rationalisation and disenchantment, as he understands it. Even if Weber fo-
cuses on the question of politics in the essay under discussion, it should follow 
that the socio-historical conditions under which any political ethic is to gain its 
plausibility, are the same as the conditions under which any ethic is to demon-
strate its appropriateness. Now, not all fields of ethics have to do with the 
adoption of the means of the State, the means particular to politics, but in all 
ethics the question of the preference for principle-guidedness or consequence-
guidedness is important in that it confronts pre-established principles with the 
means appropriate to that field of action. Moreover, if the question about 
Levinas’ stance in relation to these two ethical orientations is posed, it should 
be borne in mind that all action is for Levinas political (as previously argued). 
This doesn’t mean that it has directly to do with the violent means at the dis-
posal of a State – Levinas’ definition of politics is formed by the ethical obli-
gation to the others and the consequent quest for justice – but that it might ul-
timately lead to an impact on those means. 
What, then, is the most appropriate response to our current world and in 
the face of the other? What is the most fitting ethical orientation in this in-
hospitable world? Levinas adamantly affirms that the answer is to be sought 
in a particular understanding of the ethical: the other impacts on the subject 
as an appeal to limitless responsibility. And it is this originary orientation of 
all action that exerts its authority without apparent regard for the situation or 
the mediations of actions, that prompts someone like Michelini to character-
ise Levinas’ thought as a-social and a-historical.46 It is thus not only the re-
marks in which Levinas negatively demarcates his ethics with regard to the 
inherent rationality proper to the independent life spheres that suggest a 
                                           
45 PaV 127 / PaB 448f. 
46 This aspect of Levinas’ thought on ethics has been exposed in Chapter 6 with ref-
erence to his use of the famous passage from The brothers Karamazov. 
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proximity between his ethical notion of responsibility and Weber’s ethic of 
principle (as indicated above), but the fact that all actions apparently draw 
their ultimate and decisive meaning from unconditional obedience to the im-
perative of the other also points in the same direction. However, this holds 
only so long as the comparison is limited to the plain of Levinas’ ethics that 
considers only the relation between the ethical subject and the other in the 
singular. But following the repeatedly cited theme of the present book:  
“there are always at least three people. […] As soon as there are three people, the 
ethical relation to the other becomes political and enters into the totalizing dis-
course of ontology.”47  
A subject that is “always” obsessed by more than one other will always be 
political and as such is submerged in the discourse of ontology, in other 
words, will always have to weigh, calculate, interpret and reflect on the 
efficiency of actions involving others. From this perspective, from the 
plain of Levinas’ politics, the relationship between his thoughts and an 
ethic of principle is markedly different. Weber will help us to articulate 
this difference between Levinas’ political thought and the ethic of princi-
ple, before we turn in a similar way to an articulation of the resemblance 
of Levinas’ notion of responsibility and Weber’s, on the political level. 
According to Weber’s classification, the calculation of the consequences 
of action doesn’t play an important role in the ethic of principle.48 It doesn’t 
have to, since the ethic of principle is fed by a rejection of the irrationality of 
the world: it assumes that good actions lead to good consequences (even if 
appearances contradict this assumption) and that there could be no conflict 
between different duties.49 Besides, reflection on the consequences might 
compromise the fidelity with which one adheres to the intrinsic worth of cer-
tain general values or principles of actions. Furthermore, an ethic of principle 
ignores the fact that sometimes forceful or even violent means have to be 
adopted to see through what is considered a desirable decision and course of 
action. Only in extreme cases does principled ethical deliberation embrace 
the use of evil’s means against itself and that is when, from a chiliastic-
eschatological perspective, violent means are adopted to commit the  
“last violent deed, which would then lead to a state of affairs in which all vio-
lence is annihilated”.50  
                                           
47 “Ethics of the infinite”, op. cit. pp. 57–58 / “De la phénoménologie à l’éthique”, 
op. cit. p. 129 (translation modified). 
48 PaV 120–122 / PaB 441–443. 
49 Cf. Starr, “The structure of Max Weber’s ethic of responsibility” op. cit. p. 415. 
50 PaV 122 / PaB 443. 
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Levinas’ political thought (following the interpretation that I have given 
thereof in Chapters 1 and 6) stands in stark contrast to this context-blind atti-
tude. Although it is true that, as I have pointed out, the subject of politics is 
obsessed by the appeal of the other (albeit in the plural) to which, in each case, 
absolute, unconditional obedience is due, it would not be correct to equate this 
to an attitude of absolute fidelity to a set of values. The appeal of the other is a 
void imperative to responsibility and, as pointed out (Chapter 6, § 2.1.), the 
imperative emanating from one other contradicts that of other others, because 
of its equally and contemporaneously valid, unconditional and all-embracing 
nature. Levinas is thus very conscious of the fact of contradiction between 
one’s duties. It is exactly for this reason, or from this condition, that the sub-
ject as political subject is constituted. And since the political subject is consti-
tuted by contradicting equally valid claims to his/her responsibility, means 
should be devised to compare the incomparable; political subjectivity is born 
from the fact that there is no set of actions by which to serve all of the interests 
of all of the others at the same time; something, or someone, inevitably has to 
be sacrificed – preferably the ethical agent himself/herself in the first place, 
but calculation will have to determine this. It is here that the socio-historical 
context of action becomes important. It seems to me that this political condi-
tion could lead to “comparing the incomparable” equally possibly by means 
of hierarchies of values and by calculation of consequences.  
However, in the places where Levinas gives an idea of what politics en-
tails, he uses words like comparing, gathering, thinking, equalising,51 judg-
ing, deciding,52 weighing, calculating, and measuring – notions that seem to 
indicate deliberation on consequences rather than the establishment of val-
ues. This is clarified further when Levinas explains that this entails the quest 
for justice, by means of laws, courts, States,53 propositions and communica-
tion,54 work and technology,55 science and commerce,56 and philosophy that 
is charged with introducing a measure in the comparison.57 Given these 
spheres of the realisation of deliberation concerning the just ways of arbitrat-
ing the contradicting claims of responsibility, it seems unlikely that a true 
Levinasian would leave deliberations concerning the consequences of ac-
tions out of consideration. In fact, it seems probable that the notion of re-
                                           
51 OB 16 / AE 33, GCM 82 / DVI 132. 
52 AS 61. 
53 ENT 165 / EN 171, GDT 183 / DMT 214. 
54 OS 142 / HS 192, OB 134 / AE 211. 
55 OB 159 / AE 248. 
56 OB 161 / AE 251. 
57 OB 161 / AE 251. On these routes from the ethical appeal to responsibility to do-
mains of the realisation of justice in the sphere of ontology, see De l’éthique à la 
justice 271–274. 
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sponsibility, on the plain of politics, would mean that one would have to 
stand accountable for the means chosen by which to respond to the appeal of 
the others. This would be affirmed by the fact that all actions stand forever 
open to revision and improvement – one would have to evaluate the out-
comes of action for their fidelity to respond to the others. That Levinas 
would count on a happy outcome for whatever is undertaken in the name of 
the others is excluded. For this, he is too disillusioned with the world.58 
Now, if it is true that the quest for appropriate ways to respond to the con-
tradicting appeals of the others leads to the adoption of the means of the dif-
ferent life spheres, and if we take into consideration Levinas’ suspicion of the 
inevitable violent inclination of means on the plain of ontology, then it seems 
unavoidable to conclude that he would have agreed that the “good” could be 
realised by “evil” means. This becomes evident when we consider his refusal 
of “non-resistance to evil”.59 And it is here that an unexpected similarity with 
the ethic of principle crops up on the level of politics. My discussion in Chap-
ter 6 of possible drifts of political radicalism in the frame of a Levinasian eth-
ics, should suffice to support the claim that the radical eschatologically 
minded seizure of violent means in order to make an end to violence for ever, 
could not be excluded as a possible outcome of the Levinasian styled calcula-
tions of how best to serve the contradicting demands of the others. At least, if 
it is correct that Weber’s presentation of the ethic of principle could be divided 
into three categories60 – religious-acosmic, pacifistic-political and radical-
revolutionary – then the Levinasian seeker of justice will never be religious-
acosmic, but might perhaps under certain circumstances share traits with the 
pacifistic-political (however, Levinas’ explicit rejection of non resistance to 
injustice and violence would tend to exclude this) and it could not be excluded 
that the radical-revolutionary stance be adopted.61 It seems then that in Levi-
nas’ political thought, he is quite far from an ethic of ultimate principles, and 
comes closer to the attitude of an ethic of principles, only to the degree that the 
ethic of principle itself cedes to the temptation of interfering in the conse-
                                           
58 However, one might detect a principled ethical trait in Levinas’ fallacious conclu-
sion that the different infinite responsibilities limit each other – this boils down to 
a form of thinking that good actions will have good consequences (see Chapter 6, 
§ 2.2.). But for Levinas, the limitation of responsibility is not necessarily some-
thing good. Furthermore, when Levinas expresses his belief that the individualist 
and somewhat anarchic ethics of Jerusalem will hold the Athenian doctrine of hi-
erarchy in balance (BPW 24 / LC 99, as was explained and disputed in Chapter 6, 
§ 2.3.), he falls in the ethico-cosmic realist trap. 
59 ENT 105 / EN 115. 
60 According to the exposition in Hans Henrik Bruun’s Science, Values, and Politics 
in Max Weber’s Methodology – referred to by Bradley Starr in “The structure of 
Max Weber’s ethic of responsibility” op. cit. p. 416. 
61 Cf. discussion of “for instance”, in Chapter 6, § 2.2.). 
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quences of its action, that is, to have considerations concerning means over-
ride (temporarily or by ad hoc justifications and modifications) the ultimate 
principles. Hence the need to have a look, with Levinas, at the ethics of means 
and consequences – the ethics of responsibility. 
At first glance one could point out a clash between the spirit of Levinas’ 
philosophy and the first three-fold qualifications of responsibility in Weber’s 
essay.62 (1) For Levinas the subject of politics is always obsessed by the im-
peratives of the others; Weber’s politician’s passion has the meaning of ob-
jectiveness (Sachlichkeit). (2) Levinas’ is inspired by the other; Weber’s is 
devoted to a cause. (3) Levinas’ is forever infinitely responsible; for Weber’s 
the sense of proportion is a decisive quality. However, it can be demon-
strated that a categorical opposition between a Levinasian responsibility of 
“peace and proximity” and a Weberian responsibility of “recourse to violent 
means and objective distance” would simply be a misrepresentation of the 
implications of their thought. 
To begin with, on the political plain the Levinasian political subject can-
not but calculate the consequences of his or her action and therefore also the 
means necessary to act in particular spheres of life: justice, States, communi-
cation, work, technology, science, commerce and philosophy. This has al-
ready been argued above. For this reason the drive to gain power, typical for 
the Weberian politician, may not at all be excluded from the effort of the 
practical realisation of a Levinasian politics. The reconstruction of Levinas’ 
politics that I have presented (Chapters 1 and 6) seems to be in perfect corre-
spondence with Weber’s affirmation that 
“[n]o ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the at-
tainment of ‘good’ ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the 
price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones – and facing the 
possibility or even the probability of evil ramifications. From no ethics in the 
world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose 
‘justifies’ [heiligt] the ethically dangerous means and ramifications.”63  
It therefore certainly holds for the political implications of Levinas’ politics that  
“he who lets himself in for politics, that is for power and force as means, con-
tracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that good can follow 
only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true.”64  
                                           
62 PaV 115–116 / PaB 435–436. 
63 PaV 121 / PaB 442. 
64 PaV 123 / PaB 444. Cf. my argument concerning a Levinasian justification to kill 
under certain circumstances, in Chapter 6, §2.1. The characterisation of powers as 
“diabolical” in the citation from Weber stems from the fact that he attributes this 
insight (amongst others) to the early Christians; in a secularised form Weber as-
cribes to this view (cf. PaV 125 / PaB 447). 
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This is true also of a Levinasian that, for the sake of the effective realisa-
tion of justice, needs associates – the collaborators or followers will 
have to be incorporated into the desired project, whatever their motiva-
tions for collaboration might be – be it as manifestation of what they 
consider the appropriate response to the appeals of the other, or some or 
other material, social or psychological gain.65 In addition, it would hold 
to a greater or lesser degree also for any Levinasian political project that  
“one of the conditions for success is the depersonalisation and routinisation, in 
short the psychic proletarianisation, in the interest of discipline”.66  
This would certainly not exclude that a Levinasian project team would al-
ways consist of people that contribute to each other’s mutual sensitisation 
to the ethical.67 However, it is unrealistic to think that the narrow common 
motivation – responding to the appeal of the others – would spontaneously 
lead to a broad consensus on political action. And if there is no guarantee 
of consensus, then somebody will have to put through his or her idea of 
what best justice entails at the price of some collaborator’s ideas on the 
same issue and with their collaboration none the less (which does not ex-
clude that the others will simply abandon the project). Yet, reflection on 
co-responsibility is very far from Levinas’ domain of interest. 
These are some of the paradoxes to which Levinas’ notion of re-
sponsibility inevitably leads in the domain of the political; however, it 
seems unlikely that Levinas would have had the courage to acknowledge 
with Weber (as I think he should have) that  
“[w]hoever wants to engage in politics at all […] must know that he is responsi-
ble for what may become of himself under the impact of these paradoxes”68 
that may endanger the “salvation of the soul”69 in that sense. Furthermore, 
although the Levinasian political subject, then, takes the meaning of human 
action seriously, I am not convinced that Levinas shows sufficiently intimate  
“knowledge of tragedy with which all action, but especially political action, is 
truly interwoven”.70  
But even then, Levinas never uses ethics as a means of justifying action 
or events, “of being in the right”,71 and always as a manner of pursuing a 
                                           
65 PaV 125 / PaB 446. 
66 PaV 125 / PaB 447. 
67 Cf. Levinas on “awakening” (éveil) and “sobering-up” (dégrisement) – De 
l’éthique à la justice Chapter 8, § 2.1 “Le dédire et la poursuite de l’authenticité” 
and § 2.2 “La communauté des philosophes et les livres”. 
68 PaV 125 / PaB 447. 
69 PaV 126 / PaB 447. 
70 PaV 117 / PaB 437; cf. PaV 121 / PaB 442. 
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cause72 in full cognisance of the means associated with a domain of ac-
tion73 and with the non rational nature of the world74 – all of which are 
typical of the Weberian ethic of responsibility. 
If it is correct then to attribute to the political Levinas at least the implicit 
recognition that the use of forceful means and reflection on the consequences 
thereof are indispensable for the quest for justice, it is patent that we do not 
have to do here with a politics of turning the other cheek. Self-sacrifice, that is, 
considering oneself as the ultimate means to a specific end, can however 
never be excluded as political strategy. Turning the other cheek is an attitude 
of unconditional surrender to the other – but in Levinas’ politics the subject’s 
giving to the other is not unconditional, it is conditioned by the calculation of 
which of the others comes first and of the most effective use the subject can 
make of himself or herself in that justice. If that consists of self-sacrifice, then 
the infinite responsibility to the others calls for it, but this would not always be 
the case. Equally possible is that the political subject accords to himself or 
herself an important role, for the sake of an efficient response to the others. As 
pointed out previously, Levinas does not support non-resistance to evil and 
would therefore certainly agree with Weber’s politician that  
“thou shalt resist evil [and, if need be – EW] by force, or else you are responsible 
for the evil winning out.”75  
Hence I find it very unlikely that a Levinasian on the political plain 
would practise truthfulness at all costs, as a principled ethicist would76 – 
at least if he or she does, it is not for the truthfulness as such, but for the 
others. Rather, in the name of the other one might have to lie, obscure, or 
misrepresent information, exactly because the question of consequences 
of action is in harmony with the responsible quest for justice. 
Responsibility on the political plain probably entails for Levinas, as 
for Weber, that the results of actions are imputed by the subject to his or 
her own agency,77 whether they were intended or not, adequate for or 
contradicting of the initial intention.78 This could be done only when 
                                           
71 PaV 118 / PaB 439. 
72 PaV 117 / PaB 438. 
73 Although I have argued in Chapter 6 that Levinas didn’t always realise what this 
implies.  
74 PaV 123 / PaB 444. 
75 PaV 119–120 / PaB 440. 
76 PaV 120 / PaB 441. 
77 PaV 121 / PaB 442. 
78 PaV 117 / PaB 437. 
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such an agent is convinced of the desirability of the cause that he or she 
pursues. Although it is certainly correct to state that Levinas’ politics is 
driven by the plurality of ethical appeals of the others, this does, through 
the mediating process of calculating what justice entails, mean pursuing 
a cause, namely the quest for the realisation of that justice (that is of 
course always in principle open to revision under the appeal of the others). 
Even here is found a correspondence with Weber’s responsibility, since 
when Weber asserts:  
“Exactly what the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for power 
and uses power, looks like is a matter of faith [Glaubenssache]”,79 
he means that the idea of the end that is to be pursued cannot be given by 
scientific means, since no form of science can provide that kind of guid-
ance.80 And likewise, what Weber calls faith, Levinas develops in the 
greatest detail in his rendering of one’s non-ontological affectedness by the 
alterity of the other, of which ultimately no phenomenology can give ac-
count (i.e., just like faith, the affectedness by the other is a source of moti-
vation that does not draw its resources from knowledge or science). But 
even if the Levinasian political subject is obsessed by the alterity of the 
other, he or she is not intoxicated by power as vain politicians are.81 This 
Levinasian subject is rather bound to the cause, not in the sense of being 
neutral, but in “distance towards one’s self”, i.e., against vanity82 and even 
– as indicated – to the point of self-sacrifice, if needed. His cause is the 
others and justice for them. And nobody can replace the bearer of this 
responsibility in the task of obeying it, just like the Weberian politician 
cannot reject or transfer his or her responsibility.83  
Considering the arguments above, it should be clear that the Levina-
sian political subject shares a number of important characteristics with 
Weber’s responsible politician. On the plain of the political, of the quest 
for justice, Levinas’ philosophy implies something quite similar to We-
ber’s ethic of responsibility.  
However, even while affirming this conclusion, the differences 
should not be obliterated. For Weber, ethics is a serious matter in an era 
of disenchantment, since it is not possible to give any justification for 
ethics – for choosing one form of ethics rather than another, and for re-
maining true to a chosen ethic rather than not. Levinas agrees with this 
                                           
79 PaV 117 / PaB 437. 
80 SaV 143 / WaB 540. 
81 PaV 116 / PaB 436f. 
82 PaV 116 / PaB 436. 
83 PaV 95 / PaB 415. 
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social critique of ethics, but only provided that one suspends considera-
tion of the face of the other, which for him settles the question of the 
realness or validity of the ethical. The other of whom the subject is al-
ways already a hostage, in the ethical sense that Levinas develops, is not 
exactly the justification of any particular ethic, but is rather that with ref-
erence to which something like justification has meaning at all. At the 
least, the Levinasian subject is elected to act in response to the others. 
That is why Levinas could go along with Weber in describing the world 
as irrational, but ultimately claims, and spends the largest part of his phi-
losophical energy to render credible that “we are not duped by moral-
ity”.84 Since there is no ultimate justification of action for Weber, his 
subject of responsibility is to be self-responsible (eigenverantwortlich). 
As a subject of ethics, the Levinasian subject is exactly the opposite of 
self-responsible: being a subject means exactly being constituted origi-
narily as responsive-responsible to the others that invest the subject’s 
action with the decisive ethical meaning. However, it should be noted 
that matters are very ambiguous for the Levinasian political subject: this 
subject always acts by responding to the contradicting appeals of the 
others, and since nobody can replace that subject in the task of determin-
ing what justice entails in this or that context and since nobody can re-
place that subject in the realisation of that justice, one could get the im-
pression that he or she is de facto responsible to himself or herself for 
justice. However much this might correspond in form to a political self-
responsibility, for a Levinasian political agent no action is possible that 
cannot be argued to be done out of responsibility for the other. The fact 
that the other’s opinion of what justice might entail in this or that context 
is only one amongst many factors to take into account in the decision 
concerning the demands of justice, doesn’t take away from the fact that 
the subject, in making this decision about justice, remains responsible 
for the others. In fact, the subject has to act out of responsibility for the 
other, even if the course of action adopted in the name of justice is exe-
cuted despite that other’s opinion concerning the demands of justice. 
The importance of this distinction between Levinas and Weber is ac-
centuated by the fact that there is in Levinas’ philosophy no limitation of 
responsibility for social roles. In contrast, Weber gives at least the distinc-
tion between the responsibility of a civil servant and that of the political 
leader.85 But in Levinas’ idea of responsibility there can be no limitation 
                                           
84 T&I 21 / TI 5. 
85 If Weber’s indication that his discussion in Politics as a vocation is about ethics in 
politics is taken seriously, one could add that responsibility is attributed to the role 
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by role, since any such limitation would amount to an illegitimate restriction 
of the infinite ethical obligation. Or more accurately, whatever limitation one 
might assume for oneself or demand of others in the name of justice, can be 
accepted only as long as these roles are considered the best means to serve 
the end of justice. Besides, these roles would remain forever open to re-
view. That is why, for Levinas, the political responsibility of the bureau-
crat is exactly as demanding as that of the political leader (and of whatever 
other citizen). Social roles are no limit to responsibility, they are only ele-
ments in the calculation and execution of justice. 
2.3 Responsibility elevated to principle  
or principle elevated to responsibility? 
The distinction between Weber’s and Levinas’ ethics of responsibility be-
comes even clearer when a final idea of Weber’s concerning responsibility 
is considered: this entails the combination of the ethic of responsibility and 
the ethic of principle as it is made by “the mature person” [ein reifer 
Mensch].86 Such a person becomes so conscious of the consequences of a 
course of action, that in the execution of that responsibility he/she 
“reaches a point where he [or she] says: ‘I can do no other, here I stand.’ [ich 
kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich]”.87  
This is explicitly a position in which any person – not just political lead-
ers – can find himself or herself.88 At this point, Weber relativises his 
rigid distinction between the “two fundamentally differing and irrecon-
cilably opposed maxims”,89 by claiming that in the face of the over-
whelming possible consequences of one’s actions  
“an ethic of principle and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but 
rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine person – one who 
can have the ‘calling for politics’”.90  
The combination of the ethic of principle and the ethic of responsibility 
is thus the summit of human action, and is what is required from those 
                                           
of political leaders in a sense that cannot be said of other citizens. However, when 
seen from Weber’s remark that the ethic of principle and the ethic of responsibility 
are general categories of all ethics, this distinction is cancelled. 
86 PaV 127 / PaB 448, translation modified. 
87 PaV 127 / PaB 448, translation corrected. 
88 PaV 127 / PaB 448. 
89 PaV 120 / PaB 441. 
90 PaV 127 / PaB 449, translation modified. 
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that want to live for politics. According to Weber, responsibility can and 
should ideally be elevated to the level of principle91 – and this is what he 
ultimately asks for: the willingness to assume the consequences for the 
use of the power (of the State, in some people’s case), an assumption to 
the point of “here I stand”, i.e., elevating this responsibility to a principle 
in order to prevent the social order collapsing into “anarchy”.92  
This elevation of responsibility to a level of principle follows both 
from Weber’s rejection of cosmic-ethical realism and his definition of the 
State with reference to the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. 
The argument seems to work as follows. The responsible person stands 
accountable for the foreseen and calculated consequences of his/her action. 
But since responsibility is acted out in a cosmos where one cannot assume 
good consequences for good actions, the responsible person will have to 
also be accountable for unforeseen consequences. Whatever the unforeseen 
consequences that will accompany the foreseen ones, and independently of 
(in the sense of ignorant of) the context that is to come, the responsible 
person will assume those consequences associated with his/her use of 
powerful means. This has to be accepted in order to guarantee the unified 
seat of legitimate use of violence in the State and thus to prevent anarchy.  
How is Levinas to be situated with respect to this culmination point in 
Weber’s presentation of responsibility? Just as Weber does, Levinas gives a 
radical thrust to responsibility by linking it to a context-independentness or 
by ascribing to responsibility a principled weight. Whereas this “principled 
weight” is in Weber the unconditional accountability for one’s decisions re-
garding the use of power, in other words the principledness of responsibility 
is effective in the present with a view to the future in order to avoid anarchy, 
in Levinas this principled weight comes from behind, as it were, by the con-
text-independent validity of the imperative of absolute obligation to the 
other. But here a significant difference should be noted: whereas Weber’s 
principled responsibility aims at avoiding the fragmentation of the legitimate 
use of violence, the appeal of the “principle” of the imperative is anarchical. 
It is anarchical not only in the sense that Levinas explicitly gives to it, 
                                           
91 It is true that Weber presents the two ethics as supplements of each other, but in 
the same phrase (cited above) his concern is still clearly with an ethics that is ap-
propriate for the vocation of politics, and for this reason it would amount to a sim-
ple contradiction of everything that Weber had said previously of ethics in politics 
if one were to insist on the flip side of this conjunction, namely that the ethics of 
responsibility supplements the ethics of principle. That is why I opt for calling 
thus conjunction “elevating responsibility to a principle”. 
92 PaV 78 / PaB 397. 
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namely that in the face of the others (in the plural) whatever solution is found 
to instate justice in society is submitted to eternal correction, revision and 
questioning in the name of the imperative of the other (and that ultimately 
ethicity doesn’t operate with a foundational logic), it is also anarchical in the 
sense that I have explained in Chapter 6: the plurality of different require-
ments of the others explodes this apparent universal rule of obedience to the 
other into a myriad of conflicting claims. The plurality of ethical appeals that 
constitute the Levinasian subject as an ethical and responsible subject, each 
of which holds unconditionally as in the ethic of principle, constitute by their 
contradiction a political subject that continues to be responsible, has to an-
swer for the others. However, because of the plurality of the others, the po-
litical subject has to take responsibility for the consequences of justice even 
if it may unfortunately contradict the needs or claims of certain individual 
others. And in the frame of Levinas’ thought no limit is set to this responsi-
bility and no reflection accompanies it on the means appropriate for the as-
sumption of this responsibility. The effect of this is (as argued previously) 
that no justification can be given for keeping Jerusalem and Athens in bal-
ance, or in Weberian terms, no justification can be given for protecting the 
State against the fragmentation of the valid use of violence. Quite the con-
trary: in final analysis, the Levinasian State has as many instances of the le-
gitimate use of violence as there are ethico-political subjects. 
However wide the scope of possible actions a politician can consider as 
justified by Weber’s theory of responsibility, the sociologist’s concern about 
the integrity of the State makes it impossible for the subject of responsibility 
to put at stake or sacrifice the integrity of the State. This is true, first, in the 
case of responsibility as the ethic of the broader public and political officials, 
since no role is assigned to them that would place them in a position from 
which it would be possible to put the State at risk; second, in the case of the 
highest holders of political power, sacrificing the State is excluded since their 
responsibility is the responsibility for the monopoly on the use of violence 
that constitutes the State and thus the role of political leaders. But this much 
could not be said of Levinas’ subjects of responsibility. Levinas does not 
take into consideration the entire complex issue of the competence of the 
ethical agent in matters political and its relation to the use of the array of 
means deployable in the name of justice. Therefore, the Levinasian political 
responsibility cannot protect itself against the temptation of attempting to 
radically undermine a state of affairs judged to be unjust, that is to embrace 
eschatological or chiliastic violence in order to radically re-found society. In 
other words (as indicated above), just like an ethic of principles that tempo-
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rarily appropriates for itself the means proper to the exercise of the ethic of 
responsibility, the fanatical Levinasian subject could place anything and eve-
rything at risk, in the name of the calculation of justice, a function for which 
no expertise or competence is required. Since the competence in responsible 
calculation of consequences is negligible in importance to the sensitivity to 
the appeals of the others (which, alas, is a cacophony of mutually contradic-
tory claims), the Levinasian version of the combination of an ethic of princi-
ple and an ethic of responsibility resembles less an elevation of the assump-
tion of consequences of responsible action to a principle (as in Weber), and 
more the elevation of a principled ethics to the assumption of the means of 
an ethic of responsibility. 
In conclusion, it could be derived that there is in Levinas no casuistry or sys-
tem of ethical rules because of the fact that he shares Weber’s conviction that 
there is no universal rationality that would allow for programming action 
towards the good, and it might be for this reason that he leaves or abandons 
the question concerning the calculation of the consequences of action to each 
particular ethical agent in every particular situation. Levinas implicitly places 
all of his hope on the spontaneous, unschooled capacity of every ethical 
agent to obey the imperative from the other and to measure his or her at-
tempts to realise that obedience in sophisticated ways. 
That this is a philosophical stance of radical responsibility, cannot be 
questioned. It deals with a radical plurality of values and doesn’t count on 
the rationality of reality for help; it is backed up by no history of philosophy 
that would guarantee the ultimate success of ethical conduct. But the political 
responsibility, the real quest for just action, is constantly held hostage or ter-
rorised by the mercilessly infinite and unconditional imperative of the others. 
The gains of this exploration of Levinas through the lens of Weber’s 
notion of political responsibility can be summarised in two essential 
points: first, it magnifies the political implications of Levinas’ theory of 
responsibility, the contours thereof are mapped more sharply and the po-
tential and limits thereof are thus clearer; second, by indicating the numer-
ous correspondences on essential points between a consequent Levinasian 
political practice of responsibility and the Weberian politician’s responsi-
bility, the way has been opened up to gain more for a reflection on responsi-
bility after Levinas from the tradition of thought on Weber’s notion of re-
sponsibility. The work of two representatives of the critical appropriation of 
Weber – Apel and Ricoeur – will be at the centre of the next two Chapters. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Towards a post-Levinasian  
understanding of responsibility:  
the Weberian contribution of Apel 
 
 
 
I have argued that there is a significant similarity between Weber and Levinas 
in their reflection on responsibility. Particularly, Weber’s distinction between 
an ethic of principle and an ethic of responsibility highlighted and clarified the 
implications of Levinas’ notion of responsibility, especially its implications 
on the political plane. There is a further advantage of this comparison, and of 
the correspondences that have been indicated, namely that it helps us to better 
situate Levinas within a spectrum of ethico-political issues. When the debates 
concerning Weber’s position and possible responses to them – in other words, 
the broad tradition of reflection on responsibility in the wake of Weber – are 
considered, it could suggest ideas for further reflection on Levinas and thus 
enrich the resources available for his project on responsibility and justice, al-
beit in the form of a post-Levinasian theory of political responsibility. In this 
short Chapter, such inspiration will be drawn from the work of Karl-Otto 
Apel. Since one could consider this choice of interlocutor as unexpected, a 
number of remarks of justification and orientation are in order.  
1 JUSTIFICATION: APEL  
AND THE UNAVOIDABILITY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In order to engage with a (non exhaustive) series of these thorny political is-
sues in connection with Weber’s notion of responsibility, I draw from the later 
work of Karl-Otto Apel. This does not mean that I consider him the ultimate 
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authority on Weber, nor does it imply that I shall advocate his discourse eth-
ics. Rather, Apel is interesting for the current project because of the fact that 
he, coming from his particular Kantian perspective – a perspective that he 
himself described in his later work as a species of ethic of principle (Gesin-
nungsethik) – explicitly attempts to reflect on the shortcomings of his own 
principled ethical perspective under stimulation of Weber’s notion of the ethic 
of responsibility. Apel is further also important for the current project because 
since his transformation of metaphysical philosophical approaches to ethics 
he has attempted to displace the monological approach of the solitary ethical 
subject with the collective ethical effort – which is exactly one of the deficien-
cies that I have indicated in Levinas. In the development of his own ethics of 
responsibility, Apel showed great sensitivity for the means required for ethical 
action and for the fact that these means should in our era be reflected upon in a 
global perspective – hence contributing to another deficiency indicated in 
Levinas. Finally, he seems suitable to use as thought partner for Levinas in 
reflecting on the Weberian issue of context and means-specific consequences 
of ethical conduct, exactly because he shares with Levinas (whatever the dif-
ferences between them might be1) the desire to anchor ethics in a context-
independent and universally valid justification.  
What does Apel teach us when he situates himself in Diskurs und 
Verantwortung (Discourse and responsibility) explicitly in relation to 
Weber?2 In this re-interpreting and critical appropriation of Weber’s no-
tion of responsibility, of which I have shown the correspondences with 
Levinas’, what hints can we get for the direction in which we can think 
with Levinas against Levinas? 
In order to exploit this appropriation of Weber by Apel for our consid-
erations of Levinas, a few remarks have to be made to situate this develop-
ment in Apel’s thought. Why would a philosopher that – at least in his own 
estimation – disposes of an ultimate philosophical foundation (a Letzt-
begründung) for ethics, give himself anew over to the task of a fundamental 
                                           
1 The comparison of Levinas and Apel has thus far not drawn much attention from 
the scholarly community. However see Michael Barber, “The vulnerability of rea-
son: the philosophical foundations of Emmanuel Levinas and K.O. Apel”, in The 
prism of the self: philosophical essays in honor of Maurice Natanson. Steven G. 
Crowell (ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 93–106. Barber 
has subsequently attempted to deploy his coordination of Levinas and Apel for an 
ethical reflection on affirmative action in Equality and Diversity: Phenomenologi-
cal Investigations of Prejudice and Discrimination. Amherst, New York: Human-
ity Books, 2001 (see Chapters 5–8). Noteworthy is also the last section of Sophie 
Loidolt’s Anspruch und Rechtfertigung: eine Theorie des rechtlichen Denkens im 
Anschluss an die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. 
2  It should at least be noted that there is in this book no reference to Levinas. 
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conception of ethics? It is because Apel’s Diskurs und Verantwortung is 
written in response to his realisation of a shortcoming in his established dis-
course or communicative ethics (Diskursethik), namely when it is confronted 
with the question of practical application. The problem is, according to Apel, 
in a profound manner part of the transcendental pragmatic ultimate founda-
tion (transzendentalpragmatische Letztbegründung) of ethics and the dis-
course ethics that flows from it. Put quite simply, the transcendental prag-
matic foundation of communicative ethics relies (for internal reasons that 
need not be discussed here) on a counter-factual anticipation of an ideal 
communicative community (kontrafaktische Antizipation einer idealen 
Kommunikationsgemeinschaft),3 but this a priori differs in an essential and 
practically irresolvable manner (prinzipiellen, faktisch nie völlig aufhebbaren 
Differenz)4 from the actual communicative community and its historically 
constituted morality. Now, whereas the detail of this project is not of concern 
here, it is important to note that Diskurs und Verantwortung is presented ex-
plicitly as one of two strands by which Apel considered it important to de-
velop his initial project of re-conceiving philosophical ethics – and consists 
of reflection on the conditions for the application or gradual realisation of the 
ideal communicative community in a lifeworld that consists of different real 
communicative communities.5 Without regard for the time that separates the 
current historical communicative communities and the (never fully attain-
able) ideal communicative community, the consequences and side effects of 
the application of the communicative ethics in the present, would render this 
ethics irresponsible. This problem is seen by Apel as more than merely that 
of the application of general principles to particular situations; rather, be-
cause of the radical historical constitution of the difference between the ideal 
and real communicative communities, the very reasonability with which it 
could be expected of people to adhere to discourse ethics is destabilised. This 
could be illustrated with an example.  
“How should one act at the same time in terms of a universalistic moral principle 
of reciprocity and responsibly, in a lifeworld in which something like legal safety 
– that is, above all protection against violence, but also corruption-free applica-
tion of laws – in the State, let alone in international relations, cannot even be 
guaranteed without exception?”6 
                                           
3 DV 9. 
4 DV 9. 
5 Cf. DV 8. 
6 DV 242, see DV 139 for a different example. It should be noted that this example 
immediately places the question of the global dimensions of responsibility in the 
centre of reflection, since it poses the question concerning the ways in which mar-
ginalised regions and groups are interconnected with the rest of the world. 
208 | POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD 
 
A second type of reflection on ethics (called Begründungsteil B) is thus 
required to cope with the historically situated application of communicative 
ethics7 since this dilemma cannot simply be addressed from and by means 
of the transcendental pragmatic ultimate foundation of ethics, or as Apel 
recognises,  
“a morally sensible new beginning in the sense of the perfectly understandable 
demand, for example, for the settlement of all conflicts of interest by ‘practical 
discourses’ [is] in principle impossible.”8 
At this crucial point, Apel himself presents this challenge to his work in 
Weberian terms, and this is where Apel becomes interesting for our pur-
poses.9 Without a further reflection on the historically contingent application 
of discourse ethics, the latter will merely lead to irresponsibility:  
“it should be clear that the unconditional compliance with the ideal principle of a 
communicative ethics – ‘act in such a way, as if you were a member of an ideal 
community of communication!’ – just as the unconditional compliance with 
Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ would come to a principled ethical [gesin-
nungsethische] maxim, which would ‘leave the responsibility to God’.”10 
In order to avoid this, Apel then takes up the challenges in Diskurs und 
Verantwortung of conceiving the  
“historically related application of the communicative ethics as ethics of respon-
sibility”.11  
Even if we were to have an ultimate foundation for ethics, it would then be 
either impotent, or potentially harmful – in any case, irresponsible – to deploy 
it without consideration for the historical context of action. Or more generally 
still, the ethical meaning of action cannot be thought of merely in context-
independent terms. And this is exactly the problem that I have pointed out in 
Levinas (however much his ethics may be different from that of Apel): he 
seems to have believed that the a priori validity of the ethical affectedness by 
the other would suffice to express (as good as is humanly possible) the inter-
ests of the others. I have argued that this is not necessarily the case. Conse-
                                           
7 DV 11. 
8 DV 10. 
9 One could also trace the essential development of Apel’s appropriation of Weber 
in his interview with Michelini in “Ética del discurso y globalización. La ética an-
te las coerciones fácticas e institutionales de la politica, el derecho y la economía”, 
in Erasmus, revista para el diálogo intercultural 2/2, 2000, pp. 99–119, see espe-
cially p. 100. 
10 DV 10, my emphasis, the last phrase quoted is from Weber’s PaB. 
11 DV 10. 
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quently, I could re-formulate my own project in Apelian terms as the quest for 
a historically situated realisation of the ethicity of the plurality of contradicting 
others as ethics of responsibility or as political responsibility. 
2 FROM A WEBERIAN APEL  
TO A WEBERIAN LEVINAS 
If we then consider what Apel judged the strong and weak points of Weber’s 
theory of responsibility, it would help us to clarify the challenges faced by 
Levinas’ (largely) similar theory of responsibility.  
The first major contribution of a historically situated notion of respon-
sibility is that it takes the question of strategy for ethical thought seriously. 
The fact that an ethics of responsibility would be sensitive to the historical 
circumstances and means in and by which actions are to be accomplished 
– the blindness of a principled ethical approach in this regard may do more 
harm than good – implies that ethics necessarily has to think strategically.12 
Although the question of strategy is not developed by Levinas, the path from 
the Saying to the Said and the concomitant insistence on calculation doesn’t 
exclude it.13 However, it should be evident that a true Levinasian would al-
ways submit a previously adopted strategy to scrutiny under the inspiration 
of the ethical appeals of the others. One could certainly not find fault with 
this – as long as one thinks in a context-independent manner about it. But 
as soon as one thinks about strategy in a strategic manner, it becomes clear 
that whoever continues to constantly revise an adopted strategy will un-
dermine that strategy and will be an unreliable ally in the “resistance 
against evil”. Or if the question of the efficiency with which one opposed 
injustice or served the interests of the others is taken seriously – as it 
should be in calculations about justice – the strategies for the efficient pur-
suit of justice will necessarily require trade-offs between the appeals of the 
different others – trade-offs of which Levinas is not able to draw the limits 
or provide a frame for their ethical reflection. Thus Apel’s identification of 
the issue of strategy supplements our considerations about collaboration 
and co-responsibility in Chapter 7 (§2.2). Strategy cannot be given serious 
thought without taking the other as ethico-political agent seriously and 
thus strategy and co-responsibility imply each other. 
                                           
12 Cf. DV 62. 
13 See Chapter 7, § 2.2. 
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Second, instead of storming into every situation armed with the good 
will of an ethic of principle in the belief that this will suffice to actualise 
the integrity of morality in that context, the adherent of an ethics of re-
sponsibility à la Apel  
“supposes on the contrary, that he/she has to take up the historically given condi-
tions of calculable success for action”  
since the  
“problem raised hereby encounters its material manifestation, not under the opti-
mal conditions of the evolution of the moral consciousness […], but under condi-
tions under which moral conduct can often appear as unreasonable to demand 
[unzumutbar].”14  
The reason why, according to Apel, adherents of an ethic of principle find 
this conclusion difficult to make is because in human history the ethic of 
principle was the way in which the obligations valid for the intimate circles 
of orientation (family and neighbourhood) have been generalised and even 
cosmopolicised.15 It should, however, be clear that these principles of in-
timate relationships cannot simply be applied to modern ethical problems 
involving either large groups (e.g., classes of society), or modern technical 
means,16 or non-human victims (e.g., the ecosystem).17 Therefore,  
“[w]hat would be called for in the present crisis of the technico-scientific civilisa-
tion on a planetary scale, is […] something like an ethics of common responsibil-
ity of solidarity for humanity in the sense of a communicative negotiation of in-
terests and advice on situations [eine Ethik der gemeinsamen solidarischen 
Verantwortung der Menschheit im Sinne einer kommunikativen Interessenver-
mittlung und Situationsberatung].”18 
Although I shall not follow Apel in the way he responds to this chal-
lenge, I fully subscribe to this estimation of what our times require (as 
explained above). Apel’s appropriation of Weber’s notion of responsibil-
ity also challenges Levinas: reflection on ethics cannot circumvent the 
question of the context of ethical action since this is part of the very 
meaning of the ethical (which Levinas never recognised or conceded) 
and this would hold even if Levinas’ idea about the ethical meaning of 
the face of the other is accepted as it is. Consequently, it is impossible to 
take the manner in which the context-specifics of ethical action contrib-
                                           
14 DV 242. 
15 DV 23. 
16  Apel clearly draws on Jonas here. 
17 Cf. DV 23. 
18 DV 23–24. 
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ute to the constitution of the meaning of the ethical seriously without 
reflection on the nature of the means by which ethical agents act. This 
involves, of course, the entire spectrum of technical and institutional 
means from the smallest to those that constitute the global dimension of 
human existence.19 This also means that we have to reflect on our con-
temporary situation that differs greatly from the situation known to and 
described by Weber. Furthermore, the context-specifics, the technical 
means and the scale of responsibility, necessarily entail re-affirming the 
bearing of co-responsibility on responsibility (see previous point). 
But, third, Apel makes his approach to Weber very cautiously. When 
he criticises Weber’s notion of responsibility, it has almost always to do 
with the manner in which it is demarcated from the ethic of principle, and 
the socio-historical implications of this distinction. After all, Apel doesn’t 
abolish his a priori (deontological) ethics. An ideal politician needs both a 
true consciousness of responsibility and a fundamental ethical orientation 
for political decision-making.20 Exactly this ethical orientation is absent 
from Weber, or rather, pushed back to a domain outside of public debate 
and scrutiny – a fact that is implicitly recognised by Weber in his schema-
tisation of ethical orientations as either an ethic of principle or an ethic of 
responsibility (according to Apel’s reading). In this, Weber would be a 
typical representative of what is, according to Apel, the major ailment of 
Western normative thought, namely the  
“dualism, or to be precise, the complementarity of value-neutral rationality and 
the irrational choice of ultimate axioms of judgement”.21  
Apel explains that Weber is one of the “co-founders of that system of 
complementarity of the Western ideology [Komplementaritätssystems 
der westlichen Ideologie]” according to which  
“the praxis in the public domain of life – in the spheres of politics, law and science – 
has to be regulated exclusively from the value-neutral rationality of science and 
technology, and thus the guidelines for goals and judgement have to derive from 
agreements in the sense of democratic majority decisions. In contrast, morality – 
just as religion – has to be exclusively a private matter.”22  
                                           
19 Here the concern for the largest, global range of reflection on political responsibil-
ity – expressed especially in Chapter 3 – and that of the inevitable reflection on the 
means of responsible political action – introduced especially in Chapter 6 – are 
thus re-introduced from another angle. 
20 Cf. DV 39–40. 
21 DV 56. 
22 DV 56–57. 
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Hence Apel’s characterisation of public or political decision-making in the 
frame of Weber’s thought on responsibility as irrational.23 This inherent irra-
tionalism of political responsibility would then be at the origin of the tradi-
tion of criticism against what is considered to be Weber’s decisionism.  
This criticism of Apel’s is aimed at a Weberian responsibility as prac-
tised under normal circumstances and that entails isolated political deci-
sion-making in the face of the particular needs of a situation. However, 
even though the entire thrust of Apel’s ethico-political reflection is aimed 
at “saving” politics from this “irrationalism”, he doesn’t deny that in extreme 
cases or borderline situations (Grenzsituationen) one could still be forced 
to that kind of decision. But as far as Apel is concerned, this is only a valid 
manner of responding to highly exceptional circumstances.24 This important 
concession to what he considers to be irrationality is given a very specific 
place within his description of the requirements for a new theory of re-
sponsibility, the thrust of which I have fully supported – I cite the same 
passage, this time fully:  
“However, what would be called for in the present crisis of the technico-scientific 
civilisation on a planetary scale, is much more than an ethics of existential border-
line situations – an ethics that could even possibly [womöglich] depend on irrational 
final decisions. What is called for is something like an ethics of common responsi-
bility of solidarity for humanity in the sense of a communicative negotiation of in-
terests and advice on situations.”25  
Apel thus acknowledges for all his transcendental pragmatic foundation of 
discourse ethics, some form of ethics that would be more than, but not 
excluding,26 an ethics of existential extreme situations, which can arrive at 
responses to those exceptional situations, only by means of ultimately non 
                                           
23 Cf. DV 40. 
24 In the current study, I shall not enter into the detail of the thorny issue of exception 
in its relation to the debates concerning decisionism. My reader will not be sur-
prised to hear that I find a certain form of decisionism – a decisionism of applica-
tion, but not a decisionism of foundation – one of the possible manifestation of 
Levinas’ ethics (for the distinction see Eckard Bolsinger “Was ist Dezisionismus? 
Rekonstruktion eines autonomen Typs politischer Theorie”, in Politische Viertel-
jahresschrift 39/3, 1998, pp. 471–502, here p. 472). I have indicated one way in 
which to consider Levinas’ ethics in relation to Schmitt’s thought on political the-
ology and sovereignty in “The State and politics in a post-colonial, global order. 
Reconstruction and criticism of a Levinasian perspective”, in SA Publiekreg / SA 
Public Law 24/2, 2009, pp. 352–369, here § 5. 
25 DV 23–24, I emphasise “even possibly”. 
26 Apel says explicitly of this kind of situational ethics that it “doesn’t meet the re-
quirements of the moment”, but adds: “although it is by no means obsolete, as the 
borderline situations of solitary decision definitely exist (situations in which eve-
ryone has to choose his/her gods, as M. Weber said […])” (DV 23). 
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reason-bound decisions – i.e., under these circumstances a Weberian re-
sponsibility without any recourse to a deontological ethics or to an ethic of 
principle would be in order. Under such circumstances, the enormity of the 
context overrides the authority of the principles and the responsibility has 
to be elevated to a principle.27 Such situations cannot be avoided, but the 
dilemma that they bring to light should not be generalised either, according 
to Apel. Now, this poses a challenge to my criticism of Levinas’ politics, 
since (as shown in my commentary on the fatal “for instance” from the 
Kearney interview in Chapter 6, § 2.2.) “sometimes” a Levinasian politics 
can find recourse to very extreme means and might (as I have shown 
above in comparing his responsibility to Weber’s ethic of principle) even 
develop into an eschatological violence. And here, in the current discussion 
of Apel’s appropriation of Weber, Levinas seems to have found an un-
expected ally: from one of the most serious representatives of a contem-
porary re-actualisation of deontological ethics, comes the recognition of 
exceptional states in which a priori, universal principles have to cede to 
considerations of the circumstances and a communicative ethics makes 
way for an ethics of extreme situations.  
3 FOUR OBJECTIVES FOR A THEORY  
OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A number of important impetuses for further reflection concerning the de-
ployment of a Levinasian responsibility, and responsibility in general, in 
its political dimension could be derived from Apel’s project, as it has been 
shown to fit with Levinas and Weber at the same time. Apel’s appropriation 
of Weber’s ethics of responsibility, or rather, his recognition that there is 
something indispensable in a consequentialist responsibility to complete 
his principled ethical re-appropriation of a Kantian deontology could show 
what the challenges are that one faces when reflecting “after Levinas” on 
political responsibility in a globalised world. Both the positive elements of 
Apel’s evaluation of Weber’s ethics of responsibility and the negative 
criticism thereof, present us with important categories for asking what a 
theory of responsibility should be able to do and what it should look like. I 
have argued above (Chapters 6 and 7) that Levinas cannot but recognise 
                                           
27 As I have explained above, and as explained by Apel with reference to Weber’s 
remark about the connection between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of 
principle (in “Ética del discurso y globalización.” op. cit. p. 101.) 
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that the consequences of ethical conduct have ethical meaning, namely 
that considerations regarding the consequences belong to the essence of 
the moment of decision making in the face of the plurality of others. Practi-
cally all of the traits that Levinas’ theory of responsibility shares with that 
of Weber follow from this finding. Now, just as I have magnified the 
implications of Levinas’ notion of responsibility for the domain of the 
political by looking at it through the lens of Weber, we can now amplify a 
number of requirements for re-conceiving responsibility after Levinas, by 
looking at it through the lens of Apel. 
First, if the consequences of ethical action participate in the very 
meaning of the ethical, then it is impossible to avoid thinking about eth-
ics not exclusively in terms of the meaning of the face of the other (or in 
terms of transcendental pragmatics, in the case of Apel), but also to think 
strategically. All of this seems to me in line with Levinas’ recognition 
that, in the face of the plurality of others, one should compare the in-
comparable and act accordingly. Not thinking strategically would 
amount to clinging in a principled ethical manner to a cosmic-ethical 
realism that has centuries ago already been problematised convincingly 
by the world religions.28 In other words, since there is in Levinas no such 
necessary correlation between action that is done in response to the appeal 
of the others and the beneficial outcomes of those responses, the subject 
has to think strategically. Strategic thinking necessarily means not obeying 
all of the others completely, but having to prioritise and ultimately to 
make sacrifices in the name of the maximisation of justice. 
Second, if an ethics of responsibility is then an ethics of consequences and 
therefore of strategy, then Weber’s description of responsibility is too simple. 
Or more precisely, whereas Weber devotes a lot of attention to describing at 
least the contemporary social conditions under which one will have to take up 
responsibility if one has the vocation for politics, his Politics as a vocation is 
insufficient to unpack the different forms of responsibility that one could as-
sume or be made to take up in different spheres of social and political reality. 
Reflection on these different forms and dimensions of responsibility29 is, 
                                           
28 Cf. PaV 123 / PaB 444. 
29 By “forms and dimensions of responsibility” I shall henceforth refer to the typical 
distinguishable configurations through which responsibility is socially integrated. 
These types might be more or less stable roles and more or less distinguishable, 
depending on historical circumstances; the forms and dimensions also involve the 
roles and competences of the subject of responsibility in society, which in turn 
impacts on the sphere of influence, the circle of people, things and events that are 
influenced, the scales of competence, the nature of activities, relationships be-
tween people, etc. Usually the forms and dimensions of responsibility refer to the 
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however, indispensable for a general theory of responsibility – of which Levi-
nas aspired at least to uncover the justification (and even if this general theory 
implies a generalisation of the political to the entire social reality30). Taking 
the forms and dimensions of responsibility seriously, means thus to engage 
with the inevitable strategic nature of responsibility and the embeddedness 
thereof in a historical context and a network of possible means, and can there-
fore not simply be assimilated to an enthusiasm for technocratic solutions (see 
also point three, below). Whoever has to think strategically about responsibil-
ity, necessarily has to think of the different conditions under which one has to 
be responsible and the forms of responsibility that one should carry. Even if, 
from a Levinasian point of view, all such roles remain forever open to critical 
intervention from the side of ethics, from whence they would always seem 
like a limitation of infinite responsibility and an alibi to shake off or shift over 
                                           
distinguishable aspects of temporality (prospective, retrospective), subjectivity 
(individual- or co-responsibility), conditionality (formal, informal, legal, contrac-
tual), modality (responsibility for action, for failing to act or preventing someone 
from acting), and so forth. The point here is not to work out these forms and di-
mensions, but to integrate thought on them in a project of reflection on responsi-
bility in its political nature after Levinas. Expositions regarding the forms and di-
mensions of responsibility can be found in most introductions to the philosophy of 
responsibility; see particularly Hans Lenk’s detailed presentation “Typen und Di-
mensionen der Verantwortlichkeit”, in Konkrete Humanität. Vorlesungen über 
Verantwortung und Menschlichkeit, op. cit. pp. 261–284. 
 It would be misguided to reduce the formal aspect of responsibility to that of the 
contractual obligations of the stereotypical bureaucrat (as is all too often done). 
The person that is unexpectedly confronted with someone in need and the libera-
tion fighter can equally be shown to be informed by certain pre-existing forms of 
responsibility as they play out their responsibility outside of an institutional 
framework and it would not be correct to consider their attempts at responsible ac-
tion (supererogatory or transgressing) as simply formless. What is at issue in the 
discussion of forms of responsibility is not to predetermine responsible action in-
dependently of the situation of action (it cannot be done), nor to eliminate conflict 
between the multiple roles that every person holds (it cannot be done) – the issue 
is that responsibility action cannot exist without it.  
 I am not ignorant of the fact that such considerations about the forms and dimen-
sions of responsibility would, in Levinas’ mind, largely be considered derivatives 
of originary responsibility and for this reason not only secondary, but also mere 
translations and therefore already treasons against originary responsibility. My 
point is that even if this is accepted, the practical execution (translation) of origi-
nary responsibility on the level of politics (that is, in principle, all action) partici-
pates in the meaning of the originary imperative and that one therefore must con-
sider the whole when reflecting on political responsibility. 
30 Let it be repeated here that I share, with Levinas, Ricoeur’s conviction that the 
political is not merely one amongst different spheres of social life, but a unifying 
aspect of them. However, this does not mean that the entire social existence could 
be reduced to or exhaustively explained in political terms. 
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responsibility, these roles of responsibility should be considered indispensa-
ble in the execution of responsibility, also in the execution of a truly Levina-
sian responsibility. The person that exposes or denounces all the sacrifices 
made in respect to the legitimate appeals of the others and all the limitations or 
compromises made to infinite responsibility by remaining true to the rules of 
specific roles of responsibility, might well be ethically in the right, but also 
risks undermining the strategy necessary for effective service to the others. 
Furthermore, such reflection on the strategy, conditions and roles of responsi-
bility would necessarily entail reflection on co-responsibility31 – a notion that 
is completely absent from Levinas, since if nobody can respond in my place to 
the appeals of the others, the sharing of responsibility could, at best, be a sec-
ondary derivative of my own responsibility, at worst, another alibi to shirk my 
duty towards the others. The consequence of my arguments concerning pos-
sible fanaticism derived from a Levinasian ethics (Chapter 6, § 2.2.) should 
show that a defect in reflecting on co-responsibility thoroughly could equally 
do violence to the interest of the others. Furthermore, it seems to me under the 
current conditions of the disenchanted polytheistic world impossible to con-
ceive of co-responsibility between different ethical agents – for a context that 
demands strategic thinking, acting and sacrifice – without negotiation be-
tween the relevant partners concerning strategy and sacrifice, in fact concern-
ing everything entailed in ethical conduct. Negotiation between ethical part-
ners would not have a foundational pretence here, but it does seem an indis-
pensable component in the execution of ethical conduct – at least when ethics 
in a context larger than just the very narrowest of interpersonal relations is 
concerned. That such negotiation could take different forms conjugating dif-
ferent degrees of participation, engagement, consultation with specialists, 
concessions, reason and pressure seems undeniable. However it does seem 
that there are limits to such negotiations that could not be transgressed without 
putting the collaborative ethical endeavour at risk.32 
                                           
31 It is probably more prudent to understand co-responsibility (Mitverantwortung) as 
“shared responsibility”, rather than “collective responsibility”, as distinguished by 
Iris Young (in “Responsibility, Social connection, and Global labor justice”, in 
Global challenges. War, self-determination, and responsibility for justice. Cam-
bridge and Malden: Polity, 2007, pp. 159–186). She defines shared responsibility 
as “a personal responsibility for outcomes or the risks of harmful outcomes, pro-
duced by a group of persons. Each is personally responsible for outcomes in a par-
tial way, since he or she alone does not produce the outcomes; the specific part 
that each plays in producing the outcome cannot be isolated and identified, how-
ever, and thus the responsibility is essentially shared.” (p. 179). 
32 The passage from Levinas to different forms of dialogical or discourse ethics is 
opened in this way and will have to be elaborated on in future reflection. 
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Third, if the consequences, strategy and roles of responsibility are 
essential elements of an ethics of responsibility, then the socio-historical 
and cultural context of the ethical decision making becomes extremely 
important, since consequences, strategy and roles are all equally consti-
tuted by historically contingent processes. Consequently, this means that 
responsibility cannot be contemplated without considerations to the his-
torically contingent means by which that responsibility is to be realised; 
strategy and roles are determined by the means that are available for re-
sponsible action and reflection on consequences is necessarily reflection 
on means. Therefore means – whether conceived in terms of technology, 
systems or institutions – are a constituting factor of responsibility. Fur-
thermore, in the era in which we live, the global extent and influence of 
means of action as well as of the context of action, should be considered 
the ultimate horizon, as Apel correctly pointed out and as I have shown 
the implications of Levinas’ reflections on totalitarianism and the post-
colonial order to be.33 Also, the question of the means at one’s disposal 
for action, would necessarily lead to considerations concerning the sus-
tainability of their use and thus about ecology.34 At the same time, none 
of these reflections about means and the consequences of their use could 
be imagined without the recourse to expertise. These include not only 
the sciences and law (including the law-enforcement systems), but also 
insight into the nature of action, means and consequences so as to avoid 
the moralism engendered by context-ignorance.35 
                                           
33 See Chapter 3. This is also an essential aspect of Bernasconi’s conclusion con-
cerning the re-conception of ethics for the current globalised world: “If globalisa-
tion means to live in a world in which the notions far and near, foreigner and 
neighbour, do not have the same meaning for us as before, since they can be seen 
to belong to the same sphere, then the hunger of those that are pushed to the re-
motest periphery, represent the fundamental point of reference” in “Globalis-
ierung und Hunger”, in Im Angesicht der Anderen. Levinas’ Philosophie des Poli-
tischen. Pascal Delhom and Alfred Hirsch (eds.). Zürich and Berlin: Diaphanes, 
2005, pp. 115–129, citation p. 125. 
34 I state this as a very minimum entrance to the question of an ethics of ecology. 
Other, non-anthropocentric approaches would of course award a much more 
prominent place to the responsibility to non-human forms of existence. Although I 
do not ignore the importance of these kinds of considerations, they are not my 
concern here. 
35 That this introduces at the same time the risks involved in technocracy and exper-
tocracy has been forcefully argued by such authors as Habermas and Slama. But 
my point is that responsibility asks for engagement with these problems. Similarly 
an engagement with the complexities of agency (as in the thought of Ricoeur, 
which will be focused on in the next Chapter) should enforce one’s vigilance 
against moralism. 
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Fourth, (linking with the first point) the fact of being responsible for dif-
ferent others at the same time necessitates strategic thinking about ethical ac-
tion and hence about sacrifice. One cannot merely do the right thing – one has 
to decide what the best course of action is. One has to weigh, or as Levinas 
says, compare the incomparable. But this means that, in certain historical cir-
cumstances, ethical agents might consider radical means of answering the 
appeal of the others to be the appropriate thing to do – they might consider the 
appeal of the others, as they hear it, to override the institutionalised organisa-
tion of matters as it is in place in their field of action. They would, in other 
words, feel themselves ethically obliged to obey the appeal of the others, 
rather than the laws or rules in force – not, perhaps, out of a lack of respect for 
the law, but out of a conviction that the urgency of the appeal of the other re-
quires an exception. Responsibility is an ethics of uncertainty; as an ethics of 
consequences it keeps itself open to unforeseen or unforeseeable realisations 
of itself, even if it is driven by context-independent imperatives. In fact, re-
sponsibility is an ethics of equity, in the sense that it always has to consider the 
possible conflict between the “letter” and the “spirit” of its obligation. As 
shown in Apel’s concession, it is not possible to avoid limit situations, and 
under these extreme situations the normal response makes way for excep-
tional responses. This could entail abandoning one’s reflection on the circum-
stances and simply executing the rule; it could equally be to follow one’s in-
terpretation of the circumstances to the detriment of the rule. But one thing is 
clear – one has to decide: not only on what one is going to do, but on whether 
and to what degree the context of action constitutes an exception. The pair 
decision-exception thus makes an integral part of a proper theory of responsi-
bility. And it makes a significant difference if one reflects on responsibility by 
starting from the question of the exception, or if one interprets the exception as 
the last outgrowth of the common everyday practice of responsibility. Ulti-
mately, reflection on the exception joins a meditation on evil.36 
In these four points I hope to capture the task of a theory of responsibility 
“after Levinas”. The requirements for such a theory of responsibility might 
not be entirely new – my use of Weber and Apel to make this point should 
be ample recognition of this fact.37 However, what is new, as far as I can 
                                           
36 Of which I find Levinas’ presentation very unsatisfactory – cf. De l’éthique à la 
justice 60ff. A much more convincing reflection on evil (in which a chapter is also 
devoted to Levinas) is Richard Bernstein’s Radical evil. A philosophical interro-
gation. Cambridge: Polity, 2002.  
37 From the vast literature on politics and responsibility, the following deserve to be 
singled out: Kurt Bayerz (ed.), Verantwortung: Prinzip oder Problem?. Darm-
stadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995 and Ludger Heidbrink and Alfred 
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see, is the double claim that (1) all of these are necessary consequences of 
reflecting on the implications of Levinas’ responsibility as it takes effect 
on the level of the political and (2) that they are not secondary derivatives 
of the primary meaning of ethics, but part of the very meaning of ethics, if 
one thinks the implications of a Levinasian responsibility through. Yet, 
most of this is largely, if not completely, absent from his thought. 
These requirements, this task, are what our study of Levinas leaves 
us with. It would simply be foolhardy to attempt to work that out in the 
current context. Instead, these four requirements will be developed in 
Chapter 9 with the help of our last interlocutor, Paul Ricoeur. 
                                           
Hirsch (eds.). Staat ohne Verantwortung? Zum Wandel der Aufgaben von Staat 
und Politik. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2007. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 9 
Ricoeur’s contribution  
to a notion of political responsibility  
for a globalised world 
 
 
 
Having in the two previous Chapters first sharpened the contours of the im-
plications of Levinas’ notion of responsibility and its political deployment 
and then outlined the four basic tasks for the further elaboration of a general 
theory of political responsibility in Levinas’ wake, it is important in a third 
movement to consider the possible implications of such a fourfold progres-
sion in the reflection on post-Levinasian responsibility. The interlocutor 
chosen to aid me in magnifying the implications of the task of further devel-
oping the notion of political responsibility is Paul Ricoeur. He is used here 
not in order to hold him up as the bearer of the ultimate solution to this task – 
not least because the theme of responsibility is left in a somewhat undecided 
state in his work. Rather, the complex manner in which he integrates aspects 
of both Weber and Levinas’ notions of responsibility makes him suitable to 
help explore the potential of the subsequent restructuring of Levinas’ respon-
sibility for our current purposes. The aim is thus not to present a comparison 
of Ricoeur and Levinas, but to inquire into the magnifying potential that we 
can obtain from Ricoeur’s ethico-political thought for our project of a politi-
cal responsibility for a globalised world. At the same time, this exercise 
would already suggest a number of ways by which my concerns, born of a 
critical examination of Levinas, can be pursued by different means. I shall 
therefore not attempt an exhaustive presentation of Ricoeur’s ethico-political 
thought, but only elaborate on possible contributions that his work could 
make to a fuller understanding of the requirements that crystallised from my 
Levinas-Weber-Apel reading. 
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If Ricoeur is well suited for this task, it is not only because of the inher-
ent merit of his work, but also because it is fairly natural to place him in the 
line of my Weberian exploration. Although it would obviously not be correct 
to reduce his political thought to his Weberian heritage, it can be argued that 
an examination of the way in which Ricoeur received Weber and the place 
accorded to that reception in his own thought, would give a valid and fruitful 
entry to Ricoeur’s ethico-political thought. Consequently, Ricoeur’s contri-
bution to the project of a post-Levinasian theory of political responsibility 
will have to start with a clarification of his orientation in political philosophy 
and his appropriation of Weber (§ 1). This can be done best through an ex-
amination of a selection of his texts from the late 1950s. However, the accent 
in this study is on Ricoeur’s “Little ethics” and the elaborations on it in the 
1990s (to which the discussion will go over in § 2). A brief overview of the 
“Little ethics” is needed to map the terrain in which the subsequent reflection 
on political responsibility will be placed (§ 3). Having thus prepared the ex-
ploration, Ricoeur’s contribution to the four requirements for a theory of po-
litical responsibility – as developed in Chapter 8 – will be proposed (§ 4). 
1 RICOEUR’S POLITICAL PARADOX  
AND APPROPRIATION OF WEBER 
It is well known that the essay “The political paradox” (1957) marks an 
important moment in the formation of Ricoeur’s political philosophy. 
While he wrote texts of political philosophy before that, and even texts 
in which themes from the 1957 essay were anticipated, Ricoeur himself 
explains retrospectively that 
“[i]t is true that my subsequent reflections in political philosophy have stemmed 
from this initial text.”1  
The figure of the political paradox is a recurrent theme that structures Ri-
coeur’s political thought over many decades, and it is clear that when in 
the late 1980s and 1990s he develops his “Little ethics” (petite éthique), he is 
still concerned with an examination and deepening of the idea of the political 
paradox.2  
The repeated use of the expression “the political paradox” might mis-
lead one to think that an unequivocal definition can be given for it. Yet, it 
                                           
1 C&C 95 / CC 147. 
2 Cf. RF 80. 
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would be more exact to refer to the expression “the political paradox” as a 
pattern of interpretation of which the interpretational potential is gradually 
discovered and explored, as Ricoeur develops his reflection on the political. 
A definition of “paradox” from one of Ricoeur’s later texts might be help-
ful to come to a first approximation of the figure of the political paradox. 
A paradox is  
“a situation in which two contrary theses equally oppose being refuted and, as a 
result, require being preserved or abandoned together”3  
and in contradistinction to an antinomy, where two theses do not belong to 
the same discursive universe, in the paradox they do. Of course, I do not 
maintain that this is the exact definition that Ricoeur had in mind when he 
drafted the 1957 essay, but rather that this definition suffices to clarify this 
dominant pattern of research in Ricoeur’s political philosophy. 
This research pattern, this situation of thought stuck between two op-
posing theses, concerns the specificity of the political or of political 
power.4 The difference and relation between the two theses could be profiled 
in a number of ways: the paradox concerns the political and politics, the 
form and force of politics,5 the power of willing to live together and the 
legitimate recourse to violence by the power of domination,6 the horizontal 
and the vertical political dimensions,7 the legislative and the executive 
powers,8 the rationality particular to the political and the foundational vio-
lence thereof,9 the encompassing nature of the political with respect to the 
different spheres of society and the encompassed nature of politics as one 
amongst the spheres of society (englobant – englobé).10 
In order to make my way towards a more detailed presentation of this 
paradox and to align this presentation with my general strategy for this Part 
of the book – namely to reflect on political responsibility with Max Weber’s 
essay on Politics as a vocation as stimulus – another important characteristic 
                                           
3 RTJ 19, 73 / JII 27, 86. 
4 C&C 96 / CC 148, 149. 
5 OAA 257 / SA 299. 
6 C&C 99 / CC 153. 
7 C&C 99 / CC 152. 
8 C&C 105 / CC 161. 
9 C&C 96, 98 / CC 149, 151. 
10 C&C 103, 104 / CC 159, 160. See also Bernard Dauenhauer’s recapitulation of 
the dimensions of the political paradox in Paul Ricoeur. The promise and the risk 
of politics. Lanham, et al.: Rowman and Littlefield publishers, 1998, pp. 211–212, 
which draws on Ricoeur’s “Fragilité et responsabilité”, in Eros and Eris. Contri-
butions to a hermeneutical phenomenology. Paul van Togeren et. al. (eds.). 
Dortrecht, et al.: Kluwer, 1992, pp. 295–304. 
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of its development by Ricoeur needs to be mentioned: next to a series of 
other authors, Weber is assigned an important role in the elaboration of the 
political paradox. The very first time that the notion of the political paradox 
appears (at the beginning of the essay “The political paradox”) it is presented 
in terms that could be said to reflect a Weberian agenda:  
“Techniques change, human relationships evolve depending upon things, and yet 
power unveils the same paradox, that of a twofold progress in rationality and in 
possibilities for perversion.”11  
Since Weber’s work on the Protestant work ethics, the adjective “Webe-
rian” may be applied to any idea of a history of increasing rationality 
and its dark flip side, emblematically referred to as the “iron cage”. Even 
if Weber is not referred to by name, and no facile identification of Ri-
coeurian and Weberian terms is intended, the resonance of the Weberian 
theme in Ricoeur is undeniable. Yet, the importance of Weber for Ri-
coeur’s political paradox is not so much in the development of the form 
of the paradox, than in the particular place designated for Weber in the 
paradox. Ricoeur repeatedly uses Weber’s definition of political power 
as the monopoly on the ultimate recourse to legitimate violence, as the 
precise formulation of the vertical power of politics, of the executive 
power of domination. Not only does this serve (in 1957) to explore the 
particular nature of political evil, but consequently, it serves implicitly to 
launch the question concerning the nature and constitution of legitimacy 
and the question concerning the limitation of that power. Let’s then see 
how Ricoeur presents his political thought in this key text. 
When we turn to “The political paradox”, it is clear that Ricoeur is con-
cerned with arguing for the irreducible particularity of political rationality 
and political harm or evil (mal). The paradox resides in the fact that these 
two particularities oppose each other, but can be reflected on only together:  
“This paradox must be retained: that the greatest evil adheres to the greatest rationality, 
that there is political alienation because the political is relatively autonomous.”12  
This paradox is theoretically indissoluble, but can be responded to by a 
practical solution. What then is the autonomous rationality of politics? 
What is the nature of the particular alienation or evil of politics? And 
how could this practical solution be clarified? 
The Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, taught us the meaning and sig-
nificance of the fact that human beings are essentially, and not accidentally, 
political beings. The rationality of the political is derived from this: a politi-
                                           
11 HT 248 / HV 295. 
12 HT 249 / HV 296, translation modified. 
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cal being, that strives to live well, aims at the good through life in the State. 
Political rationality is a teleological rationality that aims at “contributing to 
the humanity of people”,13 by living together in a State, as citizens, and by 
practising virtues of participation in power. One acquires these virtues by 
living in the State and they not only define the individual as citizen, but make 
the individual into a human being. The rules and means of other spheres of 
social interaction (e.g., economy) are deemed subservient to, or at least 
neatly distinct from, the teleology of politics.14 The tyrant is a secondary 
phenomenon of the political and can be understood and judged only in the 
light of the inherent rationality and autonomy of the political. 
Ricoeur finds a second essential component of the particularity of 
the political in Rousseau’s social contract:  
“The great, invincible idea of the Social Contract is that the body politic is born 
of a virtual act, of a consent which is not an historical event, but one which only 
comes out in reflection.”15  
Unlike the case with Hobbes’ notion thereof, this consent to the social con-
tract is not an exercise by which freedom is exchanged for security, but the 
entry of individuals into a civil existence by an act whereby all consent to the 
law16 and thus constitute – again, retrospectively and in reflection – the State, 
and through the State constitute the citizens as free and equal.17 Whatever the 
subsequent abuses of the law by powerful interest groups in the State may 
be, the contract is the truth of politics and the reality of the State.18 For Ri-
coeur, Rousseau essentially continues the teleology of Aristotle:  
“In the two cases, with the Telos of the State and the generating pact of the general 
will, it is a matter of manifesting the coincidence of an individual and passional will 
with the objective and political will, in short, of making man’s humanity pass 
through legality and civil restraint.”19  
Hegel’s notion of the State as reasonable organisation of individual free-
dom would be an extension of the same idea.20  
But even if this is so, the political (le politique) never appears in history 
detached from politics (la politique); the political may show itself retrospec-
tively in reflection as reasonable organisation, but politics has to cope with 
                                           
13 HT 250 / HV 297, translation modified. 
14 HT 265 / HV 315. 
15 HT 251 / HV 299. 
16 HT 252 / HV 299. 
17 HT 252 / HV 300. 
18 HT 252 / HV 300. 
19 HT 253 / HV 301. 
20 HT 254 / HV 302. 
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uncertainty and has to make decisions in anticipation of an uncertain future, 
moreover, it has to do so by using political power and the means particular to 
politics.21 These means are characterised by “the monopoly over legitimised 
physical constraint [le monopole de la contrainte physique légitimé]”.22 
Whereas this “legitimacy” refers the force of political power back to the end 
and form of the political, the relation between the monopoly on violence and 
its legitimacy differs in intensity from case to case. Politics, in contradistinc-
tion to the political,23 is defined by power and by the means of its exercise 
and it is here that the possibility of political evil takes root. This finding oc-
casions a new formulation of the political paradox: however the means, the 
power, of politics may be used, it remains the instrument of the “historical 
rationality of the State”,24 that is to say that the political, detached from the 
power of politics, remains powerless, without effect; yet, the quest for the 
good life through the State can be realised only by the means of the State that 
carry in themselves the potential of evil use of the monopoly on the use of 
violence. Or, formulated negatively, 
“on the one hand, the meaning of power resides in the desire of a plurality of 
people to live together; on the other hand, power dispossesses, nevertheless, all 
those that do not exercise power from the capacity to decide.”25  
The political can realise itself only through politics, yet politics has shown 
itself often to be an unreliable partner: the power and even violence that is 
needed to constitute the political can spend itself on the undermining of the 
political – this is the political paradox. At the same time, the denunciation 
                                           
21 HT 255 / HV 303. “From the political to politics [Du politique à la politique], we 
move from advent to events, from sovereignty to the sovereign, from the State to 
government, from historical Reason to Power.” (HT 255 / HV 303, translation 
modified). 
22 HT 255 / HV 303, translation modified; no explicit reference made to Weber by 
Ricoeur. 
23 Here Ricoeur refers explicitly to Politics as a vocation when he defines politics as 
“the sum total of activities which have for their object the exercise of power, 
therefore also the conquest and preservation of power. Step by step, politics will 
encompass every activity whose goal or effect will be to influence the division of 
power.” (HT 255 / HV 304). Cf. Also “The State is that reality that down to the 
present has always included murder as condition for its existence, its survival and 
first its institution.” (HV 288, my translation). 
 Note that here Ricoeur does not adopt the categorisation of Arendt where the po-
litical as the desire to live together is itself the source of political power and poli-
tics is defined in Weberian terms as the recourse to certain forms of the exercise of 
power (C&C 99 / CC 152f).  
24 HT 256 / HV 304. 
25  Marc Crépon, “Du ‘paradoxe politique’ à la question des appartenances”, in Paul 
Ricoeur (Cahiers de L’Herne), Myriam Revault d’Allonnes and François Azouvi 
(eds.). Paris: L’Herne, pp. 307–314, citation p. 309. 
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of political evil becomes unintelligible if the human quest for the good 
through political being is not presupposed in that critique. 
A long procession of political thinkers throughout human history may 
have denounced events in which the sovereign parades as sovereignty itself, 
but even so, a perfect harmony between the political and politics is unattain-
able.26 However, it would be too simple to merely classify political power as 
evil, because the means of political action belong radically to the human being 
as a political being. The evil of political power, is the evil of the human being 
as political being.27 Human beings can no more rid themselves of the di-
lemma of the use of political power, than from their essence as political be-
ings.28 Although Ricoeur doesn’t do so in this text, he subsequently regularly 
mentioned the fact, when referring to Weber’s presentation of politics and the 
unavoidable constitution of power by violent means, that Weber presented 
this picture of politics in an address made to naive pacifist students.29 Ricoeur 
too rejects this political naivety as can be derived from his insistence in the 
essay “The political paradox” on the fact that his exposition of the evil of poli-
tics is motivated by a quest for lucidity and an attempt to remain politically 
vigilant.30  
This lucidity and vigilance are of considerable importance in making 
the transition from the theoretical to a practical reflection on the political 
paradox, since whereas there is no theoretical (dis-)solution of the political 
paradox – the two theses can be maintained only together – there is a practi-
cal solution to it. This practical solution of the paradox consists of allowing 
the State enough power to do its beneficial work, but setting limits to that 
power, or practising an “ethic of limited violence [éthique de la violence 
limitée]”.31 In more concrete terms:  
“the great problem of democracy concerns the control of the State by the people”,  
which means  
“to devise institutional techniques especially designed to render possible the exer-
cise of power and render its abuse impossible.”32  
                                           
26 Cf. HT 259 / HV 308. 
27 HT 261 / HV 310. 
28 Cf. HT 261 / HV 311. 
29 E.g., LI 235. 
30 HT 261 / HV 310, 311, respectively. 
31 HT 262 / HV 312, my emphasis. This is a crucial expression, since it is in practi-
cally the same terms that Ricoeur, two years later, suggests the coordination of the 
ethic of principle and the ethic of responsibility be interpreted in Weber (see dis-
cussion below). It also corresponds with the terms in which the nature of the po-
litical paradox was posed in its first use (see above). 
32 HT 261f / HV 311 and see HT 264 / HV 314. 
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How then does Ricoeur see the question of a political ethics of limited vio-
lence – this thoroughly Weberian question of realism with regard to the 
means of politics? If the paradox of the political is a universal structure, in 
other words if it is independent of historical contingencies of particular po-
litical forms, then it follows that there would always be at least the possibility 
of institutional dispositions of the State that would surpass the interest of a 
power group within the State. One example is of particular importance here: 
the universal intention of liberal politics since the 18th century surpasses the 
contingent form of what socialists would call the bourgeois State.33 The 
“universal” aspects of liberalism would be: (1) the independence of judges 
with regard to the State, (2) the possibility of access for citizens to sources of 
information and science that are generated independently from the State, and 
this includes the freedom to form a public opinion, which in turn depends on 
the freedom of the press, (3) the settlement of differences in interests be-
tween the State and the work force, even if it means recourse to strikes, and 
(4) the control exercised by a democratically organised citizenry to negotiate 
the tension between long-term planning and continual discussion. Hence 
Ricoeur’s conclusion that if the term “liberalism” is to retain any credit it 
stands for a formulation of the political paradox from the perspective of 
liberty: 
“either that the State founds freedom by means of its rationality, or that freedom 
limits the passions of power through its resistance.”34  
The final considerations of Ricoeur’s exposition of the political paradox 
clearly battles with the question of the inevitable use of the violent means 
that define the State,35 and thus attempts to accompany reflectively the 
Weberian issue of a political ethic of responsibility. Although Ricoeur draws 
the terms describing this issue from Weber (amongst others) and Politics as 
a vocation in particular, in the essay on “The political paradox” he doesn’t 
make mention of the notion of an ethic of responsibility and thus the ques-
tion of how he would articulate the different concerns recorded by Weber in 
the opposition between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of principle 
remains in suspense.  
                                           
33 HT 267 / HV 317–318. 
34 HT 270 / HV 321. 
35 As he does in a text of the same year in “State and violence” (HT 234ff / HV 
287ff). Although Weber is never mentioned in this essay, he is even more present 
by implicit illusions to the most important aspects of his political thought. 
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GLOBALISED WORLD | 229 
 
For a response to this question one could perhaps turn to the curious little 
essay “Ethics and politics” (1959),36 written shortly after “The political para-
dox” as commentary on the then recently published French translation of 
Politik als Beruf.37 My choice of the word “curious” is deliberate. One could 
safely say that the six pages of simple exposition are successful as introduc-
tion to the paper of Weber, but that it is otherwise uneventful. One notes that 
the question of legitimate violence is central in this exposition, as it is in 
“The political paradox” and “State and violence” (also of 1957) and that this 
violence is the means of the State and its defining characteristic. That vio-
lence is organically fused with the political suffices to evoke the question 
concerning an ethics of politics – which Weber does with his distinction be-
tween an ethic of principle and an ethic of responsibility. These derive their 
meaning not only from the historical conditions in and for which Weber 
wrote, but also from the more general characteristics of politics in the mod-
ern era. Weber’s question, then, is to understand what a person is to be like, 
who lives under these conditions for politics (and not merely of politics). 
Such a person has to have a passionate devotion for the cause, a cool reflec-
tive vision of the state of affairs and then also responsibility (as we have also 
seen in Chapter 7). And it is here that Ricoeur’s fairly uneventful commen-
tary becomes interesting. Without commenting on the detail of the ethic of 
principle and the ethic of responsibility, Ricoeur first insists that Weber 
shows a lot of respect for the ethic of principle of the Gospel and for the im-
perative of responsibly taking on the consequences of action by oneself – 
this twofold respect prohibits Weber from taking pleasure in the thorny con-
flicts associated with political decision-making. Then, having posed this twin 
respect of Weber for the two political ethics, Ricoeur claims that Weber 
doesn’t call for a rejection of the ethic of principle, since it is exactly because 
of the fact that the ethic of principle is “impregnable” (inexpugnable)38 that 
there is a problem (supposedly of the ethical orientation of political decision 
making). Furthermore, Ricoeur reads Weber to mean that  
“for souls that are not dead, there is always a moment that can neither be planned, 
nor stipulated, when the ethic of principle blocks the person that acts according to 
the rule of responsibility and suggests, as Socrates’ demon that said always no: 
‘Up to here, but no further [Jusqu’ici, mais pas plus loin].’ It is not said either 
that this contradiction is without solution; it is rather a test [épreuve] in all the 
meanings of the word – and this test makes a choice inevitable.”39 
                                           
36 LI 235–240. 
37 This is as far as I know, the only lengthy commentary of Ricoeur on this paper of 
Weber.  
38 LI 240. 
39 LI 240. 
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This citation in which we find Ricoeur’s reading of the coordination between 
the two ethics of politics of Weber is curious for a number of reasons.  
(1) First, instead of declaring the ethic of principle a possible, but inap-
propriate ethic for contemporary politics (as Weber does), Ricoeur 
sees it playing an equal but different role from the ethic of responsi-
bility in political decision making.  
(2) Second, instead of elevating the ethic of responsibility to a level of prin-
ciple (as I have shown Weber does), responsibility is bound in a tension 
with the ethic of principle that has its own independent role to play. 
(3) Third, this role of the ethic of principle does not consist of shying away 
from or refusing to contemplate and assume the consequences of action 
(as Weber defines the ethic of principle), instead, the ethic of principle is 
redeployed as setting limits to the ethic of responsibility, that means in 
fact that the ethic of principle now consists of embracing the ethic of re-
sponsibility that contemplates and assumes the consequences of action 
within the limits set to it by the ethic of principle, in order to set those li-
mits to it. This new role assigned to the ethic of principle is enforced by 
two further improvisations. On the one hand Ricoeur equates it with the 
Socratic “no”; one could perhaps see it as the negation that is the root of 
deontological thinking (see discussion below). On the other hand Ri-
coeur renders the words, attributed legendarily to Luther, in a very odd 
manner: “Jusqu’ici, mais pas plus loin” – not only does he not follow Ju-
lien Freund’s translation (even though his paper was written to celebrate 
the new translation!), but also, although in meaning Ricoeur’s translation 
corresponds with the Freund translation, it is an incorrect rendering of 
“ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich” (by which Weber cites Luther, but 
inverts the two halves of the phrase, PaB 448). Gerth and Mills translate: 
“Here I stand; I can do no other” (PaV 127); I translate it somewhat free-
ly as “This is my position and it is impossible for me not to hold it” or 
“This is what I think is to be done and I shall not budge on it”, but 
Freund translates it as: “Je ne puis faire autrement. Je m’arrête là!”40 (“I 
can do no other. I stop here!”) and Ricoeur then: “Jusqu’ici, mais pas 
plus loin” (“Up to here, but not further”). This translation clearly serves 
the purpose of assigning an independent role to the “no” of principled 
                                           
40 Max Weber, Le savant et le politique. Julien Freund (transl.). Raymond Aron (in-
tro.), Paris: Plon, 1959, p. 199. The more recent translation by Catherine Colliot-
Thélène reads very similarly: “Je ne peux faire autrement, je m’arrête ici.” in Max 
Weber, Le savant et le politique. Une nouvelle traduction. Paris: La Découverte, 
2003, p. 204. 
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ethics.41 This “no” is presented in Ricoeur’s reading of Politics as a vo-
cation as the pronouncement of a practitioner of the ethic of responsibil-
ity that has equally internalised the ethic of principle, understood as the 
setting of limits to the range of actions responsibly assumable. However, 
the words of Luther, in the mouth of Weber, seem rather to speak of as-
suming or the consequences and undesired side-effects of one’s action.  
(4) Fourth, while affirming that there is no theoretical solution to this 
conflict of ethical orientations (as Weber also does), Ricoeur claims 
that there is a practical solution possible (just as he claimed for the 
response to the political paradox). Since this solution is practical, 
cannot be dictated before-hand and thus constitutes a test (épreuve), 
it would be in order to call this an exercise of phronésis between the 
“excess” of political power and the “deficiency” of the moral prohi-
bition. The phronetic choice is the moment of the exercise of power 
within certain limits; it is the practical manifestation of an “ethic of 
limited violence” as Ricoeur says in 1957. It is also this that Ricoeur 
identifies as the heart of the vocation of politics in the last sentence 
of his 1959 essay. In other words, if the vocation of politics consists 
of practising the ethic of limited violence, then it also consists of 
practically responding to the political paradox, notably by effecting 
control over the exercise of State power. 
                                           
41 On reflecting about how to interpret the relation between the two kinds of political 
ethic, identified by Weber, Raymond Aron, in the introduction to the first French 
translation, concedes that there exists a veritable “antinomy” between the two 
forms of ethic. However, he thinks it nonetheless reasonable to expect that “in the 
majority of cases, prudence would suggest a reasonable compromise” (“Introduc-
tion” in Le savant et le politique, op. cit. p. 46). Compromise is of course necessi-
tated by the conflicting nature of political interaction. Whereas the adherents of an 
ethic of principle refuse to engage with this conflict, the responsible political agent 
does engage with the conflict, yet, not without sometimes being forced to pro-
nounce the principled ethical “no”: “There is no responsible person who will not, 
one day or another, be forced to say ‘no’, whatever the price of it might be, weil er 
nicht anders kann, because he can not do otherwise.” (p. 46). 
 Like Ricoeur, Aron identifies the voice of the ethic of principle with saying “no”. 
Although Aron is not very clear on the coordination of the two ethics, he seems to 
believe that under extreme circumstances the ethic of responsibility transforms 
into an ethic of principle where the responsible agent is forced to say: “No, I don’t 
budge, whatever the price”. In this Aron is closer to Weber than Ricoeur. Ri-
coeur’s “no” rather says: “here I yield, in order not to sacrifice what is of absolute 
value, to gain what is merely of great value”. For this reason it seems implausible 
to identify Aron as the inspiration behind Ricoeur’s peculiar reading of this point 
in Weber. 
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In expounding his reading of the coordination between the ethic of principle 
and the ethic of responsibility, Ricoeur is manifestly quite far from the text 
of Weber, in fact, one learns in it much more about the thought of Ricoeur 
than of the thought of Weber.42 For the purposes of my argument this is a 
very valuable discovery: Ricoeur appropriated Weber’s thought on politics 
and responsibility in such a manner that he could, as it were, read his own 
philosophical project from the text of Weber. And it is striking that the 
schema of realistic use of political power and violence, challenged by a 
deontological prohibition and thus requiring the arbitration of practical 
wisdom, as derived here from a reading of Politics as a vocation, will be 
the basic framework for reflecting on the normativity of political action in 
Ricoeur’s “Little ethics” of the 1990s. 
Let us, in conclusion, develop this point: what do we learn about Ri-
coeur’s political thought from the emergence of the notion of the political 
paradox and the Weberian appropriation accompanying it? The political can 
be understood only under the figure of a paradox. Human beings striving for 
their fullest accomplishment through political existence need political force 
and even violence to constitute and realise this political existence; at the 
same time it is the means of political life that carries the possibility of evil 
abuse of that power. One could refer to the two dimensions of this paradox 
                                           
42 In as far as a later text can be called to witness for an earlier one, the essay “Tasks 
of the political educator” (1965) (in Political and social essays. David Steward 
and Joseph Bien (eds.). Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974, pp. 271–293 / 
LI 241–257) confirms this rendering of Ricoeur’s appropriation of Weber. Speak-
ing of the difficult connections between politics and ethics, and thinking now 
more on an institutional level than an individual level, Ricoeur clearly states: “I 
want to say at once that I adopt as a working hypothesis, and I add as a personal 
guideline, a most fruitful distinction which I borrow from the great German soci-
ologist of the beginning of this century, Max Weber.” He is equally clear about 
what it is that he derives from Weber: “I am convinced, in fact that the health of a 
collectivity rests ultimately on the justness of the relation between these two eth-
ics. On the one hand the ethic of principle is supported by cultural and intellectual 
groups and by confessing communities, including the churches, which find here – 
and not at all in politics proper – their true point of insertion. On the other hand, 
the ethic of responsibility is also the morality of force, of methodological violence, 
of calculated culpability.” (Political and social essays, op. cit. pp. 287–288 / 
L1 253, translation modified). What social health needs, then, is to maintain these 
two ethics in “a lively tension […]. For if we reduce the ethic of principle to the 
ethic of responsibility, we will sink to political realism and Machiavellism, which 
results from the constant confusion of means and ends. But on the other hand if 
the ethic of principle pretends to a kind of direct action, we will sink to all the illu-
sions of moralism and clericalism. The ethic of principle can only operate indi-
rectly by the constant pressure which it exerts on the ethic of responsibility and 
power.” (Political and social essays, op. cit. pp. 287–288 / LI 253–254). 
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as the horizontal and the vertical aspects of the political. Whereas the hori-
zontal aspect is presented in 1957 especially with the aid of Aristotle, Ri-
coeur will do so in the 1990s with the aid of Arendt43 – political power is 
seen as constituted by the will or desire to live together (vouloir vivre en-
semble) that represents the teleological aspect of human social action. The 
deontological force of the contract theory, presented by Ricoeur in 1957 with 
reference to Rousseau, will in the 1990s be developed through a series of 
studies on Rawls. But the deontological moment of reflection on the political 
is provoked in particular by the drifts in the use of means of political action, 
that is, the means associated with domination, which is the vertical aspect of 
the political. Ricoeur still presents this vertical aspect in the 1990s with re-
course to Weber’s definition of politics as the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence.44 Even though the political will to live together and the 
eventual use of violent means by politics are fatally joined, Ricoeur will still 
insist on and elaborate his conviction that the political stretches beyond the 
sphere of politics and encompasses the other spheres of social action.45 The 
practical negotiation between the teleological and the deontological moment 
of ethics is a central concern for Ricoeur in the 1990s. Accordingly, the 
practice and limitation of politics through discussion46 takes an important 
place, amongst others, in Ricoeur’s debate with discourse ethics. Also the 
reflections on the just extends the thought about the settlement of disputes, of 
conflicting claims. All of these points could serve to support Ricoeur’s 
(implicit) claim that in his “Little ethics” and the elaborations on it, he was 
providing “a sufficient anchorage” for his previous and contemporary work 
on the paradoxes of political power (RF 80). And inversely, as will follow 
from the ensuing discussion, accepting the political paradox is a condition 
for the intelligibility of responsibility in its political dimension.  
In order to make the transition from the 1950s to the 1990s and to 
enforce the legitimacy of the claim that Ricoeur is (amongst others) occu-
pied with the Weberian concerns that I have formulated earlier, I shall find 
my point of entry to the “Little ethics” from a marginal essay of 1991. 
                                           
43 On this, see Ricoeur’s reading of Arendt, with the telling title: “Power and vio-
lence” of 1989 in LI 20–42. 
44 OAA 194 / SA 227. 
45 LI 288, TJ 92 / JI 141, C&C 101 / CC 156. 
46 OAA 257–262 / SA 300–305. It should be noted that his exposition of discussion 
follows directly from a reference to the political paradox and Weber’s concern 
about politics’ defining recourse to legitimate violence in Politics as a vocation – 
see OAA 257 / SA 299. 
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2 FROM THE POLITICAL PARADOX  
TO ITS INTEGRATION IN THE “LITTLE ETHICS” 
The “Postface au Temps de la responsabilité”47 could be considered a minor 
text in Ricoeur’s work of the 1990s, not least because it is written as an 
overview and interpretation of a collection of essays by other authors. Con-
sequently, in this text Ricoeur’s concern is first with presenting the opinion 
of the authors of the book. However, at certain places his own voice comes 
through very clearly. In categorising the contributions to the book in two 
kinds, with regard to the way in which the notion of responsibility is treated 
in them, Ricoeur discusses first the opposition between a logic of responsi-
bility and a logic of obedience,48 before turning to the opposition between an 
ethic of responsibility and an ethic of principle.49 The reason why I would 
like to comment on these latter few pages is that they neatly take up the 
question of the Weberian opposition between an ethic of responsibility and 
an ethic of principle where we left it at the end of the 1950s. However a 
number of terms that are crucial for Ricoeur’s political and normative 
thought in the 1990s are attached to this pair – in such a way that I may 
claim that we find here, through a few remarks on the Weberian ethical cate-
gories, a small entrance to Ricoeur’s later political thought. 
First Ricoeur insists on the problematic nature of the distinction: does the 
categorisation of an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of principle mean that 
responsibility goes without principle or conviction? Likewise does it deny 
that principle or conviction50 invests people with responsibility? Having 
questioned the absoluteness of this opposition, Ricoeur advances by main-
taining the close relationship between these opposed ethico-political ap-
proaches and reflection on the political. The close tie is due to the fact that 
the domain of the exercise of political power is a scene of conflict – between 
pragmatic political engagement and idealistic moral conviction. It is impor-
tant to note that Ricoeur claims that this is a commonly acknowledged in-
sight at least since Sophocles’ Antigone, because it is exactly by means of a 
commentary on Antigone that Ricoeur introduces the notion of the tragic 
nature of action in Oneself as another, where it will be explored under the 
three dimensions of conflict (institution, autonomy, respect) in the ninth 
study (entitled “The self and practical wisdom: conviction”). 
                                           
47 LI 271–294. 
48 LI 284ff. 
49 LI 286ff. 
50 For the sake of clarity, it needs to be recalled here that I consistently render We-
ber’s Gesinnungsethik by ethic of principle, and thus also when commenting on 
Ricoeur’s use of the term in the French translation as “éthique de conviction”.  
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It should, however, immediately be pointed out that the notion of princi-
ple (Ricoeur uses “conviction”) as Ricoeur comments on it in the “Postface” 
and where “principle” denotes, in accordance with Weber’s initial usage “an 
‘idealistic’ invocation of moral values, without consideration for the conse-
quences”,51 differs markedly (1) from its use in 1959 and 1965 where, 
without a clear definition it denotes a positive contribution of non-political 
intellectual, cultural and religious discourses to the health of a collective by 
remaining in constant tension with the political morality of force and vio-
lence52 and (2) from its use in Oneself as another where conviction, together 
with argumentation, keeps the difficult balance between teleology and de-
ontology. But as in 1965, Ricoeur here agrees with Weber that an idealist 
ethics of principle – that is not willing to face up to what defines the exercise 
of political power, namely the ultimate recourse to violence – is not worthy 
of our human reality. Rather, whoever wants to engage with the reality of 
political action and decision making is, according to Ricoeur, immediately 
caught up in the paradox of the political53 and thus he makes the link with 
his earlier political philosophy explicit. It is only when one enters this para-
dox of the “fragile conjunction” between the form (constitution and State of 
law in so far as they express the will to live together) and the force (origin 
and use of violence) of political action54 that one is confronted with the 
“tragedy of action” and hence, one might add, with the need for a practical 
solution of the paradox.  
In fact, this paradox manifests itself also beyond the political sphere 
in all matters pertaining to the use of power in action and where the 
choices about the use of power are in effect political.55 To be quite clear, 
Ricoeur specifies that 
“After all, the political is not a separate or additional sphere, but the place where 
decisions are made on the scale of those historical communities that are the na-
tion States. The same problems will arise on the level of supra-state, European or 
global authorities.”56 
This declaration is evidently of great concern for the current project, first 
because it states the terms of a general notion of the political dimension 
of action beyond the social sphere of politics, and secondly, because it 
already affirms the global reach of this principle. 
                                           
51 LI 288. 
52 LI 253. 
53 LI 287. 
54 Cf. OAA 257 / SA 299. 
55 LI 288. 
56 LI 288. 
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Closely tied to this is the affirmation of the need for a restriction of re-
sponsibility by something – for which the name ethics of principle is at least 
a suitable place-holder – that would prevent the reflection on the use of 
means in responsibility slipping into a brutally one-sided calculation of effi-
ciency. In fact, responsibility should be rooted in a “conviction” (or princi-
ple), of which Ricoeur now gives his own circumscription, namely “the ob-
ligation to help the fragile [périsable]”.57 This re-definition of conviction is 
remarkable, not only because it clearly rejects the ethic of principle (or ethic 
of conviction) understood as “an ‘idealistic’ invocation of moral values, 
without consideration for the consequences” (as he did just before), but also 
as its new content embraces two ideas that are very relevant for the current 
project. First, the idea of “obligation” that is the key notion for the morality, 
for deontology, as part of Ricoeur’s “Little ethics” between teleology and 
practical wisdom. In fact, if he here says that responsibility has to be moder-
ated by conviction that has the form of obligation, he refers (and I guard 
against a too facile identification of the structures of the argument in the dif-
ferent loci of Ricoeur’s work) to the coordination of the teleological and the 
deontological for which the conflict of practical ethical conduct calls. Sec-
ond, this reading is reinforced when one considers that a few pages earlier, 
Ricoeur carefully appropriates Jonas’s notion of responsibility, but particu-
larly that part in which the Jonasian categorical imperative of responsibility 
is foregrounded as the appropriate way to respond to the new dimensions of 
human fragility:  
“if the human being has become the fragile par excellence, the main moral maxim 
becomes the exercise of moderation, restraint and even of refraining from action.”58  
Again the idea of limiting the scope of adoptable courses of action by a rule 
of conduct (maxime) is clear (even though it is done here, following Jonas, 
under the name of “responsibility” and not “conviction”!). One might at this 
point recall that in Ricoeur’s 1959 essay the value of the ethics of principle 
was exactly said to be its force of saying “no!” in the face of the exigencies 
of political efficiency.59 The character of negativity, or rather the force of 
interdiction, we shall see, is the beginning of the moral order of obligation, 
since morality responds primordially with a “no!” to the violence committed 
by some against (the fragility of) others; but the interdiction implies already 
the ethical from which the “no!” of moral indignation draws it strength.60 
                                           
57 LI 289. 
58 LI 284. 
59 LI 240. 
60 OAA 221 / SA 258. A simple illustration of how this “no!” impregnates the 
power of the State can be found in “La justice, vertu et institution” (in La sagesse 
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The specificity of the political is then this conflict between responsibility 
(as the effort to give form to the political by the means of politics) and convic-
tion (or principle) of controlling the spontaneity of political action by the de-
mand to help the fragile. Subsequently, if one wants to understand human ac-
tion in its political dimension, beyond the sphere of politics, by taking into 
account ethical considerations (in as far as they can be shown to be philoso-
phically credible) and the very nature of political action in whatever form, this 
short passage from Ricoeur’s “Postface” makes a series of important sugges-
tions. As normative should hold, not only considerations about obligation and 
interdiction, but equally reflection on where obligation and interdiction draw 
their strengths from; this should be done in full realisation of the tragic nature 
of human action. It is to these questions that we shall turn now. 
3 POLITICAL ACTION BETWEEN CAPACITIES  
AND CONFLICT 
From the earlier Ricoeur, we have seen that the central figure of thought 
of his political philosophy – the political paradox – is formulated, 
amongst others, by an appropriation of Weber’s definition of the State as 
having a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and of the idea of 
responsibility consisting in the sober use of the (ultimately, violent) 
means associated with political power. From the later Ricoeur, we have 
seen that this Weberian distinction and coordination is appropriated, al-
beit through a reinterpretation thereof, to set out the need for the limita-
tion of or the control over the use of these political means. From this 
perspective one could consider Ricoeur’s central notion of the political 
paradox as a manner in which he positions himself in the extension of a 
Weberian thought on political power and responsibility, more precisely, 
with respect to the half of the paradox which has to do with the inevita-
ble recourse to the means of political power and for the question of its 
control, which is the question of the practical solution to the paradox.  
                                           
pratique. Autour de l’oeuvre de Paul Ricoeur. Jeffrey Barash and Mireille Del-
braccio (eds.). Amiens: Centre régional de documentation pédagogique de 
l’académie d’Amiens, 1998, pp. 11–28) where Ricoeur explicitly recognises the 
Weberian definition of the State by its monopoly on public violence (p. 12), but 
when it comes to the question of the death penalty, he insists: “But one thing is 
sure and that is that the State may not behave like the executioner and that there 
should be a kind of restraint, namely that State should prohibited itself [s’interdit] 
to act like a murderer.” (p. 16). 
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However suitable Weber’s thought might be in the development of 
these key aspects of Ricoeur’s political philosophy, it always has to be 
situated within a broader development of his political thought. The simplest 
way to show this is to point out that the first half of the political paradox 
hardly comes into view when one focuses only on the Weberian side of 
the paradox. This first half of the paradox is represented by the political, 
the essence of which is elaborated on in the larger ethico-political theory 
by the teleological formula: “aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others, 
in just institutions”.61 This formula encapsulates what Ricoeur calls ethics 
or the ethical (l’éthique) and it is only in the confrontation between ethics 
and what he calls morality or the moral (la morale) (that, without being 
identical to it, takes the place of Weber’s ethic of principle), that a context-
sensitive ethics of prudence can be deployed. With some reservations, that 
will be formulated later, it is the latter that gives us the best picture of what 
a Ricoeurian notion of political responsibility would look like. 
The core of his ethico-political theory, first expounded in Oneself as 
another (published in 1990, and then further developed in essays during 
the decade that followed and of which most have found their way into the 
two volumes of Le juste),62 takes form by a reflection on action in which 
Ricoeur, not completely unlike Levinas,63 confronts this question of action 
by redirecting it to the question of the agent: Who is it that aims at the 
good life with and for others in just institutions? Therefore, in order to 
                                           
61 OAA 172 / SA202. 
62 An exposition of the philosophy of these books that cover the same terrain as the 
present subsection is Olivier Abel’s Paul Ricoeur. La promesse et la règle. Paris: 
Editions Michalon, 1996. See also the presentation and appraisal of Ricoeur’s 
“Little ethics” in Fred Dallmayr’s “Ethics and public life. A critical tribute to Paul 
Ricoeur” in Paul Ricoeur and contemporary moral thought. John Wall, Willam 
Schweiker and W. David Hall (eds.). New York and London: Routledge, 2002, 
pp. 213–232. 
63 Despite this similarity it is clear from the outset that Ricoeur’s philosophical an-
thropological approach to the agent of ethico-political action differs considerably 
from Levinas’ metaphysical or ontological approach. The most significant aspect 
of this difference is probably the importance attributed to pure passivity by Levi-
nas and the accent in Ricoeur on capacities and self-esteem. Ricoeur captured this 
difference in a letter to Levinas (25 June 1990) by saying: “If there is between you 
and I some disagreement, it is to be situated exactly at the point where I maintain 
that the face of the other could be recognised as source of questioning [interpella-
tion] and of injunction only if it turns out possible to arouse or to awake a self es-
teem [understood in terms of ‘solicitude for others and justice for everybody’ – 
EW] (published as “L’unicité humaine du pronom je”, in Ethique et responsa-
bilité: Paul Ricœur. Jean-Christophe Aeschlimann (ed.). Neufchâtel: Editions La 
Baconnière, 1994, p. 37.). However a detailed comparison of the two theories of 
subjectivity is not the issue here. 
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provide us with the orientation needed for our current exploration, a num-
ber of remarks are in order concerning the agent, the capable human being 
(l’homme capable), both in his/her capacities and in his/her constitution. 
This consideration of (and for) the capabilities of the agent will form the 
background to what I want to draw from Ricoeur in the project for a theory 
of responsibility “after Levinas”. The competence of political agents to 
determine and execute responsible action in sensitivity for the normative 
restriction of efficiency, but also in cognisance of the complexity of praxis 
seem already to be major components of this theory (whereas, as argued 
before, they are neglected by Levinas). But in order to show how Ricoeur 
could be useful in this regard, the entry of the ethical and the moral on the 
scene of the agent’s existence has to be presented as well. These two issues – 
the capable agent and the ethical – represent the two axes of the chart on 
which Ricoeur’s ethico-political reflection can be mapped out:64 the horizon-
tal axis being the dialogical constitution of the self and the vertical axis 
representing the hierarchy of predicates applicable to action and to agents 
– “ethical”, “moral” and “prudent”. Lets recall the main traits of these two 
axes in turn, before exploring their intersection in more detail.65  
Saying that one could represent the constitution of the self on a horizon-
tal axis entails that the self, in isolation and in the singular, is for Ricoeur 
only an abstraction of the person that is continually constituted by others. 
These are the nearby others, the “you”, but also the anonymous others, “he 
or she” or “everyone”. This triad of first, second and third person should thus 
be seen as a relation of dialectical constitution of the self.66 Furthermore the 
constitution by an interpersonal alterity of the second person and an institu-
tional alterity of the third person67 should be considered equally original. At 
the same time the agent requires the mediation of the others in order to de-
velop and actualise his or her capacities into powers, which in turn find their 
realisation or deployment in similar relations to the others.68 The capacities 
in question here are those of speaking, acting and suffering, narrating about 
oneself, and presenting oneself as a subject of ethical imputation. It is only 
                                           
64 Cf. TJ xii / JI 13. 
65 There are a number of core aspects of Ricoeur’s approach that I shall not look at 
here: the “epistemological status” of claims about the ethical agent (the entire issue 
of attestation), the language pragmatics in which Ricoeur’s argument is embedded, 
the problematisation of the is/ought-dilemma by Ricoeur and the justification of 
discourse on the ethical, the detail of the dialogical constitution of the self. It is only 
the limits of the current use of Ricoeur that could justify such a thematic restriction. 
66 RTJ 60 / JII 72. 
67 TJ 5 / JI 34. 
68 TJ 5 / JI 33–34. 
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by the deployment of these four kinds of capacities that someone can iden-
tify himself or herself (each time as a “self”, rather than a direct introspective 
and free standing “I”) and show esteem for himself or herself. In fact by de-
ploying its capacities the self shows its care69 for its life, and for that of oth-
ers, and is situated in the force field of desire and lacking that stretches to-
wards the accomplished or good life.70 This teleological directedness of the 
self is not so much a description of the normal human inclination to the good 
(but does at least not exclude such inclinations), but rather an optative 
through which it is affirmed that a life would indeed be good in which the 
self would care for himself/herself with and for the others in just institu-
tions.71 It should already be added here that while the telos of teleology is the 
good, what this good entails is a matter of uncertainty72 and thus the issue of 
uncertainty will infiltrate the “Little ethics” from the beginning. 
Let’s look at the essence of the activation of self-esteem through the 
four capacities. This always happens through relationships and interac-
tions of reciprocity or of recognition with the nearby others, that is, in 
solicitude73 and/or through institutions with everybody, that is, in jus-
tice.74 It is, furthermore, important to emphasise that Ricoeur is espe-
cially concerned with the distributive mode of justice, which allows him 
to visualise the institutions (that are responsible for just distributions) in 
a very broad way:  
“every institution as a schema of distribution, of which the portions that have to 
be distributed are not only goods and merchandise, but rights and duties, obliga-
tions and tasks, advantages and disadvantages, responsibilities and honours.”75  
Distribution as a function of institutions includes sharing, participation 
and distinction.76 If the deployment of capacities always involves self-
esteem, solicitude of others and just institutions, it could be shown to be 
the case in all four of these capacities. 
Through the first capacity, that of speech, a person identifies himself 
or herself by engaging in speech acts in exchange with interlocutors and 
by adopting the institution of language (that is sharing and participating in 
                                           
69 LI 259, LII 208. 
70 TJ xi / JI 16. 
71 Cf. LI 259. 
72 LI 178. 
73 LII 205. 
74 LII 206. 
75 LII 206. 
76 OAA 200 / SA 233; prendre part as Ricoeur says in LI 180, presenting a vision of 
social participation not unlike that of Norbert Elias. 
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its existence) that belongs to nobody in particular, but of which a distinct 
use is made at that moment. Or: someone says something about something 
to somebody77 in a certain language. The same pattern marks the deploy-
ment of the second capacity, that of acting. By acting, the self identifies 
himself/herself in interaction with other people and these actions take 
shape under the social institutions of the “rules of the game” or different 
kinds of measures of excellence with which all actions comply to a greater 
or lesser degree and that help us to identify them as ways of participating 
in the myriad of social practices and playing certain roles,78 Or: someone 
does something (or undergoes something) in interaction with somebody, 
according to standards of excellence that constitute practices. 
The capacity of narration, as third in the series of four, foregrounds 
the temporal development of the agent of speech and action. By narrat-
ing his or her existence, the agent establishes his or her identity. This 
happens once again in a dialectical implication of the others with whom 
one’s life-narrative is shared or entangled and through which the consti-
tutional triad unfolds. These other narratives include those of the institu-
tions with whom one interacts and even fictive narrations. Furthermore, 
through narration a dialectic of identity as sameness (idem, immutability) 
and identity as selfness (ipse, selfhood) is worked out.  
In all three of these capacities of the agent, care (for the self, the 
nearby others and the just institutions) gave a distinct teleological direct-
edness to the parallel threefold realisation thereof. This is only partially 
true for the fourth capacity, that of self-assignation of imputability. In 
order to get the full picture of this capacity, one has to return for a mo-
ment to the capacity of action. Whenever one considers the interaction of 
people, there are often not only active agents, but also those that pas-
sively undergo action. Action often entails the power of some over oth-
ers and thus the possibility and reality of the infliction of harm.79 Here 
the “no” of prohibition and its imperative expression, the obligation, are 
called for,80 since the infliction of harm is an attack on the very capacities 
of the other and it is these that are truly worthy of respect in a person81 
and that one has to recognise to have self-respect. The ethics of teleo-
                                           
77 LII 212. 
78 LII 215–216. 
79 LII 216. 
80 OAA 218 / SA 254. As Ricoeur explains in RTJ 235 / JII 271, the moral plane of 
reflection is needed because of the potential for conflict for which ethics, by the 
sole resources of teleology, cannot provide the necessary arbitration. 
81 LI 163. 
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logical valuation of action in self-esteem has to be doubled by a deonto-
logical valuation in self-respect. In other words, the capable agent has to 
identify himself or herself through the considered application of the 
predicates “good” and “obligatory” on actions and retrospectively on 
their agents and himself or herself as the person that makes the judge-
ment.82 The fourth capacity is, then, special in the sense that it includes 
the other capacities: it is as capable of self-identification as the person 
that utters speech, as the actor of action and as the protagonist-narrator 
of narrations that one could be considered worthy of self-esteem and 
self-respect.83 Therefore, this capability of ethics in the true sense of the 
word, is also deployed in the interpersonal dimension (e.g., in agree-
ments and promises) and with others in just institutions, the latter includ-
ing especially all the institutions of law, up to the international level. 
With this last capability, we have also started to present the vertical 
axis of Ricoeur’s ethico-political theory, which concerns the attribution of 
evaluative predicates on three levels. The first level of ethical judgement is 
the teleological and is encapsulated in the formula: the desire for the good 
life, with and for the others, in just institutions. If it is accepted that the 
discussion of the teleological dimension of ethics as given above suffices 
for our present purposes, the second level can be presented in more detail.  
For Ricoeur the deontology is the moral aspect of the attribution of 
evaluative predicates and concerns the aspiring of the teleological towards 
the good under the regime of the moral law, that is, the formalisation of obli-
gation by which the optative essence of teleological directedness is submit-
ted to restriction.84 Detached from teleological concerns, the moral refers to 
the universalistic ambition of obligation.85 Hence Ricoeur’s predilection for 
the Golden rule as formulation of morality as prohibition against the in-
fringement on the dignity of the other: “do not do unto others what you 
would not have them do to you”.86 The indignation with which this impera-
tive or rather prohibition responds to violence is rooted in the reciprocal rec-
ognition of self-esteem in solicitude (and mutatis mutandis in just institu-
tions).87 Here, on the moral level, one can see again the relatedness of the 
self to the others. This relatedness is not merely a supplement to the self-
respect for the autonomy of the moral self; rather the respect for the others as 
                                           
82 TJ 4 / JI 32. 
83 TJ 4 / JI 33. 
84 OAA 204 / SA 238. 
85 OAA 238 / SA 276. 
86 Cf. elaboration OAA 219 / SA 255. 
87 Cf. OAA 222 / SA 258. 
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an end goal in itself is co-constitutive of self-respect. Just as self-esteem is 
complemented by solicitude and justice, so personal autonomy (and self-
respect) is complemented by communitarian and cosmopolitan autonomy.88 
Or, one could equally say that the moral obligation is complemented by the 
formal norm and by legality. The latter represents the institutional incorpora-
tion of deontology as nourished by the contractualist tradition of political 
theory and where justice refers to procedural formalism.89 
However, when considering the question: “what then shall we do in this 
situation?” one is immediately confronted with the tragedy of action: the ten-
sion between the singularity of particular cases and the generality of obliga-
tion, the conflict between obligations and the complexity of life in society.90 
Thus one is forced to the third level of ethical judgement of action, that of 
prudence or practical wisdom. This is not a third independent source of 
evaluative reflection, but emerges from redirecting the formalism of morality 
back to ethics under the conflicting circumstances of the situation of ethical 
praxis.91 If practical wisdom requires the relativisation of the universality of 
the moral imperative, because of the historically particular circumstances of 
action or because of the particular claims of certain people, then this does not 
mean abandoning the moral imperative in order to embrace a flat arbitrari-
ness,92 but to keep the tension between the ethical and the moral. Or in a later 
reformulation of the relation:  
“On the one hand, we can take morality as the plane of reference in relation to 
which a fundamental ethic that is anterior to it and an applied ethics that is posterior 
to it are defined. On the other hand, we can say that moral philosophy in its unfolding 
of private, juridical, and political norms constitutes the transition structure that 
guides the movement from the fundamental ethics to applied ethics, which gives 
moral philosophy visibility and readability on the plane of praxis.”93  
                                           
88 RTJ 237 / JII 273, similarly OAA 238 / SA 277. 
89 But here, the correct coordination of contractual thinking – the inspiration of Ar-
endt or Rousseau on the one hand and Rawls on the other – is important. See 
Abel, Paul Ricoeur. La promesse et la règle. op. cit.: “Before being this procedure 
of reciprocal regulation that will play an important role in the second approach to 
justice, the contract is thus the act through which a common will is instituted. In 
this sense, just as in Rousseau the social contract is an implicit and retrospective 
pact that has not taken place but that is the presupposition of all political existence, 
the real contract has to be rediscovered incessantly together like a forgotten project 
that precedes all our rules. The political is nothing other than the rootedness of in-
stitutions in this fictitious pact.” (p. 53). 
90 RF 81. 
91 OAA 250 / SA 291. 
92 OAA 241 / SA 280. 
93 RTJ 56–57 / JII 68. 
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However it is then formulated, the power with which this dialectic be-
tween the ethical and the moral is played out in practice, is carried by con-
viction that effects the mediation in coordination with argumentation.94  
 But the insistence on the conflicting and tragic nature that this mediation 
can take on, doesn’t mean that all situations are of the nature of distress, but 
that prudence exactly creates space for reflection on it and that the possibility 
of tragedy in ethical decision making always has to be taken into account. 
For the conflict that arises then in the situation of practical application, a 
practical solution has to be found (like in “The political paradox”), and this 
not only in self-reflection, but in consultation with others and in engagement 
in public debate.95 Furthermore, since “the principles of justification of a 
moral or legal rule leave the problems of application intact”96 and “applica-
tion” is a notion of interpretation, the tradition that mediates the application 
of universal norms to particular situations should constantly be submitted to 
interpretation in prudent reflection.97  
This synopsis suffices to map out the terrain in which Ricoeur works out 
his ethico-political theory. A self that can identify himself or herself as the 
capable agent of speech, action, narration and imputation, is constituted by 
the other – those close by, but also by everybody – and in interaction with 
the others these capacities can be deployed. This is the horizontal axis. 
Driven by the desire for a flourishing or good life, but already under the im-
pression of the problem of conflict and violence, the self seeks the realisation 
of the good life under examination of the universal and formal obligation, 
but also in full cognisance of the complexity of the situations of application. 
This is the vertical axis. The ideas interpreted in this synopsis represent the 
indispensable orientation for the subsequent detailed exploration of a number 
of aspects of this theory, within the framework of my own project. 
4 RESPONSIBILITY, PRUDENCE,  
COLLABORATION, EQUITY 
Having presented the broad schema of Ricoeur’s ethico-political thought, we 
can now enter some of the detail thereof, equipped with my own project as 
agenda for this exploration. This will be done in three movements: first, a 
number of clarifications with regard to the situation of Levinas’ ethics in re-
                                           
94 OAA 287 / SA 334. 
95 OAA 257–262 / SA 300–305. 
96 RTJ 243 / JII 279. 
97 RTJ 243f / JII 280. 
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lation to Ricoeur’s framework will be presented; second, the uncertainty 
concerning the exact place and function of the notion of responsibility in Ri-
coeur’s “Little ethics” needs to be focused on in order to highlight that there 
is no short-cut for adopting Ricoeur’s insight for this project and; third, it 
will be argued how this theory of Ricoeur’s can be expected to contribute to 
the elaboration of my project and provide pointers in the development of a 
political notion of responsibility for a globalised world. 
4.1 Remarks on the resources: Levinas and Ricoeur 
As declared earlier, the intention of introducing Ricoeur in this study about 
Levinas and responsibility is not to work towards a comparison of the two 
authors.98 Instead, the question is how Ricoeur can help to give an im-
proved grasp on my project of a political responsibility after Levinas. This 
doesn’t mean that the value that such a confrontation between Ricoeur and 
Levinas could have for the current theme is denied, but simply that it falls 
outside of the current thematic and strategic delimitation. 
However, although I shall thus not enter into the detail of the profound 
philosophical arguments concerning, especially ontology, alterity and the 
constitution of the subject, my strategy of using Ricoeur to enhance my 
post-Levinasian project necessarily involves at least an implicit confrontation 
between the “resources” or most fundamental thought of these two phi-
losophers. For that reason, I consider it desirable to at least give an account 
of the structural differences between the two philosophies. I shall do this 
                                           
98 The comparison between the two philosophers has naturally been the subject of 
exploration and dispute. The contributions of Patrick Bourgeois and of Richard 
Cohen in Ricoeur as another. The ethics of subjectivity. (Richard Cohen and James 
Marsh (eds.). Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002) are worthy to be 
highlighted as valuable, since they represent two strong, opposing answers to the 
question concerning the correctness of Ricoeur’s interpretation of Levinas and with 
it the relation between Levinas and Ricoeur. It should be clear that my reading of 
Levinas and Ricoeur is much closer to that of Bourgeois than to that of Cohen: the 
formidable scope of enterprise and the strength of the sovereignty of the Levinasian 
political subject (as I interpret it) seems to me to be the consequence of the strong 
emphasis on exteriority of the other as regards the ethical (emphasised in Bour-
geois’ mostly approving reading of Ricoeur’s interpretation of Levinas). And if in 
“accepting the role of solicitude in human existence, Ricoeur has developed a place 
within interiority that really allows a response to the face of the other.” (“Ricoeur 
and Levinas: Solicitude in reciprocity and solicitude in existence”, in Ricoeur as 
another, op. cit. pp. 109–126, here 122) then he also allows for taking the opinion of 
the other about matters ethical seriously and thus taking the other as agent of ethics 
seriously – to a point I doubt possible in Levinas. 
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by highlighting a number of significant divergences of Levinas with respect 
to the framework of Ricoeur that has been presented above. 
(1) In Ricoeur’s development from the first person to the second and third 
person, the self is doubly constituted by the other and this on the plane of 
reciprocity. In Levinas the priority of the second person other is indisput-
able in the absolute asymmetry between the self and the other; this asym-
metry is so radical that, on the level of ethics the other overwhelmingly 
defines the self. Furthermore, not only is the place of the third person 
other underdeveloped in Levinas, but there is no clear indication of the re-
lation between the other and the thirds, or their irrelation is simply ex-
pressed as contradiction.99 However, on the level of politics this contra-
diction is the resource of a fraternity of eternally asymmetrical relations. 
(2) Ricoeur presents the triangular unfolding of the identity of the self in 
relation to the other as the expression of the different dimensions of self-
esteem and thus of esteem for the life of the self and of the others with 
whom it is directly and institutionally linked. This teleological moment 
of the self would, for Levinas, be equal to the conatus, the perseverance 
in the ontological identity and as long as the alterity of the other is not 
sufficiently recognised, the affirmation regarding the constitution of the 
self by the other risks sliding into the identitary or indifferent force of 
participation with all of the potential violence lurking within it, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. 
(3) There is in Ricoeur a dramatisation of the coordination between teleologi-
cal ethics and deontological morality – both find their realisation in the 
dialectical relation to each other that is expressed in practical wisdom. 
Levinas fuses the teleological (that is condemned as inevitably conspiring 
with the dark side of ontology) and the deontological (in the sense of the 
unconditional imperative emanating from the other and the negativity of 
that imperative in the “thou shalt not kill!”) in the double, ontological-
ethical, constitution of the subject, and of which the ambiguity of ageing 
(discussed in Chapter 1, § 2.1. and Chapter 5, § 3) is the easiest manifesta-
tion.100  
                                           
99 Didier Frank convincingly argues that Levinas reduces the complex relationship 
(the political) to the simpler one (the face-to-face) and tries to derive the com-
plex from the simple. This should be regarded a considerable weakness in his 
approach to the political. Cf. Didier Frank (L’un-pour-l’autre. Levinas et la 
signification. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008) p. 237. 
100 I am fully aware that these are not Levinas’ terms and that I present him with the 
tools borrowed from another artisan. This could be allowed at least for the stra-
tegic purposes outlined in this Chapter. 
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(4) Even though there is no development of practical wisdom in Levinas, 
his description of the constitution of the quest for justice (cf. Chapter 
7, §2.2) sufficiently marks the place in his philosophy where that 
should be situated. For Ricoeur reflection on ethics culminates in a re-
flection on practical wisdom. 
(5) Whereas in Ricoeur, situations of tragedy necessitate a recourse to the 
ethical despite the validity of the moral, in Levinas the law is to be 
challenged by what is even more moral than the law, namely that for 
which the unspeakable imperative “thou shalt not kill!” holds the place. 
(6) Whereas the question of the capacity of the self is central for Ricoeur 
and finds its culmination in imputation, the self in Levinas is always 
elected, independent of whatever capacity; this election is simply 
imposed or assumed passively. But this difference on the level of the 
constitution of the subject has implications for the political situation 
of the subject. Strictly speaking, every Levinasian subject is isolated 
in his or her responsibility for the others, in the sense that nobody 
can be responsible in the subject’s stead. Furthermore, this responsi-
bility draws all of its resources from a constitution independent of 
that of the life in a State. For Ricoeur, on the other hand, the question 
of the form of the State and the respect due to the others are ulti-
mately rooted in the capacities of the citizens.101 
(7) Since, for Ricoeur, ethical agency is constituted in relationships of 
reciprocity and recognition and mediated institutionally, ethical action 
can be coordinated between different agents or executed alone. For 
Levinas nobody can take my place and any collaboration can only be 
understood as and accepted in as far as it is an extension of my ir-
replaceable obedience to the other. Any reciprocity or recognition is 
already an expression of the attempt to answer in responsibility the 
appeal of the others. Consequently, all initiatives at institutionalising 
and mediation of ethical conduct would, for Levinas, merit at least a 
healthy dose of suspicion.  
                                           
101 “On the contrary, an anthropology that makes a place for the notions of the ca-
pability to act, dispositions, development, realisation, can give account of the 
fact that the capabilities that we quite rightly consider as immediately worthy of 
respect can flourish only in societies of a certain form, and thus their develop-
ment is not possible in simply any political society. And yet, if the individual 
becomes human only under the condition of certain institutions, then the obliga-
tion to serve those institutions is itself a condition for the continued development 
of a human agent.” (LI 163). And one should add that this central position ac-
corded to capacities and institutions in turn implies the significance of the tech-
nologies associated with the capacities and institutions (which is not the same as 
adopting a technocratic approach to politics). 
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(8) For Ricoeur the force behind the improvement of justice is the force of 
the political, of the will to live together. By contrast, for Levinas, the 
force for the improvement of justice resides in the individual agent’s 
orientation by the ethical imperative and the plurality of these impera-
tives, which result in the strength to override or call to greater justice 
the legal system that is in force at a certain place and time. 
In these points the most salient differences in the ethico-political profile of 
Levinas and Ricoeur are sketched. This should suffice to contrast them 
with respect to their deepest philosophical orientations in matters ethical 
and the political thought that is nourished by these orientations, which lead 
to the divergent contributions they would make to a debate about political 
responsibility. In accordance with the demarcation of the present study, I 
remain as far as possible agnostic regarding the ultimate philosophical is-
sues presupposed by the work of Levinas and Ricoeur, in order to devote 
my attention to matters that ensue from it. For this reason it is important to 
insist that the point at which Ricoeur enters this project is not on the level 
of the debate of the ultimate philosophical concerns, but limited to the 
level of the elaboration of the four requirements for a political notion of 
responsibility (see Chapter 8), that were already a step away from Levi-
nas’ own thought. 
Now, whereas the notion of responsibility is evidently a key notion in 
his thought, thus far nothing has been said about Ricoeur’s contribution to 
the question of responsibility (accept, of course his commentary on We-
ber’s notion thereof). The reason for this temporary exclusion needs to be 
explained. It is necessary to give a review of the complicated attitude of 
Ricoeur with regard to the notion of responsibility, since it is only by do-
ing so that I can complete the justification for the stated manner in which I 
shall attempt to make his thought useful for the current project. 
4.2 Ambiguity concerning Ricoeur’s use  
of the notion of responsibility 
It would certainly be too simplistic to understand the thrust of my argu-
ment as replacing a defective Levinas with a correct Ricoeur. This cannot 
be the case, not only because of the manner in which I inscribe my reflection 
in the continuation of central aspects of Levinas’ thought (see end of 
Chapter 6), but also because Ricoeur, in the development of his ethico-
philosophical theory, attempted to incorporate important aspects of Levinas’ 
thought into his own and therefore it seems incorrect to schematise the re-
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lationship between the two philosophers as that of two mutually exclusive 
alternatives.102 There is a further significant reason why one could not 
simply open Ricoeur’s work and draw from it a theory of responsibility in 
its political dimension and this is the uncertainty concerning the status of 
the notion of responsibility in Ricoeur’s later thought.  
It seems that in the later work of Ricoeur there are at least three 
somewhat divergent uses of the notion of responsibility.  
(1) It is, first of all, used as synonymous for “imputability”. The fourth ques-
tion by which to enquire about the identity of the capable agent “who is 
the moral subject of imputation?”,103 is sometimes simply formulated as 
“who designates herself as the morally responsible author of her 
acts?”.104 Likewise, Ricoeur would claim that without a subject that 
could have self-esteem through being capable of acting intentionally and 
of initiating action, there would be no “responsible subject”.105 And with 
a different emphasis and some reservations, Ricoeur explains that only in 
so far as a subject is capable of situating his or her action under the obli-
gation to conform to rules and to assume the consequences of action, can 
that subject be called responsible.106  
(2) In spite of Ricoeur having equated responsibility and imputability, he 
immediately then opens a gap between the two notions. If responsibility 
is to be taken as a synonym for imputability and if imputation means 
first of all the capacity to assume on one’s account an action, then re-
sponsibility means first of all Zurechnungsfähigkeit, the capacity to have 
an action placed on one’s account as it were, that is, not “to respond to” 
in the first place, but giving an account of one’s actions or admitting to 
having authored them.107 But this means that there is also another mean-
ing of responsibility, in which the “responding to” is dominant and in 
this sense is not the same as imputation. In “The concept of responsi-
bility. An essay in semantic analysis”108 this difference despite the simi-
larity between imputability and responsibility is worked out by tracing 
the historical development by which “responsibility” as a notion bran-
ched off from “imputability”. “Responsibility” changed from simple 
                                           
102  See again Bourgeois, “Ricoeur and Levinas: Solicitude in reciprocity and solici-
tude in existence”, op. cit. pp. 122f. 
103 OAA 169 / SA 199. 
104 TJ 23 / JI 55. 
105 LII 205. 
106 RTJ 82 / JII 96. 
107 RTJ 82–83 / JII 97. 
108 TJ 11–35 / JI 41–70. 
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attribution (that is, imputation) to obligation (especially in law), and 
from there the explosion of its use filled it with ambiguity in law 
(withdrawal of the meaning of imputation and inability in the tendencies 
of attribution of penalty and culpability for those that commit mistakes). 
A proliferation of meanings also developed in moral philosophy. The 
latter entails a shift in the object of responsibility (e.g., from responsibili-
ty for one’s actions to responsibility for the other, in Levinas) or the un-
limited extension of the scope of responsibility (e.g., for future generati-
ons, as in Jonas) and in both of these cases there is increased emphasis 
on prospective responsibility, rather than on retrospective responsibility 
(of which imputability is a species) and a consequent undermining of the 
component of the identifiability of the subject of responsibility (due to 
the lapse of time between consequence and initial action, or due to the 
complexity of the causal network that makes the calculation of what 
responsibility is taken for very hazy). When Ricoeur then concludes that 
the subject of responsibility becomes ungraspable (insaissable) and dilu-
ted (dilué)109 we have arrived very close to the opposite of the initial idea 
(in point 1.) of responsibility as the capacity of imputation. In fact, the 
prudence that Ricoeur proposes as corrective to the (legitimate) issues 
expressed in the new moral philosophies of responsibility, depends on a 
stronger emphasis and valuation of the capacity of imputation. In this 
sense this course of examination presented by Ricoeur doesn’t amount to 
a plea for the abolition of the moral theories of responsibility, but for a 
considerable rethinking of them, starting by anchoring them anew in the 
agent that is capable of imputation. 
(3) Between these two extremes of convergence (synonymy) and divergen-
ce (or firm distinction), is a third, positive place accorded to the notion of 
responsibility in Ricoeur’s ethics. In the conclusion to the “Little ethics” 
and, in fact, to the first nine studies of Oneself as another.110 Ricoeur re-
capitulates the contribution of the three ethical studies not only to the re-
flexive identification of the self by ethical judgement, but to the entire set 
of capacities of the capable human. If Ricoeur explains the title of the 
book right from its first pages by the threefold question concerning the 
identity of the “who?”, then the conclusion following the ninth study 
provides a comprehensive answer that can be given only once the entire 
course of the exploration of the capacities of speech, action, narration 
and ethico-moral judgement has been followed through. Let it be recal-
                                           
109 TJ 34 / JI 69. 
110 OAA 291–296 / SA 337–344. 
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led that the threefold question concerning the “who?” consists of (1) the 
question concerning the reflexive identity of the self (soi) through me-
diation by speech and action, (2) the question about the dialectical identi-
ty of sameness (identity-idem) and selfness (identity-ipse) and (3) the 
question regarding the dialectical identity of selfness through alterity.111 
The exploration of ethics provides answers to these three questions while 
at the same time drawing on the three other capacities (speech, action, 
narration) and in this sense recapitulates the entire movement of the re-
sponse to these three questions concerning oneself as another.112 For 
each of these three answers a name could be given to encapsulate the re-
sponse that is only possible to give once the fourth, the ethical, capacity 
has been reached. The encapsulating term for reflexive self-identification 
is imputation, the term for the dialectical identity of sameness and self-
ness is responsibility, and the term for the identity emerging dialectically 
from the self and the other is recognition. Imputation designates the self 
as capable of attributing statements or actions to himself/herself through 
the mediation of the ethico-moral predicates (good, obedient, just, pru-
dent, etc.).113 Recognition  
“is a structure of the self reflecting on the movement that carries self-esteem 
toward solicitude and solicitude toward justice. Recognition introduces the 
dyad and plurality in the very constitution of the self.”114  
 Between the two, responsibility refers to the continued self-
identification or “self-constancy” [maintien de soi-même]115 that re-
mains in dialectical tension with the mere duration of empirical same-
ness of the ethical agent through the vicissitudes of time and the ad-
ventures of ethics that it entails. Ricoeur elaborates on this by examin-
ing the temporal aspects of responsibility. The prospective or future 
aspect of responsibility refers to assuming the future consequences (in-
tended or not) of actions; the retrospective or past aspect of responsi-
bility refers to the assumption of actions (committed by oneself or not) 
or the recognition of debt. But “[h]olding oneself responsible now, is 
                                           
111 Cf. OAA 1–4 / SA 11–15. 
112 We have seen a similar movement at work in one of the texts used to introduce 
the question of the identity of the ethical agent and his/her capacities: “Ap-
proches de la personne” (LII 203–221) and “Who is the subject of rights” (TJ 1–
10 / JI 2–40). 
113 OAA 291, 293 / SA 338, 340. 
114 OAA 296 / SA 344. 
115 OAA 295 / SA 343. 
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[…] accepting to be held to be the same today as the one who acted 
yesterday and who will act tomorrow”.116 Furthermore,  
“this responsibility in the present assumes that the responsibility of the con-
sequences to come and that of a past with respect to which the self recognises 
its debt are integrated in this non-pointlike [non ponctuel] present and in a 
sense recapitulated in it.”117  
 Even if the notion of responsibility proposed here by Ricoeur includes 
imputation (described previously), it is certainly non-synonymous with 
it, in fact it rather represents a further development the idea of imputa-
tion. Likewise, one could consider recognition as an extension or further 
development of the notion of responsibility. 
Instead of attempting a superficial conflation or harmonisation of these three 
uses of “responsibility” by Ricoeur, or even worse, making a choice between 
them, I shall take a step back in order to situate the issue at stake in each of 
them within the broader framework of Ricoeur’s ethico-political theory, that 
I approach from the point of view of the political paradox. Since such an ap-
proach is justified by nothing more than the aims of the current project, my 
point is obviously not to propose a “rectification” of Ricoeur’s use of “re-
sponsibility”, but just to examine the ways in which he could be said to con-
tribute to the construction of my own development on “responsibility”. 
Three things are sure about this “practical solution” to the uncertain posi-
tion of the notion of responsibility in Ricoeur, and with them I shall proceed 
on my alternative approach to finding Ricoeur’s contribution on responsibil-
ity. First, accepting the first sense of responsibility as imputability is the con-
dition for thinking with Ricoeur about matters ethical; second, the third sense 
should be considered as an expansion of the meaning of the first and with 
this statement the question of the further expansion of the use of the term in a 
Ricoeurian frame is opened; third, it could be accepted that the second sense 
is concerned with theoretical problems in contemporary theories of respon-
sibility118 and could thus be considered a negative contribution to considera-
tions on the use of the term. All three of these statements affirm that Ri-
coeur’s ethical theory remains the major stake of the use of the term “respon-
sibility” and hence for current purposes it could be acceptable to refer the 
issue of the polysemy in Ricoeur’s use of it back to the frame of his ethics 
sketched earlier. 
As stated, in what follows certain aspects of Ricoeur’s ethics will be dis-
cussed in greater detail, notably from the perspective of the political paradox. 
                                           
116 OAA 295 / SA 242, translation modified. 
117 OAA 295 / SA 243. 
118 Cf. also RTJ 159 / JII 185. 
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The reader will recall that I have shown that the political paradox could be 
presented as a reformulation of Weber’s concerns in the paper in which he 
developed his theory of political responsibility. This is the perspective in 
which I want to bind all considerations about responsibility, since it is the 
perspective from which I have tried to develop a project for political respon-
sibility out of Levinas. 
Let us now consider some of the aspects of Ricoeur’s contribution to the 
developed fourfold project of political responsibility.119 
4.3 Towards a political responsibility  
for a globalised world 
For the sake of clarity, let it be recalled that the notion of “political”, as it is 
used here, concerns something broader than one of the spheres of social real-
ity. In fact, it includes all human relationships, with the possible exceptions of 
(aspects of) close interpersonal relationships. The political refers to the broad 
power of the will to live together (Arendt) and is the furthest implications of 
the teleological aim of human life. But the power of the political is necessarily 
bound up with the political paradox: in order for political power to realise it-
self, it has to adopt means appropriate to that realisation (see Weber on the 
means of the political), but those means carry at the same time in them the 
possibility of their violent use and misuse. The political paradox is thus a form 
of the tragedy of human action. Since this is the case, the question concerning 
the limitation or control of these means has to be asked, and in Ricoeur’s rein-
terpretation of the ethics of principle this entails the affirmation of the obliga-
tion of restraint. The assumption of the use of political means and the conse-
quences thereof, that Weber designated as an ethic of responsibility, has to be 
placed under control by the force of obligation – Ricoeur’s reformulation of 
the relationship between Weber’s ethic of responsibility and ethic of principle 
turns out to be the tension between the teleological and deontological sides of 
his “Little ethics”. But this tension doesn’t resolve the political paradox, in-
stead it continually calls for a practical response to it, which is reflected on by 
Ricoeur under the term of practical wisdom or prudence. If the summit of re-
sponsibility is for Weber the coordination of responsibility and principle by 
elevating responsibility to a principle, then for Ricoeur the summit of ethical 
                                           
119 For an exposition of political responsibility on Ricoeur’s own terms, see Ber-
nard Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur. The promise and the risk of politics, op. cit. 
Chapter 8: “Political responsibility”. Although Dauenhauer gives full recogni-
tion to the fact that, in Ricoeur, the political extends beyond the sphere of poli-
tics, his presentation thematises mainly responsibility for or in connection with 
the political sphere. 
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action is the practical solution of the eternal tension between the ethical and 
the moral in practical wisdom. The way in which Ricoeur opts to think 
through this complex issue that leads up to prudence situates the “who?” of 
this practical wisdom in the centre. He also refers to this being as a person or 
the subject of law or again the capable human. With my Weberian perspective 
on Ricoeur, it may be permissible to call it the agent of political responsibility.  
Central to the motivation for seeking in the Ricoeurian agent of political 
responsibility an ally in reflection on political responsibility after Levinas, is 
the fact that Ricoeur engages with the capability of the agent and conse-
quently also facilitates reflection on the means of agency (whatever the status 
of the capability and the nature of the means might be). Let it be recalled here 
that a number of problematic issues with the ethical subject in Levinas seemed 
to necessitate this continued reflection on responsibility that I undertake in this 
Chapter: behind all of the insufficiencies concerning reflection on co-
responsibility, the complexity of application to a practical context and the me-
diatedness of action, is the blind-spot concerning the nature and dimensions of 
the competence of ethical agents. One could be perfectly ethically constituted 
as Levinas has it, but fatally clumsy in subsequently translating that ethical 
constitution into appropriate action. This is of course not to say that an acqui-
sition of certain skills and knowledge programmes an agent to more ethically 
acceptable conduct, but simply to recognise that the practise of ethics is not at 
all without relevance for the meaning of the ethical. If Ricoeur, then, draws 
our attention to the capacities of ethical agents, it will neither be to ignore the 
role of the other in the constitution of that agent, nor to establish a set of re-
quirements for effective ethico-political agency, but to open the discussion of 
ethics to a reflection on who the agent is or how the capacity to act ethically is 
constituted. By referring the question about ethics to a philosophical anthro-
pology of human capabilities (to Ricoeur’s homme capable), an approach is 
adopted in which the competence of the ethico-political agent is taken seri-
ously, since capacity immediately implies the distinction between degrees of 
capability, and thus of excellence or the lack of it or of sufficiency in it. This 
means that if we are from the outset concerned about the capacity of ethical 
agency that it will facilitate reflection on: (1) strategy, calculation and sacri-
fice; (2) the distribution of roles, the dimensions of responsibility and co-
responsibility; (3) the context of action and its institutional and instrumental 
dimensions in particular and (4) the dilemma of the exception and equity – in 
short, the four objectives for reflection on a notion of political responsibility 
“after Levinas”, as outlined in Chapter 8. This insistence on the capability and 
excellence of the ethical subject doesn’t mean that the meaning of “for the 
other” is interfered with or compromised, but simply that we cannot merely 
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be concerned about the “that” of ethical agency, without this implying the im-
portance of the question of “how?” or “what?” of excellence. Ethical action is 
not an all-or-nothing matter; excellence doesn’t exclude the possibility of the 
fairly good sufficing in certain circumstances. This conviction is of course 
Aristotelian. But this shouldn’t surprise us, since the entire discussion con-
cerning Ricoeur headed for a re-appropriation of phronésis.  
How would reflection on the phronetic capacity of ethical agency con-
tribute to the four objectives set out above? In answering this question I do not 
only confront the four objectives that crystallised from my Levinas-Weber-
Apel reading with the insights gained in this Chapter from Ricoeur, but simul-
taneously formulate my view – in as far as it can be developed in the present 
book – on the development of a theory of political responsibility for a global-
ised world. 
The first point on the agenda is that of strategy. If the question regarding 
strategy arises from the affirmation of the importance of competence and 
means for ethics, then it is rooted deeper still in the rejection of cosmic-ethical 
realism. The positive formulation of this rejection is in the affirmation of trag-
edy, of “the unavoidable nature of conflict in moral life”.120 Ricoeur’s entire 
effort in moral theory could be considered as an attempt to show how this cru-
cial recognition of tragedy in human action calls for ethical reflection that is 
appropriate for practice, while avoiding both arbitrariness and univocity.121 
Only a practical wisdom that engages with the situation or context of its reali-
sation, while remaining informed about consideration that transcends the 
mere factual particularity of the situation, can accomplish this task. Therefore, 
responsibility, in order to be responsible, has to be more than the name for 
ethicity, but has to anticipate the consequences of its practice, which in turn 
implies the question of the optimisation of those consequences in terms of 
obedience to the meaning of the ethical. That is why applied ethics (les éthi-
ques) cannot be understood as mechanical application of context-independent 
principles to situations, as a blind casuistry.122 Instead applied ethics is ethics 
as it applies itself through phronetic engagement with the situation. That is 
why applied ethics cannot be considered as separate from ethical reflection; its 
distinction from ethics resides in the specialist insight that it generates con-
cerning specific contexts or cases in which the ethico-moral dialectic has to 
realise itself, just like the political that strives to realise itself through politics. 
                                           
120 OAA 243 / SA 283. 
121 OAA 249 / SA 290. 
122 “We can say that moral philosophy in its unfolding of private, juridical, and po-
litical norms constitutes the transition structure that guides the movement from 
the fundamental ethics to applied ethics, which gives moral philosophy visibility 
and readability on the plane of praxis.” (RTJ 57 / JII 68). 
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Responsibility thus benefits equally from reflection on ethicity and by re-
flection on its practical realisation. But this reflection is always done in the 
face of practical conflict and not as a programming of action towards inevita-
ble success. Responsibility is practice in the face of moral conflict – the in-
comparable has to be submitted to comparison as Levinas so aptly says, 
which implies the need for prioritisation and even sacrifice. The practical so-
lution of ethical situations of conflict, through responsible action, affirms and, 
in this sense, maintains the conflict associated with the situation, while at-
tempting to show itself as prudent response to it. That prudent responsibility is 
sacrificing responsibility should be considered an inevitable concession.123 
However, while affirming the inevitable role of calculation in the assumption 
of responsibility and the tragic dimensions it can assume in certain cases, we 
must avoid regarding the conflict involved in responsibility as evenly spread 
over all situations of responsibility, lest we risk contaminating the entire no-
tion of responsibility with an unremitting pathos of the sole agent agonising in 
every act of decision making. Because responsibility is serious, it strives to 
realise itself strategically, which may allow for division, formalisation and 
variation in complexity and collective assumption (all, evidently, in varying 
degrees, depending on the context). 
Responsibility is not one. The demands of strategy naturally differentiate 
responsibility out into different forms and dimensions of responsibility which 
are in turn inevitably bound up with institutions, means and other dimensions 
of the context of action. These have been indicated to be the second and third 
points on the agenda for an alternative notion of responsibility. One could 
perhaps say that responsibility doesn’t simply concern a “here I am, responsi-
ble for others”, but that it has the form of someone being responsible for other 
people (for the consequences of what is done or not done to them), in ways 
determined by different social roles, within certain institutional frameworks, 
where the competent use of certain means will be required and where the spe-
cifics of each of these elements may be submitted to revision according to the 
circumstances of its application.  
That responsible people are responsible as members of societies seems to 
be the primary lesson to be derived from Ricoeur’s extension of the aim of the 
good life to political existence – and to this should be added that one should at 
least count with the other members of society as probable agents of responsi-
                                           
123 But Martha Nussbaum is correct, at least in principle, to call for the claim that 
loses out in the phronetic decision to be kept in play; the fact of its being can-
celled as the decisive claim through a practical decision doesn’t take away from 
its initial validity in the tragic conflict between competing claims. See her “Ri-
coeur on tragedy: teleology, deontology and phronesis”, in Paul Ricoeur and 
contemporary moral thought, op. cit. pp. 264–276. 
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bility (which is not the same as to claim that all members of society devote 
their lives in responsibility to others). If one wants to avoid thinking of oneself 
as the last bastion of ethics (which is the hallmark of fanaticism124), in other 
words, if one simply seriously engages with the question of efficiency of re-
sponsible action, one would naturally be lead to the issue of co-responsibility. 
And this in turn entails taking other people seriously as agents of responsibil-
ity. They have to be taken seriously, not only because one has to collaborate 
with them, but also because one is constituted as an ethical agent in numerous 
ways by the others. 
In fact, the plurality of agents of responsibility in society do not simply act 
in a haphazard and uncorrelated fashion – they interact and this interaction is 
supported and conditioned by an array of institutions by which actions are 
correlated. In Ricoeur’s broad use of the notion of institution structure is given 
to interaction by language and different social practices. Institutions are the 
mode of living together of others that are not close by (although the relation-
ship with the “you” is not completely without mediation from institutions) 
and they pre-exist the life of the individuals that are involved in them. In fact 
institutions are that by which one becomes human in the way that one does 
and it is through institutions that one acquires the capacity to act,125 possibly 
responsibly. They are all characterised by a “teleology that regulates ac-
tion”,126 where regulation refers to the distribution of roles (including privi-
leges, obligations, control over goods, etc.) by which people participate in the 
institution.127 In this manner institutions are societal structures by which 
equality of distribution (i.e., proportionate equality) could be aimed at, even 
though it should also be counted amongst the traits of institutions that they do 
not succeed in distributing goods, obligations, risks, etc., justly.128  
In his presentation of social institutions, Ricoeur doesn’t only prepare his 
reflection on justice (which will be focused on below), but he has a clear so-
cial theoretical objective, namely to overcome the opposition between the 
sociologism of Durkheim and the social individualism of Weber.129 This 
social theoretical aspect of the theory of institutions is of considerable impor-
tance for reflection on responsibility, since it contributes to a fair understand-
ing of what human action and interaction in general, and therefore responsi-
                                           
124 But also of saintliness. However, the point is here to confront the ambiguity of 
saintliness, rather than to dispute the possibility of saintliness having laudable 
consequences.  
125 OAA 254 / SA 296. 
126 LII 215. 
127 OAA 200 / SA 233. 
128 Cf. LII 207. 
129 OAA 200 / SA 234, LI 180. 
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ble action in interaction with others, entail on a social theoretical level. Since 
the agent of responsibility is always constituted by participation in institu-
tions, he/she always has to take these forms of mediation into account in in-
teraction with the third: not only to know one’s own capacity of action, but 
also to gain insight into the network of social interactions that distributes the 
consequences of one’s action. As true as it might be that injustice lurks in all 
forms of institution, so it is true that it is not possible to do away with all as-
pects of institution at the same time – one needs the benefits of institutional-
ised interaction and one’s institutional constitution in order to counter, for 
instance, systemic injustice. As such, institutions are not only a major aspect 
of the socio-historical context on which one has to act, but an aspect that 
mediates the context to agents of action and interaction. 
If one is then constituted by institutions that impose a certain form and 
coordination on action as interaction with other agents of responsibility, it 
seems inevitable to give serious consideration to the question of co-
responsibility. In a situation where interaction is regulated by the institutional 
distribution of roles and everything that is associated with it, one could, first, 
identify the respective forms of excellence involved in the practice of certain 
roles and, second, differentiate different forms and dimensions of responsi-
bility that fit with these roles and their capable execution.130 Again, this 
doesn’t suppose that all institutions are just, or that the capacities acquired by 
playing all roles are good. But when all competence is condemned as con-
spiracy with injustice, one leaves the bearer of responsibility without any 
means. Under normal circumstances (I shall question this term in the Con-
clusion) some practices can be considered acceptable means of supporting 
other people. 
The roles and dimensions of responsibility, then, stand for the acceptance 
of certain limits, qualifications or specialisations of responsibility, when con-
sidered under the perspective of interaction and co-responsibility. Often roles 
are the incarnation of certain principles laid down for the bearers of office. 
This is the original sense in which the term responsibility was used as an 
ethico-political term. In this sense role-associated responsibility has a deonto-
logical character. However, even this deontology can be confronted with con-
flicting demands in particular situations that would necessitate a hermeneutics 
                                           
130 More of the detail concerning competence, excellence and the constitution of 
practices and their interrelation can be read in OAA 175f / SA 206f and LI 163. 
This reflection, which evidently engages with such neo-Aristotelian philoso-
phies of virtue as that of Alasdair MacIntyre, clearly has important implications 
for the consideration of the relationship between ethics and means, which will 
be turned to shortly.  
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of prudence – as Ricoeur’s numerous studies on medical ethics sufficiently 
illustrate. 
Whether in the form of restricted roles of responsibility or a certain pru-
dent adaptation to the demands of practical dilemmas, responsibility has to 
reckon with the demands of compromise.131 But the recognition of co-
responsibility makes it possible to introduce expertise and negotiation into the 
process of compromise. Expertise has the potential to prevent responsible 
agents rushing into decisions in domains where they have no competence. But 
expertise is only one of the forms in which consultation, discussion or ex-
change of views forms part of negotiation or dispute. This conflict of opinions 
regarding what should be done crosses the entire field laid bare by the political 
paradox, by the tension between the will to live together in just institutions 
and the means by which this is to be realised. There is no reason to adopt an 
overly irenic image of what this entails. Discussion is a form of conflict by 
which decisions are made that cannot be settled by scientific or dogmatic 
means.132 And these decisions are in principle forever open to revision. On a 
more radical level, even the aims and form of discussion and the legitimisa-
tion of power could be submitted to revision.133 In extreme cases the very na-
ture of dominant practices can be challenged, that is, justice could be ques-
tioned in the name of equity – to this I shall turn in a while.  
But before doing so, I need to stress a last aspect of Ricoeur’s contribution 
to the issues of the roles of responsibility and the context of its application. 
This concerns the ultimate extent of the context of action and thus the ultimate 
horizon for deliberation about responsibility. It seems that Ricoeur would 
agree that this ultimate horizon is the entire humanity. He insists on the fact 
that  
“human action takes on its first meaning only when it is crowned by the activities 
relating to the quest for a good government, whether it be that of the city, the na-
tion of humanity as a whole.”134  
Elsewhere he refers to the extension of justice over the entire humanity as 
ideal,135 which takes form in reflection on the international order.136 The de-
                                           
131 Of the particular character of compromise in Ricoeur, Abel gives a valuable 
articulation in Paul Ricoeur. La promesse et la règle. op. cit. pp. 104–106. 
132 OAA 258 / SA 300. 
133 OAA 258–261 / SA 301–304. 
134 LI 162. 
135 LI 182, and I see no reason why this should not be taken literally, since Ricoeur 
also says: “The citizen that results from this institutional mediation can only 
wish that all humans would enjoy in the same manner this political mediation, 
which, apart from being one of the necessary conditions noted by a philosophi-
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velopment of reflection on justice to this scale is in any case made inevitable 
by the emergence of an increasing number of post-national or supra-state in-
stitutions, amongst which are those that have legislative powers.137 The condi-
tions of this global extent of ethico-political reflection are referred to in his 
“Postface au Temps de la responsabilité”138 where Ricoeur evokes develop-
ment, technology, geopolitics, and the threat to the environment or the econ-
omy – that can be taken as indications of the will and need to transcend the 
national boundaries in political reflection.139 This implies that the teleological 
optative aiming at the good life in just institutions, as well as the imperative 
against injustice and their dialectic in prudent decisions of justice should all be 
considered, ultimately, in their global dimension. This is implied in the very 
definition of the ethical, since justice  
“adds to solicitude, to the extent that the field of application of equality is all of 
humanity”.140 
If the universal claim of the moral imperative through human rights cannot 
rid itself of its particular formulations, then this is an indication that the 
dispute (referred to above) concerning these “universals” has to be con-
ducted on a global scale, since 
“only a discussion on the concrete level of cultures could say – after a long history that 
is still to come – which claimed universals will become the recognised universals”.141  
The fourth point on the agenda for a reflection on political responsibility af-
ter Levinas concerns equity. Responsibility seems to me an appropriate term 
                                           
cal anthropology for the transition of the capable human being to a real citizen, 
also becomes a sufficient condition thereof.” (LI 40). 
136 LI 193. The passage in question is devoted to the idea of a “just distance”. 
137 TJ 93 / JI 142. 
138 LI 272f, 275f, 277, 286, 288. 
139 See also Fred Dallmayr’s reflections on the global relevance of Ricoeur’s 
ethico-political thought in “Ethics and public life.” op. cit. pp. 214, 228–229.  
140 OAA 202 / SA 236. One could also consider who the everybody (chacun) is 
that constitutes the political dimension of the ethical teleology. Could this “eve-
rybody” be limited by membership of political institutions (in the narrow sense 
of “political”), like citizenship? Would it not be more coherent to consider the 
“everybody” with whom one would live in just institutions as all those with 
whom one has or could have an institutionally mediated relation (in the large 
sense)? This would mean that “everybody” is incorporated into the ethical tele-
ology by all de facto exchanges, whatever the nature thereof might be. Whatever 
Ricoeur’s opinion on this matter might be, this conclusion leads immediately to 
the dimension of globalisation and the texture of social ties as they are mediated 
technologically. 
141 LI 268. 
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through which to approach the question of equity, since responsibility is an 
ethics of uncertainty,142 compromise and sacrifice. By acknowledging this, 
the idea is not to celebrate tragedy, but to do justice to ethics. Equity con-
cerns exactly justice, its credibility and its desirability or commendability, 
ever since the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Keeping justice just, in 
other words keeping the socio-historically contingent institutionalised ex-
pression of justice true to the originary signification of the ethical, is Levi-
nas’ concern in his attempt to coordinate ethics and justice. In this sense 
Levinas could be said to contribute to a theory of equity. But it was also the 
interference of the ethical in the domain of justice that posed problems in 
Levinas’ philosophy (see Chapter 6).  
Ricoeur is eminently aware of the need to accompany reflection on jus-
tice with reflection on equity, and to accompany reflectively, in turn, equity 
as far as possible. As far as possible, since equity represents, for Ricoeur, a 
species of ethico-political conflict. In order to grasp the contribution that he 
could make to the question of equity in a notion of political responsibility, 
one has therefore first to recall how he understands justice. The just, says 
Ricoeur,  
“faces in two directions: toward the good, with respect to which it marks the extension 
of interpersonal relationships to institutions; and the legal, the judicial system con-
ferring upon the law coherence and the right of constraint”.143  
This is a precious schematisation, first, because it systematises the double 
position that Ricoeur accords to reflection on justice (namely at the same 
time in teleology and in deontology), second, because it underscores the in-
evitable recourse of justice to the means of its realisation and, third, because 
it links justice to the tension inherent in the political paradox between the 
horizontal will to live together and the inevitable vertical exercise of force. 
As a result, the concerns reaped from Ricoeur’s reading of Weber’s notion 
of political responsibility (notably the legitimate use of violence and the con-
trol over it) could be located here.144 At the same time, through the analyses 
of the teleological and the deontological perspective on justice (that will not 
be retraced in detail here), one is inevitably guided towards the conflict be-
                                           
142 Compare this with what Ricoeur writes about practical wisdom in the preface to 
The just: “the just in the final analysis qualifies a unique decision made within a 
climate of conflict and incertitude.” (TJ xxi / JI 24). As such, practical wisdom is 
a model for responsibility.  
143 OAA 197 / SA 231. 
144  There is an explicit return to the notion of the political paradox as well as We-
ber’s definition of the political in terms of the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence in the subchapter concerning conflict and institutions in the ninth study 
of Oneself as another (OAA 257 / SA 299). 
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tween justice as the good and justice as legality and thus to the repetition of 
the question of justice in the sphere of prudence or practical wisdom. It is 
only when reflection on justice has covered this long trajectory that it can 
elevate itself to the status of equity.145  
The conflict concerning justice, to which prudent consideration has 
to bring arbitration, arises especially from the fact that the qualitative 
heterogeneity of goods to be distributed is equalised out by the legal 
process of distribution that imposes a quantitative homogeneity. Ricoeur 
sees especially two versions of this: conflict concerning the primary social 
goods, and the contextualist or communitarian form of claims that limit 
the universalism claimed for rules of justice.146 Hence the intricate con-
frontation of Ricoeur with Walzer and Boltanski and Thévenot on the 
one hand,147 and with Habermas and Apel on the other hand.148 
But instead of entering these debates, I aim directly at the core of the 
question of equity. Ricoeur identifies this core by his answer to the double 
question: why would political practice be the site of specific conflicts and in 
what way do these conflicts refer us to the ethical meaning (le sens éthique) 
of justice?149 Ricoeur gives his response to this double question, his inter-
pretation of the constitution of the question concerning equity, by taking 
recourse to the political paradox.150 There is a conflict particular to the prac-
tice of politics because of the fact that the hierarchy of domination of politics 
(la politique) tends to cover and obscure the power of politics (le politique), 
yet the purely horizontal power of politics can generate no truly political 
action without the vertical structures of political domination.151 Since Ri-
coeur rejects the Hegelian solution of the State “erected as a superior 
agency endowed with self-knowledge”,152 he counts on the plural or public 
dimension of phronésis.153 This prudent dispute by which the horizontal and 
vertical dimensions of political conflict are arbitrated is played out on three 
levels of radicality (alluded to above). The prudent way to dispute justice is 
to descend gradually through the discursive modes of political practice:  
                                           
145 OAA 250 / SA 291. 
146 OAA 251f / SA 293. 
147 See especially “The plurality of instances of justice” (TJ 76–93 / JI 121–142). 
148 See especially “The universal and the historical” (RTJ 232–248 / JII 267–285). 
149 OAA 256 / SA 298. 
150 OAA 256–257 / SA 298–299. 
151 OAA 257 / SA 299. 
152 OAA 256 / SA 298. 
153 OAA 261 / SA 304. 
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“[1] from that of institutionalized political debate in pluralist democracies to [2] that of 
discussion about the ends of good government (security, prosperity, equality, solidar-
ity, and so on), and finally [3] to the level of the legitimation of democracy itself”.154  
One can gauge the importance that this three-storey presentation of the pru-
dent solution to conflict in matters of justice would have for reflection on po-
litical responsibility by considering how it responds to the weakness concern-
ing equity in the implications of Levinas’ theory of justice (which was a major 
point of Chapter 6).155 (1) One can be engaged in these different levels of dis-
pute of justice only if the other is recognised – at the very least in the capacity 
of opponent – as valuable in the struggle to find what one could consider as 
greater justice. In this way the charge of responsible changes brought to jus-
tice as legality, in the name of justice as the good, is placed on the shoulders of 
many. (2) The way in which one participates in such a struggle and the way in 
which one thus recognises the other as responsible agent, changes from one 
level of radicality to another. This entails the assumption of roles and dimen-
sions of responsibility appropriate for each of the respective levels of dispute. 
In other words, the very challenge of justice in the name of equity is tied up 
with the institutional distribution of roles of responsibility – this role-bound 
responsibility is shed only gradually, which means at the same time assuming 
other roles with other responsibilities. (3) The exposition of the levels of con-
flict indicates an appropriate degree of polemics determined by the degree of 
conflict. At the same time it is implied that certain capacities would allow for 
responsible participation in the dispute at each of the levels. (4) All three of 
these levels of dispute represent ways of calling justice to greater justice, by 
referring legality to the aim of the good life in just institutions. As manifesta-
tions of public phronésis they serve to arbitrate between the teleological and 
deontological dimensions of justice, but evoke already the question of the ex-
ception: every challenge to the generality of the law, with recourse to the par-
ticularity of specific cases, in other words every appeal to equity, calls for ar-
bitration. Furthermore, with every level of dispute, the extent and the stakes 
involved are increased, but the alternative of all-or-nothing is postponed to the 
very last. And even if that point is reached, equity remains another name for 
justice and this becomes pertinent in the face of the failure of the law to do 
justice. That is why equity as justice refers to the very last reaches of the ap-
peal to it, to a long trajectory of arbitration:  
                                           
154 OAA 284–285 / SA 330, discussed in OAA 257–262 / SA 300–305. 
155 It should also be considered that the three levels of dispute discussed here are 
typical of the domain of politics, but that similar structures for the institutionali-
sation, conducting and even generation of dispute in other domains could be ex-
plored. Ricoeur’s studies on medical and legal ethics testify to this fact. 
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“Equity […] is another name for the sense of justice, when the latter traverses the 
hardships and conflicts resulting from the application of the rule of justice.”156  
Or inversely:  
“there would not be a problem of equity in unique situations unless there were a 
general problem of justice capable of universal recognition.”157  
In all of this, I do not suggest that Levinas’ take on justice excludes such 
reflection, but only that there is no way in which his thought on ethics 
could enable him to introduce it and that the reflection on the practical re-
course to equity is not of secondary importance to the meaning of ethics.  
In this consideration about disputed justice, it stands out that the prudent 
arbitration of conflicts (the comparison of the incomparable as Levinas 
would say) remains the culminating point in the attribution of the predicate 
“just”. Thus the just could be called the “good” (in the teleological perspec-
tive) or the “legal” (in the deontological perspective) or “the equitable” when 
the just concerns the exercise of judgement in a particular situation. Equity, 
says Ricoeur, is  
“the figure that clothes the idea of the just in situations of incertitude and of con-
flict, or, to put it a better way, in the ordinary – or extraordinary – realm of the 
tragic dimension of action”.158  
Furthermore, this reflection on the tragedy of action and the response of 
practical wisdom necessitates reflection on the conscience, as the ultimate 
seat of arbitration:  
“It is at this stage that the moral conscience, as an inner forum, one’s heart of 
hearts, is summoned to make unique decisions, taken in a climate of incertitude 
and of serious conflict.”159  
This “climate of incertitude and of serious conflict” is where the reflection 
on the intensifying dispute of justice in the name of equity leads; these are 
situations where the intensity of uncertainty places particular pressure on the 
individual conscience:  
“When the spirit of a people is perverted to the point of feeding a deadly Sittlich-
keit, it is finally in the moral consciousness of a small number of individuals, in-
accessible to fear and to corruption, that the spirit takes refuge, once it has fled 
the now-criminal institutions.”160  
                                           
156 OAA 262 / SA 305. 
157 RTJ 247 / JII 284. 
158 TJ xxiv / JI 27. 
159 TJ xxi / JI 24. 
160 OAA 256 / SA 298. 
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We have to examine Ricoeur’s position on this problem, since it was the 
recourse to ultimate means by the isolated individual that has been 
shown to have a dark side in Levinas’ ethico-political thought. 
In order to examine Ricoeur’s contribution to this locus of the problem 
one has to step outside of the “Little ethics” in Oneself as another to the 
discussion of the “great kinds” in the tenth Study, where the conscience is 
discussed under the heading of the self and the other.161 One should, to start 
with, shed all illusions concerning a supposed clarity of the conscience:  
“Conscience is, in truth, that place par excellence in which illusions about oneself 
are intimately bound up with the veracity of attestation.”162  
Furthermore:  
“left to its own judgment, conscience will never be rid of the tendency to confuse 
good and evil, and […] this very confusion remains the fate of conscience left 
solely to itself.”163  
Since this is the case, the exploration of the conscience should resist the 
temptation of a self-celebrating auto-justification of the conscience164 and 
rather take the humbler way of dispersing the alternative of a good and bad 
conscience. The reinterpretation to which Ricoeur submits the triad of eth-
ics, morality and prudence in terms of alterity, points to an understanding 
of the conscience as attestation-injunction. This means that what is indi-
cated by the metaphor of the voice of the conscience is the passively un-
dergone injunction to live well with and for the others in just institutions 
and to which the bearer of conscience attests through self-esteem that ex-
presses itself in the optative: my I live well with and for the others in just 
institutions.165 Formulated briefly, in Heideggerian parlance,  
“[c]onscience, as attestation-injunction, signifies that these ‘ownmost possibili-
ties’ of Dasein are primordially structured by the optative mood of living well, 
which mood governs in a secondary fashion the imperative of respect and links 
up with the conviction belonging to moral judgment in situation.”166  
And ultimately this judgement in a particular situation and the decisions 
ensuing from it rest with the individual that is called by the conscience:  
                                           
161 The philosophical register in which this is done, is one that I have been avoiding 
in this book, but that is evidently not irrelevant to the current thematic. However, 
it is not the present objective to enter the debate about the “great kinds”.  
162 OAA 341 / SA 394. 
163 OAA 345 / SA 397. 
164 OAA 347 / SA 400. 
165 OAA 351 / SA 405. 
166 OAA 352 / SA 406. 
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“it is always alone that, in what we called the tragic character of action, we make up 
our minds. In measuring up to conviction in this way, conscience attests to the passive 
side: ‘Here I stand! I cannot do otherwise!’ [Ici je me tiens! Je ne puis autrement!].”167  
In these words we have arrived at, what is for Ricoeur, the narrowest and ul-
timate space of conflict and arbitration. We recognise, of course, the words of 
Luther, cited by Weber to express the climax of his exposition on political 
responsibility and that has been our companion throughout this Part. One 
would also recall that Ricoeur had, quite early on, appropriated these words to 
express the need to submit the exercise of political domination to control, to 
set a limit to what politics may allow itself to do. By returning to these words – 
even if it is without an explicit reference to Weber – Ricoeur deepens the im-
plications of their meaning within his ethico-political theory. The ultimate 
seat of responsible decisions concerning the political is the individual con-
science. However, unlike the case in Levinas, the injunction recorded by the 
conscience is immediately captured by the self-esteeming self that is called to 
live the good life with and for the others in just institutions, which means that 
the recognition of the other as affected conscience is even in the extreme 
cases, not far away. Also, the space for reflection concerning the means and 
appropriateness of their use in response to the injunction, is already implied in 
the injunction. But at this point one enters the debate about the status of alter-
ity on a level about which I remain, for the present study, agnostic. 
Yet, it should be stated unambiguously that for Ricoeur too, the ulti-
mate decision concerning the situation of exception, the exceptional char-
acter of such a situation and the concomitant compromises and even sacri-
fices that have to be made, reside with the individual capable agent as in-
spired by the call of the conscience. This is the conscience of which Ri-
coeur has acknowledged from the outset that it is  
“that place par excellence in which illusions about oneself are intimately bound 
up with the veracity of attestation”,168  
and that  
“left to its own judgment, conscience will never be rid of the tendency to confuse 
good and evil, and that this very confusion remains the fate of conscience left 
solely to itself”.169  
For this reason, Ricoeur’s presentation of the conscience doesn’t amount 
to a self-justification of a good conscience.  
                                           
167 OAA 352 / SA 405. 
168 OAA 341 / SA 394. 
169 OAA 345 / SA 397. 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
For a “good enough” justice 
 
 
 
Through the preceding Chapters I have searched for a way in which to 
think with Levinas, but also “after” Levinas. My attempt has consisted of a 
series of exercises by which, next to the central theses of his thought, 
detailed exegesis of marginal aspects of Levinas’ work and explorations of 
inherent tensions in his work have been combined and subsequently sub-
mitted to amplification in confrontation with authors from the Weberian 
tradition, in order to gain a passage to a refigured conception of political 
responsibility for a globalised world. 
The trajectory was launched by an insistence on the primordial political 
nature of the responsibility presented and advocated in the thought of Levi-
nas. Responsibility is not only the name for ethicity, but it is at the same time 
a wisdom that is “urgent” and that by its very nature seeks its realisation in 
the fragile existence of people that are all too often exposed to different sorts 
of violence. Responsibility is political, because it is concerned with the fate 
of the plurality of others and the responsible agent always has to coordinate 
and prioritise the relative urgency of the others’ respective contemporane-
ously valid appeals to that agent’s responsibility. This political dimension is 
proper to all responsibility, whether practised in the framework of the social 
sphere of politics or not. In fact, political responsibility is called for in all 
domains of human interaction and also on the scale of all human interaction. 
This holds from the local to the global scale of all matters that would solicit 
or complicate the execution of responsible action; the ultimate horizon for 
reflection on political responsibility is the global scale of humanity, with the 
intricate relations of States and other global role players, of cultural and in-
terest groups. Reflection on the history of colonisation and decolonisation 
throws this horizon of responsible action into relief. 
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The perspective from which Levinas’ response to these challenges to 
responsibility has been presented is that of a humanism of which the root 
is not an essence of the human being, but the ethical obligation imposed 
by the other. This theme finds expression in certain writings prepared for 
a Jewish setting and where it furthermore resonates in a Jewish cultural 
politics by which Levinas reinterprets Jewish particularism in order to 
give it a new pertinence for the socio-political and intellectual situation 
of the Diaspora Judaism in France. The humanism of the other is given 
full philosophical expression in the book in which the major concerns of 
Levinas’ work – the decisive origin and sense of all meaning in the con-
text-independent ethical imperative imposed by the other on the self – 
are gradually developed in the form of thinking of his later period. 
It is particularly the political implications of this thought of Levinas 
that is critically examined. Whereas the good intention and seriousness 
with which Levinas confronts the issue of responsibility cannot be ques-
tioned, it seems that there are possible unexpected and undesirable side-
effects that could be engendered by his radical and limitless understanding 
of responsibility. More important than this probably marginal (but even 
so, serious) slide, is that the difficulty that Levinas’ ethics has in dealing 
with the profound contradiction between the appeals of the plurality of 
others, with the unlimitability of responsibility and with reflecting upon 
the competence and means appropriate for responsible (in other words 
political) action within a particular historical context are exposed.  
When these aspects of the political implications of Levinas’ theory of 
responsibility are carefully studied, the marked difference between responsi-
bility considered on the level of ethicity and responsibility considered on 
the level of its political enactment becomes clear. It is the wager of the 
third Part of this book that the range of political implications of responsi-
bility should be developed and submitted to further reflection. This has 
been prepared by identifying Levinas’ double “polytheism”, consisting, 
first, of the impossibility of finding an ultimate arbitration between the 
conflicting claims of different cultural (and other) perspectives (for which 
he proposes ethics as unifying meaning) and, second, of the annoying fact 
that the political agent is always confronted by a multitude of conflicting 
and incommensurable claims to his/her responsibility from the side of the 
others, which has to be arbitrated in a world where the agent of such arbi-
tration will constantly be in conflict with other similar agents regarding the 
best arbitration. Once this is recognised, Levinas’ notion of responsibility 
turns out to be much closer to Weber’s than one would believe when con-
sidering only the first philosophy of the ethical meaning of the single 
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other. In fact, by amplifying the political implications with the aid of We-
ber, one can identify the importance of thinking about the consequences of 
action embarked on in responsibility. The consequences of action and the 
means adopted to realise justice contribute to the meaning of the ethical. 
By analogy with Apel’s recognition that even a deontological theory 
inevitably has to incorporate reflection on the consequences of responsibil-
ity, a four-fold programme for subsequent reflection on political responsi-
bility has been outlined, consisting (at least) of elaborations (1) on strategy 
and sacrifice, (2) on forms and dimensions of responsibility and co-
responsibility, (3) on the context and means of responsible action and, fi-
nally, (4) on the confrontation of responsibility with its limits in equity and 
the question of the exception. These four elements have been clarified with 
the help of Ricoeur, represented from the perspective of his appropriation 
and reinterpretation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility. The complex con-
stitution of practical wisdom in Ricoeur’s ethico-political thought shows 
itself to be suitable to elaborate the intricate web of considerations that has 
to be held in tension when thinking about political responsibility. Whereas 
this trajectory suffices to indicate how I think responsibility in its political 
dimension can be thought after Levinas, a full development of such a the-
ory of responsibility will have to be the project for another book. 
My critic will not have failed to notice that, with respect to the difficult, 
unconditional and self-sacrificing justice of Levinas’ ethics, the way 
forward that I propose for reflection on political responsibility entails a 
certain abatement. And since this abatement is associated with the effort 
to think realistically about the insertion of responsibility as ethicity in the 
world of its practical effectuation, one might be tempted to attribute an 
extreme cynicism to this project. But is the darkest cynicism not rather 
to be found in Levinas that condemns the entire tendency of politics, in 
fact, of Being itself, as a flux of violence? Is it not perhaps facile to criti-
cise my moderation with respect to Levinas’ position when the latter ad-
vocates the unconditionality of demanding responsibility against a pitch 
dark night of violence? Whereas I see no reason to adopt a rosy view of 
politics and its potential, the absolute denigration of human history 
makes the appeal to eschatology – that, after all has to be mediated, real-
ised, by people – possible and thus the negative effects of the recourse to 
ultimate means can be written off against the account of the all-
pervasive evil ontology. If, on the contrary, one wants to maintain the 
seriousness of responsibility, but at the same time remain vigilant with 
respect to the recourse to ultimate means and heroism, one does a favour 
to the concerns of Levinas to pull them into a Weberian sphere of 
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thought, in as far as this means integrating considerations regarding the 
means and consequences of responsible action, as they can be identified 
for a specific moment in history, into the very meaning and understand-
ing of what responsibility is. 
I could state my position somewhat differently. It is not my intention 
to evacuate the radicality attributed by Levinas to responsibility, but to ac-
company that radicality reflectively as far as possible, since that radicality 
cannot be assumed to be an a priori good when put to political action. It 
would be a caricature to suppose that such a reflective accompaniment 
would entail taming responsibility by a programme that would remedy the 
fallibility of ethical agents. Rather, it should be recognised that the fallibil-
ity of responsible agents and the complexity of the world in which they 
have to act, submit them to an unfortunate degree of incompetence. The 
human condition of responsibility is one of meagre moral luck. That is 
why the reflective accompaniment of responsible action will always be 
something of what Marquard called the competence to compensate for 
incompetence. This compensation for our moral un-luck means, in a world 
where it cannot be assumed that action out of good intentions will lead to 
desirable consequences, that one does better to recognise that there is an 
interval between the ethical constitution of the agent of responsibility and 
the exceptional, tragic and totally self-sacrificial exercise of that responsi-
bility. If it can be conceded that there are situations that do call for the ul-
timate self-sacrifice, it seems nonetheless ill-advised to construe all forms 
of responsibility as derivatives of that exceptional manifestation of respon-
sibility. Rather, prudent responsibility requires adaptation of the demands 
and forms of responsibility in correspondence with the degree of instabil-
ity of the context in which responsible action has to be deployed. Equity is 
the figure under which different degrees of questionability of a state of jus-
tice can be challenged, in a way appropriate to that situation. 
But is it not true, then, that there might be situations that are so exceptional 
and where the social institutions of responsibility are destabilised to such a 
degree, that it is incumbent on the individual agent of responsibility – despite 
his/her lack of skill or insight into the situation – to take whatever measures 
available to oppose a state of injustice? As hard as my criticism of the possi-
ble fanatical slide in a Levinasian ethics might be, I cannot see how the pos-
sibility of such “states of exception” can be ignored. Both Apel and Ricoeur 
have been indicated to affirm as much. This is also the central problem in 
Arendt’s troubled reflections on personal responsibility.1 It is for this reason 
                                           
1 See Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment. Jerome Kohn (ed.). New York: 
Schocken Books, 2003. Considering the case of Nazi Germany, Arendt is con-
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that I have described the dramatic self-sacrifice towards which the Levina-
sian political agent may head as ambiguous: political saints are not only 
known throughout history for having sown chaos and destruction through 
their fanatical pursuit of justice; other saints have also faced the most adverse 
circumstances in the most praiseworthy manner – for other people and at the 
expense of their own lives. This ambiguity seems to me possible to recog-
nise only if one doesn’t abandon Being as such to pitch-black evil, but sees it 
in its shades of grey, as it were, and thus realises that the intensity of action 
that drives the two extreme possibilities of this ambiguity apart, is only 
gradually arrived at as the call for responsibility approaches regions of in-
creasingly complex, troubled and unstable action, and where the call for eq-
uity gives increasing credibility to considering the exception reasonable.  
Yet, there is no neutral vantage point from which to judge the gravity 
of exception of historical situations. Because of this fact, the fragility2 of 
responsible agency is amplified by the obscurity of what could be called 
evil; calling the exception is ultimately a manifestation of the inscruta-
bility of the ultimate ground for the choice between good and evil.3 This 
fact is exacerbated by the tragedy that evil can masquerade as the ulti-
mate good, for instance the ultimate good of the exception that, under 
extreme cases, one cannot simply refuse. For this reason one might ask 
if it is not better to adopt a stance towards the exception and equity that 
                                           
vinced that “there exist extreme situations in which responsibility for the world, 
which is primarily political, cannot be assumed because political responsibility 
always presupposes at least a minimum of political power.” (p. 45). Hence, as-
suming personal responsibility under conditions in which all customary rules have 
broken down (pp. 26–27) means two things. First, it entails responding to the 
negative counsel of the conscience that prohibits one as an individual from engag-
ing in certain activities if one wants to be able to live with oneself henceforth (p. 
44) – this powerless refusal to collaborate or consent being the trait of moral, 
rather than political action. Second, under the “marginal situation in which moral 
propositions become absolutely valid in the realm of politics is impotence” (p. 
156), and judgement, for Arendt, functions without any pre-established procedure. 
 But even here, one does well to compare Arendt’s notes on “Civil disobedience” 
(in Crises of the Republic. San Diego, et al.: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1969, 
pp. 51–102), which is a neat argument for justice as equity, in other words for call-
ing the law to greater justice in the name of the spirit of the law. Civil disobedi-
ence is thus already a fairly radical questioning of a state of justice, but not so se-
vere that one could say that the actors of civil disobedience act out of absolute 
powerlessness and personal responsibility and thus completely apolitically. 
2 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “Fragilité et responsabilité”, in Eros and Eris. Contributions to a 
hermeneutical phenomenology. Paul van Togeren et. al. (eds.). Dortrecht, et al.: 
Kluwer, 1992, pp. 295–304. 
3 I take the formulation of this phrase from Richard Bernstein’s Radical evil. A phi-
losophical interrogation. Cambridge: Polity, 2002, p. 235. 
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might be called that of a good enough justice, in a way comparable to 
what Winnicott calls a “good enough” mother. This is not an attempt to 
tackle political matters with tools from family psychology, but simply to 
adopt the idea of “good enough” as opposed to “perfect”. The good 
enough mother doesn’t do everything by the book as the perfect mother 
does (and the latter consequently risks suffocating her child by her care). 
“Good enough” is a figure of real and constant, demanding devotion, but 
where the relationships in which one is involved and the historical de-
velopment thereof are given due recognition. The perfect justice might 
be the cleanest in theory, but can be quite messy in practice; a good 
enough justice accepts compromise to various degrees in common cir-
cumstances and while it doesn’t exclude the dramatic exception, it 
doesn’t live constantly under the pressure of tragedy. It is true that “good 
enough” would be a hermeneutical concept and it might be that finally it 
says not much more than prudence. Therefore, in order to have the ad-
vantages of prudence, of a serious devotion to practice that is nonethe-
less not insensitive to contingent circumstances, such prudence has to be 
given its proper place in ethical reflection. That is why it should be in-
cluded in a thorough theory of responsibility.  
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